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Abstract 
 
Scholarship concerning relations between North and South Korea has focused on the 
political and economic areas of relations between the two Koreas’, and the ‘unification’ issue 
has been mainly considered a work of ‘government’ conducted in the formal political domain. 
However, this thesis examines the Olympics and international sporting events as major 
sources and vehicles of discourse reflecting but also shaping relations between North and 
South Korea.  
 
The thesis, adopting a Critical Realist ontology, applies a constructivist theory of 
International Relations to establish how the framework of North and South Korean sports 
relations contributes to, and at times drive, political relations. The study adopts Critical 
Discourse Analysis as method, and the analysis protocols employed were established by 
adapting frames of reference from the work of Fairclough (2005) and Jäger and Meyer 
(2009).  In terms of the sources employed the North Korean newspaper Roh-Dong, which is 
subject to state control we take to represent the view of the North Korean regime. This was 
selected as a resource to illustrate how the North Korean government sought to construct a 
particular discourse concerning national identity, political position and sport. South Korean 
newspapers Dong-A and Hankyoreh were chosen to identify two relatively different 
(relatively ‘right’ and ‘left’ in Korean terms) political views evident in the South Korean 
context and their constructions around these issues. In addition, the summaries of North and 
South Sports Talks published by the South Korean government provide a source of data 
reflecting South Korean governmental interests.   
 
From 1978 to 2007, the changes in the international context from Cold War to post-Cold War 
and the domestic political changes in particular in South Korea, framed each decade’s North 
and South Korean sports relations. The shared notion of national identity and of nationhood, 
reflected in the ‘primordial nationalism’ evident in both North and South Koreans’ view of 
themselves (and of one another) as drawn from the same ‘bio-cultural stock’, is a factors 
shaping the actions of governments and other stakeholders. This ideology of shared heritage 
goes some way to explain why despite regularly occurring political tensions, there was a 
recurring appeal to common identity which manifest itself in sporting activity in for example 
the consideration of building unified teams in major competitions, or marching together at 
Olympic opening ceremonies.  
 
 
 
iv 
 
Thus the role of sport in developing relations between North and South Korea is one which is 
more than simply a reflection of the state of diplomatic relations, but is actually a significant 
shaper of such relations. Sport diplomacy, though a form of ‘soft’ diplomacy, is in this case a 
key factor to be incorporated with the explanation of developing political relations.   
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, henceforth North Korea in this thesis) 
and the Republic of Korea (ROK, henceforth South Korea) represent a divided nation, and 
this division is one of the remnants of World War II. A considerable amount of academic 
analysis has centred on national security and the unification of the two Koreas, mainly 
involving consideration of 'hard politics' employed to ensure cessation of the war between 
the two countries. However, little attention has been paid to the relations between North and 
South Korea in respect of cultural relations between the two. In particular the peculiar 
tension between on the one hand nationalisms emerging through national pride in sporting 
and in particular Olympic performance, and on the other the 'universalist' and inclusive 
ideology of Olympism has been little debated in the Korean context. The fact that sport has 
played a key and often sensitive role in the diplomatic relations between the two Koreas is 
reflected in the explicit concerns of government. For example, reflecting the sensitivity of 
both governments, the South Korean press reported in January 1989 that: 
......The Ministry of Sport (South Korea) announced that it will limit the North Korean 
and South Korean sports interaction to discussions concerning international matches 
which are organised by International federations and Asian federations.…..(Translated 
from Korean by the author)  
(Dong-A 13, January, 1989; 1959) 
In some senses, given the adversarial relationship between their political systems North and 
South Korea have exhibited a relatively generous attitude concerning the development of 
interaction through international sporting events. This illustrates the significance of the role of 
sport diplomacy in developing links between the North and South which have otherwise 
been frustrated by national differences in political and economic ideology. The antagonism 
between the North and South has not just been a domestic issue. Rather it was the result of 
the international political climate of the Cold War. North and South Korea sought to resolve 
this tension between them by employing various methods, such as cultural interaction and 
humanitarian aid. These links also included sporting events under the governance of 
international organisations. This thesis focuses on the development of interaction of the 
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North and South through sport, and in particular on how sporting events, and the 
negotiations surrounding them, have contributed to be countering all the reinforcement of 
political, economic, and social divisions or tensions between the two. 
 
In the contemporary context, governments' use of sport for domestic political ends and 
foreign affairs is a well-known phenomenon. At the same time, these political rationales have 
been criticised as ‘impure’ motives for engagement in the sporting domain, for political 
purposes which can ‘corrupt’ the nature of sporting events. It is argued for example that in 
the case of the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games, the South Korean government used sporting 
events as a tool to deflect people’s attention away from domestic political issues as well as a 
vehicle for attracting inward economic investment rather than promoting sport for its intrinsic 
value. In recent years there has been a more explicit acknowledgement of the role of sport 
as a positive tool of international politics. This is illustrated for example in the developing of a 
close relationship between the IOC and the UN in the use of sport for development and 
peace, and the subsequent provision of 'observer status for the IOC at the UN (IOC 
2009:10). The question of how to use this ‘soft power’ of areas such as sport has been 
engaged current scholarship across a range of fields. This thesis will investigate the role 
which sport has played in the ‘soft politics’ of relations between North and South Korea by 
analysing the development of ‘Inter-national’ and ‘intra-national’ relations through sport 
across three time periods. It will do so by reference to the analysis of discourses used in 
media sources in North and South Korea, and in South Korean documents relating to the 
‘Sports Talks’ between North and South from 1978 to 2007.  
 
1.1 Research Aims 
The study will focus in particular on the role of international sporting events in the evolution 
of relations between the divided nations of North and South Korea. It will outline the ways in 
which the different forms of nationalism and national identity evident in this case reflect 
attitudes toward patriotism in the Olympic Games and in sport interaction more broadly, with 
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the existence of, or support for, separate/joint teams or entities. It also seeks to demonstrate 
how this has (been) reflected in and influenced by sport diplomacy between North and South. 
The role of the superpowers in the Cold War period will be reviewed and also in the multi-
polar context of the Post-Cold War period, when dominant powers have sought to influence 
the ways in which Olympic politics are played out. The research will also address the issue 
of the contexts within which the Olympic Movement can act as a stimulus for promoting 
positive or negative relations between North and South Korea. 
 
The study of the case of North and South Korea can generate insights into the ‘positive’ and 
‘negative’ uses of sport in particular diplomatic contexts. Drawing on theoretical material 
associated with international context, and concepts and understandings of nationalism and 
national identity, the study will consider ways in which the relationship between sport and 
nationalism has changed over time. The contemporary context of the early 21st century is 
very different from that of the Cold War and the political roles which sport can play in 
diplomacy have evolved accordingly. Moreover the status of the IOC in international politics 
has also changed and the impact on the international context requires consideration. A 
major goal of the Olympic Movement is in part to promote positive international relations 
among different cultural entities through sport, as evidenced in the Olympic Charter (IOC 
2011:10).  
“The goal of Olympism is to place sport at the service of the harmonious development 
of humankind, with a view to promoting a peaceful society concerned with the 
preservation of human dignity.”  
 
Thus the Olympic value of peace through sport is potentially a critical diplomatic good.  
 
A major focus of this thesis is therefore on how international sporting events, in particular the 
Olympics and beyond that, been used as a tool in the management of diplomatic relations 
between North and South Korea. Critical to understanding the relationship between North 
and South, is an understanding not simply of international relations but also of the nature of 
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nationalism and national identity in the two Koreas which has developed with its own 
specificities (Shin and Robinson 2000).   
 
1.2 Research Structure 
This research seeks to evaluate the role played by sport in the developing relations between 
the North and the South. In particular claims that the Olympic movement and specifically the 
Olympic opportunity provided by the 1988 Seoul Games, possibly used to enhance the 
development of peaceful relations between the two entities will be considered. The sporting 
dialogue which will be the focus of analysis in this thesis takes place in the context of what 
are often increasingly conflicting relations between the two states and their respective allies, 
conflict which other forms of international interaction such as that under the auspices of the 
UN, and forms of ‘hard politics’ have found it difficult to counter.  
 
Chapter 1, the introduction, outlines the research aims, structure and context of the study.  
 
Chapter 2 provides an account of the methods and findings of a systematic review of the 
literature. The review culminates in a thematic analysis of the literature identified in the 
systematised search. 
 
In Chapter 3, methodological issues are discussed including the philosophical position 
adopted in terms of ontology and epistemology, the identification of appropriate primary 
sources to be subject to analysis, as well as the process of conducting that analysis through 
Critical Discourse Analysis.  
 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 present the results of the analysis of the three periods selected for 
consideration in this research. Chapter 4 incorporates analysis of materials from 1978 to 
1987. The year of 1978 was chosen as of the start date, since this reflects the beginnings of 
interest in Sports Talks while 1987 is the year before the staging of the Games when North 
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Korean attempts to have the IOC remove the Games from South Korea were beginning to 
recede, to be replaced by the ultimately frustrated proposal to have the Games held jointly in 
the North and the South. The famous boycotting in 1980 in Moscow and in 1984 in Los 
Angeles, and the discourse exchanges around these events between the two Koreas are 
included together with the reaction of North Korea to the awarding to Seoul of the 1988 
Olympic Games are dealt with as major discourse themes. This chapter provides examples 
of North and South interactions in the Cold War context and of discourse which illustrates 
the specific (and largely common) character of nationalism in the two Koreas.   
 
Chapter 5 covers the decade from the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games, up to the 1997 financial 
crisis in which the International Monetary Fund had to come to the aid of South Korea. In this 
context of flux, discourses relating to joint and separate participation in international sporting 
events are described and analysed. With the success of 1988 Seoul Games, the awareness 
of political usages of sporting events was well understood by both regimes, and the North 
and South Korean Sports Talks to some extent became a regular feature of the period. In 
particular the discussion associated with the concept of a unified team for North and South 
Korea was a major theme, and the significance of a unified team (where one was formed or 
when it was resisted) was elaborated in the official Sports Talks between the two Koreas.    
 
Chapter 6 deals with the period from 1998 to 2007 in which the North and South Korean 
sport interactions took place in the post-Cold War context. Any optimistic expectations of the 
North and South Korean Sport interactions for the previous two decades had not been 
realised, and the limitations of inter-governmental negotiations had become evident. 
Therefore, the leading role of governments in the discourses of sport relations gave way to, 
or was at least joined by, private sector initiatives. Hyundai, for example, followed its 
founder’s wish to develop North-South cooperation in sport, and made various contributions 
to the promotion of sporting relations between the two Koreas, generating practical legacies 
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such as private- sector led sporting events, and the cross-border movement of people and 
materials. 
 
The conclusions of this research in Chapter 7 include the summary of North and South 
Korean sporting interactions from 1978 to 2007 to highlight the issues which have been 
discussed between two Koreas. The final chapter also seeks to identify the contribution of 
this research to knowledge in the field of sports diplomacy.   
 
1.3 Background to the Research 
 
1.3.1 The Rhetoric of ‘Peace’ in the context of the Seoul Olympic Games    
The 1988 Olympic Games in Seoul was a ‘popular’ event in its own right but was expressly 
used by the national political leaders. In the 1960s, South Korea, supported by the US, was 
not as strong in military and economic terms as its northern counterpart, which was under 
the patronage of the Soviet Union. In this period, the balance of power between two Koreas 
was complicated and peace was not assured. The South Korean political leaders wanted to 
use the Olympics as an opportunity to gain world recognition, and to persuade IOC members 
that the Games would help to promote peace, but also to use the Games to promote 
economic development  
 
The major goal of the Olympic Movement is to promote positive international relations 
between different cultural groups through promoting Olympic values. Indeed although the 
IOC is seen the world over as primarily a sporting body, the Olympic Charter describes sport 
as a ‘means’ (to achieving broadly humanitarian goals) rather than as an end in itself. 
However in the context of international competition, an understanding of nationalism and 
within/between nation rivalry will be critical to an understanding of how the Olympic message 
might be spread. Olympism as a philosophy emphasises peace, and this is a cornerstone of 
the Olympic Charter. The goal of Olympism is “to place sport at the service of the 
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harmonious development of man (sic), with a view to promoting a peaceful society 
concerned with the preservation of human dignity” (IOC 2011:10). This prioritising of 
humanitarian goals goes some way to explaining why the UN and the IOC’s relationship 
have deepened in recent years, in particular in relation to the UN’s adoption of the 
programme ‘Sport for Development and Peace’.     
 
1.3.2 Sport and the International Relations 
The concept of ‘power’ in International Relations (IR) is generally agreed as an “ability to 
affect others to obtain the outcomes you want” (Nye 2008:94). Power is one of the essential 
units of analysis in international relations, not only for academic purposes, but also as the 
driver of practical applications of foreign policy. In relation to US foreign policy, discussion 
about the failure of ‘Hard power’ and the subsequent need to exercise influence via  ‘Soft 
power’ in its relations with the Arab world emerged following the 9/11 terrorist attacks . A 
traditional realist approach towards foreign policy, which characterised the approach of the 
Bush administrations, was dominantly activated on the basis of a ‘hard power’ approach – 
the use of economic and military strength to influence others in the form of either ‘incentives’ 
or ‘coercion’. However, this approach had limitations, and an alternative approach which 
used persuasion and image, so-called soft power, to achieve compliance, has thus also 
been employed. ‘Soft power’ is defined by the initiator of the term as the ability to influence 
others through persuasion and attraction (he refers to the attractiveness of US culture, 
political values, institutions and policies as assets of national power) which can be used to 
persuade others to align themselves with the interests of another nation (Nye 2008:94-95). 
 
Since the Cold War system disintegrated, despite differences among nations in terms of 
political ideology, these differences became less serious obstacles in inter-nation interaction, 
and this produced a power structure which was ‘relative rather than absolute and defined 
along different dimensions. In this context, the cultural aspects of national power gained 
more recognition and were more valued than had been the case. ‘Public Diplomacy’ is a 
 
 
8 
 
relatively new term in the academy, and had tended to be treated as a purely symbolic 
activity which was not taken ‘seriously’ and treated as peripheral. However, since the end of 
Cold War era with the emergence of various regional networks of nations the relationship 
between soft and hard power has been much investigated with the focus primarily on the 
potential of ‘Soft power’ (Kim 2009:337-338).  
 
The necessity of proper public diplomacy encourages governments to look for more efficient 
soft power resources. However, this does not mean that hard power is no longer considered 
as a central feature of foreign policy, but rather heralds a new approach which combines 
hard and soft power, framed as a new concept, ‘Smart power’ (Nye 2008:107-108). Wilson 
III (2008)  emphasises ‘Smart power’, since hard power shows limitations in terms of using 
military intervention, coercive diplomacy, and economic sanctions as foreign policy 
resources, based on the neo-realist theoretical tradition, and soft power influences are seen 
as more evident in the approaches adopted by emerging nations on the international stage. 
Wilson suggests that the efficient use of smart power is the key to the success of one 
nation’s foreign policy, and this can be achieved by the use of smart strategies (Wilson 
2008:120-122). 
 
1.3.3 The United Nations (UN) and the International Olympic Committee (IOC) 
On 19th October 2009, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) achieved observer status 
in the United Nations (UN) General Assembly. This is not surprising news if the relationship 
between the UN and the IOC is looked back on. The year 2005 was designated as the year 
of Sport and Physical Education by the UN and many practical projects were planned and 
conducted by the UN and the IOC. There is an office of Sport for Development and Peace 
(UNOSDP) in the UN (introduced by Kofi Annan in 2001), and various projects are 
systematically implemented and on-going with the cooperation with IOC. Therefore observer 
status was not just a diplomatic gesture but based on ‘real’ cooperation in areas such as 
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humanitarian assistance, peace-building, education, gender equality, environment and the 
fight against HIV/AIDS. 
 
As the IOC president Jacques Rogge said, “This is huge recognition of the role sport can 
play in contributing to a better and peaceful world” (IOC 2009:9), the IOC promotes sport at 
a new level. He also added that “The Olympic values clearly match with the UN philosophy. 
Today’s decision further strengthens the partnership between the IOC and the UN system” 
(IOC 2009:9) This does not just mean general agreement on the concept of peace, but goes 
back to the tradition of the Olympic Truce. The Truce was revived by the IOC in 1992, and 
recognised by UN resolution 48/11 on 25 October 1993 as a means of harnessing the 
cultural and moral power of Olympism in reducing war and conflict.  
 
With regard to the issues relating to North and South Korea, the UN and the IOC are both 
deeply involved as significant actors in international relations. However, compared to the 
political and legislative status of the UN, the IOC’s role was to act as something of a 
‘lubricant’ between the North and South. Dependent on political circumstances, the voice of 
sport has on occasions proposed and rejected various ideas, and despite being a ‘non-
political area’, has worked as a useful communication channel for both nations. 
Consequently, those capabilities of the IOC and sport events to promote peace and other 
goals of the UN have resulted in the UN assuming the role of a co-obligated international 
organisation for peace.  
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the systematic review for this research will be explained as vehicle for 
understanding the present progress of this field of interdisciplinary research. However, prior 
to the systematic review, a consideration of two areas of theory is undertaken namely, 
fundamental theories drawn from the fields of International Relations and Nationalism. These 
preliminary elements were regarded as crucial to the development of the research 
framework for this study. In this chapter, more specifically a constructivist theory of 
International Relations will be briefly described as the basis for analysis the use of sport in 
the socially constructed relations between North and South Korea. In addition, exploration of 
the concept of ‘two state, one nation’ requires acknowledgment of Nationalism theory in 
explaining the phenomenon of Korean national identity. The chapter then moves on the main 
part of the literature review, the process of the systematic review methodology adopted and 
the result of this review.    
 
2.1.1 Theoretical Framework 
In North and South Korean sport relations, the international geopolitical situation of two 
Koreas is well-known with their ideological differences. This research evaluates a 
constructivist approach to fulfil the purpose of this research to understand how North and 
South Korea described and thus construct and respond to their international context and 
position as ‘a reality’ in their sport interactions. The constructivist approach argues that while 
there are real interests at play in international relations these are socially constructed in the 
interaction between nations (Wendt 1999; Zehfuss 2001:72-74).  
 
The approach adopted here seeks to understand the emerging pattern of relationships 
between North and South Korea as forged in their interaction in part (and significantly) 
around sport, and the differing understandings they adopt or promote in their interactions.  
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Alongside the concern with the construction of inter-‘nation’ relations is a concern with 
nationalism and national identity, both as a resource in this constructing of inter-‘nation’ 
relationships, but also as a product of these unfolding relationships across the period which 
is the focus of this study. North and South Korea as we demonstrate later in this text, are 
known to share a strong sense of ethnic nationalism, drawing on what Smith (2001) termed 
Primordial Nationalism (Smith 2001:51).  
 
This has clear implications as to how they (both North and South Koreans) perceive 
themselves and how they wish to be portrayed to the world through sport. Since in the period 
which concerns us there were major shifts in terms of ideology at the global level, these had 
significant impact on, or relevance to, the relations between North and South and the 
significance of nationalist ideology in the two Koreas. It is part of our contention that this 
emerging negotiation of interests of and through an ideology of nationalism was to a 
significant degree carried out in the sport field. 
 
2.1.2 Constructivism in International Relations Theory  
The term ‘Constructivism was known to be introduced by Onuf (1989) in International 
Relations, and the genealogy of constructivism was rooted philosophically in the work of 
Wittgenstein and subsequently various other philosophers and theorists (Fierke and 
JØ rgensen 2001:4-7). Constructivism suggests that even though there is no objective 
international system, still there are ideas which are mutually shared among the public as a 
conceptualised international order. Wendt (1999) argued that the term ‘constructivism or 
constructivist’ does not simply apply to the international relations field but is more widely 
evident as a form of “structural idealism” in sociology. From this perspective, constructivism 
attempts to explain how international contexts are constructed by actors such as politicians 
and international organisations. Thus, the world is made by human consciousness and such 
constructions are evidenced in language, discourse, signs and symbols and other forms of 
human understanding and communication (Jackson and SØ rensen 2003:254)  
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The constructivist position which is subject to evaluation may seem to be inconsistent with 
the critical realist ontology adopted for the overall study. However, though socially 
constructed, the structures which exist – for example the Sports Talks, or the structure of the 
economy in the North and the South, are nevertheless real, thus there are real implications 
for the North and South interactions.  
 
2.1.3 Primordial Nationalism in Theory 
Anthony Smith (2001) recognized that a “ ‘Nation’ is a named human community occupying 
a homeland and having common myths and a shared history, a common public culture, a 
single economy and common rights and duties for all members” (Smith 2001:12-13). The 
discussion of this definition opens up interesting possibilities that a nation is a rich legacy of 
memories with the “desire to live together, the will to continue to value the heritage that has 
been received in common” (Renan 1996:57-58 cited in Ö zkirimli 2000). ‘Nationalism’ is a 
controversial concept, from its definition to the question of its actual existence while its 
treatment is social theory terms in stretched across the fields of sociology, politics, 
international relations, anthropology and history. Consequently, the interests from scholars 
from these various fields tend not to be effectively focused  to establish a thorough discourse 
of nationalism (Ö zkirimli 2000:2-3).  
 
The idea of nations as cultural units and the firm idea of nations’ ontology have been 
challenged by Benedict Anderson with the famous notion of the nation as ‘imagined 
community’, since the 1980s. Anderson believes that whatever seems like ‘nation’ is 
imagined community, and it is constructed based on the ‘idea’ of nationalism. This notion is 
applicable particularly to the decolonised third world, such as south eastern Asia and Africa. 
Because they experience a colonial period, following independence, they possess 
nationalism which is associated with anti-colonial identities (During 2005:99). 
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However, the concept of primordial nationalism has been challenged, and the biological 
basis for assuming ‘nation’ differences among ethnic group, or ‘race’ group is weak. 
Nevertheless, some groups hold to a form of primordial nationalism, such that the ethnic 
group has an attachment which is a ‘cultural given’ of social existence (Smith 2001:7). While 
modernisation might see the nation-state as a recent invention are fundamental requirement 
to operate effectively in a global economy and polity, primordial-nationalist argue that nations 
are (or ought to be) the politicked expressions of shared ethnic (cultural and biological) terms. 
This ideology is particularly strong in Korean context (Shin and Robinson 2000; Shin 2006) 
and goes some way to explaining why the overwhelming majoring of North and South 
Koreans event thought ideologically divided continued to think of themselves as a single 
ethnic, with common history, culture, language, and biological roots, and thus continued to 
seek ways of engaging with one another through sport and constructing teams to represent 
the ethnic rather than the political entity of the state 
 
Nationalism is a motive and also a main ideology that a nationalist follows. Anthony Smith 
mentioned three common elements of the nationalist belief-system. The first one is a set of 
basic propositions which most nationalists adhere to. Secondly, there are some fundamental 
ideals which are present in every manifestation of nationalism, although in varying degrees. 
Thirdly, there is a range of cognate concepts that give more concrete meaning to the core 
abstractions of Nationalism. However, Nationalism may be seen not only as a belief-system, 
but also as a form of culture and type of religion. During the French Revolution, nationalists 
insisted on their national autonomy which involved a centralised economic and political 
territory and a single public culture. The unity which nationalists look for is thus a kind of 
social and cultural unification of the members of the nation (Smith 2001:21-42). 
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2.2 Systematic Review 
 
2.2.1 The Rationale of Systematic Review 
The aim of this section is to identify the outcomes of the previous related research in order to 
inform research questions and structure the groundwork for a research synthesis. This 
chapter will also outline and explain the systematic review process and the merits and 
limitations of such a procedure as a research tool in conducting a literature review. Following 
this, the second element of this section will draw attention to the thematic analysis of the 
resources identified. In an exploration of the systematic review, the issue of cultural 
interaction and usage of sport as a diplomatic method among divided nations will be 
discussed. The aim of using a systematic review process is to address a specific and very 
relevant question. Such a review can work to reduce bias and make it easier to notice any 
gaps between previous and present research outcomes in the literature (Torgerson 2003:58). 
As with traditional descriptive literature review methods, the idea of a systematic review 
implies its own ontological and epistemological methodology. Therefore this section includes 
not only the systematised review process but also the purpose of this design method to 
rationalise the research process. 
 
As a result of the systematic review process, a thematic analysis is undertaken. The 
thematic analysis consists of a series of key concepts and subject headings which have 
been deduced from the systematic review process. Whilst the key themes originated from 
the resources of the systematic review, they are reconstructed and reinterpreted from their 
original source contexts. The thematic analysis will cover a range of multidisciplinary 
research topics drawing on the disciplines of history, politics, international relations and 
economics. 
 
The idea of a systematic review is relatively recent, but nevertheless the principle has a long 
history in the research arena. It has been explained as analogous to a ‘harvesting strategy’ 
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in which all relevant studies on a particular topic are brought together to create a ‘meta-
synthesis (Chalmers and Torgerson 2003:55). It is not without its critics, however, and is 
considered by some to be a ‘mechanical review process’ that takes risks concerning the 
quality of interpretation of its sources (Eysenck 1995 and Torgerson 2003:61). As a literature 
review method, a systematic review is done through meta-synthesis. Despite the limitations 
of such a methodology, notably concerning the difficulty of assuring a good understanding of 
the raw data, meta-synthesis is still considered worthy of use for investigators because it 
provides an auditable trail. This means that the reviewing process and the judgments made 
in literature section and synthesis will be explained through a clear methodology. Moreover, 
any inherent bias created by the selection of sources in the research could be limited 
through the application of a careful process of identification of the keywords used to uncover 
the available evidence, mediated and validated by an expert panel (Torgerson 2003:58). 
Therefore, the decision has been taken to use the process of systematic review for this 
research as a means of tracing and synthesising highly relevant literature whilst taking steps 
to minimize the inherent bias caused by the data selection process.  
 
The uses of systematic review methods have historically been the domain of health research 
and there have been objections raised to the transference of this methodology to other 
research areas (Torgerson 2003:58). Alongside this concern, there remain questions over 
the inherent subjectivity of the process itself. Subjectivity arises during the sorting of 
resources from original data bases, because a procedure of value judgment has to be 
applied. In addition, once the data has been sorted, there is the need for an acceptable 
extraction procedure. In each of these stages, the exclusion/inclusion criteria are selected by 
the researcher, which means there are various stages at which the outcome could be 
different for each researcher. This is a critical point concerning the systematic review 
process itself because its credibility and validity depends upon its being a repeatable and 
duplicable method of research (Torgerson 2003:58). However this source of researcher bias 
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is mediated by the use of the expert panel to which each decision of inclusion and exclusion 
is reported. 
 
2.2.2 The Process of Systematic Review 
This current area of research has been carried out whilst utilising the systematic review 
protocol. The first stage consisted of identifying appropriate key databases which will contain 
and reference as high a proportion as possible of the studies relating to the field of research 
and the specific topic. The next part of the process is selecting suitable key words to find the 
relevant resources from the existing databases and this was done using the following 
research topic: International Sporting Events, Nationalism and Sport Diplomacy’. As result of 
previous discussion and trial work on a few databases, the following sets of key words were 
selected:  
  [Table 2.1] Keywords Combinations for Systematic Review 
Number Keywords Combinations 
1 Korea* and International relations* and Olympic* 
2 Korea* and International relations* and Sport* 
3 Korea* and National identity* and Olympic* 
4 Korea* and National Identity* and Sport* 
5 Korea* and Nationalis* and Olympic* 
6 Korea* and Nationalis* and Sport* 
7 Korea* and Politic* and Olympic* 
8 Korea* and Sport policy* 
9 Korea* and Sports policy 
 
With these key words, the following ten databases selected by reference to the expert panel 
were searched: 
[Table 2.2] Databases used for finding Literatures  
Number Databases 
DB 1 ANTE 
DB 2 BHI 
DB 3 Physical Education Index 
DB 4 Socio Abstract 
DB 5 World Cat. Discussion 
DB 6 ECO 
DB 7 Article First 
DB 8 Sport Discus 
DB 9 Web of Science 
DB 10 LA web 
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The result of the search by the key word in each database is as follows.  
[Table 2.3] The Number of Sources by the Keywords search in the Databases 
  Key word DB1 DB2 DB3 DB4 DB5 DB6 DB7 DB8 DB9 
DB1
0 No 
1 
Korea* & 
International 
relations* & 
Olympic* 24 0 0 5 0 1 0 5 1 45 81 
2 
Korea* & 
International 
relations* & 
Sport* 29 0 0 8 0 3 0 5 0 47 92 
3 
Korea* & 
National 
identity* & 
Olympic* 9 0 0 4 0 1 0 1 0 19 34 
4 
Korea* & 
National 
identity* & 
Sport* 22 1 1 9 0 3 0 7 1 22 66 
5 
Korea* & 
Nationalis* & 
Olympic* 22 1 3 11 0 3 0 18 0 1 59 
6 
Korea* & 
Nationalis* & 
Sport* 58 7 10 21 0 7 1 36 1 1 142 
7 
Korea* & 
Politic* & 
Olympic* 80 6 6 17 4 4 0 90 3 1 211 
8 
Korea* & Sport 
policy* 6 0 2 3 5 4 0 8 1 8 37 
9 
Korea* & 
Sports policy* 3 0 1 0 3 2 0 2 2 12 25 
No 253 15 23 78 12 28 1 172 9 156 747 
 
The total number of sources identified including duplications of sources was 747.  
 
[Table 2.4] The Total Number of Sources 
  Key word Total Number 
Selected 
Number 
1 Korea* & International relations* & Olympic* 81 30 
2 Korea* & International relations* & Sport* 92 9 
3 Korea* & National identity* & Olympic* 34 12 
4 Korea* & National identity* & Sport* 66 20 
5 Korea* & Nationalis* & Olympic* 59 30 
6 Korea* & Nationalis* & Sport* 142 57 
7 Korea* & Politic* & Olympic* 211 88 
8 Korea* & Sport policy* 37 14 
9 Korea* & Sports policy* 25 3 
Total Number 747 263 
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The first criterion for extraction was source duplication. The second criterion was source 
format: the following formats were excluded: books, conference presentation notes, news 
articles and other non-academic journal articles, etc. The third criterion for extraction was the 
relevance of the contents of the journal abstracts. Thereafter, the resulting number of 
resources was reduced in number 92. 
 
The process of data extraction was as follows: 
 
[Table 2.5] Extraction Categories 
Number Extraction Category 
Extraction 1 Exclusion of non-English languages and unmanageable database sizes 
Extraction 2  Exclusion by the data format (non-research based article formats 
excluded) 
Extraction 3 Exclusion by the relevance of the contents 
Depth 1-title/short abstract, summary 
Extraction 4 Exclusion by the availability of obtaining full data 
Extraction 5 Exclusion by the relevance of the contents 
Depth 2-relevance of main theme of content  
 
An example of descriptive analysis for inclusion / exclusion decisions regarding sources is 
shown below: 
   [Table 2.6] The Example of Descriptive Analysis  
No. Item Details Criterion 
1 
Title 
 
Too Weak for the Job: Corporate Codes of Conduct, Non-
Governmental Organizations and the Regulation of 
International Labour Standards 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Not 
Selected 
– Due to 
the lack 
of 
relevant  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Author Wells, Don 
  Source Global Social Policy, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 51-74, Apr 2007 
  
Descriptors 
 
 
*Nongovernmental Organizations; *Organizational 
Effectiveness; *Codes of Conduct; *Corporations; *Factories; 
*Consumers; *Government    Regulation; *Labor 
  
Abstract 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The shift of economic production from higher labour 
standard regimes in the global North to lower standard 
regimes in the South is undermining enforcement of global 
labour standards. Responding to criticisms from the 'anti-
sweatshop' movement, consumers & governments, many 
transnational corporations (TNCs) have adopted codes of 
conduct to regulate labour standards in their supplier 
factories.  
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are increasingly 
used to monitor compliance with these codes. This article 
analyses the monitoring effectiveness of three kinds of such 
'third party' NGOs. It concludes that major monitoring 
deficiencies reflect, first, significant organizational 
weaknesses of the NGOs & their dependence on TNCs for 
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whom they monitor; second, powerful limits imposed on 
NGO effectiveness by corporate restructuring & market 
competitiveness; & third, inadequate pressures from anti-
sweatshop movements, consumers & governments.  
These constraints suggest that this NGO-centered, 'soft law' 
policy approach is 'too weak for the job'. References. 
[Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., 
copyright 2007.] 
2 Title 
Reluctant Mediator: Hong Kong, the Two Koreas and the 
Tokyo Olympics 
Selected 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Author Bridges, B 
  Source 
International Journal of the History of Sport [Int. J. His. 
Sport]. Vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 375-391. Mar 2007. 
  
Descriptors 
 
Article Subject Terms: International sports; Olympics; 
Participation; Team sports; Article Geographic Terms: China, 
People's Rep., Hong Kong; Japan; Korea, Dem. People's 
Rep.; Korea, Rep. 
  
Abstract 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This essay examines the complex, and ultimately 
unsuccessful, negotiations between North and South Korea, 
undertaken with the encouragement of the International 
Olympic Committee during 1962-63 to form a united Korean 
team to participate in the Tokyo Olympics of 1964. In 
particular, it focuses on the role of Hong Kong, chosen as a 
`neutral' site for the two Korean delegations to meet. It 
shows how the IOC's optimism for a `sporting' solution was 
to founder on continued mutual suspicion and recriminations 
between the two Koreas and how the Hong Kong 
government's reluctance to get involved, the US political 
intervention, and North Korean participation in the GANEFO 
Games were all to complicate the process. 
 
The extraction processes were continued, including duplication, until finally 92 sources were 
included.  
[Table 2.7] The Specific Titles of Final Sources  
No. Title 
1 
The Importance of ‘Othering' in China's National Identity: Sino-Japanese Relations as a 
Stage of Identity Conflicts 
2 
Modernizing China in the Olympic spotlight: China's national identity and the 2008 
Beijing Olympiad. 
3 
The 2010 Football World Cup as a political construct: The challenge of making good on 
an African promise. 
4 An introduction to the sociology of sports mega-events. 
5 
Using History to Think about the Beijing Olympics: The Use and Abuse of the Seoul 
1988 Analogy 
6 
Long-Term Impact of a Mega-Event on International Tourism to the Host Country: A 
Conceptual Model and the Case of the 1988 Seoul Olympics 
7 Seoul-Moscow relations: looking to the 1990s 
8 South Korea: striving for success 
9 The dangers of hateful rhetoric: lessons of flight 007 
10 
Televised Constructions of the Seoul Olympic Opening Ceremony in Australia, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States. 
11 
The Political Culture of the 1990s Immigrants from the Former Soviet Union in Israel 
and Their Views toward the Indigenous Arab Minority: A Case of Ethnocratic 
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Multiculturalism 
12 The Psychology of Worldviews. 
13 No Turning Back? 
14 The World Cup and Sports Diplomacy 
15 Korea/Japan or Japan/Korea? The Saga of Co-Hosting the 2002 Soccer World Cup 
16 Recentering Beijing: Sport, Space, and Subjectivities 
17 
Accounting for Mega-Events: Forecast and Actual Impacts of the 2002 Football World 
Cup Finals on the Host Countries Japan/Korea 
18 Olympic Spectacle: Opening Ceremonies and Some Paradoxes of Globalisation 
19 The Invention of Korean Ethnic Sport 
20 Social Identity Theory and Mass Communication Research. 
21 
(Re)Constructing Identities: International Marriage Migrants as Potential Agents of 
Social Change in a Globalising Japan 
22 Mega-events and modernity revisited: Globalisation and the case of the Olympics. 
23 South Korea and the Asian Games: The First Step to the World 
24 Ideology, Politics, Power: Korean Sport - Transformation, 1945-92 
25 Sport, politics and the new nation: Sport policy in the Republic of Korea (1961-1992) 
26 Coercion for Asian Conquest: Japanese Militarism and Korean Sport, 1938-45 
27 
South Korea's "Glocal" Hero: The Hiddink Syndrome and the Rearticulation of National 
Citizenship and Identity 
28 
National publics and transnational subjectivities: Manufacturing Koreanness through 
media sport 
29 
Glocalisation, Globalization and Migration: The Case of Scottish Football Supporters in 
North America 
30 The Globalization of Football: A Study in the Glocalisation of the 'Serious Life' 
31 
Football and the Koreans: The Cultural, National, and Political Aspects of the 
Perception in the ROK of the Football World Cup 2002 
32 
International Sport Events, Collective Behaviour, and Social Integration: The Case of 
the 2002 World Cup in South Korea 
33 Confucianism, Imperialism, Nationalism: Modern Sport, Ideology and Korean Culture 
34 
A Curious Conjunction - Sport, Relation And Nationalism: Christianity And The Modern 
History Of Korea 
35 Nation, State and Football: The Korean Case. 
36 Cultural chauvinism and the Olympiads of East Asia 
37 Reluctant Mediator: Hong Kong, the Two Koreas and the Tokyo Olympics 
38 The Four 'Knowns' of Sports Mega-Events 
39 Africa and the `World' Cup: FIFA Politics, Euro centrism and Resistance 
40 Emotion in social relations: Cultural, group, and interpersonal processes. 
41 
The Olympic Games, Human Rights and Democratisation: Lessons from Seoul and 
Implications for Beijing 
42 
The Mass Media and Public Relations: A Conceptual Framework for Effective Media 
Relations in Asia 
43 Host community reactions: A cluster analysis. 
44 Global television and the politics of the Seoul Olympics 
45 The Ethnographic Imperative in Comparative Olympic Research 
46 Chance sets a hot pace 
47 Rites of Passage: The 1988 Seoul Olympics as Public Diplomacy 
48 Seoul-Moscow relations: Looking to the 1990s 
49 External Dynamics of the Korean Conflict: The present soviet policy reorientation 
50 South Korea in 1988: A revolution the making 
51 Can us forestall south Korean 'explosion'? 
52 Reunification of Korea: A forty years stalemate  
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53 South Korea in 1984 
54 Facing the new realities: Korea's rational options 
55 
National image richness in televised coverage of South Korea during the 1988 Seoul 
Olympia Games 
56 
A comparison of the social-political ideologies of the people of the Republic of Korea as 
the host country of the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games 
57 Korean sports in the 1980s and the Seoul Olympic Games of 1988 
58 
The Olympics and their role in the political development of Japan, Mexico and South 
Korea 
59 
The Political Significance of Sport: An Asian Case Study - Sport, Japanese Colonial 
Policy and Korean National Resistance, 1910-1945 
60 Government policy for the promotion of sport for all in South Korea 
61 An analysis of sports policy in South Korea 1945-95, with special emphasis  
62 Gifts of Corruption  
63 Korean Sports in the 1980s and the Seoul Olympic games of 1988 
64 Olympic Studies Current Intellectual Crossroads 
65 
Sport, Science, and intercultural relations reflections on recent trends in Olympic 
scientific meeting  
66 Olympism, a Dead Ideal and a Western Product 
67 Sport and the Olympic Games in the Global Post-Cold War Era(1989-Nowadays) 
68 The Diplomatic Background to the 1966 football world cup 
69 The IOC and the World of interdependence 
70 The Olympic Bribery scandal 
71 Toward a theory of Olympic Internationalism  
72 Olympic and Sport Mega-Events as Media-Events 
73 Staging the Olympics, The event and its impact 
74 The Successful Sydney Olympic Bid, A debate  
75 An Analysis of an Over-crowded Worried Life 
76 Angst, Argument, and Antiquity 
77 Making Way - War, Philosophy and Sport in Japanese Judo 
78 Olympic Hosting in Canada 
79 Olympic Masculinity 
80 Puerto Rico is not the only one 
81 Russia and Eastern Europe in the Future of the Modern Olympic Movement 
82 Serious Fun-A History of Spectator Sports in the USSR 
83 The Olympic Flame and Torch-Running Towards Sydney 2000 
84 The Olympic-A history of the modern Games 
85 
The Tragic History of the Military Press in Olympic and World Championship 
Competition 1928-1972 
86 Colonialism, Christians sport 
87 Ethnicity and Sport 
88 Olympic Review, by Frou Kidane, 1999 August-September Vol. XXVI No. 28 
89 Political Influence and the Olympic Flame 
90 Sport, Politics, and the New Nation 
91 The Olympic Selection Process 
92 Sport development assistance  
After reviewing these sources related to this research question and topics, particular themes 
were induced. These are considered in the following section on thematic analysis.  
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2.3 The Result of Thematic Analysis 
Through descriptive analysis as a first stage of the process for systematic review, the 
following specific themes emerged. 
[Table 2.8] Contents of the Thematic Analysis 
 
2.3.1 History of Modern Sport in Korea 
A. The Colonial Period  
B. Independence  
C. North and South Korean Relations 
 
2.3.2 Nationalism, National Identity and Sport 
 
2.3.3 Sport Diplomacy 
A. The Context of Korean Sport Diplomacy 
B. The Position of the IOC in the international context 
 
2.3.4 Seoul Olympics and North and South Korea 
 
2.3.5 The Implication of the Impact of the International Sporting Event 
A. Sport as a Domestic Political Vehicle 
B. Sport and Diplomatic Usage 
C. The Economic Impact of International Sporting Event 
 
2.3.6 The Media and International Sporting Event   
A. The Approaches of Media Research 
B. Power and Role of Media and International Sporting Event 
 
Grouping into these themes was undertaken on an intuitive basis, clustering themes to 
reflect both chronological development and conceptual and policy development in the 
unfolding use of sport as a vehicle for conducting interaction between nations for non-
sporting ends.  
 
2.3.1 History of Modern Sport in Korea 
In Korean history, reference to the ‘Modern’ period begins at the end of 19th century, when 
most European countries had already established the modern concept of the ‘nation’. 
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Moreover this late modernisation occurred parallel to the colonial period and this causes 
difficulties in the interpretation of this concept due to its confusion with the movement against 
Japanese colonialism. As with other previously colonised countries, ‘Modernity’ and 
‘Modernisation’ has often simply been interpreted the result of progress which implies 
learning from, and becoming like, ‘developed’ Western countries. Due to this simplified 
concept, the meaning of Korean modernisation and its merits to its failings in Korean history 
have certainly divided critics into different schools of thoughts. 
 
A leading interpretation can be classified as ‘colonial modernity’, which claims the colonial 
period to be the main driver of progress and dismisses the idea that Korea had within itself 
the possibility of transformation into a ‘modernised’ country. Another interpretation of events 
concludes that the potential for progress was latent in Korea, but that it just had not come to 
fruition until the beginning of the twentieth century and that it would have occurred 
independently of Japanese influence anyway. The first is an explanation of modernisation of 
Korea by Korean nationalist and the latter is relying on the Colonial Modernisation theorist. 
Recently, a new standpoint has been taken: this is termed ‘Colonial modernity’ and it seeks 
to explain modernisation in the framework of hegemonic nation structures rather than simply 
as ‘progress’. The concept of modernisation here is not about progress but rather about the 
process of interacting among actors in the structure (Shin and Robinson 2000). Also, this 
analysis is focused upon the construction of structures by dominant societal powers and the 
reasons for this.      
 
The origins of the modernisation of sport in Korea, however, seem less disputable: they 
appear to be the result of novel evolution or sudden paradigm transition rather than organic 
neutral progress. Until 1880, the philosophy of Confucianism was what primarily (and deeply) 
influenced the Korean people’s perception of physical activities, particularly affecting the 
educated upper class (the ‘Yang Ban’ in Korean), ruling their daily lives: the Yang Ban were 
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not supposed to run and women were not supposed to do outdoor activities in public 
(Mangan and Ha 2001:49-76). 
 
Radical changes occurred in Korean sport during the Japanese colonial period between 
1910 and 1945. Japanese administrative policy intended to assimilate Korean people by 
utilising the Korean physical education system as a means to create strong second citizens. 
However, it is paradoxical that the germination of Korean’s sport occurred as a part of 
independent movements associated with Western-established Christian institutions. It is 
analysed that modernisation of Korean sport had followed and at the same time had forced 
by the imperialism, then it went through Japanese colonial period with mobilisation of strong 
nationalism (Mangan and Ha 2001:49-76). 
 
A. The Colonial Period  
Physical training as a form of military exercise was considered a necessity for the Korean 
people by both the Japanese rulers and the Korean independent army. The Japanese 
needed physically well-trained Korean soldiers as weapons in their plans for their pan-Asian 
expansion policy. Particularly between 1937 and 1945, Korean sport was intensively 
controlled by the Japanese authorities. In this period Japan was focused solely upon its 
military goals: they approached Korean society and Korean sport merely as a means of 
creating support for their army and as a way of merging most of Korea’s sport organisations 
into Japanese organisations (Ok 2007:338-356). Despite this imperialistic usage of Korean 
sport by the Japanese, sport grounds such as football stadiums kept their symbolic meaning 
for Korean nationalists and were seen as representations of national pride which could be 
used as symbols of an independence from Japan (Lee, Jackson et al. 2007:283-301). 
Moreover, it was also seen as urgent to obtain higher numbers of well-trained patriotic 
Koreans in the independent army. Therefore, in order to prevent this, Physical Education 
and Sport activities were supported by Japanese government policy even though this had a 
hidden purpose for Koreans which support the Independence movement.      
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 As has already been explained, sport clearly played a prominent role in the Korean 
independence movement and nationalistic motivations helped develop Korean modern sport 
in some ways. Ha and Mangan (1994) specified the ‘YMCA (Young Men’s Christian 
Association)’ as a booster organisation in Korean modern sport. It supported people who 
tried to mobilise Korean nationalism for the purposes of future independence. They 
convinced those Koreans who joined the YMCA that their main motivation should be 
assisting the Korean independence movement. Even though the motive for participation in 
modern sport activities was not publicly proclaimed certainly the YMCA was also aware of 
this hidden meaning of Korean participants’ activities (Ha and Mangan 1994:329-354). 
 
However in Korea at that time, the organisation which led the movement of nationalists into 
involvement in the independence movement used a different name from the YMCA. Instead, 
they worked in other organisations such as the ‘Hwangsong Kidogkyo Chonggnyon Hoi (The 
Association of the Christian Youth)’, which was essentially the same organization as the 
YMCA, only under a different title. This makes possible the assumption that there was a 
strong link between the Korean nationalists and the YMCA. Particularly, Ha and Mangan 
found that the YMCA tended to embrace the Korean people’s traditional Confucian cultural 
attitudes in their promotion of the Christian religion and the nationalist independent 
movement (Ha and Mangan 1994:329-354).  
 
The literature gave a plausible explanation for the reason as to why the Korean 
independence movement group mobilised in the YMCA: it was because the missionaries did 
not easily be suppressed by the Japanese colonial government. From the Japanese 
perspective, if that suppression were to happen, it could become a diplomatic problem. 
Needless to say, at that time the Western imperialist nations were strong allies of the 
Japanese. Modern sport training was affected by Christianity in ways of discipline. With that 
purpose, it has emphasised the control of body and mind by training. Mind control 
emphasised from the Confucian tradition, contrary, emphasis of body strengthens evolved 
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as a counteraction of the Japanese colonialism. Particularly, girls’ outdoor activity has been 
fully emancipated by Christianity’s notion of equality (Ha and Mangan 1994:329-354). 
 
It was emphasised that Korean modern sport has been significantly influenced by Western 
imperialism. Along with this, Japanese colonialism which Ok (2005) defined as ‘Eastern 
imperialism’ had an essential role. Sport was seen as a non-direct way of resisting, helping 
people retain their national pride and strong will for independence. This colonial legacy has 
continued even until the present day as Podoler (2008) encapsulates the importance of 
Korean nationalism in a sporting context, when he describes a football match between 
Japan and Korea during which one of Korea’s coaches was heard to tell a player, ‘You are 
not just playing football. You are fighting for the independence of the Korean people’ 
(Podoler 2008:1-17). 
 
Western imperialism showed itself in the form of the missionaries’ educational initiatives and 
Eastern imperialism designated Japanese intentions to spread their control across the 
continent (Ok 2005:649-670). Nowadays, these imperialist forces include not only economic 
dominance, but also very much a cultural hegemony. In many aspects, imperialism has not 
disappeared; it was transformed into a more complicated global interaction. Globalisation, 
which is the result of a neo-liberal market economy and cultural conquest by Western 
centralism, also began to spotlight a huge Eastern market with China as its icon. 
 
When the Japanese colonial policy swung from exclusionism towards internationalism, the 
Korean independent groups also diversified. As Japanese policy was never fully successful 
in uniting the whole of Korea as a Japanese colony, none of the Korean ideologies of 
independence were fully embraced by the whole independent movement. This separation of 
the Korean independence movement is reflected in the later formations of the North Korean 
and South Korean entities (Ok 2005:649-670). Both the North and the South had their own 
armies fighting for independence, though their character was subtly different. The North 
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emphasised the importance of military strength for independence, while the South was more 
focused on the welfare of the country. Both North and South emphasised the importance of 
sport and physical activity for military purposes. 
 
B. Independence  
At the end of World War II, Korea became independent from Japan as a result of the 
Japanese defeat. From that point, Korean society struggled to establish a new tradition of 
democracy since democracy had not existed prior to Japanese occupation. The subsequent 
history of achieving a new modern political regime based in an underdeveloped economy 
saw Korea experience authoritarian presidencies until the early 1990s.  
 
After independence, Korean modern sport became a significant tool of political propaganda. 
The development of modern sport in Korea can be split into three eras related to modern 
political regimes. These are Rhee Syngman’s regime from 1945-1960 and Park Jung Hee 
regime from 1961-1979, as the first, then Chun Doo Hwan regime, as the second, and Roh 
Tae Woo regime between 1980 and 1992. It is reasonable to note these three eras, because 
through 1988 Seoul Olympic Games, Korea came to be recognised as a part of the modern 
world. As Ha and Mangan (2002) explained, the nature of the Korean government regime is 
important in the investigation of Korean modern sport. Korean sport was characterised by 
government control and initially an elitist emphasis (Ha and Mangan 2002:213-242). 
  
Ha and Mangan (2002) investigated the Korean modern sport movement throughout each 
regime, and claimed that the Park Jung Hee regime began the resuscitation of Korean 
modern sport, based on the ideal of the militarisation of Korea. Since then, military dictators 
had inherited Park’s policies and added political propaganda. Ha and Mangan (2002) 
focused on the motivation behind the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Seoul Olympic 
games which were the result of a governmental plan to bring Korea into the world spotlight 
(Ha and Mangan 2002:213-242). 
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C. North and South Korean Relations  
Since the Korean War (1950-1953), North and South Korea have been typical of divided 
nations with the division having been caused by ideological conflict during the Cold War era. 
The 1988 Seoul Olympic Games was a watershed moment in the East/West ideological 
conflict, even though North Korea itself did not participate in the Games. Nevertheless other 
countries, such as the Soviet Union, China, and East European socialist countries joined the 
Games. MacLauchlan (2001) has found that the South Korean government used the 
circumstances of their division with North Korea as an argument for hosting the FIFA World 
Cup through showing the possibility of co-hosting the Games with North Korea. This implied 
that a symbolic ‘unification’ of nations through sport had considerable significance. Moreover, 
North and South Korea already had experience of this, for example McLauchlan (2001) has 
mentioned the 1991 World Table Tennis tournament where North and South Korea formed a 
joint women’s team and won the event. Also, the North and South Joint team reached the 
quarter finals of the 1999 Youth Soccer World Cup. The last example of such a gesture of 
peace through sport was the joint march of the North South Korean team in the 2000 Sydney 
Olympics’ opening ceremony (McLauchlan 2001:481-507). 
 
The North and South Korea division process was not sought or supported by the Korean 
people but was the inevitable result of the power struggle between the USA and the Soviet 
Union following World War II. It is understandable that during this era of history Korea was 
seen as “a shrimp in a sea of whales” (Skak 1989:19-33). This can be explained by 
international relations around the Korean peninsula during the Cold War era. With North 
Korea supported by the Soviet Union, and South Korea cooperating significantly with the 
USA, the Korean peninsula was no more than a playground for this conflict. As cited by Skak, 
commentators have concluded that the political framework of the North-South conflict as a 
Cold War phenomenon was generally accepted. This East–West framework also showed 
clearly on the map around the Korea peninsula. The reason why the Korean peninsula is the 
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last bloc in Asian Pacific was because the USA wanted to keep the Soviet Union and China 
at bay (Polomka and Kihl cited by Skak 1989:19-33). 
 
In the field of sport, North and South Korea had interesting relations which did not always 
parallel or follow the international political context. As Podoler (2008) illustrates, North and 
South Korean nationalism that was demonstrated in football matches certainly fluctuated 
between rivalry and the manifestation of one single ethnic notion of nationalism. In terms of 
how the two Koreas’ domestic political power tried to use football, Podoler (2008) was sure 
that football could be one of the methods for showing themselves distinct from another as a 
result of reflect the nationalists’ goals of promoting nationalism (Podoler 2008:1-17) 
 
Bridges (2007) highlights North and South Korean tensions, before the Korean War. When 
Korea gained independence from Japan, there were two independent governments. Both 
Koreas had a ‘One Korea’ policy, which would not accept the other Korea as an independent 
nation. This policy directly affected international relations, and in terms of diplomacy the rest 
of the world also needed to choose one of the two sides. In the process of joining the IOC as 
a member nation, North Korea did not want to join with South Korea. However with a 
powerful ally in the USSR, the North was able to negotiate joining as an NOC, to be 
recognised as a nation by the rest of the world (Bridges 2007:375-391). 
 
2.3.2 Nationalism, Nation Identity and Sport 
In modern Western nations, the mobilisation of nationalism has specific traceable origins and 
is mostly based upon popular national identity, whatever perspective that comes from. This 
is supported by the definition of national identity as “the relationship between nation and 
state that obtain when the people of those nations identify themselves by the state” (Suzuki 
2007:23-47). 
Suzuki (2007) applies a sociological conceptual framework, a ‘Self’/‘Other’ approach, to the 
debate on nationalism, particularly concerning the formation of China’s national identity and 
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the role of Japan in that process. The process of how the Japanese are ‘Othered’ is similar 
to the process for China and Korea, as both of them experienced a Japanese colonial period. 
The criteria for the separation between ‘Self’ and ‘other’ depend on the group. However, 
here Suzuki (2007) considered China’s position within international society, which compared 
with Japan, was in relative terms, on the periphery (Suzuki 2007:23-47). In other words, 
even though China ‘Othered’ Japan, it was still itself ‘Othered’ by dominant world nations. In 
the end, Suzuki (2007) conceptualised China’s ‘victimhood’ in their national identity as a 
product of their being ‘Othered’ by Japan in the eyes of the major world powers. With the 
‘Self/Other’ concept, China has always differentiated itself from Japan by regarding itself as 
an ‘out-group’ and Suzuki (2007) has argued that this is an on-going process of formation 
within China’s identity (Suzuki 2007:23-47). 
  
In the case of North and South Korea, the academic field of the study of the nationalism has 
been built upon critically contrasting viewpoints. Nevertheless, there remain a few 
unexplained aspects. Koh (2005) has argued in his research that Korean ‘nationalism’ is 
mainly understood as the ‘pride in, and loyalty to, one’s ethnicity’ rather than ‘pride and 
loyalty in one’s nation’. The nationalism that is dominant in the Korean context is an abstract 
‘ideology’ rather than the concrete legalistic ‘stricture’ which emerged with modern nation 
building. Korean nationalism had evolved throughout the Japanese colonial period, more or 
less to its own pattern. The key feature of Korean nationalism is its ethnic element and this 
has now been replaced by modern citizenship (Koh 2005:468-478). Throughout the 5,000 
years of Korean history Korea has been interacting only with its big and small neighbours, 
such as China, Mongolia and Japan. These Eastern Asian nations generally adapted to 
China’s cultural advances; however, they kept their identity by clearly differentiating 
themselves from the others. Nevertheless, Korea shared certain cultural similarities with the 
other neighbours as they shared borders with each other (Pirozhenko 2003:92-107). 
 Korean traditional sport, which is called ‘ethnic sport’, had a key role in the promotion of 
nationalism. Whoever the leaders were, they used these sports for their nationalistic 
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purposes. However, Lee (2005) focused on the fact that ‘ethnic sport’ was not only used at a 
government level but also by the people themselves. This analysis differs from that of Koh, 
where only an outside force, Japan, affected the formation of Korean nationalism. Lee (2005) 
has argued that the Korean government had the intention of creating an ‘ethnic sport’ culture 
in order to promote Korean national identity. However, individuals also had their own 
particular purposes for taking part in the ‘ethnic sport’. In his conclusion, Lee (2005) 
concludes that there are two driving forces involved in the development of ‘ethnic sport’ and 
that these are firstly, government and secondly, individuals (Lee 2005:125-130). This may 
mean that, even though it has been used to boost national sport in international competition, 
the anti-Japanese perspective of Korean nationalism is only an historical reflection of 
people’s emotions not nationalism per se.  
  
The 1986 Asian Games was the first moment when sport was used as a tool for the 
promotion of Korean nationalism (Lee 2005:125-130). Since then, the Korean government’s 
motivation for hosting international sport mega events has grown stronger. The passion 
which the Korean people recently showed to the world when holding the 2002 World Cup 
cannot be separated from their national pride. At the same time, through this sporting event, 
the Korean people reshaped their national identity and they themselves were aware of this 
(Pirozhenko 2003:92-107).  
 
Pirozhenko (2003) found that the Korean media mainly dealt with the successful 
achievements of the 2002 World Cup performance not as a sport but as a political and a 
cultural success. However, Pirozhenko (2003) has analysed differently, in that he believes 
that the strong nationalistic bond of the Korean people originates from the unique bond of 
the family in Confucianism. Confucianism was dominant throughout the Cho Sun dynasty, 
and Pirozhenko would not be surprised about Korea’s special nationalism, if all Koreans 
recognized themselves as being part of a ‘big family’ (Pirozhenko 2003:92-107).   
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Korea’s nationalistic attitude which originated from the Confucian tradition was not only 
shown in international sport competition but also became well known through the process of 
overcoming its economic crisis in the late 1990s. In this sense, Pirozhenko (2003) has 
reached the conclusion that Korean nationalism is not an absolute product of Western 
modernity (Pirozhenko 2003:92-107). Thus the modernist perspective of nationalism, he 
argues, is not suitable for the Korean case.  
 
With regard to other countries, political issues have often been addressed during the 
Olympic Games: for example, under Hitler’s regime, the torch flame was used to emphasize 
the legitimacy of their ethnic inheritance from the ancient Greeks in Hitler’s Nazi Germany. 
However, the actual motive for using the torch flame in the beginning of the modern 
Olympics was to symbolize peace and harmony which the founders wanted. There is also an 
exception: Cahill (1999) researched the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games relay, and found that 
it was remembered as one of the ‘pure’ torch relays that had successfully avoided political 
influence or otherwise. This was also the ideal intention of both the organising committee 
and the IOC (Cahill 1999:181-190). 
 
2.3.3 Sport Diplomacy 
Richard Pound, an International Olympic Committee member in Canada, wrote a thesis 
which concerns the role or value of sport particularly on the perspective of national 
development programmes which mostly dealt with a global political economy perspective. 
He specifically argued that the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s 
(OECD) Official Development Assistance criteria had not included sport in the range of 
activities which they funded (Pound 1992:301-307). He also said that politicians’ ignorance 
and misconception of sport is based on their presumption of the hierarchy of importance 
among sport, politics and economy (Pound 1992:301-307). Pound(1992) suggested a clear 
strategy for obtaining certain funds through cooperation between the International Olympic 
Committee (IOC) and other International Governmental organisations such as UNESCO, 
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WHO, the EC and others (Pound 1992:301-307). In addition he also included not only 
International Federations and National Olympic Committees, which are obviously elements 
in the ‘Olympic family’, but also the private sector, academics and scholars, and 
governments (Pound 1992:301-307). 
 
As Weinberg mentioned, there is a background to hosting the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games 
which is related to the peacekeeping reputation of the IOC. With the history of the ancient 
Olympic Truce, nations agreed not to make war during the Games and provided peaceful 
passage for their enemies (Weinberg 2001:19-27). As Polley (1998) points out, among the 
many big and small diplomatic dialogues between nations, sport though only one part of the 
issue could be the important one (Polley 1998:1-18). In that sense, Polley (1988) assumed 
that the diplomatic process which dealt with ‘Sport’ as a topic is Sport diplomacy. There are 
several cases, for example, like the 1966 World Cup finals, when North Korea qualified in an 
abnormal way. This is the case where international sport issues confronted normal 
diplomatic circumstances which were considered ‘formal’. Surprisingly, the formal procedure 
had changed for some international sport events. Technically, the British government were 
supposed to refuse North Korean players’ visas, in general, in the middle of the Cold War 
era. However, with a significant proportion of the world’s population watching the decision, 
the sport diplomatic context rapidly changed.  
 
Concerning this particular sport diplomatic issue in the UK, Polley (1998) also addressed 
each department’s responsibility in central British government. However, as a part of the 
Government, each would need to consider British tax payers’ interests, so they had to find a 
visa solution; otherwise they might have been be blamed by the world for bringing politics 
into sport (Polley 1998:1-18). Why the Foreign Office was involved here was investigated. 
The simple answer was that as long as North Korea was a member of FIFA, they had a right 
to join the competition. Moreover, it was not only the Foreign Office which intervened in this 
issue. The Far Eastern Department actually had to lead this project, due to North Korea’s 
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geographical location. This procedure was evaluated and praised the UK government. The 
Central government process of sharing information was efficient and well organised (Polley 
1998:1-18). Whether Olympic and other sports intended it or not, sport as part of culture was 
now a well-known tool of diplomacy.  
 
A. The Context of Korean Sport Diplomacy 
The purposes of hosting sporting events are mostly related to domestic political issues in 
most nations. Nevertheless, there was a football boom in South Korea in 2002, even though 
South Korea was not the sole host. However, Pirozhenko (2003) claims that South Korean 
society’s reaction is a unique social phenomenon (Pirozhenko 2003:92-107). South Korea 
concentrated on hosting sport events and noticed their impact, particularly following the 1988 
Olympic Games. Through this event, even Eastern European countries recognised South 
Korea as an independent nation. More significantly South Korea had been admitted to the 
UN and this global recognition through the Olympic Games strongly affected the process of 
joining the UN (Howe, 1989:15 cited by Macintosh and hawes 1992:2-13).  
 
The context and the limitation of Korean diplomacy are obvious, at least concerning North 
Korean relations. Korea won the bid for the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games even though 
relations at that time between North and South Korea were poor. The weak point of South 
Korea’s bid to host the Games was clearly stated in Weinberg’s work, which summarised 
three main issues. The first is that technically South Korea and North Korea had merely 
ceased the Korean War. This meant that there was a possibility of war during Olympic 
Games and this was too much of a risk for the IOC. The second issue was that the South 
Korean political system was a relatively unstable dictatorship and this political instability 
fuelled concerns for the financial support of the Games. The third issue was the communist 
bloc in the IOC which did not have any national relations with South Korea, since they were 
closer to North Korea. This clearly showed the limitations that Korea had, compared to 
Japan, which had diplomatic relations with most communist countries (Weinberg 2001:19-
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27). However, this context also represented an opportunity for South Korea. If a successful 
Olympics could be held in South Korea, it could contribute to recovering diplomatic relations 
with the Socialist bloc nations and offer a unique opportunity to pursue the remodelling of an 
independent foreign policy. This would consequently create an international climate more 
helpful to Korean reunification (Larson and Park 1993:171). 
 
B. The Position of the IOC in the International Context  
Most of the political problems facing the IOC faced originated from the Cold War era. For 
instance, the 1976 Montreal Olympics needed to consider recognising Taiwan and that was 
just beginning of a series discussion in relation to Taiwan’s position. The 1980 and 1984 
Olympic Games, held in Moscow and Los Angeles, were global sporting events which 
manifested the conflict over ideology during the Cold War. The IOC’s transnational influence 
was evident in the Taiwan issue in the 1976 Montreal Olympic in its direct negotiations with 
the Canadian government. During this process, the IOC opposed the American position and 
had to face its allies’ pressure and obtained US agreement to an exception in relation to their 
‘One-China’ foreign policy(Macintosh, Greenhorn et al. 1991:423-448).  
 
With scandals related to the Salt Lake City Olympics, the IOC and Olympic movement 
suffered serious damage to the IOC’s legitimacy in representing the Olympic spirit and to its 
positive image (Booth 1999:43-68). The IOC had also previously played a role as an 
international actor for example when mediating North and South Korea’s first sport talks in 
Lausanne, Switzerland, on 24th January 1963. The IOC also showed its exceptional 
diplomatic influence in securing visas for North Korea, despite Hong Kong’s reluctance when 
the North Korean delegation visited Hong Kong for the North and South sport talks about 
participation at the Tokyo Olympic Games (Bridges 2007:375-391). Bridges (2007) pointed 
out that “sport may be very easily integrated into the political projects of governments” 
(Bridges 2007:375-391). Nevertheless, during Juan Antonio Samaranch’s presidency of the 
IOC, he believed it to be important to position the IOC properly in international relations 
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(Kanin, 1988 cited by Macintosh and hawes 1992:2-13). The IOC’s biggest political 
intervention would happen with Juan Antonio Samaranch. In 1980 and 1984, there were two 
Summer Olympics in a row held in the respective states which led the conflict over East and 
West ideologies. Seoul was nominated as the venue for the 1988 Olympic Games in 1981. 
Considering the North and South Korean situation, it was hard to imagine the successful 
operation of the Olympic Games without any engagement. Samaranch, however, accepted 
the possibility of holding some events in North Korea, even though this was not formally 
possible under the IOC’s rules. The 1988 Seoul Olympic Games was possible because the 
Soviet Union and China promised that they would join the Games no matter what the 
political circumstances were (Taylor, 1988 cited by Macintosh and hawes 1992:2-13).  
 
2.3.4 Seoul Olympics and North and South Korea 
Within this context a strong rivalry continued to be present. North Korea did not want to 
merely be a guest at South Korea’s festival, missing out on what it saw as an excellent 
opportunity to be in the world spotlight. No one could be sure that North Korea would not 
provoke a military situation either. In terms of diplomacy, before the Games 37 states did not 
have official relations with South Korea, because of their positive relations with North Korea. 
This meant that there was significant potential for many nations to boycott the 1988 Olympic 
Games. Ha (1998) has mentioned that South Korea’s domestic political situation was very 
tense due to the political leadership changing hands just after the Olympic Games. There 
could be serious rioting or a military coup.  
 
As was expected, North Korea protested against the IOC’s decision to award Seoul the 1988 
Seoul Olympics, but this had no effect. Subsequently North Korea changed its strategy and 
attempted to persuade the IOC to divide the Olympics between the two venues of Seoul and 
Pyongyang. North Korea wanted to host half of the events and also wanted the two Koreas 
to participate as one united team. Despite the IOC and South Korea’s willingness to 
compromise in some respects, North Korea’s proposition meant that it would be a full co-
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host of the Games, which was not acceptable either to the IOC or South Korea. Samaranch 
suggested modified conditions and North Korea seemed to take part in the negotiations with 
an affirmative attitude, but at the fourth set of talks, they reverted to their first proposition 
again, and thus North Korea rejected the final offer from the IOC (Ha 1998:11-13). 
 
2.3.5 The Implication of the Impact of the International Sporting Event 
The political impact of the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games were obvious to the South Korean 
regime. As President Chun’s government expected, the successful performance at the 1988 
Seoul Olympic Games caused the Korean people to celebrate a sporting nationalism whilst 
putting to one side any political problems. However, the host government was unable to fully 
control the political impact of the mega sport event in ways it wished. As Manheim (1990) 
explained, the South Korean government did not anticipate the amount of attention it would 
receive from the world. Consequently, it was not prepared to deal with the political 
opposition’s movement for increased democratisation in South Korea. Manheim has said 
that the international media and other interested parties played a significant role in 
pressurising the Korean government (Manheim 1990:279-295), and Larson and Rivenburgh 
(1989) conclude that most of the nations’ goals for participating in the Olympic Games are to 
achieve their political purposes (Larson and Rivenburgh 1989:1-43).  
 
The 2002 Korean World Cup occurred in the same year as the South Korean presidential 
election. The ruling party wanted to use the success and popularity of football for their own 
political ends. For example, the scandal of corruption in the government of December 14, 
2001 was treated as a small media issue, and instead the South Korean football team’s 
performance was reported as the major issue (Pirozhenko 2003:92-107). Moreover, an 
independent candidate, M.J. Chung, who was head of the World Cup organisation, was 
regarded as being a firm and smart leader by the South Korean people, and his popularity 
rose to become higher than the ruling party’s candidate. Pirozhenko (2003) has made clear 
that this was a result of the success of the South Korean team in the football World Cup 
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(Pirozhenko 2003:92-107). Pirozhenko (2003) has also analysed how South Korean society 
accepted football not only as a sport but also as a part of Western culture with the 
implication that that success in football matches was considered as success in the 
modernisation of South Korea. From this it is clear that the 2002 World Cup was a huge 
political event, and not simply a purely football event, which was organised solely by the 
government rather than by independent groups (Pirozhenko 2003). Meanwhile, the ‘Hiddink 
syndrome’ proved during the 2002 World Cup that the Korean people were willing to accept 
that the traditional features of Korean nationalism could be changed by globalisation or at 
least were aware of the possibility of this transformation (Lee, Jackson et al. 2007:283-301). 
 
A. Sport as a Domestic Political Vehicle  
The South Korean regime believed that the success of the Seoul Olympic Games would be 
dependent upon sustained social and political stability, thus for the Games to be successful 
the regime planned to using  ’strong arm tactics’ to control rioting or unrest on the part of  
those supporting the political opposition (Pravda 1987:17-24). At this time, the association of 
Korean students’ movement attempted to hold a meeting with a group of North Korean 
students to discuss the topic of the Olympic Games. A significant proportion of the South 
Korean people believed that hosting the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games amounted to a 
declaration that North and South Korea were not a nation (Han 1989:29-38).  
 
The reasons as to why the South Korean government wanted to host the Olympic Games 
and how much they felt it concerned the national reputation were made clear in a speech by 
President Mr Roh:  
“Our national sense of confidence and advanced national consciousness, given the 
success of the Olympics, pose for us a new challenge and obligation that we should 
fulfil [,] the task of joining the advanced nations and achieving full democracy in the 
country.” (Ha 1998:11-13) 
 
Despite the South Korean government’s clear willingness to host the Olympic Games, the 
IOC’s attitude to the hosting of the Games by South Korea was not that positive. Richard 
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Pound, whilst talking about the nomination of the Seoul Olympic Games, concluded that it 
was “at best as risky and at worst as recklessly foolhardy, depending on one’s degree of 
optimism and place on the political spectrum” (Ha 1998:11-13). Worries from the outside 
world resulted in an address made by President Roh in June of 1987 which promised 
political change in South Korea after the Olympic Games. Thus we can argue that the 1988 
Seoul Olympic Games definitely played a role in the changing of the South Korean 
leadership (Manheim 1990:279-295). 
 
As a result of the Games, South Korea achieved major political advantages, particularly in 
the growth of democracy, as a result of the negotiation between the ruling party and its 
opponents. The South Korean ruling party realised that there was no way to ignore the 
eagerness for freedom of its citizens if it was to protect its political regime. South Korea also 
gained external benefits: China, the Soviet Union and East European communist bloc 
nations decided to participate in the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games and this meant that 
diplomatic relations with communist nations were started, even though the opening of new 
relations with socialist nations did not result in North and South Korea cooperating in the 
Olympic Games (Han 1989:29-38). Black and Bezanson (2004) have argued that the 
Olympic impact can backfire in an uncontrollable manner on the host government. The 
South Korean military regime illustrated this fact. Even though South Korea’s 1988 Seoul 
Games was not the only ‘fuse’ in the setting off of South Korean democracy, it recognised 
the role of the Olympic Games in stimulating nationalism (Black and Bezanson 2004:1245-
1261).     
 
B. Sport and Diplomatic Usage 
The 1988 Seoul Olympics was a typical example of a government attempting to use the 
games for its own diplomatic purposes. Alongside the circumstances of a rapidly developing 
economy, the Korean people demonstrated a wish for political freedom and an eagerness for 
democracy. In South Korea, this diversification of political propensities was seen as a huge 
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threat to the dictatorial government. For this reason, the government used anti-communist 
propaganda as a tool for repressing people’s expressions of oppositional political 
perspectives. In response, North Korea kept provoking tensions in the Korean peninsula and 
this all affected the South Korean government’s decision to host the 1988 Seoul Olympic 
Games (Manheim 1990:279-295).   
 
It has been said that the staging of the Olympic Games is effectively just ‘rhetoric’ and that it 
is relatively less important than ‘hard politics’ in international relations. However Payne (1984) 
has argued that the rhetoric of the bipolar powers during the Cold War which showed in 
Korean peninsula  was impropriate to explain several successful achievements such as 
unified team for table tennis championship (Payne 1984:55-65). Payne (1984) cited 
Reagan’s words when Reagan described the Soviets as evil and Russia as an ‘evil empire’ 
in order to express how different their political ideologies were. Relations between Russia 
and the United States worsened not because of the gap in their political ideologies, or 
changes in material conditions, but because of the nature of the rhetoric employed (Payne 
1984:55-65).   
 
In the middle of the Cold War era, in order to demonstrate the superiority of their political 
regime, the South Korean government wanted to gain a better international reputation as a 
developed country using the opportunity of televising the Olympic Games. Larson and 
Rivenburgh (1989) have researched South Korea’s decision to televise the Olympic Games 
and concluded that it was motivated by the South Korean government’s intention to become 
a ‘world player’ (Larson and Rivenburgh 1989:1-43). Following the shift in the balance of 
power in international relations between the Cold War and the Post-Cold War era, the 
meaning of sport mega-events became more complicated due to the focusing of the spotlight 
upon particular individuals. Pirozhenko (2003) notes what Hope had already mentioned, that 
is, that the Korean football World Cup had an influence upon the Korean people’s 
perceptions of a reunified North and South Korea. At least, he claims that the Red Devils 
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movement would provide another impetus for a national unity process (Pirozhenko 2003:92-
107).  
 
C. The Economic Impact of International Sporting Events  
The South Korean government learnt the lesson of the 1964 Tokyo Olympic Games, and 
dreamt of achieving the same order of success. At the same time it ignored the Mexican 
case which was known as being less satisfactory and continued to push the policy of hosting 
the Games (Manheim 1990:279-295). Even though the South Korean government wanted to 
emulate the success of the Japanese Olympic Games, which was regarded as a triumph in 
economic and external relations, domestic political confusion meant that the political 
situation seemed closer to the circumstances in Mexico (Manheim 1990:279-295). 
 
Generally it is thought that sport mega-events, such as the Olympic Games, provide both 
long and short term economic benefits. However, surprisingly, research suggests that 
economic impact decreases year after year. Kang & Perdue (1994) concluded that the effect 
of the mega-event in terms of the number of foreign visitors was positive and, note that 
despite increasing only slightly for the very first year, increased significantly the following 
year. They have deduced that this is because customers, who were attracted to the nation 
through the sport event, would need time to react to the media publicity and schedule their 
holiday (Kang and Perdue 1994:205-225). 
 
There are three main reasons for the economic impact of sport mega-events. Development 
of mass communication technology can be the principal factor. Through television, people 
are able to enjoy sport competitions held all around the world.  This is possible because 
organisations such as FIFA and the IOC sell the rights to broadcasting companies in each 
region or country for huge amounts of money. This money is usually the main source of 
income for each organization and this makes them less dependent on other financial support. 
Secondly, the spread of sport’s popularity creates the potential for new links between 
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sponsors and the professional sport leagues. This, in turn, produces further opportunities for 
broadcasters. The third reason is that the city or region which hosts the mega-event has the 
chance to promote it. Through hosting mega-events, they are potentially able to be 
recognised as ‘world class’, or at least as players on the world stage, by influential people 
(Horne and Manzenreiter 2006:1-24). 
 
2.3.6 The Media and International Sporting Events  
 
A. The Approaches of Media Research 
Media is one element of society whose role significantly grows during sport mega-events. 
The focus here will be on how media is used not only as a tool to represent certain 
ideologies but also as a mechanism which shows the interactions between production of 
discourse and its recipients. Particularly in relation to a sport mega-event, technical progress 
in media coverage means that their public popularity increased and resulted in many aspects 
of the events changing. Sriramesh (2003) for example, has agreed that as a part of the 
globalization process, advances in media technology have caused the broadening of 
communication and maximized information exchange. This is not limited to commercial 
products, but also includes services and life style choices (Sriramesh 2003:1-20). 
 
Sriramesh (2003) has focused on the conditions of various international communications 
which adopted the use of developed media technology such as the internet. Media is now 
recognized as a strategic tool in international public relations. The impact of internet 
communication itself is different from the ‘global village’ effect which emerged due to 
television (Roche 2006:26-40). Castells (2001) has argued that media research needed to 
become focused upon internet communication and this had to take full account of any socio-
political aspects. The global organization has become the social and political reality of the 
21st century, which contrasts with the dominance of the nation state in the 19th and 20th 
centuries (Castells, 2011 cited in Roche 2006:26-40). Progress in media technology has 
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affected all structures of society, despite the complexity of international relations and 
differences in political ideology in those structures. Therefore, media itself has the power to 
show a multiplicity of structures and bring huge attention to that diversity.   
 
B. Power and Role of Media and International Sporting Event  
Horne (2006) has identified three reasons as to why mega-events kept growing throughout 
the ‘global era’. The first reason is that the development of technology made it possible to 
see events through television wherever there was a broadcast satellite. Alongside this, the 
second reason is that advertising on television during the event became more lucrative to 
the commercial market and so corporations naturally supported professional sport leagues. 
The third reason, which will be explored more deeply in this thesis, is the political and 
economic attraction to the hosts of these mega-events (Horne and Manzenreiter 2006:1-24). 
During the Olympic Games, the host nation presents their national culture and identity 
symbolically through media installations using sentimental music and images. Through the 
various channels of the media, national identity is exposed to countries all over the world. 
Once this construction of national identity begins to influence the people of the nation itself, 
national unity can be affected either positively or negatively (Larson and Rivenburgh 1989:1-
43). 
  
Horne (2006) has analysed the process related to the 2002 World Cup finals from a 
globalization perspective. He has explained that the World Cup itself stimulated the 
globalization process because mega-events also include economic interests and have 
cultural significance. He has claimed that mega-events are hosted generally only for 
economic and political reasons, but those cultural areas are also influenced and develop 
(Horne and Manzenreiter 2006:1-24). The characterization of the host nation by the media 
during the Olympic Games represents the host nation’s nationalism and Olympic ideology. 
Particularly, concerning the Seoul Olympic Games, the existence of Korean media 
corporations resulted in the establishment of different political views. Larson and Rivenburgh 
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(1989) have added the conclusion that media creates not only a national representation, but 
also reflects a particular world view (Larson and Rivenburgh 1989:1-43). Tomlinson (1996) 
has concluded that the Olympic opening ceremony includes various ideological values and 
the history of Olympic movement itself, even though the original Olympic values are being 
contested by its recent reformation and destabilization (Tomlinson 1996:583-602). 
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Chapter 3 Methodology 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The ‘method’ is clarified as a technique and a skill for collecting data and analysis and 
‘methodology’ as a strategy which leads us to find the answer to our questions by revealing 
social reality. Methodology rather tells us how to proceed by situating the choice of method 
in terms of its relationship with theory, applying certain logic (Blaikie 1993). In this research 
the critical realist ontological and epistemological approach has been adopted as a 
framework through which to analyse the relations between structure and agency of North 
and South Korean sporting relations across three decades from 1978 to 2007, from the 
perspective of a constructivist view of International Relations. Thus, this research focuses on 
how the discourses associated with the Olympics, (and sport more broadly) are entangled 
with, but also shape and mediate North and South Korean relations. In this sense the thesis 
is not simply arguing for the constructivist position because it acknowledges the material 
changes taking part in the wider world and how those are mediated by rather than solely 
constructed by the discourse between the two nations.  
 
3.2 Philosophical Approaches 
 
3.2.1 Ontology and Epistemology 
Ontology is a claim in philosophy which refers to what exists. The ontological traditions or 
claims of various perspectives (in particular within and between the social and natural 
sciences) may vary considerable. This research is about the social ‘reality’ which is 
fundamentally the object of most social enquiry. Therefore, as Grix (2004) stated, whether ‘a 
particular thing’ exists in the real world or not, and in what sense it exists, is an essential and 
fundamental question to be answered in the beginning of any form of research (Grix 
2004:60). Lewis (2002) also implies the necessity for identifying one’s ontological position 
because of the conceptual link between social enquiry and its objects of analysis to develop 
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a coherent and convincing research strategy which needs to be consistent with 
epistemological assumptions and research strategy (Lewis, 2002:17 cited in Grix 2004:60). 
Even so, ontological assumptions are not amenable to ‘proof’ but may be subject to a test of 
reasonableness whether one’s assumptions about reality are defensible and consistent with 
methods employed to investigate a social phenomenon (Grix 2004:60). 
 
There are two main roots of dominant positions in the ontology question: the first is 
Foundationalism. Foundationalism means that so called ‘reality’ exists independently of 
whether we acknowledge it or not, and that claims about reality have a rational and universal 
value (Flyvberg 2001:130; Grix 2004:60). This implies that objective notions of truth are 
‘foundational’. The positivists and realists start their position on this basis and share the 
umbrella term ‘foundationalism’. In addition to the term foundationalism, reference may be 
made to ‘realism’ or ‘objectivism’ in arguing for this view (Hughes and Sharrock 1997:4-5 
cited in Grix 2004:61). In contrast to Foundationalism, some people would argue that the 
world and what we call ‘reality’ is ‘constructed’ by our acts. So called anti-foundationalism 
suggests that the world does not exist independently from our knowledge of it, emphasising 
that we are involved in the constructing of an external social world. Consequently, the nature 
of ‘reality’ cannot be rationally or universally grounded (Grix 2004:61). This is related to 
constructivist ontological traditions, which indicate that social reality which includes 
phenomena and meanings are constantly reconstructed by social actors. Therefore, reality is 
a fully constructed phenomenon (Bryman 2001:16-18). 
 
If a simple definition of ontology is that it is about what exists, then epistemology is about 
how we know about the things which exist. It is also understood as ‘theories of knowledge’, 
those are statements about the methods of attaining knowledge. More broadly, it includes 
the justification and criteria of knowledge. By doing so, it differentiates knowledge from belief 
(Grix 2004:63). There is no doubt that ontology and epistemology are fundamental 
philosophical concepts relating to the search for ‘truth’ in various fields of science (Schwandt 
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2001). There are three dominant traditions of epistemology. One is based on the ‘Positivist’ 
paradigm; another is ‘Interpretivism’ with Critical Realism as a form of ‘compromise’ between 
these two poles. Firstly, the Positivist and Interpretivist approaches will be discussed. Critical 
Realism will subsequently be discussed in more detail since my own research will start from 
this perspective.  
 
Positivism is well known as an approach used in the natural sciences. However, it is one 
which is also used in social analysis (Grix 2004:64). It has several distinctive features. Firstly, 
positivism’s ontological foundation is foundational (Guba and Lincoln 1998:204). As 
Denscombe (2002) points out the association of chronologically prior occurrences of an 
‘independent’ variable and the subsequent occurrences of a ‘dependent’ variable may be 
taken to support causal inferences. Positivist method is regarded neutral simply noting these 
(statistical) associations and drawing inductive inferences about caused relationships (Grix 
2004:80-81). Positivists believe that reality can be ‘captured’ and that with this knowledge; it 
is possible to predict things which will happen later in the same circumstances. They focus 
on ‘facts’ rather than ‘values’, in other words on what the result is, or might imply.  This is 
because positivists want to find ‘objectivity’ in research results (Marsh and Furlong 2002:18 
cited in Grix 2004:80-81).  
 
Interpretivism focuses on the difference between the human in social reality and objects in 
natural science. It emphasises that the meaning of social action tends to be subjective, so it 
requires a different approach from that of the natural sciences (Bryman 2001:12-13; Grix 
2004:63-64) Interpretivism approaches can be explained with reference to several features. 
Firstly, the ontology of Interpretivist is broadly Anti-Foundationalism, which means what 
which constitutes knowledge is bound up with the nature of the world we consume. Because 
‘this world is socially constructed’ by its components, what is ‘fact’ and what is ‘value’ cannot 
be clearly differentiated. Unlike natural science, social phenomena are not separately 
observable by the researcher. Therefore, social reality is the result of social interaction and 
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the researcher’s interpretation of it (Williams and May 2002:59-63 cited in Grix 2004:18). 
Knowledge is subjectively concluded with selected theories and discourses as interpretivist 
focuses on understanding rather than explanation. Moreover, for the understanding of social 
reality, Interpretivist tend to see the role of language as a key element in the constructing of 
‘reality’ (Grix 2004:18). 
 
In this research, a Critical Realist approach was as adopted in relation to its ontological and 
epistemological position. Therefore, the Critical Realist perspective of ontology and 
epistemology will be considered separately and more importantly after explaining general 
concepts of epistemology. Critical Realism shares some interpretivist ideas; however, it is 
more focused on a practical research strategy based on its ontological assumption that there 
is a certain real structure which we can observe indirectly, but scientifically. There is a critical 
realist epistemology position based on the compromised and developed logical flow of 
strategy between inductive and deductive methods.   
 
3.2.2 Critical Realism 
Critical realism shares some aspects of the foundationalism-based approach of positivism in 
that it adopts the assumption that real structures exists which may not be observed but also 
that the effects of these may be observed. However, in fundamental agreement with Realist 
ontology, Critical Realism argues for the nature of a constructivist view, particularly in social 
science. In other words, Critical Realists claim that real structures are both real and exist 
independent of our perception of them, but are also constructed (and reproduced or modified) 
in social interaction. Social structures are real, subject potentially to change, but social 
actions can only be explained by reference to the structural context which exists at a given 
point in time (Peter Kerr 2003:122-123 cited in Grix 2004:85). 
 
The ontological account provided by Critical Realism which ‘ties in’ both social action and 
deep structure which are socially reproduced is argued by some commentators to share a 
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Structuralism position. Hay (2002) for example is concerned with the idea of mutually 
constitutive structure and agency. “Structure and agency are best seen, not so much as flip-
sides of the same coin, as metals in the alloy from which the coin is forged.” However, 
though these are mutually constitutive we can separate them out, Hay (2002) argues, for 
analytical purposes (Hay 2002:127). Given this analytic distinction between structure and 
agency, we may distinguish between them in terms of our research focus. We may choose 
to focus on the individual at micro level, or on the structure itself, conducting research at the 
macro level. However, reconciling research at different levels is also feasible and may 
indeed be desirable (Penins et al. 1999:9 cited in Grix 2004:48-49). 
   
Of course, Critical Realists acknowledge that real structures are not directly observable, but 
that though hidden from direct observation, their ‘effects’ will be visible-as Bhaskar (1989) 
argues, through practical and theoretical investigation (Bhaskar cited in Grix 2004:86). 
Positivist (and Post-Positivist) methodologies may be employed to understand the 
association between structure and agency, while Interpretivist, qualitative approaches may 
be used to obtain individual (group) perspectives on ‘local’ situations, and actors’ 
perceptions of reasons for individual choice and to perceive opportunities or constraints 
which a given structural context affords. In other words, mixed methods aimed at 
understanding structural context and actors’ perceptions of such context (both of which may 
explain their past behaviours) are promoted by a Critical Realist approach (Bhaskar, 1989:79 
cited in Hay 2002:19) 
 
Van Fraassen’s criticism of Critical Realism is a significant position to be considered. He 
(1980) argues that, once the Realist ontological positions and Interpretivist epistemology 
have been chosen, then it could be said that the research itself is a ‘construction’ rather than 
a finding of truth’. Van Fraassen terms this a form of “constructive empiricism” which is 
ontologically opposed to Realism (Van Fraassen 1980:5 cited in Blaikie 1993:3). Stockman 
(1983) criticised Critical Realism by citing Habermas’s “objectivist illusion”, which considered 
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that realism can be used as a doctrine, and thus as a good excuse for conceptualising one’s 
own reality (Stockman 1983:224 cited in Blaikie 1993:3).  
 
3.2.3 Retroductive Strategy 
Inductive and Deductive strategies serve as two main traditional philosophical views on 
developing theories in both the natural and social sciences. Seen from a Critical Realist point 
of view, relatively new strategies such as Retroduction and Abduction are developed and 
tend to be advocated in both the natural and the social sciences (Blaikie 1993:159). The 
Inductive strategy can be adapted by following four stages. Firstly, without any previous 
assumptions, all factors are supposed to be observed and recorded. Based on that, analysis 
begins and subsequently there will be comparison and classifications. With this analysis, the 
result will be inductively generalised and relations among the findings will be discussed. 
Consequently the generalisations are further tested (Blaikie 1993:137-138). Fundamentally, 
this logic is based on a belief in objective observations, and relies on being convinced that 
researchers are neutral in their analysis. In other words, the Realist ontology assumes that 
reality can be explained with epistemological trust that there are no problems in objective 
procedures. By doing so, Inductive interpretation can be sensible, and reveals laws and 
principles (Blaikie 1993). There is also a weak point in this Inductive strategy, since it is 
based on observation without basic assumptions. The justification of Induction itself could be 
an issue. It has been mentioned that the truth of Inductive strategy is upon the experiences, 
to which Popper (1959) has responded by claiming involvement of an infinite regress. This 
implies that no logic can be pure and that it is hard to establish the validity of mechanical 
induction processes (Popper, 1959 cited in Blaikie 1993:137-140).  
 
A deductive strategy in the social sciences is adopted in recognition of the fact that Inductive 
claims can never be ‘proven’. Given the claim that ‘all swans are white’, no matter how many 
white swans are observed, one cannot ‘prove’ the claim. However, falsification of a 
hypothesis can ‘prove’ that a claim is false. If I see a black swan, I can, in theory, reject the 
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claim. In effect, I can prove that not all swans are white. This view has however significant 
flaws. What happens when a ‘black swan’ or its equivalent is spotted may be that scientists 
simply argue over whether this is a swan, or a swan-like bird. The ‘discourse’, the language 
used to define what the bird is, a character that has been seen, rather than reflecting what 
has been seen in a neutral, objective fashion. In this study, we will be considering not swans, 
but sporting events and their relationship to national identity. 
 
Critical Realist epistemology can also be called ‘Retroduction’, which is neither looking to 
falsify hypotheses, nor to inductively uncover general laws and statistical associations. 
Rather, this focus on discourse and the ‘framing’ of ‘realities’ about sport does not 
necessarily imply a lack of ‘real’ deep structures which frame the interaction between North 
and South Korea, but rather it is a focus on the social (and language) constituting those 
structures. This strategy is concerned with understanding how sport is ‘reacted to’ or 
‘marshalled’ in support of different ideological positions. Our focus is thus on using press 
accounts, policy documents and interview material to illustrate these approaches. What we 
are effectively considering are the discursive strategies which have been employed to define 
the nature of social interaction in the sporting domain between the two elements of the 
‘divided nation’.  
 
3.3 Method Appropriateness 
 
3.3.1 Qualitative Research   
No research methods approach can be perfect for every research inquiry. Quantitative 
approaches also have several weak points, particularly when it comes to social science. One 
of them is related to the tendency of what quantitative research wants to do. It is more often 
used to predict results from the causal facts that it has found, and therefore tends to make a 
statement of causality as opposed to correlation. Moreover, by implying that facts are 
supposed to be ‘variable’ and ‘measurable’, many things may be ignored that are considered 
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part of cultural, social contexts. However, some aspects of human reality cannot be 
‘measured’ (Grix 2004:19). 
 
In contrast to quantitative research, qualitative studies do not tend to be concerned with the 
systematic calculation of numerical results (Knussen 2002:27). Qualitative research admits 
that the nature of study is already value-laden, since it is part of social reality. Researchers 
need to actively read and reflect on the gathering of sources for the field. Consequently, the 
research products will be written with the voices of those involved, including the researcher 
themselves. It is relatively clear that a qualitative research approach needs more interpretive 
inquiry and assumes that researchers’ interpretations involve their own culture, history and 
experiences. Moreover, a qualitative researcher tries to capture a broader picture of social 
reality, which includes various perspectives, not just simple cause and effect relations 
(Creswell 2007:19). 
  
3.3.2 Critical Discourse Analysis  
In the earlier sections, the ontological and epistemological perspective adopted in 
conducting this research was identified. This was the Critical Realist’s ontology, which as 
‘realist’ infers that ‘reality’ exists independently of our knowledge. However, Critical Realism 
is also constructionist, arguing that people do produce ‘shared reality’, meaning that reality 
and real structures exist in the extended world but that this reality and these structures are 
the product of agency i.e. of the interaction of human agents. This Critical Realism can 
appeal to Post-Positivist approaches in the sense of qualitative, hypothesis driven, 
evaluation of the relationships between variables, as well as qualitative, interpretive 
approaches which seek to understand how actors’ understandings frame, produce, 
reproduce and amend such structures.  
 
In the systematic review, a lack of research was identified relating to the role of sport in 
North and South relations. Although many do address aspects of sport and domestic politics, 
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little focus is given to issues relating to sports diplomacy, and there are no major empirical 
studies which focus on sport diplomacy in the two Koreas. Sport diplomacy takes place 
within a set of structures from the diplomatic world; the UN, the communist and capitalist 
blocs etc. In addition, it takes place within the structures of the sport world, e.g. The Olympic 
Family (IOC, NOCs, and IFs), sport markets (media, sponsors, producers and manufactures).  
 
In the context of this study, the ‘constructed reality’ of international relations between North 
and South Korea will be identified through the discourses, and the roles which sport and 
sport related events have played in reflecting, reproducing and changing that ‘reality’. This 
will be done by analysing the structures of international relations within which this interaction 
takes place and the process of construction of these structures through the qualitative 
analysis of documents. The decision to choose the documents as primary sources of this 
research is based on the assumption that by analysing the language in the documents, and 
by identifying their meaning, it is possible to understand the real structural and cultural 
context of the phenomena (Altheide 1996:2). 
 
This analysis requires the selection of official documents as sources from the field along with 
the purpose of written for (Grix 2004:131). This includes an encounter with documentary 
analysis for evaluation under four categories: authenticity, credibility, representativeness and 
meaning. Authenticity can be identified relatively easily by checking the origin of the 
document. Credibility refers to the document not having errors or misrepresentations. It is a 
little more complicated in terms of the meanings of documents. There are two levels. The 
data are documents that have literal meaning as most context of the literature has. Secondly 
there is also interpretative understanding. These two levels of meanings are clearly different, 
but need to be considered together (Gilbert 2001:204-205). 
 
Fairclough (2005) approaches discourse analysis from a Critical Realist ontological position 
and tries to explain the relations between structure and existing events which means 
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focusing on the role of discourse in the construction of and challenge to dominant power 
from various groups in the various areas (Dijk 1993:301). He (2005) sees discourse analysis 
as bridging between social practices and real structures which are in an on-going process of 
establishment (Fairclough 2005:923). He (2005) uses the concepts of genre and style, which 
make the order of discourse. It is interesting that he identified the structured order of 
discourse, like the “stratified” view of ontology in critical realism. Fairclough (2005) said that 
discourse, which includes physical, social and psychological elements, represents part of the 
world. The genre is mainly associated with social action; who acts together. Then the style 
means a particular identity, such as leadership in certain organisations (Fairclough 
2005:925). 
 
Fairclough (1995) proposes a three-dimensional model of the communicative events which 
consists of text, discourse practice and socio-cultural practice. Text includes both written and 
spoken forms that one can read and listen to with or without visual aids through the media. 
Three main aims of text analysis can be identified as follows. Firstly, text analysis focuses on 
particular representations of social practices which may contain ideological meanings. With 
regard to the current study, an attempt will be made to reveal the way in which Olympic 
Games are represented and some ideological meanings embedded in the coverage such as 
capitalism and Olympism. In addition, it pays attention to specific constructions of producer 
and audience identities. National identity politics in the media coverage of the Olympic 
Games will be a good example. Finally, the relation between the reader and the writer that 
the text signifies is also a main concern of the text analysis. Whether the media considers 
the audience as consumers or critical audience can be clarified by investigating the manner 
in which Olympic related news items are introduced.  
 
The differentiation of the order of discourse is related to the power discussion which is one of 
the useful points that Jäger and Meyer (2009) made, by differentiating ‘Power of discourse’ 
and ‘Power over discourse’, the former concerns the general argument of discourse which 
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has power to constitute individual and collective action, which includes material reality by 
repeating certain statements constantly. The latter, power over discourse, emphasised that 
the discourse itself, which developed, after it became the discourse. This shows the 
interaction of discourse between individual or collective, therefore one specific actor cannot 
say a certain discourse has a certain purpose (Jäger and Meyer 2009).  
 
3.3.3 Issues of Warrantibility  
Validity in social science research refers to internal and external validity. Internal validity 
deals with the question of whether the concepts or indicators that the researcher adopts 
really do relate to the ‘truth’. For example, do claims about real structures, or empirical data 
which give clues as to the nature of real structures, truly relate to what they claim they do? In 
quantitative research this may be interpreted as ‘does concept X or observation Y really 
relate to phenomenon Z?’ (Is for example occupational status truly an indicator of social 
class?). In terms of the emphasis on judgements of the ‘truth’ of a statement, the criterion of 
truth here is truth as correspondence ‘does the truth claim about phenomenon Z correspond 
to the observations made?’ In qualitative research however internal validity as a concept is 
often replaced by the notion of Warrantibility (Wood and Kroeger 2000). Demonstrating that 
my claim is warrantable is a matter of assessing whether my claims are ‘reasonable’ given 
other assumptions. Thus, the emphasis here is on the criterion of truth as coherence, or 
perhaps more accurately on network theories of truth which suggest that a claim can be said 
to be truth-like if it is consistent with a network of other claims which we take to be truth-like.  
 
External validity relates to whether one can generalise from the case or sample under review 
to a wider population. In quantitative studies this means assessing the statistical strength 
and significance of claims made concerning the relationship between sample and population. 
However, in qualitative studies we refer to what (Yin 2003) terms ‘theoretical generalisations’ 
rather than statistical generalisations. Thus, the question thus is not ‘can I generalise from 
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this sample to the wider population?’ but ‘how likely is it that the theoretical claims made in 
relation to my case studies might be applicable to other cases in other similar contexts?’  
 
In this research we address in the systematic literature review the concerns of generalisation, 
in terms of whether we can generalise from the sample of papers, and other sources we 
obtain to claim that this is a representative sample. This is a question of validity (evident in 
relation to a quantitative element of a mixed methods approach’. However the question of 
whether the themes identified in analysing the literature are the critical ones for our study, 
this is much more a matter of Warrantibility. How coherent are our claims concerning the 
themes raised in the literature. Warrantibility is thus a criterion to address, both in the 
analysis of the literature which was systematically obtained for our review, and of course in 
conducting the critical discourse analysis itself.  
 
3.4 Data Collection and Analysis   
For the purposes of analysis the three decades from 1978 to 2007 are selected as periods 
for research. In 1978, China declared a policy of ‘opening up its economy’, and this became 
the sign for a change of diplomatic tactics on the part of a number of communist countries. 
The first period selected is thus from the 1978 until 1987, which was the period during which 
the North-South Sport Talks took place between the two Koreas before the World Table 
Tennis Championship in Pyongyang. This was the event over which the North and South 
had their first official dialogue relating to sporting events which held in Korean peninsula. 
This period also fell within the context of the Cold War.  
 
The second period is from 1988 until 1997. In this period, further North-South Sports Talks 
relating to establishing a ‘unified team’ and other sporting interactions between the two were 
held. In terms of the international context, this was the time during which the collapse of 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union took place, signaling the beginning of the Post-Cold 
War, or emergent multi-polar era. The third period is from 1998 till 2007. Just after the 2002 
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World Cup, North and South Korea started to talk about participation as a unified team in 
other international sporting events. This third period can be considered as the fully Post-Cold 
War Era, which is considered an era with the further development of a multi-polar 
International order.  
 
As the main sources of analysis, South Korean summaries of the Sports Talks for North and 
South Korea were selected (together with other relevant government papers). North and 
South Korean newspapers have been chosen to investigate additional discourses 
surrounding North and South Korea which could construct and reflect the reality of North and 
South Korean sporting relations. Roh-Dong from North Korea, Hankyoreh and Dong-A from 
South Korea, 1978 to 2007 are selected as analysis material and are analysed using a 
critical discourse analysis protocol as described below.      
 
3.4.1 Data Collection Process 
This data collection has been conducted using various documents from the Korean 
government archive, which are based on the record of the dialogue and the response of both 
nations. The primary documents are the summaries of the Sports Talks (see Table 3.1). 
These documents need to be investigated to understand the general circumstances of North 
and South Korean sport relations. North Korea’s official position will be perceived through its 
main news print medium, which provides responses to the dialogues and the North Korean 
regime’s interpretation of the circumstances. Along with South Korea’s summary of the 
Sports Talks, the North and South Korean media have been selected as reflections of how 
the discourses in the two Koreas concerning their sporting interactions were constructed and 
displayed. Roh-Dong was chosen as the North Korean medium, because it is the first 
newspaper published by the government, and there is no ‘private’ newspaper coverage in 
North Korea. Thus, Roh-Dong as the voice of the establishment reflects what the North 
Korean government wanted to construct as the ‘reality’ of the North and South Korean 
sporting relations. From South Korea, two newspapers have been chosen, as 
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representatives of a North Korea / unification friendly political position (regarded as ‘left-wing’ 
in Korean terms), and a more skeptical approach to North Korea (though also pro-unification) 
position (described as ‘right wing’ in Korean terms). The analysis seeks to compare the 
difference and similarity between these two newspapers, Hankyoreh and Dong-A, to know 
their different views of North and South Korean sporting relations. South Korean newspapers 
from 1990 were collected from the national database of South Korean media archives and 
articles before 1990 were captured by recently published private newspaper archives in PDF 
picture format. The collection of materials from the North Korean newspaper Roh-Dong was 
more time consuming because of the lack of electronic materials. The Roh-Dong website 
recently constructed a database system for its articles, but this was not accessible in South 
Korea due to National Security law. Roh-Dong was only available in three media archives in 
South Korea, and only on-site viewing was allowed. Therefore, to allow thoroughness and 
repeated cross checking of the articles, photos of all the selected articles which were related 
to the theme of ‘North and South Korean sporting relations’ were taken manually.    
 
[Table 3.1] South Korean Government List of Sports Talks  
NO Title 
Date  
(MM-DD) 
Location 
1 
 
The 1st North and South Korean  
Table Tennis Association Discussion 
1979.02.27 
Panmunjom 
Neutral Zone 
The 2nd North and South Korean  
Table Tennis Association Discussion 
1979.03.05 
Panmunjom 
Neutral Zone 
The 3rd North and South Korean  
Table Tennis Association Discussion 
1979.03.09 
Panmunjom 
Neutral Zone 
The 4th North and South Korean  
Table Tennis Association Discussion 
1979.03.12 
Panmunjom 
Neutral Zone 
2 
The 1st North and South Korean Sports Talks for Unified 
Team for the LA Olympic Games  
1984.04.09 
Panmunjom 
Neutral Zone 
The 2nd North and South Korean Sports Talks for Unified 
Team for the LA Olympic Games 
1984.04.30 
Panmunjom 
Neutral Zone 
The 3rd North and South Korean Sports Talks for Unified 
Team for the LA Olympic Games 
1984.05.25 
Panmunjom 
Neutral Zone 
3 
The 1st North and South Korean Sports Talks with IOC 
Arbitration for the Seoul Olympic Games 
1985.10.09-10 
Swiss 
Lausanne 
The 2nd North and South Korean Sports Talks with IOC 
Arbitration for the Seoul Olympic Games 
1986.01.08-09 
Swiss 
Lausanne 
The 3nd North and South Korean Sports Talks with IOC 
Arbitration for the Seoul Olympic Games 
1986.06.10-11 
Swiss 
Lausanne 
The 4th North and South Korean Sports Talks with IOC 
Arbitration for the Seoul Olympic Games 
1987.07.14-15 
Swiss 
Lausanne 
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4 
The 1st North and South Korean Sports Talks Principal 
Meeting for Unified Team for the ‘90 Beijing Asian Games  
1989.03.09 
Panmunjom 
Southern area 
The 2nd North and South Korean Sports Talks Principal 
Meeting for Unified Team for the ‘90 Beijing Asian Games 
1989.03.28 
Panmunjom 
Northern area 
The 3rd North and South Korean Sports Talks Principal 
Meeting for Unified Team for the ‘90 Beijing Asian Games 
1989.10.20 
Panmunjom 
Southern area 
The 4th North and South Korean Sports Talks Principal 
Meeting for Unified Team for the ‘90 Beijing Asian Games 
1989.11.16 
Panmunjom 
Northern area 
The 5th North and South Korean Sports Talks Principal 
Meeting for Unified Team for the ‘90 Beijing Asian Games 
1989.11.24 
Panmunjom 
Southern area 
The 6th North and South Korean Sports Talks Principal 
Meeting for Unified Team for the ‘90 Beijing Asian Games 
1989.12.22 
Panmunjom 
Northern area 
The 7th North and South Korean Sports Talks Principal 
Meeting for Unified Team for the ‘90 Beijing Asian Games 
1990.01.18 
Panmunjom 
Southern area 
The 8th North and South Korean Sports Talks Principal 
Meeting for Unified Team for the ‘90 Beijing Asian Games  
1990.01.29 
Panmunjom 
Northern area 
The 9th North and South Korean Sports Talks Principal 
Meeting for Unified Team for the ‘90 Beijing Asian Games 
1990.02.07 
Panmunjom 
Southern area 
5 
The 1st North and South Korean Sports Talks for Unified 
Team for the International Games  
1990.11.29 
Panmunjom 
Northern area 
The 2nd North and South Korean Sports Talks for Unified 
Team for the International Games 
1991.01.15 
Panmunjom 
Southern area 
The 3rd North and South Korean Sports Talks for Unified 
Team for the International Games 
1991.01.30 
Panmunjom 
Northern area 
The 4th North and South Korean Sports Talks for Unified 
Team for the International Games  
1991.02.12 
Panmunjom 
Southern area 
6 
The 1st Administrative Discussion of North Korean 
Participation to the Busan Asian Games 
2002.08.17-19 
The 
Geumgang 
Mountains 
The 2nd Administrative Discussion of North Korean 
Participation to the Busan Asian Games 
2002.08.26-28 
The 
Geumgang 
Mountains 
7 The Administrative Discussion concerning the Daegu 
Summer Universiad 
2003.07.04-06 
 
The 
Geumgang 
Mountains  
8 
The Administrative Discussion concerning the Athens 
Olympic Games Joint March 
2004.06.23-25 
Beijing in 
China 
9 
The 1st Administrative Discussion for the 2005 8.15 North 
and South Korean ‘Unification Football Match’ 
2005.07.26 
Gaeseong in 
North Korea 
The 2nd Administrative Discussion for the 2005 8.15 
North and South Korean ‘Unification Football Match’ 
2005.07.28 
Gaeseong in 
North Korea 
10 
The 1st North and South Korean Sports Talks for Unified 
Team of Two Koreas  
2005.12.07 
Gaeseong in 
North Korea 
The 2nd North and South Korean Sports Talks for Unified 
Team of Two Koreas 
2006.06.29 
Gaeseong in 
North Korea 
The 3rd North and South Korean Sports Talks for Unified 
Team of Two Koreas 
2006.11.30-
12.02 
Doha in Qatar 
The 4th North and South Korean Sports Talks for Unified 
Team of Two Koreas 
2007.02.13 
Gaeseong in 
North Korea 
11 
The 1st Administrative Discussion for Using of Gyeongui 
Rail Road for participation the Beijing Olympic Games of 
Joint Cheer Team    
2007.12.28 
Gaeseong in 
North Korea 
The 2nd Administrative Discussion for Using of Gyeongui 
Rail Road for participation the Beijing Olympic Games of 
Joint Cheer Team 
2008.02.04 
Gaeseong in 
North Korea 
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[Table 3.2] Newspapers Data Collection 
Nation South Korea North Korea 
Newspaper Dong – A Il Bo Hankyoreh Roh-Dong Shin Moon 
Keyword ‘North and South Sports’ 
Nam Book Che Yook (in Korean) 
1978-1987 Available Available from May 1988 Available 
1988-1997 Available Available Available 
1998-2007 Available Available Available 
 
 
3.4.2 Data Analysis Protocol 
To understand the North and South Korean sport relations by identifying what sort of 
discourses emerged from whom, specific summaries of North-South Korean Sports Talks 
were investigated. In the process of undertaking the document analysis, a protocol was 
adopted and modified for reviewing documents. In terms of designing the approach for this 
research, the discourse analysis protocols of two leading theorists were compared and 
adapted, to allow the flexibility to deal with the two kinds of materials (Government Summary 
of Sports Talks and newspapers) and to identify the difference of language context between 
North and South Korean accounts. The two protocols were those of Fairclough (2005) and 
Jäger and Meyer (2009). After consideration of various approaches to critical discourse 
analysis, key research protocols were adopted from the categories of Fairclough for this 
research. Those are Format, Frame, Genre, Theme, Discourse and Style and the contents 
which explained the meaning of each category were briefly organised as the following figure 
demonstrates.  
 
Jäger and Meyer (2009) suggest a structural process of analysing the dispositive by 
identifying discursive practices, non-discursive practices and materialisations. Their 
approach recommends identifying discourses by identifying discourse fragments. Based on 
the argument that “discourses do not exist independently: they are elements of dispositive”, 
what composes this dispositive needs to be analysed together. Here, discursive practices 
are mainly language and thought, non-discursive practices refers to actions, and 
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materialisations are the product created by these non-discursive practices. If this applied to 
the North and South Korean sporting interactions, the motivations and claims made by both 
sides for hosting Talks between them is discursive practice. The Talks held under this 
initiative and the responses on represent the non-discursive practices. As a result of the 
Talks, the concrete materisations produced are for example the uniform and the anthem for 
the unified team of North and South Korea.     
 
In this research, the discourse of the contents will be the centred focus of analysis while the 
format, frame, theme and genre of the data represent the contacts for frames the discourse 
and will be subject to secondly analysis. The first draft of the analysis of the summaries of 
Sports Talks which adopted used the given protocol is outlined below [Table 3.3]. The format 
and genre were analysed for the general understanding of the material as a source of 
analysis.  
 
   [Table 3.3] Contents of Analysis Protocol 
Category Contents 
Format 1. Pertain to the underlying organization 
2. Assumptions of time , space and manner of experience 
1) Temporal flow and rhythm 
2) Place and visual editing  
3) Style 
Frame 1. What will be discussed 
2. How it will be discussed 
3. How it will not be discussed 
Genre 1. Activity – Purpose of activity 
2. Social Relations – Power vs. Solidarity 
3. Technology Intertexutality – included/excluded 
4. Assumptions – Ideological assumptions  
Theme 1. General meanings 
2. Mainframes 
3. General definitions or interpretive frames 
Discourse 1. How abstractly or concretely are social events represented 
2. How are social actors represented 
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3. What was the occasion for the article 
4. How do these topics relate to each other and overlap 
5. What logic underlines the composition of the article 
6. What actors are mentioned, and how are they portrayed 
7. What concept of society does the article presuppose and convey 
8. Other peculiarities of the article  
Style 1. What do authors commit themselves to in terms of truth 
2. What level of commitment is there 
3. To what values do authors commit themselves 
    
 
 
[Table 3.4] Application Sample of Analysis Protocol for Sports Talks – Common Category 
Common 
Category 
Contents 
 
 
Format 
South Korean Government Document 
The author is sure about the North Korean motivation from the beginning of the 
Talks. Therefore, all the responsibility for the result, which is that the South 
Korean team cannot join the game, is with North Korea. The tones of voice / 
words are firm and clear. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Genre 
Analysis of Genre chains: 
> Pre-genre: Narrative 
> Genre: Summary of the Event 
> Situated genre: Summary of the North and South Korean Sports Talks from 
the South Korean Government 
Analysis of Genre mixtures: 
> Descriptive narration and explanatory narration of political propaganda 
Analysis of individual genres 
> Purpose of activity  
Inform (Education) and propaganda 
> Social Relations 
North and South Korea 
North and South Korean People 
North and South Korea with Foreign Countries 
> Communication Technology  
One way - mediate : Website 
 
 
 
 
63 
 
The summary of Sports Talks between North and South Korea have been analysed by other 
categories such as format and Genre as above [Table 3.4] and frame, theme, discourse and 
style as [Table 3.5].  
 
[Table 3.5] Application Sample of Analysis Protocol for Sports Talks – Detailed Category 
N
o 
Category 1st Document  Analysis 
1 Title The 1st - 4th North and South Korean  
Table Tennis Association Discussion 
  
Date 
(YYYY-
MM-DD) 
1979.02.27/03.05/03.09/03.12   
Location Panmunjom JSA (Joint Security Area)   
 
 
 
 
Focus 
From NK (event host country) to SK 
 
The meaning of ‘unified team' in North and 
South Korea 
 
Motivation of both North and South Korea, 
what do they expect from this talk? 
 
Result : Failure to organise unified team 
Absence of South Korea 
 NK: Unification team  – A team 
for North and South Korea as 
representing the wish for a 
‘politically unified Korea’ 
  SK: Unified team – A team for 
North and South Korea as 
representing the symbolic peace 
of the divided nation 
 
Frame North and South Korean Sports issue   
 
 
Theme 
‘North Korea suggested having discussion on 
the 27th of February, concerning the matter 
of organising unified team for the 35th World 
Table Tennis Championship which will be 
held in North Korea on 25th of April. 
Organising North and South 
Korean unified team for the 35th 
World Table Tennis 
Championship 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Discourse 
 
Motivation: Why did North Korea suggest a 
unified team? 
In terms of 'one nation, one 
state' nationalism 
Context:  
In the process of the contact between the 
North and South Korean Control Committee 
…on behalf of the president of the North 
Korean Table Tennis Association, a letter 
was sent to the Chief of South Korean Sport 
Association (KSA) and the Chief of South 
Korean Table Tennis Association (KTA). 
The mood between NK and SK 
was not predictable 
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Discourse 
Language 1:  
NK side…… 
NK Table Tennis Association’ VS ‘Korean 
Sport Council 
How do NK media present each 
organization in their 
perspective? (guess: Cho Sun 
VS Nam Cho Sun) Each side 
argues that it has the legitimacy 
of united Korean authority and 
using different name to call 
another.  
Language 2: 
By acceptance of South Korean Sport 
organisations, the Talks held and proceeded 
totally 4 times 
‘Acceptance’ is a rather 
‘emotion’ involved word. In 
formal, official and relatively 
neutral word could be ‘answer’, 
or ‘response’.   
Logic or Ideology Statement 1: 
 
'In the Talks, the representative of KTA 
emphases that if North and South Korea 
cannot reach the agreement for organising a 
unified team by 12th of March, North Korea  
should guarantee the participation of the 
South Korean team and cross the board 
through Panmunjom by arranging other 
procedures.  
South Korea agreed on a unified 
team discussion, but there is an 
assumption that this will not 
reach a positive conclusion. 
South Korea asked the North to 
promise the participation of 
South players in the game, 
through the Panmunjom route to 
show the progress of the 
'peaceful' relationship between 
the two Koreas. This means that 
South Korea concerns the 
symbolic harmony of one nation 
and ethnic nationalism not only 
by the organising unified team, 
but also other represented 
feature such as crossing the 
border. But the 'arrange other 
procedure' part has a nuance of 
blaming or transferring all the 
responsibility to North Korea 
whatever the result is. It 
certainly shows the passive 
attitude of South Korea in the 
Talks.  
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Logic or Ideology Statement 2: 
 
North Korea suggested a principal 
agreement of a unified team and also 
suggested details of procedures…… 
North Korea wanted to reach the 
conclusion for a unified team 
first, but its motivation is not 
clear.  
Logic or Ideology Statement 3: 
 
The representatives of STA pointed out that 
the purpose of North Korea’s suggestion of a 
unified team seems to obstruct the separate 
participation of South Korean players and 
thus, requested to secure the right to 
separate participation of the game first.  
South Korea clearly made a 
statement concerning North 
Korean motivation to try to 
obstruct South Korean players 
to the game. If South Korea 
assumed North Korean 
motivation like this, why did 
South Korea not focus on the 
detail of conditions of a unified 
team? - Just simply to blame 
North Korea? 
Logic or Ideology Statement 4: 
 
North Korea avoided answering this 
question, and were obstinate to agree on the 
principle of a unified team. By doing so, 
North Korea clearly stated that they will 
refuse the separate participation of South 
Korean players.  
South Korea expressed that 
North Korea “avoided 
answering” and were “obstinate' 
concerning the unified team 
which showed some degree of 
reluctant attitude in South Korea 
on the unified team issue 
discussion.   
 
 
Style 
  The tone of the summary 
implied the ‘hidden’ motivation of 
North Korea and its suggestion 
related to organising unified 
team. 
 
The newspapers of North and South Korea, Roh-Dong, Dong-A and Hankyoreh, provided a 
relatively large number of articles, since they cover the general theme of ‘North and South 
Korean Sports’ during three decades from 1978 to 2007. Therefore, software for qualitative 
research analysis, N-Vivo, was used to code the relevant themes emerging from the 
application of the analysis protocol to the individual articles and government statements. 
This was a first order descriptive level of analysis which was followed by a more detailed 
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analytic analysis of the discourse teasing out the subtleties of rhetoric, meaning and context. 
 
The detailed discourse analysis was conducted in a chronological reviewing of the sporting 
events and related issues between North and South Korea. The articles were retyped in 
Korean in order that the files could be used with N-vivo, and after detailed discourse analysis, 
the final selected article segments which are discussed in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 were 
translated into English. 
 
   [Table 3.6] Thematic Segment of the Discourses in Roh-Dong, Dong-A and Hankyoreh 
 
Theme of discourse 1 
 
Theme discourse 2 
 
Number of 
Sources 
Number of 
References 
Blaming North Korea   25 36 
Blaming South Korea   31 59 
Cultural Festival   2 2 
Dae Jung Kim   3 3 
Economic perspective on Sport   21 25 
Flame for Games   5 5 
Friendly Exchange Games   49 59 
Incheon Asian Games   1 1 
International Context   35 57 
  China-Taiwan 3 3 
  East and West Germany 22 26 
  IOC related 32 37 
  Japan 18 24 
  North Korea & US relations 6 6 
  North and South Yemen 3 3 
  UN related 1 1 
Sporting Events    0 0 
  2002 World Cup 28 43 
  41st World Table Tennis 44 54 
  46th World Table Tennis 
Championship 
18 27 
  1988 Seoul Olympic Games 10 15 
  1993 World Table Tennis 
Championship 
1 1 
  Aomori Winter Asian Games 3 3 
  Athens Olympic Games 15 18 
  Atlanta Olympic  2 2 
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  Barcelona Olympic United Team 22 29 
  Beijing Asian Game united team 21 24 
  Beijing Olympic Games 24 28 
  Busan Asian Games 43 63 
  Daegu Summer Universiad 10 15 
  Doha Asian Game 16 24 
  Hiroshima Asian Game 1 1 
  Joint March 52 63 
  Macao East Asian Game 3 4 
  Pyongyang Winter Olympic Games 5 7 
  Salt lake City Winter Games 2 2 
  Sydney Olympics 38 45 
  The 6th Youth Football Match 22 25 
  Unification Basketball Team 32 41 
  Unification Football Match 43 57 
  Unification Table Tennis 4 5 
  Joint Cheer Team 33 39 
  Unified Team 123 195 
Ju Young Jung   26 29 
Korean Nationalism   212 348 
Negative View   20 34 
  Negative Tone 6 8 
  North and South Conflict 20 24 
  Problems 3 5 
North Korea Broadcast    11 12 
Ping Pong Diplomacy   4 4 
Positive View   69 82 
Private Sport relations   59 78 
Relations to Politics   168 264 
Sport Diplomacy   3 5 
Support for South Korean Regime   5 5 
The role of Sport   268 446 
Unification   135 214 
Unique relations between North and 
South Korea   
108 158 
Un Young Kim   18 20 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
We began this chapter by arguing for a critical realist standpoint, which intimates that there 
are underlying these social interactions between North and South Korean actors, a real set 
of structures. These structures and ideological positions are nevertheless socially 
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constructed by, and reflected in, the discursive performance of government actors in the 
controlled press of the North and the official statements of the South Korean Government 
concerning the Talks, as well as in the discourses of the partisan press reflecting ‘right’ and 
‘left’ (in South Korean context) in terms of relations with the North. In the three chapters 
which follow we will seek to disentangle the evolving relationship between discourse and 
context in the three periods selected. 
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Chapter 4 North and South Korean sports relations from 1978-1987 
 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter is intended to provide an analysis of the various media discourses concerning 
North and South Korean sport relations from 1978 to 1987. In exploring the questions of 
North and South Korean sport relations, media sources will be limited to consideration of 
three newspapers, which are Roh-Dong in North Korea and Dong-A and Hankyoreh in South 
Korea. As explained in the methodology chapter, Hankyoreh was not published until April 
1988 and so is not included in the analysis for this chapter. The summary of Sport Talks 
between the two Koreas which was produced by the South Korean government has also 
been considered to be material that manifests a South Korean government perspective, 
while Roh-Dong newspaper is considered as expressing the perspective or voice of the 
North Korean government, since it is generally acknowledged that the North Korean regime 
controls media output (Byman and Lind 2010:44-74).  
 
     [Table 4.1] General Results of Analysis According to Protocol of this given time period 
 
Item 
 
Roh-Dong 
(North Korea) 
 
Dong-A 
(South Korea ) 
Summary of Sport 
Talks from the 
South Korean 
government 
 
Format 
 
Newspaper 
 
Government 
documents from the 
web data 
 
Frame 
 
The North and South Korean Sport Relations 
 
The North and 
South Korean 
Official Sport Talks 
 
 
Theme 
1978 Bangkok Asian games 
The 35
th
 World Table Tennis Championship 
1980 Moscow Olympic Games 
1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games 
1986 Seoul Asian Games 
1988 Seoul Olympic Games 
 
The 35
th
 World 
Table Tennis 
Championship, 
1984 Los Angeles 
Olympic Games 
 
Genre 
Explicit Informative, Constructive, Ideological  Informative 
 
Implicit 
 
Informative, Constructive, Ideological 
Constructive, 
ideological 
 
Discourse 
 
Various 
 
 
Various 
 
Style 
Nationalistic/Anti-
Separationist 
Nationalistic/Strong 
Anti-Communism 
Nationalistic/Pro-
Unification 
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The items employed in the analysis protocol: Format, Frame, Theme, Genre, Discourse, and 
Style have been defined in the methodology chapter. Here the contents of the materials are 
briefly identified by item. The two formats of items reviewed are newspaper and government 
document data from websites. The articles which are selected from the databases were in 
the framework of the North and South Korean sport relations, so sporting events are mainly 
those under the governance of the Olympic movement and/or International Federations. 
Specific themes in newspapers are sought in the context of the International sport events of 
the time such as World Championships, Asian Games and the Summer and the Winter 
Olympics from 1978 to 1987. The themes from the Sports Talks, however, relate to only two 
contexts. North and South Korea held Talks concerning the matter of the 35th World Table 
Tennis Championship; and the 1984 LA Olympics. These Talks relate to the issues of 
participation, organising ‘A Korean Team’ and other related processes such as team 
selection. Genre is contingently related and limited by the Format, Frame and Talks, yet it is 
more flexible and various in newspaper than in White Paper summary. Whether it has been 
a column, interview, a factual script, description of the scene or the ‘discursive argument’ of 
the reporters themselves, there are complicated elements of information about an event, 
construction of the event as it was interpreted and understood according to ideologies 
whether ‘official’, ‘formal/political’ or ‘personal’. In the discourses, even more specific and 
dynamic subjects emerged in terms of the context of various word usages and connotations 
since their interpretation extends beyond the simple understanding of the language itself but 
even more so of the realities which they embody, as they evolved and were reflected upon 
by people at particular points in time. Lastly the style may be a vehicle for expressing various 
beliefs and values through format which may be manipulated by those in power in order to 
control the themes or discourses in the writings.  
  
Despite Talks relating to the participation of “A Korean Team” in the 1964 Tokyo Olympic 
Games, these Talks failed and both South Korea and North Korea competed as separate 
teams, which manifested a stark rift between North and South Korea in terms of sport 
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relations. A decade later, Talks were initiated by the IOC, in February, 1979. The context of 
international relations from 1978 to 1987 was defined by the Cold War and the Korean 
peninsula was one of the last examples of this opposition. The reasons for the Korean 
peninsula having been chosen as the ground for this confrontation were various. Some 
blamed the lack of national capability following independence from Japan, after Japan was 
defeated in World War II. Others blamed the ignorance of the dominant countries, which 
infringed upon the Korean nation’s sovereignty by making decisions on Korea’s behalf while 
the country was too immature to function effectively. However, in this research, the above 
dispute will not be a subject for discussion rather the analysis will start from awareness of 
the context, which was the Cold War era in international relations and the place, the Korean 
peninsula and its geopolitical location.   
 
International sporting events could not be an exception to the rule of the Cold War political 
order. Rather, the Games were an open theatre of the expressions of political ideologies of 
the Cold War. The 1980 Moscow Olympics and the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics were the so 
called ‘half Games’ since the confrontation of ideological blocks manifested itself in the 
boycotting of the Games hosted by the opposing side. Nevertheless, the discourses around 
the Olympics as a sporting vehicle of peace and harmony, particularly around the period of 
the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games were considerable, and this type of discourse was certainly 
used as part of government propaganda by the South Korean military regime. The meaning 
of the Olympics for North and South Korean regimes and the ways in which international 
sport was used by them within the context of the Cold War will be the primary focus of 
analysis in the forgoing chapter.    
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4.2 The North and South Korean intra-relations since the Korean War 
 
4.2.1 The Cold War as a context of International Sport Relations   
As the Korean War itself manifests, the relations between North and South Korea during the 
last 60 years have been basically hostile, even though there are some differences of degree 
at certain junctures. Nevertheless, the matter of organising ‘A Korean Team’ was first raised 
as issue in 1957. From that date North Korea was formally recognised by the IOC. However, 
the permission to participate in the Olympic Games given at the 53rd IOC session in Bulgaria 
in 1957 was expressly made conditional on South Korea assent’s to their required 
participation as ‘A Korean Team’ a sporting union of North and South Korea. The 59th IOC 
session in 1962 again proposed ‘A Korean Team’ for the 1964 Tokyo Olympics, following a 
similar decision taken in relation to the East and West German case. This was the first time 
that North and South Korea had engaged in Sports Talks face to face. After the first Talks in 
January 1963 in Lausanne, North and South Korea agreed to follow the German approach in 
terms of athlete selection procedure, and choice of anthem ‘Arirang’. About 20 years later, 
they adopted a 1920 version of the national anthem predating the national divide. However, 
continued Talks held in Hong Kong in May 1963 fell apart with disagreement over the Tokyo 
arrangements. The atmosphere of hostility between North and South Korea changed in the 
early 1970s since the mood of détente in international politics began to affect the Korean 
Peninsula. This produced several North and South Korean dialogues and a ‘Joint Statement 
of 7.4’ in 1972 was announced by both sides. Thus, the 7.4 Joint Statements became the 
starting point for a period of ‘Conflict with Dialogue’ as opposed to the previous ‘Conflict 
without Dialogue’. The President of the South Korean Sport Association, Kim, and the 
President of North Korean NOC, Oh, adopted a new statement that they would work for the 
realisation of the North and South Korean interaction in sport. Even though this was a 
fundamental agreement, there still remained the issue of a single team which was raised in 
relation to the 1972 Scandinavian Table Tennis Open and the 1973 Shooting Championship 
in Japan. These steps proved to be significant achievements for North Korea-South Korea 
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relations. Nevertheless, this did not mean that all the discussions between North and South 
Korea from the 7.4 Statement were productive and fruitful. North and South Korea 
continuously imposed their respective views and judgements upon one another, which 
resulted in forced acceptance of decisions that would have otherwise not been accepted or 
preferred, and as a consequence, the Talks ended in controversy most of the time. A 
significant example of this is reflected in Roh-Dong commentary on Yugoslavia’s boycott of 
an international shooting competition in Seoul. 
……A clear statement has been made by the Yugoslavian people who refuse to 
participate in the World Shooting Championship which will be held in Seoul, where the 
South Korean ‘stooge’ governs without the legitimacy of representing all Koreans. The 
Park Jung Hee Regime is based on a fascist violence stand against National unity. 
This just decision by Yugoslavia is significantly damaging to Park’s regime which has 
tried to use sport strategy of ‘Two Cho-Sun (Korea)’ to promote its tainted political 
purpose…… 
(Roh-Dong 20, Mar., 1978)  
By broadcasting this statement in the North Korean media, the North Korean regime wanted 
to stress several points by way of representing the Cold War confrontation between North 
and South Korea. The words “Stooge” and “Fascist violence” are particularly critical of the 
South Korean regime as lacking political legitimacy since this was a military regime 
established by military coup. Roh-Dong also characterises South Korea’s motivation for 
hosting this event as arising out of a ‘tainted political purpose’ that is one which reinforces 
national division to gain diplomatic recognition for itself. North Korea was not alone in being 
concerned by the diplomatic acknowledgment of the North-South spilt by the rest of the 
world. South Korean interests also manifest anxiety about the activities of North Korea in the 
international sport diplomacy arena. Dong-A for example published the following in 1978.       
…… North and South Korea have been divided even in the sport world by nomination 
of a North Korean person to represent the IOC in the North Korean NOC in the 80th 
IOC session……Since North Korea also has an IOC member, the North Korea’s 
political attacks through international sport organisations are likely to grow in 
strength…… 
(Dong-A 22, May, 1978) 
In Dong-A’s articles, it is understood that South Korea has valued the combined 
representation of North and South Korea in the international sport arena. Thus South Korea 
sees the nominating of an IOC member from North Korea as a threat and thus a cause for 
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alarm. The use of IOC membership can be an ideological weapon which legitimates the 
state. These ideas reflecting the Cold War positions were also articulated in the discussion 
of international sport issues concerning the Asian Games and the Olympics.  
……South Korean National team for the ‘82 New Delhi Asian Games has met for its 
official team gathering ceremony to encourage good results in the Games, aiming to be 
ranked 3
rd
 after China and Japan with a victory in the competition between North and 
South Korea…...  
(Dong-A 9, November, 1982) 
In the article, Dong-A clearly acknowledges defeating North Korea as a national ‘goal’ for 
participating in the Games. Coincidentally, the first gold medal for South Korea in the New 
Delhi Asian Games was from the cycling competition in which North and South Korea 
confronted each other directly. Dong-A thus reinforces the distinction between North and 
South Korea (Dong-A 22, November, 1982). In the following sections, we shall proceed to 
consider sport as an arena for competing ideology and how Korean national identity has 
often been the subject of media discourse.     
 
4.2.2 Unification, national wish or burden to be forgotten? 
The critical incident which secured the North and South Korean separation was the Korean 
War. Kim Il Sung’s decision to attack South Korea in 1950 had made North Korea an enemy 
to the South and the situation has thus far been irreversible, incapable of reverting to status 
quo ante. Therefore, since the Korean War, North and South Korea have developed 
recognition of each other as a perceived ‘enemy’, so that the relations between North and 
South Korea had become characterised as competitive and antagonistic. It is obvious that a 
genuine growth of the wish for peaceful unification was in large part based on the Korean 
concept of harmony among a homogeneous Korean ethnic grouping. South Korea’s official 
recognition of North Korea was first provided in a statement of celebration of Korean 
Independence Day on the 15th August in 1970 by President Park. It has been said that this 
statement represents the first attempt to suggest the possibility of establishing the North and 
South Korean contacts. Subsequently, the Joint Statement of 4th of July (7.4) was 
announced in 1972. Whatever political implication of the Joint Statement there might have 
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been, the contents as a whole are interpreted as expressing a determination to solve 
national unification issues based on a ‘clean slate’ without the ideology of separation and a 
divided Korea.        
 
South Korea’s official systematic unification plan was announced from the statement of 
celebration of Korean Independence Day on the 15th August in 1974 through the ‘Three 
basic principles for Peaceful Unification’. The gist of this document is that peace must be 
settled first between North and South Korea by gaining mutual trust through intensified 
contact with each other and the subsequent consideration of unification by national election. 
This ‘First: Peace; second: Unification’ strategy is still the basis of South Korea’s unification 
policy. North Korea’s unification policy is represented in the so called ‘Koryo Federal (Union) 
Republic system’, which would preserve both regimes thus encouraging both of the present 
regimes to support the idea. The basic framework of the unification policy of North and South 
Korea has some fundamental commonalities which can be expressed in the light of three 
aspects: the first is respect for the opposite regime; the second is the emphasis on 
interaction and cooperation; and the third is peaceful unification. There has been a dispute 
on the matter of priority between Unification and Democracy, and both are important in the 
Korean peninsula since unification will be hard to realise without the solid democratic order 
of society. In addition, unification for its own sake is just as dangerous an ideology as the 
dogma of Anti-Communism, and therefore caution must be given to both extremes. In terms 
of analysing North and South Korean sport relations, the background of the North and South 
Korean unification stories must be understood for deeper analysis within its context.  
 
4.2.3 Sport: war without casualty or grounds of self-expression? 
In the 1978 Bangkok Asian Games, North and South Korea played several matches 
competing for medals against one another. The North Korean newspaper, Roh-Dong, and 
Dong-A, newspaper from South Korea were responsible for a certain skewed projection of 
‘reality’ seen through the subjective lens of what they understood or wished to project,  while 
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also participating in the very construction of the reality of the North and South Korean 
relations through media discourses as such relations developed.        
……It is so painful to struggle against each other as a divided nation, in sport 
competitions abroad……On the following picture in the news, the head of our team 
asked to shake hands with North Korean representatives, but a North Korean player 
just stood bearing no expression. What I felt from that was ‘There is no freedom at all’. 
There were no words from any other team members, so we were even sorry to have 
asked to shake hands when they refused……Whatever the politicians do between 
North and South Korea, sport and cultural relations it is hoped will get better…… 
(Dong-A 4, November,1978) 
Dong-A described the confrontation of North and South Korea on the sport field as “so 
painful”. It is interesting to encounter this sad expression particularly from a Dong-A news 
reporter. Although North and South Korea have had a cease-fire agreement and have been 
physically divided as two separate entities for about 25 years, whether or not the two nations 
openly acknowledge each other as a separate nation or not, the reality of the ‘split’ itself is 
considered to be both an ‘obvious sorrow’ and a ‘wound’ for the Korean Nation. Furthermore, 
the following description of the scene of people from North and South Korea meeting 
provides a valuable insight helping not only to understand the North Korean people and their 
attitudes toward uninhibited, spontaneous communication with South Korea people, but also 
entailing a symbolic implication, that is, by saying that ‘we [South Korea] felt sorry’ about 
North Korea’s refusal to shake hands, the gap that exists between North and South Korea 
was emphasised, creating a greater rift between the two regimes in the minds of readers.  
 
Interestingly enough, in the 1978 Bangkok Asian Games, North and South Korea used and 
was cheered by the same name ‘Korea’. This name originated from one of the dynasties in 
the Korean peninsula called ‘Koryo’ (918-1392), which had ruled most of the peninsular area 
and this was therefore a well-known term among neighbouring countries through trade along 
the Silk Road It was thus noted that North Korea had also cheered for their team by the 
name of ‘Korea’, even though North Korean people call themselves ‘Cho-Sun’ in Korean 
referring to the last Korean dynasty.  
……Our players keep winning medals in the 8
th
 Asian Games…...Particularly, Choi 
gave a great performance and spectators raised their thumbs and shouted ‘Korea, 
Korea’ with loud applause…… 
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(Roh-Dong 14, Dec. 1978) 
Roh-Dong emphasised the achievement of North Korean athletes winning a medal in the 
competition, but did not show much enthusiasm for promoting the propaganda of its regime 
or advancing its political values by means of the Games.  
……Our shooters have achieved various Games records in the 8
th
 Asian Games with 4 
gold medals and 2 silvers……The spectators showed enormous support and cheering   
for our players.….. 
(Roh-Dong 15, Dec. 1978)   
However, Dong-A showed that South Korea was significantly concerned about winning the 
Games (outperforming the North) for the benefit of its national reputation, so it established a 
sport training facility for elite athletes. It was even critical in the Asian Games that national 
reputations tended to be judged more by national ranking, so the South Korea wanted to 
affirm its ranking in 3rd place behind China and Japan. In the following article, the intention to 
use sport as a tool of diplomacy by identifying ‘position in Sport’ as a ‘position in the 
International Status’ can be clearly noted through the words from the president of the KOC.  
……President Kim of the KOC emphasised that ‘South Korea kept its third place in the 
Asian Games because of the consistently intensive preparation provided in the athletes’ 
camp, and only with such preparation can we maintain the strong position of the South 
Korean team among the World’s top countries.’…… 
                                                                                          (Dong-A 23, December,1978) 
 
4.3 The 35th World Table Tennis Championships in Pyongyang 
 
4.3.1 The issues surrounding the organising of ‘A Korean Team’ 
The issue of North Korea’s hosting the 35th World Table Tennis Championships in Pyung 
Yang was certainly a subject of considerable discussion between the two Koreas, and it was 
uncertain whether South Korea would participate in the championships or not, with 
organising a unified team for this International competition. Dong-A cited the Minister of 
Culture and Education of South Korea who was responsible for South Korean sport policy 
indicating that he had given his assent. South Korea’s agreement to participate in the 
competition was to be on condition that the South Korean team’s security would be 
guaranteed by the North Korean administration. This is not only a sign of the state of the 
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North and South Korean interactions through sport, but also provides evidence to counter 
claims of the shallow and tenuous mutual trust that existed between the North and South 
Korean people.   
……The Minister of Culture and Education said that he would dispatch a South Korea team 
when he is officially invited on the 35
th
 World Table Tennis Championship in Pyongyang in 
April, with an official invitation and guarantee of our security on the way to and returning from 
Pyongyang……  
(Dong-A 9, January, 1979) 
The principal source of mistrust at this time was made manifest in Dong-A article, and it is 
possible that since these championships were held in North Korea, Dong-A publishers were 
not at liberty to be supportive of the success of North Korea’s international sport events 
because of South Korea’s own totalitarian regime. This claim can be supported by the 
following articles, which describe Dong-A’s attitudes toward the ‘expected letters’ from North 
Korea on this sport issue. North Korea suggested a round table discussion to talk about the 
matter concerning the “North Korea-South Korea Unified Team” for the World Table Tennis 
Championship. In the article, Dong-A had called North Korea a “stooge regime”, but had 
acknowledged the benefits of “A Korean Team” which would hasten national unity between 
North and South Korea.  
……The North Korea stooge regime broadcast that the North Korean Sport Governing 
Committee and Table Tennis Association had sent a letter to President Park, of the 
Korean Sport Association and the President of the Table Tennis Association of South 
Korea and has suggested the idea of having a North Korea-South Korean unified team 
……This letter said that it would be a great achievement for North and South Korea to 
participate as a unified team in the Pyongyang World Table Tennis and promote the 
unity of North and South Korea…… 
(Dong-A 21, Feburary, 1979-1)  
……The discussion about organising a unified North and South Korean team has 
taken place several times in the past. However, constructive dialogue has also broken-
down several times due to disagreement about the basic conditions for a North and 
South Korean team such as team name, team song and team flag…… 
(Dong-A 21, February, 1979-2)  
Although South Korea refers to the Korean Team as ‘a unified team’ of North and South 
Korea, there were still many things to be decided such as the ‘team name, team song and 
team flag’ and so forth. Dong-A treats these issues in a style and manner of writing that 
seem to describe a sense of passivity and resignation, due to the failure of previous Talks 
and a sense of pessimism with regard to future Talks. The South Korean government simply 
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noted that the suggestion of a unified North Korean team was a bold statement, but even in 
this dispassionate tone which implies that it has been written objectively, South Korea used 
the term ‘Unified Team’ instead of ‘Unification Team’ which must be used by South Korean 
representatives as a requirement of the North Korean representatives at the Talks.  
 
[Table 4.2] The 1
st
 – 4
th
 North and South Korean Table Tennis Association Discussion-1 
 Content 
Title The 1
st
 – 4
th
 North and South Korean Table Tennis Association Discussion 
Date 1979.02.27/03.05/03.09/03.12 
Venue Panmunjom JAS (Joint Security Area) Northern and Southern areas in turns 
Summary North Korea has suggested having a discussion on the 27
th
 of February, 
concerning the matter of organising Unified Team for the 35
th
 World Table 
Tennis Championship which will be held in Pyongyang on the 25
th
 of April’. 
 
The Roh-Dong article, which was written the very next day after the Talks, clearly shows a 
rather different tone of excitement about the suggestion of a unified team. In addition, North 
Korea sought to persuade its people that a strong national reputation as ethnic Korean 
people would be achieved by a good performance by the unified team, and it must therefore 
be an ideal, or a firm objective, for all Korean people. This statement not only represented 
the wishes of the North Korean government, but also contributed to readers’ perception of 
the ‘reality’ of the Korean peninsula as it is. So the Roh-Dong newspaper sought to 
manipulate the discourses as Dong-A has done with its destructive forecast of the Talks.      
……Let’s participate in the World Table Tennis Championship as a ‘Unification Team’ 
so that we can provide great pleasure to all the ethnic Korean peoples by showing the 
power of ethnic unity and wisdom to the world…..There has been a first meeting 
between the North and South Korean sport representatives from each table tennis 
association…… 
(Roh-Dong 28, Feb. 1979-1) 
Roh-Dong had proposed a possible solution to the issues facing both sides such as the 
creation of a team name ‘Koryo’. Furthermore, Roh-Dong forced South Korea to create an 
impression of progress by saying that it had accepted its suggestion of organising a unified 
team. North Korea had seemed to believe that the ITTF (International Table Tennis 
Federation) would have to accept the decision made by North and South Korea concerning 
the Korean team by expressing the fact that it ‘welcomed’ the resolution. The anxiety 
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surrounding the subject of a ‘Unification Team’ of North Korea was expressed with the 
unusual suggestion of producing a joint statement indicating basic agreement on the issue.   
……We have suggested to use the name ‘Koryo’ as the name for our Unification 
Team……The point is that whether South Korea wants to organise a Unification Team 
or not…...If we agree on the organising of a single team, then the international Table 
Tennis Association will welcome the result.….At last, let’s announce this basic 
agreement as a joint statement…… 
(Roh-Dong 28, Feb. 1979-2) 
However, the dialogue appears to have not been going well based on the following article of 
Dong-A. It was explained that there were ‘fundamental differences’ in terms of ‘language (not 
the Korean itself but the meaning and uses of it) and ways of thing’. It has been noted that 
South Korea lacked ‘compassion’ in refusing to call the team a ‘Unification Team’ and for 
organising the team with little time before the games. It seems that the reasons for this 
‘destructive’ South Korean response were that it was “practical but too idealistic”. Dong-A 
characterized these Talks as non-cooperative dialogue. The one part that is at least 
somewhat optimistic in South Korea’s response was that it had admitted the potential of 
sports rather than politics.       
……Something which can be more progressive than politics is sport, but the 1
st
 North 
and South Korean Table Tennis Talks have shown too many gaps between North and 
South Korea. The fundamental difference is language. The expression concerning the 
Unified Team discussion of North and South Korea is as a unified team of North and 
South Korea and the unifying factor is the ‘collaboration of Sport’..….The language gap 
is nothing. The dissimilar way of thinking has been more problematic. North Korea has 
proposed that the selection of players, practice together in Pyongyang and the title of 
‘Koryo’ be used for the Unified Team. These seem to be very practical and rational 
proposals, but too idealistic when the game is just 50 days away……It was not a very 
cooperative dialogue……     
(Dong-A 2, March, 1979-2) 
With the acrimonious response of South Korea to the North’s proposals for a ‘Unification 
Team’, North Korea responded strongly. First, North Korea pointed out that South Korea had 
been asked to guarantee the South Korean team’s independent participation in the games in 
case these unified team Talks were to break down. What increased the ambiguity and level 
of suspicion on the part of North Korea was the fact that South Korea had never referred to 
the team as a ‘Unification Team’. This must have been a point at the discussion table, and 
actually, it should have been impossible to proceed with proper communication between two 
representatives of the Talks without maintaining these fundamental differences of 
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terminologies. As Bertrand Russell once said, we can only say the words that we know, so 
the difference of terms implies basically the gap between the terms that have been used.     
……South Korea has proposed North Korea to guarantee the South Korean team’s 
independent participation and the competition……South Korea has never even 
mentioned the ‘Unification Team’ once .…..’Is it that scary to say the word ‘Unification’? 
In the discussion for the Unification Team, they even never speak of a ‘Unification 
Team’ and try to use vague terms such as a ‘Unified Team’ and ‘Interactions’, which 
appear tedious and stuffy…...  
(Roh-Dong 8, Mar. 1979-1) 
North Korea tried to solve this disagreement between North and South Korea by using its 
diplomatic power in the wider world. The reason why North Korea concluded the Talks with 
this solution is that North Korea had always considered South Korea as a puppet regime of 
the United States of America, so North Korea might have attempted to speed up its 
dialogues with the South Korea by using pressure from the rest of the world to cooperate in 
North Korea’s international sport events. The following commentary of North Korea shows its 
concern about the USA’s involvement on this issue.   
……The organising of a Unification Team of the single ethnic nation Cho Sun (Korea) 
is a matter which needs to be solved by ourselves, so nobody else should get involved 
in this matter…… 
(Roh-Dong 8, Mar. 1979-2) 
However, it is ironic that the North Korean representatives kept insisting on ‘independence’ 
from a single Korean nationality, while at the same time also using a diplomatic strategy as a 
way of achieving its unified team objective. Here, it can be said that sport diplomacy can not 
only utilize sport as a tool to promote diplomatic relations, but also diplomatic relations may 
be manipulated in order to advance cooperation in sporting activities for the sake of sports. 
The former concept can be called ‘sport for diplomacy’ while the latter can be entitled as 
‘diplomacy for sport’.    
 
4.3.2 International support for establishing ‘A Korean Team’   
Once North Korea had endeavoured to make a ‘Unification Team, it started to use diplomatic 
approaches as well, to put South Korea in a position wherein it could not refuse its proposal. 
Roh-Dong published the statements from various organisations and the people from the 
countries with which North Korea had diplomatic relations. One of the best allies of North 
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Korea was Palestine since Palestine also confronted Israel in the international sport arena, 
as a proxy battlefield. In the following article, messages of support for a ‘Unification Team’ 
were sent from both Palestine and Indonesia although the level of support from respective 
countries varied to a certain degree.      
……The Rabetik [name as spelt by the author) Palestine sport spokesperson said that 
……Cho Sun must participate in the 35
th
 World Table Tennis Championship as a 
‘Unification Team’……The leader of the Indonesia Table Tennis Association team said 
that Indonesia enthusiastically welcomed the participation of the Unification Team.….. 
(Roh-Dong 8, Mar. 1979-3) 
Palestine’s backing of the idea of a ‘Unification Team’ was more aggressive than that of 
Indonesia which was expressed in a comment on the matter saying that it would ‘welcome 
the participation of unified team’. In addition, the Czechoslovakian Table Tennis Association 
had sent a letter to the ITTF to accept the North and South Korean unified team well before 
its inception, since the ITTF’s reluctance to accept a Korean team was clearly a barrier that 
hindered South Korea’s decision-making and participation in the Talks. The symbolic 
allusion to the significance of a unified team was briefly mentioned in the letter, stating that 
the ‘North and South Korean division was a clear threat to World Peace’, and that the ITTF 
as an International sport organisation, indeed had a duty to do what they could to contribute 
to World peace by accepting the application of the unified team.  
……The Czechoslovak table tennis association sent a letter to the International Table 
Tennis Federation asking that the ITTF would accept the Unification Team……The 
Vice President of the ITTF Aminabuheif [name as spelt by author) sent letters to ITTF 
and the Japanese Table Tennis Association arguing that the division of North and 
South Korea is not only a tragedy but also harmful to World peace, so the ITTF should 
help them to participate in the 35
th
 World table tennis championship as a Unification 
Team……  
(Roh-Dong 8, Mar. 1979-5) 
Czechoslovakia was not the only country to demonstrate backing of the North 
Korea’s ’Unification Team’ suggestion, and Roh-Dong had correspondingly cited the news 
for the national table tennis associations from Africa. It utilised tools of diplomacy by 
identifying or analogising position in sports with position in the context of international 
relations as expressed in the words from the president of the KOC (Korean (South Korea) 
Olympic Committee). The University council of the UN in Namibia argued for the peaceful 
unification of Cho Sun, and the Ghana Table Tennis Association expressed through a 
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statement that South Korea should have accepted the unified team for the World Table 
Tennis Championship, which would have been helpful in the matter of North and South 
Korea‘s mutual understanding.   
……The university council of UN Namibia for the Cho Sun peaceful unification 
supporter has pointed out that South Korea must accept North Korea’s proposal for 
organising the Unification table tennis team in a statement of 3
rd
 April…...On the other 
hand, Ghana Table Tennis Association said through their statement that they strongly 
supported the North Korea’s proposal of a Unification Team for the 35
th
 World Table 
Tennis Championship and this proposal could be more meaningful by helping North 
and South Korea to better understand each other more deeply……     
(Roh-Dong 19, April 1979-2) 
The method of playing supportive messages from abroad was part of the North Korea’s 
strategy for organising the ‘Unification Team’ by maintaining pressure on South Korea to 
accept the proposal. It might be more persuasive for both the North and South Korean 
people, to hear the comments published in Roh-Dong as opinions of foreign countries, even 
though they are obviously allies of North Korea. Therefore, whether North Korea had 
intended it or not, the above articles had performed a significant role as a tool of public 
diplomacy, to support the interpretation of the news provider. In this case, North Korea 
already had certain diplomatic purposes for hosting this event. Once hosted successfully, the 
event would provide North Korea with considerable propaganda to promote its regime to the 
wider world with ‘evidence’ that North Korea ‘developed continually under the guidance of 
the great leader Kim Il Sung’.  
……The preparation for the 35
th
 World Table Tennis Championship has been 
finished……Through this event, our guests from the world will know that the real 
situation of North Korea which has developed continually under the great guidance of 
the dear leader Kim Il Sung. And also peoples will know of our friendship to them since 
we all love peace and therefore, we will be able to grow in friendship…… 
(Roh-Dong 20, April 1979-1)  
Such an approach was a typical example of Cold War diplomacy. However to fully seize on 
the opportunity, North Korea had to persuade the South Korea regime to participate in effect 
under the dominance of the North Korean host team.    
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4.3.3 The different perspectives on ‘A Korean Team’   
With respect to issues associated with organising ‘a unified team of North and South Korea’, 
many interesting discourse elements emerged in the discussion. These were not simply 
technical matters about the pros and cons of team arrangement or the views of North Korea 
and the South Korea government, reflected in the context of Roh-Dong and Dong-A, but 
there were also  reported views of other countries. In the following articles, the political 
values of North and South Korea were displayed in the discussion about the team. The term 
‘Unification Team’ was deeply symbolic for North Korea. Roh-Dong suggested that it would 
contribute to bridge the 30-years divide between North and South Korea and would provide 
a vital step to the Korean national unification.   
……The participation of the 35
th
 World Table Tennis Championship as a Unification 
Team will……open the door to unification……  
(Roh-Dong 8, Mar. 1979-4) 
The implication of this message demonstrates the level of passion which is required to 
progress national unification, and was reflected in the attitude toward organising a 
Unification Team in this sport event. On balance, however, North Korea was clearly trying to 
steer South Korea into a no-win situation. If South Korea agreed to have a ‘Unification Team’ 
then clearly North Korea could be seen as a leading the process, if they disagreed with the 
proposal, North Korea could take the moral high ground because it would appear as the side 
that had actually tried to pursue unification through sports while South Korea refused to do 
so. Roh-Dong had written that South Korea ‘decided in advance not to make a Unification 
Team and ‘tried to participate in the games by themselves as a separate team from North 
Korea. North Korea had blamed South Korea for failing to agree to the announcing of a joint 
statement which included the fact that North and South Korea generally agreed on the basic 
principles of organising ‘a Unified Team’.    
South Korea has already decided in advance not to make a Unification Team and has 
pursued its purpose of participating as a separate nation in the Games……Give 
consideration to the matter of whether South Korea has been passionate enough about 
organising a Unification team or not……We have clear evidence that South Korea is 
against organising a Unification Team. South Korea has not even agreed to announce 
that we both have agreed on the fundamental principle of organising a Unification 
Team, and South Korea keeps asking us to guarantee their right to participate in the 
Games as a separate team…… 
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(Roh-Dong 10, Mar. 1979-2/3/4) 
North Korea sought to reach the conclusion of establishing a Unification Team first without 
agreement on the details of the negotiation. This tactic of agreeing unconditionally to 
organise a Unification Team was interpreted simply as a way to prevent South Korea 
players' participating in the championship. In the South Korea government’s Talks summary, 
it is noted that South Korea had received pressure with the ‘North Korea going into the Talks’ 
with a predetermined position on this ‘unified team’ discussion, with the South Korea 
government deeply suspicious of its purposes.  
[Table 4.3] The 1
st
 – 4
th
 North and South Korean Table Tennis Association Discussion-2 
 Content 
Title The 1
st
 – 4
th
 North and South Korean Table Tennis Association Discussion 
Date 1979.02.27/03.05/03.09/03.12 
Venue Panmunjom JAS (Joint Security Area) Northern and Southern areas in turns 
Summary North Korea suggested fundamental agreement of having the ‘unified team’ 
from the beginning of the Talks, with full suggestion of following 
procedures…… 
 
South Korea had also understood that this was the case as demonstrated in the South 
Korea summary of Talks as well. South Korea had basically agreed on having the sport 
Talks and on having a ‘unified team’ discussion, but South Korea considered the outcome of 
reaching a successful agreement by these Talks to be doubtful as it alluded to the timeline 
for this Talks. At the very least, South Korea wanted to prepare for the consequences of 
these Talks, which they had presumed. North Korea had responded that as South Korea 
played the Korean people and the rest of the world for fraud 
……However, South Korea has just come to the Talk as if they agreed on the idea of 
Unification Team but they have made unreasonable excuses from the beginning 
displaying an insincere attitude……South Korea now has revealed its position to the 
whole Korean people and to the world that they don’t have any intention of making a 
Unification Team for the Pyongyang World Table Tennis Championship…… 
(Roh-Dong 13, Mar. 1979)  
However, from the South Korea perspective this labelling was an unfair and an 
unreasonable conclusion to draw, since the South Korean government was against 
accepting North Korea’s unilateral suggestions without safeguards. The South Korea had 
asked North Korea to promise the participation of South Korea players in the Championship, 
 
 
86 
 
through the Panmunjom route (located in the Demilitarised Zone between North and South 
Korea) to show the progress of the 'peaceful' relationship to the Korean people. Thus, South 
Korea was also concerned with the symbolic representation of ‘one nation, ethnic 
nationalism’, an ideology shared by both the North and the South Korean regimes and thus 
forming a cornerstone of the dominant discourse of Korean nationalism. The phrase ‘arrange 
everything' seemed to imply the transfer of all responsibility for managing the process to 
North Korea whatever the result of discussions. The following lines describe South Korea’s 
passive attitude in terms of the issue and result of unified team-related Talks.  
[Table 4.4] The 1
st
 – 4
th
 North and South Korean Table Tennis Association Discussion-3 
 Content 
Title The 1
st
 – 4
th
 North and South Korean Table Tennis Association Discussion 
Date 1979.02.27/03.05/03.09/03.12 
Venue Panmunjom JAS (Joint Security Area) Northern and Southern areas in turns 
Summary In this discussion, the representatives of South Korea emphasized that if North 
and South Korea will not reach an agreement on the organising of a unified 
team by 12
th
 of March, North Korea should guarantee the participation of South 
Korea players through Panmunjom and make all the appropriate arrangements 
 
Roh-Dong expressed the points made in the North Korea’s condemnation of South Korea by 
quoting the exact dialogue of the Talks. North Korean representatives had characterized 
South Korea representatives as ‘cold-hearted’ and even had stated that “South Korea is 
afraid of collaboration with the North Korea”, which is a significant claim whether it is true or 
not. If it were true, then South Korea was deceiving not only the Korean people but also 
international society and if it were not true, then it was nevertheless still the case that mutual 
distortion and misunderstanding was a huge barrier to the realisation of their ‘national wish’ 
for Unification.  
…… ‘How cold-hearted the representatives are, how can they just ignore the Korean 
people’s wishes’……even the reporters from South Korea said that ‘people want  a 
Unification Team but they (South Korea sport representatives) are against these 
wishes’ and they criticised their own representatives. The attitudes reflect the fact that 
South Korea representatives are afraid of collaboration between North and South 
Korea on the sport field…… 
(Roh-Dong 11, Mar. 1979-3) 
It was plainly indicated in the following article by Roh-Dong when South Korea had just 
entered the Talks that the South Korea people were allegedly willing to agree on the idea of 
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a ‘Unification Team’ but “the attitude and reasons for objection are nonsense”. This is not all; 
Roh-Dong cited the comment of South Korea reporters blaming their own representatives for 
acting with ‘shamelessness’. Since this was the North Korea’s perception of the South Korea, 
it would not have been expected that a unified team would enter the 35th International Table 
Tennis Championship, and such a view was also stated in an April 25th article of Roh-Dong.   
……South Korea was against organising the Unification Team and openly sought to 
participate as separate teams. They also removed themselves from the 
Talks……South Korea representatives have just acted according to scripts. We have 
asked South Korea reporters and they answered that ‘This is just shamelessness’……   
(Roh-Dong 15, Mar. 1979-6) 
……However, I am afraid that we cannot participate as a Unification Team due to the 
insincere attitude which is bringing about permanent separation of our ethnic 
people…… 
(Roh-Dong 25, April 1979-1)  
The following Roh-Dong article, demonstrates North Korea’s flawed logic when judging 
South Korea’s intention with regards to national unification by means of organising a 
‘Unification Team’.     
……If South Korea doesn’t agree to the organising of a ‘Unification Team’, then it 
would mean that South Korea doesn’t want unification of the South Korea and North 
Korea……, we want to have a positive achievement of the Talks in DMZ, 
Panmunjom…… 
(Roh-Dong 9, Mar. 1979) 
Additionally, North Korea had also articulated their desire to know whether the Talks 
represented a ‘positive achievement’ and not something entirely dependent on the issue of 
whether the unification team would be organised or not. What then had been the logic 
behind South Korea’s response to North Korea’s suggestion? The following article in Dong-A 
explains the intent of South Korea in some sense.  
……The representative Chae said that North and South Korean sport relations and 
organising a unified team for North and South Korea is fundamentally one matter, and 
discussions about a Unified Team are part of North and South Korean sport 
relations.…..It can only interpret North Korea’s refusal to acknowledge the South Korea 
team’s right to participate as a violation of the regulations of the ITTF, if North Korea 
doesn’t guarantee the South Korea team’s participation in the Pyongyang Games 
before the discussions of the organising the North Korean team are held…… 
(Dong-A 9, |March, 1979-2) 
The above article demonstrates the differing views of North and South Korea regarding the 
framework of organising the North and South Korean team. South Korea views the 
organisation of a single team as something that ought to be accomplished over time. 
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Therefore, for South Korea, if the Unification Team was not achieved on this occasion, it 
would be achieved at some point in the future and at the right time, but participation in this 
competition as simply a South Korea team was still important for them. However, North 
Korea considered the first stage to have been accomplished already. Thus there was a 
significant gap between the speed and scheduling of this procedure on the part of North and 
South Korea.  
……The socialist group of people in Japan has criticised South Korea which has ruined 
the Talks between North and South Korea to organise a Korean National Unification 
Team……We believe that the proposal of a Unification Team was a good way to 
advance the unification of the Cho Sun (Korea)…… 
(Roh-Dong 18, Mar. 1979)  
In the above article, Roh-Dong accuses South Korea of ruining ‘the Unification team’ 
discussions which had been seen as having great benefit for national unification. However, 
South Korea’s perception of the Talks seems different. In the following summary, South 
Korea used the word ‘acceptance’, which has a meaning similar to ‘answer’ or ‘response’ but 
with the nuance of ‘allowing’ and ‘permitting’. Thus, these Talks were made possible 
because of South Korea’s openness to the fact that North Korea had been willing to organise 
a unified team.  
[Table 4.5] The 1
st
 – 4
th
 North and South Korean Table Tennis Association Discussion-4 
 Content 
Title The 1
st
 – 4
th
 North and South Korean Table Tennis Association Discussion 
Date 1979.02.27/03.05/03.09/03.12 
Venue Panmunjom JAS (Joint Security Area) Northern and Southern areas in turns 
Summary By the acceptance of Korean Sport Association and Korean Table Tennis 
Association, these Talks were held and were carried out four times in total 
 
The argument between North and South Korea seems to have been treated as a practical 
matter, but the realisation came clear early on that sport relations were too significant to be 
treated as mere administrative work. Nevertheless, North Korea had been confident that the 
decision made by the Korean people regarding a unification team would be accepted by 
international sport organisations, such as the ITTF, and North Korea condemned South 
Korea’s assumption that it would not have been easily accepted by such bodies. The world 
view of North Korea authorities was clearly evident in the following articles.  
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…… ‘As it was clearly presented during the process of the Talks, we have requested 
that South Korea  be allowed to participate in the Pyongyang International Competition, 
however, South Korea has created obstacles by saying that it is not rational that we 
organise the Unification Team. We are the ethnic who want to form The Unification 
Team so we can do it ourselves. In other words, there won’t be any problem which we 
cannot resolve ourselves for organising a Unification Team…… 
(Roh-Dong 10, Mar. 1979-2/3/4) 
……The International Table Tennis Federation (ITTF) was ready to accept a National 
Unification Team…… 
(Roh-Dong 16, Mar. 1979)  
There was a connection between the North Korea’s emphasis on the proposal that South 
Korea can “make our (Korean) Unification Team us (both North and South Korea)” and “the 
ITTF will then accept our unification team”. This is consistent with the Ju-Che ideology of 
North Korea which emphasizes its independence in international relations. In addition 
political allies of North Korea (legacy left wing totalitarian regimes) and socialist parties in 
other states continued to relay messages of support through National Table Tennis 
Associations in order to persuade the ITTF. On the other hand, South Korea stated in the 
summary of Talks that the motivation behind the North Korea’s proposal was to prevent 
South Korea from participating in the 35th International Table Tennis Competition. Given the 
suspicion, there was a fundamental problem of trust between the two regimes which would 
have to be addressed.  
[Table 4.6] The 1
st
 – 4
th
 North and South Korean Table Tennis Association Discussion-5 
 Content 
Title The 1
st
 – 4
th
 North and South Korean Table Tennis Association Discussion 
Date 1979.02.27/03.05/03.09/03.12 
Venue Panmunjom JAS (Joint Security Area) Northern and Southern areas in turns 
Summary 'The representatives of the Korean Table Tennis Association pointed out that 
the purpose of organising this united team at the suggestion of North Korea is 
to obstruct the South Korea players' right to participate in the 
championships……the South Korea was requested to secure the right of 
separate participation in the games 
 
The vivid differences in the realities constructed by North and South Korea through the 
media and the record of the official Talks became very obvious. Although the rhetoric 
concerning the ‘inevitable’ national unification might not seem to have been that different, 
while the organising processes proposed were quite similar in terms of approach, the two 
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parties suffered from a complete breakdown of trust, blaming each other for ruining the Talks, 
and accusing each other of bad faith.  
……The Talks have happened four times but have not concluded anything on the 
matter of organising a Unification Team as the Korean people would have wished, due 
to the allegedly unreasonable excuses and disturbance of South Korea…… Unification 
of the two separated ethnic entities of the homeland is our wish……We want to foster 
collaboration through sports by means of arranging a table tennis unification team, and 
spread that same notion to art, science and all other areas to take a short cut towards 
unification…….Unification is the only way to true nationalistic patriotism and separation 
is rebellion against the nation - and against ethnicity……   
(Roh-Dong 14, Mar. 1979-1) 
In the above articles, North Korea has explicitly assumed that the establishing of a 
Unification Team would provide an important easy step or ‘short cut’ in the journey towards 
national unification, while North Korea considers other forms of ‘collaboration between North 
and South Korea’. 
[Table 4.7] The 1
st
 – 4
th
 North and South Korean Table Tennis Association Discussion-6 
 Content 
Title The 1
st
 – 4
th
  North and South Korean Table Tennis Association Discussion 
Date 1979.02.27/03.05/03.09/03.12 
Venue Panmunjom JAS (Joint Security Area) Northern and Southern areas in turns 
Summary North Korea avoided answering this question, and was obstinate on the 
agreement of having a unified team. By doing so, North Korea clearly stated 
that they will refuse the separate participation of South Korea players in the 
games 
 
However, South Korea suggested that North Korea deliberately evaded the South Korea’s 
question concerning whether North Korea would accept the separate participation of South 
Korea when the Talks failed since North Korea remained ' obstinate' about having a unified 
team. North Korea used vague and ambiguous language without explaining to South Korea 
readers exactly what North Korea’s true intentions might be and this caused South Korea’s 
suspicion of the North Korea’s approach to the Talks. Furthermore, this statement was 
interpreted to mean that ‘This is the position of North Korea which has tried to prevent South 
Korea’s participation in the Championship’. If South Korea interpreted North Korea’s attitude 
as one of trying to ensure South Korea’s absence from the Championship, then South 
Korea’s attitude also can be interpreted as one of trying to ensure that the ‘creation of a 
unified team’ is not the ultimate goal of the Talks and is considered as just a ‘modest’ 
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gesture trying not to provoke North Korea or its supporters. Hence, on balance, an analysis 
of this argument would demonstrate that both parties were seeking their own interests in the 
Sports Talks, and so the purpose of the same was to find common interests to aid both 
parties to more towards unification. The context of North and South Korean relations still 
seemed to be based on Cold War conflict despite the purported ‘progressive’ standpoint. 
Nevertheless, Roh-Dong consistently and publicly expressed the North Korea’s own 
enthusiasm for the organising of a Unification Team.    
……We will continue to put effort into organising a Unification Team and we are ready 
to restart Talks whenever it is necessary. We want South Korea to respond to this clear 
gesture…… 
(Roh-Dong 4, April 1979) 
North Korea advertised the fact that it had made great efforts to politely suggest holding the 
5th Talks with South Korea.  
……We politely suggested to the South Korea Table Tennis Association to open the 5
th
 
Talks with representatives from the North and South Korean table tennis 
associations.….. 
(Roh-Dong 19, April 1979-1)  
The question therefore presents itself as to why South Korea had not responded positively 
(as evidenced by its version of the Talks) and why it interpreted the North Korea’s version of 
the event (as reflected in Roh-Dong’s articles) in a negative manner. Was this South Korea’s 
intention all along or was it an inevitable outcome of South Korea’s original intention which 
had eventually become so negative? In considering these issues account needs to be taken 
of the political context and of North Korea’s actions in the broader political spheres. The 
period was marked by incidents of North Korean spies seeking to penetrate South Korea. 
Additionally it was also known that North Korea tried to disrupt a meeting between 
representatives of South Korea and the president of Czechoslovakia. These circumstances, 
it is not surprising that South Korea would be suspicious of the North Korea’s purported aim 
to promote “cooperation and peaceful unification”. So South Korea had grave suspicions that 
the North Korea’s reason for inviting South Korea to the Talks to discuss the establishment 
of a unification team had an ulterior negative political purpose.  
……It is regrettable that the ITTF has made a statement that North Korea is still 
making an effort to organise a unified team for North and South Korea and that the 
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ITTF considers this as a ‘Promise being kept’……How can the ITTF see this trick as a 
promise being kept?...... North Korea anti-nationalists have made this play to deceive 
South Korea and world opinion. North Korea only suggested the proposal for a single 
team two months ahead of the Championship in order to make it impossible to achieve. 
We, South Korea, saw these motives and asked them to guarantee our right to 
participate separately but they refused, revealing their true motive. It is strange that 
North Korea suggested organising a unified team only a few days ago, continually, 
repeating this impossible proposal as though talking in their deception…… 
(Dong-A 25, April, 1979) 
Interesting claims are made here, suggesting that the reason why North Korea continued to 
ask to host the Talks was that they wanted to show the world that they were leading the 
effort on national unification through this sporting event. This tactic seemed to have paid off 
at least with the sporting authorities when the ITTF concluded that North Korea, though 
unsuccessful, had made real efforts to promote unification of North and South Korea.  
 
4.3.4 Propaganda of the 35th World Table Tennis Championships in 1979 
Just prior to, and during the 35th World Table Tennis Championship, portraying North 
Korea’s involvement in international relations through sport became a goal of Roh-Dong. 
This event was seen as a great opportunity for North Korea to deliver its message to the 
world through the voices of its guests. The teams from Cyprus, the Lebanon and Tanzania 
had tours around the Pyongyang city, and were interviewed about what they had seen.  
……Various countries’ players and representatives who are participating in the 35
th
 
World Table Tennis Championship are looking around Pyongyang and other land 
marks in rural areas……Cypriot table tennis players  visited the Cho Sun rebellion 
museum and said that they were impressed  by the great achievement made under the 
wise guidance of the great leader Kim Il Sung……The leader of the Lebanon 
delegation said that Cho Sun people will surely achieve unification…...The leader of 
the Tanzanian delegation said that they knew clearly that foreign powers were directly 
interfering with North and South Korean relations……Now North and South Korea are 
very different. The North Korean people are living a happy life while the South Korean 
people are not…… 
(Roh-Dong 6, May 1979-3) 
Ordinarily, a visiting delegate might have commented on their impressions of the city, or 
thoughts about the people or even on the weather, but here, the leaders of these  
delegations were reportedly commenting on political issues such as the ‘Cho Sun (Korea) 
people’s unification’ and the interference of ‘Foreign Powers’. Thus, the article implies the 
political and moral superiority of the North Korean position, as well as its material superiority 
in terms of the happiness of its citizens. A frequent tactic employed by the North Korean 
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regime was to draw sympathy on the plight of families divided by the political split, as when 
North Korea invited a family member from the USA for a visit to their relatives in North Korea 
in order to underscore the sorrow and anguish brought about by the political divide. The 
insinuated implication here is that this position was concocted and sustained by the west.    
……The 35
th
 World Table Tennis Championship has allowed  Korean American family 
members to visit North Korea to meet family and relatives……the USA has occupied 
half of our homeland for 30 years, and it caused huge damage through the Korean War. 
Now it is even interfering in the process of unification…… 
(Roh-Dong 29, April 1979-1)  
The implication of the above quote is that the tragic circumstances that were created by the 
political divide were a product of US foreign policy. The South Korean version of this story is 
one which sees the Korean War as sparked by the aggression of North Korea. On the other 
hand, the South Korean media sought to portray North Korea as technically incompetent in 
terms of staging major sporting Championships. 
……There is a considerable gap between North and South Korea in terms of their 
ability to organise international competitions. The North Korea has trouble in managing 
its records…… North Korea didn’t record properly and even had difficulties in terms of 
keeping appropriate records of various mistakes…...This is part of what Michael 
Cossack from Hungary’ column from AIPS ‘International Sport’ the 3
rd
 of 1979, since 
he participated the 35
th
 World Table Tennis Championship……By contrast, AIPS 
Basketball Commission, General Secretary Medellin Bell (spelling by author) has 
written about the 8
th
 World Women’s Basketball Competition in Seoul in April that ‘it 
was a  perfectly organised Championship executed by perfectly trained and high 
performance. This was demonstrated just next to Cossack’s writing’…… 
(Dong-A 8, December, 1979) 
Regrettably, the Cold War conflict-based notion has been a part of the activities that were 
taking place on the international sport field at this time. Particularly, this time it was the 35th 
World Table Tennis Competition in Pyongyang, so other than the South Korean government 
summary, there was not much in the way of overt propaganda in Dong-A’s article. However, 
in the above article, South Korea clearly wanted to infer that the systems and operations in 
Seoul were superior to those of Pyongyang, in terms of the skill of operating International 
sport events by emphasising that the complement of Seoul sits alongside the insulting 
remarks of Pyongyang on the foreign newspaper articles.     
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4.4 The 1980 Moscow Olympic Games 
 
4.4.1 The issues of organising ‘A Korean Team’ 
At the time of the 1980 Moscow Olympics, North Korea suggested organising a unified team 
to South Korea. Previously, North Korea had used the term ‘Unification Team’ for a unified 
team for both the North and the South, and now they called it ‘The Only National 
(Homogeneous) Team (Dan Il Min Jok Team)’ of North and South Korea. Since both had 
already experienced the failure of Sport Talks, North Korea pledged its commitment to 
fostering a ‘sincere attitude and carrying out a patient discussion’ until a conclusion could be 
reached.  
……The president of the North Korea Sport Association has sent a letter to the 
president of South Korea Sport Association which suggests a Team as the only 
National Team for the 22
nd
 International Olympics.…..This will come about if both sides 
have a sincere attitude and engage in patient discussion to reach a conclusion…… 
(Roh-Dong 21, Dec. 1979-1) 
It is important to note here that the North Korea had initiated the request to organise a 
unified team. The occasion of the 1980 Moscow Olympics was hosted by one of North 
Korea’s most significant allies. Diplomatically, it would have been a great achievement if 
North and South Korea were to organise a team and participate in the Moscow Olympics 
since it would be a symbolic representation and example of peace gained under the 
leadership of socialist nations. South Korean interests infused that as with the Table Tennis 
World Championships; North Korea was seeking to ‘prevent South Korea’s independent 
participation in the Games’ by insisting on the single National Team to be in the Games.     
……Practically, organising a unified team is difficult (due to domestic obstacles) but 
North Korea has raised this issue to prevent South Korea’s participation in the 22
nd
 
Moscow Olympics separately. This is just the same as the proposal of organising a 
Unified Team for the 35
th
 World Table Tennis Championship……Now North Korea has 
claimed differences in approaches nationalism from South Korea and will ask for the 
withdrawal of the USA army by persuading the generation born after independence (60% 
of the South Korea population)……  
(Dong-A 28, December, 1979) 
The above commentary by Dong-A contains a curious comment. The earlier commentaries 
on both sides relating to nationalism explicitly referred to a shared ‘ethnos’, implying two 
political systems but one people in terms of a ‘Primordial Nationalism’ (Smith 2001:51). 
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There is no explanation given about how the concepts of national identity employed by both 
sides have diverged. In the following article, South Korea refused the proposal of a single 
team and this time explained that it would not accept North Korea’s proposal due to the lack 
of history of interaction with each other, and the resulting lack of trust in the North Korea.  
……The president of the Korean Sport Association, Park, said that ‘North Korea’s 
proposal of a Unified Team for the Moscow Olympics won’t be possible without a 
history of sport relations which is based on trust. Therefore, after the Moscow Games, 
let’s start to establish such a relationship as a foundation for further sport relations.’ 
And he sent a letter with this message to North Korea to clarify the refusal to organise 
a Unified Team for the Moscow Games……Park also added that ‘North Korea 
prevented us from participating in the 35
th
 World Table Tennis Championship last May 
in Pyung Yang, and this resulted in great mutual distrust……Show some sincerity by 
sending a North Korean team to the Asian Lifting Competitions and Asian Junior 
Volleyball Competitions in Seoul  this coming April and October to establish a 
foundation of trust between North and South Korea through sport interactions.….. 
(Dong-A 11, January, 1980) 
Clearly, South Korea wanted to initiate the sport interaction which is necessary to develop an 
accumulated trust between the North and the South, and to do so in a context which would 
be much more helpful to South Korea’s cause as these two events were to be hosted in 
South Korea. On the other hand, South Korea recalled the case of the 35th World Table 
Tennis Championship, which South Korea had not even participated in, so South Korea had 
enough reason to have lost trust in North Korea. Additionally, South Korea perhaps sought 
another chance to build mutual trust by sending North Korean players to the competition in 
Seoul for the April and October Volleyball and Lifting competitions. However, Roh-Dong 
argued that this was ‘not a matter of time limitation or technical issues’ rather, it was about 
the true intentions of South Korea and North Korea, as Roh-Dong had continued to insist 
from the last discussions between the teams of the North and the South. Furthermore, the 
article claimed that the previous failure of organising discussions was due to the South 
Korea’s sudden interruption with irrelevant excuses.      
…… (Your refusal of the Sports Talks) It is against the earnest wishes of not only the 
sport people of North and South Korea, but also of all the Korean people who want to 
open the Talks and organise the Only Team of the Nation Team…...The problem is 
about real intentions concerning whether or not they welcome the Only Team of the 
Nation rather than the matter of time limitations or technical issues……In the previous 
Table Tennis Championship, South Korea also had brought forth non-related issues  to 
the organising of the Unification Team and broke down the Talks…… 
(Roh-Dong 22, Jan. 1980-1) 
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4.4.2 International supporting for establishing ‘A Korean Team’  
Roh-Dong went through the same pattern of citing the foreign media’s support for the North’s 
opinion that it should organise ‘The Only Team’ of North and South Korea for the Olympic 
Games. In the following article, Madagascar, Bulgaria, Egypt, the Sudan, the Republic of 
Benin expressed their assent and support to the North Korea.   
……The president of the Madagascar Olympic Committee, the president of the 
Bulgaria Olympic Committee, and the president of Egypt the Committee, the president 
of the Sudan Olympic Committee and the president of the Benin Committee have 
announced their support for ‘the proposal of North Korea to promote the ‘Only Team of 
the Nation’ at the 22
nd
 Olympic Games.’…… 
(Roh-Dong 27, Jan. 1980)  
The International relations strategy of North Korea has been revealed through the various 
supporting statements from abroad. North Korea maintained several research centres all 
over the world to promote their unique political ideology (‘Ju-Che’) and associations which try 
to promote friendly relations in addition to the traditional socialist alliances. The countries 
which possessed these organisations were Italy, Norway, France, Sweden, Portugal and 
Chile.   
……The World socialist society has emphasised that they support the proposal of the 
‘Only Team of Nation’ for the Olympics. ‘We Italian People Sport Alliance think  it (the 
North Korea’s proposal) is fair to accept……The Norway – Cho Sun friendly 
association……support this……The France – Cho-Sun friendly association……also 
agreed……The director of the research centre for Kim Il Sung ideology ‘Ju-Che’ in 
Sweden, Bert Anderson said that Unified Team the for one  nation is just so natural 
and this is a duty of the people……The researchers of the research centre for Kim Il 
Sung-ism in Portugal requested South Korea to participate in the Talks for organising 
the ‘Only Team of Nation’…...Also the Chileans, who had been Korean War 
participants strongly exhorted South Korea to accept this North Korean suggestion…… 
(Roh-Dong 9, Feb. 1980)  
It seems rather surprising that there is no relevant news article responding on this matter in 
Dong-A, but that is also understandable since Dong-A could deny foreign support or stand in 
opposition on this issue. Other than making an alluding to the subject of having ‘a Unified 
Team’, Dong-A did not talk much about ‘the Moscow Games’ themselves. South Korea and 
the Liberal block allies boycotted the Games (even PRC did not participate), and as a result 
we experienced the Cold War-influenced ‘Half Olympics’ (Dong-A 19, Feb. 1988).   
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4.5 The 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games 
 
4.5.1 The issues of organising ‘A Korean Team’  
A major element in the argument which I wish to promote is that the differing positions on 
national unity were not only simply reflected in the usage of the terminology but actually 
emerged and were identified more clearly, in part, because of the debates which mixed the 
political and sporting issues. There are claims on both sides of the divide that sport and 
politics should remain separate domains. And equally there are those from both sides of the 
divide that recognize the deeply symbolic and political nature of sporting ‘intra-nation’ 
interaction. The use of terminology in relation to the configuration of a single team differs in 
ways which are difficult to express in English. The North Korean side invariably refers to a 
‘Unification Team’ [Tong Il Team], ‘The Only Team’ [Yu Il Team] while South Korea 
authorities tend to use the term ‘Unified Team’ [Dan Il Team]. Both sets of terms imply ‘unity 
of nation (by unification)’ of one sort or another, as we shall see later in this chapter, but they 
do not imply the same approach to national unity.  
 
In 1981, South Korea made a request to North Korea to jointly organise the team for the 
1984 Olympics in much the same way as North Korea had invited South Korea to establish 
‘The Only Team’ (using its own preferred terminology for the 1980 Moscow Olympics). The 
rhetoric that South Korea employed in the rationale for organising the united team was 
similar to that used by the North Korean regime, when it asked South Korea to organise a 
team for the Moscow Games, that this represented an opportunity for promoting ‘National 
Unity’ of North and South Korea as reflected in the following articles in Dong-A.    
……The president of the Korean Sport Association, Cho has suggested to North Korea 
making Unified Team to participate together in the ‘84 Los Angeles Olympics. And he 
has requested to host Talks to discuss the details of Unified Team in Pyongyang, 
Seoul or Panmunjom……He also has added that this organising of Unified Team and 
participation in the Olympics together will be a great opportunity for ‘National 
Reconciliation’ between North and South Korea……  
(Dong-A 19, June, 1981-2) 
……There were several North and South Korean Sports Talks, but they have failed. 
The reasons for their failure are mostly due to the idealistic claims of North Korea, 
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rather than rational approach of South Korea…….In particular South Korea proposed 
the ‘Unified Team’ of the ‘84 LA Olympics  to show that South Korea was consistent in 
its stance on this matter……The difference between South Korea and North Korea’s 
approach to promotion of the Unified Team is that  on this occasion South Korea’s 
proposal allowed more time for discussion…….The Korean Sport Association said that 
North Korea asked for Unified Team for the ‘79 Pyongyang Table Tennis Competition 3 
months in advance, and six months ahead for the ‘80s Moscow Olympics in which 
South Korea did not participate, but on this occasion there were 3 years, so success 
would be more likely attained if North Korea makes an effort.  
(Dong-A 19, June, 1981-4) 
As suggested in the above articles, the most ‘reasonable’ excuse for South Korea to refuse 
the request to organise the united team for the 35th World Table Tennis Competition and the 
1980 Moscow Olympic Games was a lack of time for both sides to discuss the details. 
Therefore, South Korea pointed out that since the 1984 LA Olympics was still three years 
away, there would be enough time to discuss the details of establishing the united team. In 
addition, Dong-A commented that the South Korean proposal represented a ‘rational 
approach’ in contrast to the ‘idealistic’ approach of North Korea, while the North Korean 
authorities were suspicious of South Korea’s reasons for not engaging with the proposals for 
1979 and 1980, the South Korean media certainly supported the South Korean authorities’ 
argument.  
……Actually there are many things left to be solved for organising the Unified 
Team…… 
(Dong-A 20, June, 1981) 
South Korea pressed North Korea to accept the proposal if their proposals for a united team 
were sincere. More interestingly, South Korea intimated that it knew North Korea’s hidden 
motive to utilise this event as a route to national unification, with a nuance that South Korea 
did not wish to accept it. The South Korean explanation of its motives for a single team was 
that it would be a ‘celebration of National Talents’ by the youth of ‘Both Countries’ rather 
than the political implication which North Korea promoted.   
……It has been 5 weeks since South Korea had suggested the Unified Team for the 
‘84 LA Olympics, but there is no response from North Korea……the Korean Olympic 
Committee and Korean Sport Association have reminded North Korea that it had 
suggested the Unified Team before. So if North Korea really had in mind to adopt a 
Unified Team then it would accept this proposal…….Even though for North Korea 
there was a political motivation to make unification in its own way, this non-political 
area must be an interaction between young people in both countries to celebrate 
‘national talents’……  
(Dong-A 28, July, 1981) 
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The message that Dong-A represented as the view of South Korea seems to question not 
the degree of nationalism that both parties promote but rather whether they are promoting 
the same goal in relation to this nationalism. Ethnic based primordial nationalism has largely 
been treated and interpreted as synonymous with ‘Nationalism’ in Korea, but what is 
suggested here is that North Korea’s perception differs from that of South Korea, with the 
former seeing Nationalism as ‘a single Korean ethnic’ and the latter regarding Nationalism as 
‘South Korean’ and relating to the nation state while sharing ethnicity with ‘North Korean’ 
people. This issue of how to translate the term ‘Nationalism’ in Korean has been a matter of 
debate in the Korean academy and has become even more complicated as the study of 
Nationalism has developed. One thing which is clear is that at this time, Nationalism in 
Korean was referred to as ‘Min Jok’ ideology, which is interpreted as ‘ethno-centrism’. Both 
Roh-Dong and Dong-A had used the term ‘Min Jok’ ideology as a term to refer both to 
ethnic-based Nationalism and to state-based Nationalism. The following article illustrates 
how Dong-A understood the usage of sport interactions through the Talks with North Korea 
from a South Korean perspective.       
……It is hard to change the ideology and policy of North Korea at once by ‘Ping Pong 
Diplomacy since it has been left as the most closed society in the World. But This ‘Ping 
Pong Diplomacy will expose North Korean people to another world so North Korea can 
be more innovative and responsible in their attitude.….. 
(Dong-A 29, August, 1981) 
What Dong-A implies here is that while North Korea was a closed society which South Korea 
did not therefore know well, it nevertheless had many things in common with North Korea 
under the umbrella of shared ‘Korean’ ethnicity, and so Sport Diplomacy might be used as a 
tool for instructing North Korea in the way of communication with the wider world as an 
independent nation-state. This analysis suggests that North and South Korea were not yet 
ready to overcome the Cold War division, but rather that their differences seemed to be fixed. 
Therefore, the arguments relating to Unification had developed from agreement that ethnic 
nationalism was sufficient justification, to a position in which Dong-A is blurring the 
boundaries between ethnic and nation-state nationalism. This represents a crucial point in 
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the discussion of whether a single team will be organised or not as a symbol of Unification of 
the two nation states.  
  
4.5.2 The Talks for the Organising ‘A Korean Team’  
When South Korea proposed to organise the unified team for the 1984 LA Olympics first, 
North Korea refused this suggestion. However, when the Games were just two months away, 
the North Korean government sent a letter to South Korea inviting South Korea to Sports 
Talks on the 1984 LA Olympics and some other International sport competitions.  
[Table 4.8] The 1
st
 – 3
rd
 North Korea & South Korea Sports Talks for the LA Olympic Games 
Unified Team-1  
 Content 
Title The 1
st
 – 3
rd
 North Korea & South Korea Sports Talks for the LA Olympic Games 
Unified Team 
Date 1984.04.09/04.30/05.25 
Venue Panmunjom JAS (Joint Security Area) Northern and Southern areas in turns 
Summary In this letter, North Korea suggested participation as Unified Team in the 23
rd
 
International Olympic Games and further Asian Games and World 
Championships 
 
There was however no Sports Talks held as a consequence of a bomb incident in Myanmar 
during the ceremony when most of the South Korean cabinet members were together.  A 
number of South Korean ministers and officers died and newspapers from South Korea 
alleged this to have been carried out by North Korea, although it never admitted this.  
[Table 4.9] The 1
st
 – 3
rd
 North Korea & South Korea Sports Talks for the LA Olympic Games 
Unified Team-2 
 Content 
Title The 1
st
 – 3
rd
 North Korea & South Korea Sports Talks for the LA Olympic 
Games Unified Team 
Date 1984.04.09/04.30/05.25 
Venue Panmunjom JAS (Joint Security Area) Northern and Southern areas in turns 
Summary In the middle of the highest tension between North and South Korea due to the 
terror in Myanmar on 9
th
 October, 1983…… 
 
The situation was one in which mutual distrust was compounded by anger and suspicion of 
North Korea by its South Korean counterpart. In Dong-A, doubts about North Korea’s 
motivation for raising again the proposal for a unified team for the LA Games is guessed at 
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but Dong-A still suggests that sport interaction might be a way of reducing the tension 
between North and South Korea.  
……Actually, the KOC has suggested having the Unified Team for ‘84 LA Olympics 
and ‘82 New Delhi Asian Games……But North Korea had avoided all those 
suggestions and then suddenly asked to organise the Unified Team just 4 months 
before the Games again. Nevertheless, we want to reduce the tension between North 
and South Korea so we hope this will become a foundation of national unity…… 
(Dong-A 3, April, 1984-1)  
The estimation that mutual understanding would be accomplished by the Sports Talks 
appears to have motivated South Korea to accept the suggestion of Talks, even though 
South Korea had not anticipated success in the realisation of a unified team for the LA 
Olympics given the lack of time (there were only two months left before the Games). 
Obviously, this also implies that the attitude of South Korea towards the Talks was not that 
positive and consequently, the mood between North and South Korea was not constructive.    
[Table 4.10] The 1
st
 – 3
rd
 North Korea & South Korea Sports Talks for the LA Olympic Games 
Unified Team-3 
 Content 
Title The 1
st
 – 3
rd
 North Korea & South Korea Sports Talks for the LA Olympic 
Games Unified Team 
Date 1984.04.09/04.30/05.25 
Venue Panmunjom JAS (Joint Security Area) Northern and Southern areas in turns 
Summary On this matter, even though Korean Sport Association forecast that coming to 
a conclusion in this Unified Team discussion is almost impossible due to its 
proximity to the deadline for submission of the player list for the 23
rd
 LA 
Olympic Games, which is only 2 months ahead …… 
 
To take this opportunity for the promotion of cooperation between the North 
and South Korean people and material exchange…… 
 
Thus, South Korea's motive for attending Talks with North Korea was not so much about 
organising ‘a unified team' for the LA Olympics or other international sport events, than of 
taking this opportunity as a stepping stone in the interaction to share human resources and 
economic interchange. In the summary of the Talks, which certainly reflected the South 
Korea government’s voice, no mention was made of unification between North and South 
Korea as the purpose of the Talks. Moreover, in the summary South Korea mentioned the 
non-sport related circumstances.   
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[Table 4.11] The 1
st
 – 3
rd
 North Korea & South Korea Sports Talks for the LA Olympic Games 
Unified Team-4 
 Content 
Title The 1
st
 – 3
rd
 North Korea & South Korea Sports Talks for the LA Olympic 
Games Unified Team 
Date 1984.04.09/04.30/05.25 
Venue Panmunjom JAS (Joint Security Area) Northern and Southern areas in turns 
Summary South Korea points out that the act of terrorism performed by North Korea in 
Myanmar and the kidnapping of Eunhee Choi, and Sangok Shin, were 
significant acts of provocation which is intensifying the North and South Korean 
conflict and tension In this situation, the North and South Korean high profile 
sport people cannot freely contact and cooperate with each other...... 
Clearly, South Korea had thus brought non-sport issues to the table from the beginning of 
the Sports Talks, in particular these two incidents, even though they were vehemently 
denied by North Korea. It is important to note here that South Korea officially included 
reference to these non-sport issues in its official summary and cited them as the reason for 
their reluctance to cooperate. This illustrates how sport and politics cannot be separated in 
relations between North and South Korea. Also, South Korea blamed North Korea for further 
tension which caused the breakdown of this discussion. 
…… North and South Korea Sports Talks have broken-down just after 2 hours and 26 
minutes. In this the first
 
North and South Korean Sports Talks, North Korea was asked 
for an apology for the Myanmar explosion and the kidnapping of the two South Korea 
Actors. North Korea just left the Talks…… 
(Dong-A 9, April, 1984-1)  
The Talks concluded in failure, with Dong-A describing South Korea as having demanded an 
apology for the Myanmar explosion and the actors’ kidnapping, with North Korea simply 
leaving the venue’. The description itself seems quite interesting since South Korea was 
portrayed as right to make such requests and North Korea as impolite for leaving the venue 
in this way. The position of North Korea was also expressed in the following summary as 
well.   
[Table 4.12] The 1
st
 – 3
rd
 North Korea & South Korea Sports Talks for the LA Olympic Games 
Unified Team-5 
 Content 
Title The 1
st
 – 3
rd
 North Korea & South Korea Sports Talks for the LA Olympic 
Games Unified Team 
Date 1984.04.09/04.30/05.25 
Venue Panmunjom JAS (Joint Security Area) Northern and Southern areas in turns 
Summary North Korea argued that in relation to discussion for ‘the Only Team’, it is not 
relevant to include the political issues such as the Myanmar incident…... 
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Since North Korea had brought political discussion into sport, South Korea also began to use 
this rhetoric as an element of its approach to the 'Sports Talks' between the two states. 
South Korea had argued through Dong-A that the breakdown of Talks between North and 
South Korea was ‘very disappointing’. However, the South Korean side still argued that 
“North Korea had been unreasonably persistent about the Myanmar bomb”. North Korea 
claimed that South Korea had even made this whole story up to blame North Korea, and as 
a consequence Dong-A commented saying: “This has shown how stupid the North Korean 
character is, since it is full of stupidity, treachery and blackmail”. Both governments were not 
willing to back down and they blamed one another. The language employed thus appears to 
be a trading of insults.  
……It is very disappointing that the bloodthirsty mood and the breakdown of Talks 
were caused by provocative actions by North Korea. The head of the South Korea 
delegation, Kim, started his speech saying ‘we will start to state our opinion from now 
on......’ and the head of North Korea delegation, Park, intervened and started into his 
speech…… North Korea was unreasonably persistent about the Myanmar bomb 
suggesting that ‘Even a baby knows that this has not been done by North Korea and it 
was actually something perpetrated by South Korea’. This has shown how stupid the 
North Korean character is since it is full of stupidity, treachery and blackmail……  
(Dong-A 10, April, 1984-2) 
In the following article from Roh-Dong, North Korea suggested that the result of future Talks 
would depend on the attitude of the South Korea side, which should be sincere in its 
response to the ‘national wishes’ of the Korean people. One reason why North Korea had 
kept insisting on the ‘national wishes’ of the people was that this was the one way of 
representing that ‘we, North Korea have national legitimacy’ and are thus guardians of the 
nation. Since each represented one half of the Korean Nation, whoever dominated the high 
ground of the discourse of ‘ethnic Nationalism’ was assumed to appear more suitable, or 
reasonable as a basis for the foundation of a future Korean Nation. That is also why North 
Korea had called South Korea’s attempts to separate North and South Korea as an ‘impure 
political challenge against National Unity’.  
……The vice spokesman of the North Korean National Olympic Committee has 
announced on 10
th
, that ‘the future of the North and South Korean Sports Talks 
depends on the attitude of South Korea’……We did our best to realise the wishes of all 
ethnic Koreans and sport persons hope for Unified Team by showing a sincere attitude 
[toward unification]. Nevertheless, South Korea has shown its impure political purpose 
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from the beginning of these Talks…… This is a great political challenge which is 
against the Spirit of sport and National Unity…… 
(Roh-Dong 11, April 1984-1) 
This was the end of the First Sports Talks between North and South Korea and nothing had 
yet been decided. So South Korea proposed the Second Talks on the 18th to North Korea 
which in response had re-recommended the date as 26th April. But South Korea requested 
re-scheduling for 30th April, and finally North Korea accepted this date. A principal reason for 
the breakdown of the first North and South Korean Sports Talks was, as we can see above, 
the different starting point of the Talks between two Koreas. North Korea had assumed that 
the two parties should first mutually agree to participate in the LA Olympics as a single team, 
rather than as two separate ‘half teams’, even though North Korea’s ulterior motive, became 
evident later in its attempt to prevent the participation of South Korea as a separate team in 
the LA Olympics. On the other hand, the starting point for South Korea was that an apology 
from North Korea was necessary for its criminal activities such as the Myanmar bomb for 
which South Korea held North Korea responsible. The bottom line which had to be settled at 
the beginning of the Talks was resolved in the Second Talks.  
……The Head of the South Korean representatives stressed that the Myanmar 
bombing and the kidnapping of the movie stars [Shin and Choi] must have admitted by 
North Korea first and this is the foundation of trust. The head of the North Korean 
delegation responded that the bomb story was a ‘fabrication’ and the kidnapping was 
not a kidnapping but a voluntary ‘exile’…… 
(Dong-A 30, April, 1984-1) 
Thus the North Korean delegation denied having any involvement in the terrorist incident 
and argued that the movement of the South Korea film stars to the North was voluntary and 
not something North Korea had planned. In addition, North Korea claimed that the first 
Sports Talks demonstrated that South Korea had never really intended to make a National 
Team for International sport competition. Thus, until the Second Talks, nothing had been 
concluded and North and South Korea continued to blame one another for the failure of the 
Talks.       
……South Korea has, by ruining the Sports Talks, revealed their true position which is 
that they do not want to make a Unified Team …… Therefore, to continue these 
Unified Team Talks properly and to prevent them from being ‘polluted’ by political 
concerns, we are suggesting the following: first that North and South Korea will not 
mention non-sport matters; and second that North and South Korea will focus on the 
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Unified Team discussions for unity and cooperation by participating in the Talks with a 
sincere commitment…… 
(Roh-Dong 1, May, 1984) 
By contrast, Dong-A consistently asked North Korea for an apology and an explanation for 
the two incidents, and since North Korea did not respond to this request, Dong-A expressed 
doubt about the sincerity of the North Korean intentions in relation to establishing a unified 
team. One other issue which was raised was that South Korea had asked for a security 
guarantee for the players during the period of the formation and performance of the team. 
Such a request would of course be unnecessary if both parties had agreed to cooperate in 
forming a team for the Games. Neither side would be foolhardy enough to hold the players to 
ransom, and nor would such action clearly harm their diplomatic reputation. This sort of 
concern may originate from the misunderstanding of International relations, which both 
bipolar entities seek for the sake of harmony and peace-making.   
……Regarding the Talks which ended without conclusion, the Head of the South 
Korean representatives has emphasised that North Korea didn’t provide any 
reasonable solutions concerning the Myanmar bomb and kidnapping of the movie star 
and her partner, and moreover North Korea had ignored the minimal request for a 
guarantee of security for the South Korea players. So North Korea has shown that it 
was not seriously committed to the success of the Talks from the beginning. And 
whether there are further Talks or not is entirely a matter of North Korea’s 
attitude……And he added that ‘the North Korean head of delegation had even thrown 
a box of matches onto the table, and the North Korean reporters also had hit the desk 
to raise tension in the venue…… 
(Dong-A 1, May, 1984) 
Nevertheless, although the ideological conflict between East and West elsewhere in the 
world was waning, the level of distrust between North and South Korea remained high. In the 
article above, the description of the scene with the North Korean reporters’ ‘hitting the desk’ 
illustrates the tense nature of the Talks. However, the foreign minister of South Korea made 
a conciliatory gesture announcing South Korea’s  
…….Official position in favour of the Unified Team discussion of South Korea and 
North Korea so that this will open the door for dialogue between both sides……  
(Dong-A 7, May, 1984) 
The response of North Korea is characterised by the South Korean government in terms of 
two major demands: first that South Korea should not bring any ‘political’ issues to the table 
during the Sports Talks; and second that South Korea should admit that it had obstructed the 
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organising of ‘a unified team’ and should therefore apologise for that. The North Koreans 
stated that they would not join the Talks if there was no agreement on this.   
[Table 4.13] The 1
st
 – 3
rd
 North Korea & South Korea Sports Talks for the LA Olympic Games 
Unified Team-6 
 Content 
Title The 1
st
 – 3
rd
 North Korea & South Korea Sports Talks for the LA Olympic 
Games Unified Team 
Date 1984.04.09/04.30/05.25 
Venue Panmunjom JAS (Joint Security Area) Northern and Southern areas in turns 
Summary North Korea refused to discuss matters, setting the condition that South Korea 
should admit and apologize for bringing the Talks to a deadlock by introducing 
political incidents into the discussion which prevented team participation in the 
LA Games. Also North Korea required South Korea not to engage in any more 
political provocation 
 
Even though this was the third set of discussions, it did not even begin to address the main 
issue. This incident represents a typical case of the discourse concerning the relationship 
between 'politics and sport' in the ideological context of the Cold War. The conflict between 
North and South Korea despite the cultural specificity of their shared ethnic nationalism was 
still far from the intention to unify the states. As Dong-A had emphasised the principles which 
South Korea had announced at the beginning of the Talks were the only things that had 
generated practical outcomes.  
……Due to the insincere attitude of North Korea, the 3
rd
 North and South Korean 
Sports Talks broke down after just 2 hours and 31 minutes without any fruitful result 
other than 7 principles which were suggested by South Korea….. 
(Dong-A 25, May, 1984) 
At the 3rd Talks, North Korea had asked for two principles to be accepted as the foundation 
for successful discussions. The North Korean team commented that whether South Korea 
accepted this or not would be a test of South Korea’s willingness to promote ‘a unified team’. 
North Korea had said that it had ‘Saved the North and South Korean Sports Talks’ and 
implied that the Talks were ruined by South Korea which didn’t follow the fundamental 
principles which North Korea had stated in the article.  
……We tried to save the Korean Sports Talks which had already been ruined twice 
and to ensure progress we suggest two conditions to South Korea. The first is that 
South Korea needs to admit responsibility and apologise for constructing artificial 
barriers in the organising of ‘Unified Team’ and interrupted participation of the LA 
Olympics. And the second is a guarantee that it won’t use the Sports Talks for its own 
political purposes and won’t provoke us politically. And these principles are the 
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barometer indicating whether South Korea has it in mind to make a ‘Unified Team’ 
reflecting Korean ethnicity or not…… 
(Roh-Dong 26, May 1984-1)  
As we have seen, both sides had different goals. It seems that North Korea wanted to use 
the Talks to ensure that a separate team would not be formed by South Korea, and South 
Korea’s objective was to demonstrate that it was not refusing to be cooperative. In addition 
the understanding of the problem on both sides was also very different. Dong-A commented 
that the “insincere attitude of North Korea” as a reason for the failure to organise the 'Unified 
Team’ (Dong-A 1, June, 1984-2).  
 
South Korea interpreted North Korea’s reasons for proposing a unified team as a way of 
escaping from the diplomatic corner into which Kim Il Sung had placed himself over the 
Myanmar Bomb incident. It is interesting to consider North Korea’s motivation for requesting 
the Sports Talks in this way. If North Korea had intended to make this gesture for an ‘impure’ 
diplomatic purpose, it is questionable whether this was valuable or not. Furthermore, one 
might wonder whether from South Korea’s perspective, concluding the Talks without any 
outcomes would meet the North’s strategic objectives.  
……Kim Il Sung was confronted about his international refutation over the Myanmar 
Bomb outrage. Therefore, they (the North Koreans) suggested organising Unified 
Team to make the world forget about the Terrorist incident by spreading the impression 
of reconciliation…… 
(Dong-A 2, June, 1984) 
If the motivation of North Korea was simply to draw attention away from the political context 
while appearing to favour establishing a unified team, then the failure to organise a unified 
team was perhaps the best conclusion from their point of view, and from this perspective, 
they won the diplomatic battle.  
……we have done our best to organise the ‘Unified Team’ for the 23
rd
 Olympics to 
respect the wish of all ethnic Koreans and sports people to join the Games…… 
(Roh-Dong 3, June 1984) 
The President of the South Korean NOC, Mr Chung invited North Korea to the 4th Sports 
Talks, but the North Korea’s position had not changed and it once more asked South Korea 
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to agree to the two conditions first. And in the South Korea summary, that led to the official 
closure of the Sports Talks regarding the organising of a unified team for LA Olympics.  
[Table 4.14] The 1
st
 – 3
rd
 North Korea & South Korea Sports Talks for the LA Olympic Games 
Unified Team-7 
 Content 
Title The 1
st
 – 3
rd
 North Korea & South Korea Sports Talks for the LA Olympic 
Games Unified Team 
Date 1984.04.09/04.30/05.25 
Venue Panmunjom JAS (Joint Security Area) Northern and Southern areas in turns 
Summary The president of the South Korean Olympic Committee, Chung Ju Young 
suggested the 4th discussion to take place on 1st of June, but North Korea 
refused on the two previous premises.......thus the Sport discussions was 
finished without product 
 
The above analysis shows that diplomatic goals played a significant role in relations between 
North and South Korea, and that when it comes to politics, just as in sports, one side must 
lose. Thus, what was at issue here was not a matter of sport but rather a game of diplomatic 
manoeuvring.  
 
4.5.3 The Boycott of the LA Olympics 
North Korea is not the only nation to have decided not to participate in the 1984 LA Olympics. 
The world was still divided between two ideologies. Just as many of the Liberal/Capitalist 
block of nations had not participated in the 1980 Moscow Olympics, a number of Socialist 
countries announced a boycott of the 1984 LA Olympics, Roh-Dong thus had a simple role 
to play, which was to buoy up the boycott movement, by broadcasting all boycott decisions 
of other socialist countries. As a rationale for the boycott, North Korea firstly cited news 
about a potentially violent anti-USSR campaign, and promoted suspicion among socialist 
countries about the consequences of participation at the 1984 LA Olympics.  
……A Russian newspaper has pointed out that a violent anti-USSR campaign has 
been conducted in the USA around the time of the LA Olympics to undermine the 
North Korea’s participation…… 
(Roh-Dong 8, April 1984) 
The North Korean newspaper quoted the contents of the Soviet account, which had 
indicated that there was mounting anti-Soviet and anti-Communist sentiment in American 
society, even though the American administration tried to neutralise the residual effects of 
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the Cold War. A Bulgarian newspaper also implied that this boycott situation had been 
caused by the American administration and had even blamed the US for the 1980 Moscow 
boycott. In this context, Roh-Dong relayed the voice of the North Korea’s various Socialist 
allies to demonstrate the role as a leading media element of the socialist group in order to 
confront South Korea more powerfully.      
……The Soviet newspaper said that the USA had attempted to ruin the 23
rd
 Olympics 
by constructing anti-USSR and anti-Communist hysteria……The newspaper also 
mentioned that the US administration had tried to manipulate the social environment as 
a Cold War tactic and also has threaten the sports men and women and citizens of 
socialist countries. It also said that the great Olympic spirit must not to be distorted by 
political purposes. And the Bulgarian newspaper stated that International Olympic 
Movement was being made to suffer again by the USA administration just as it had 
done so four years before…… 
(Roh-Dong 21, April 1984-3) 
This anti-USA diplomatic position of Roh-Dong’s is also shown in the following article, where 
it quotes Polish and Czechoslovakian newspapers.    
……The News from Warsaw made a statement criticising the USA for using the LA 
Olympics as a way of attacking the opposition……The Polish National Olympic 
Committee said that the most serious problem was that the US has encouraged a 
mood of Cold War conflict in the Olympic period…...The Czechoslovak newspaper 
announced that anti-communists were planning a dangerous accident to take place in 
the Olympic Venue to block the participation of communist countries…… 
(Roh-Dong 24, April 1984) 
The Polish newspaper was reported as accusing the USA of using the LA Olympic Games 
as a political propaganda tool, which encouraged confrontation and Cold War conflict in 
international politics. The Czechoslovakian newspaper warned of potential attacks from anti-
communist groups against athletes from socialist countries. Roh-Dong relayed these 
comments and contributed to the spread of these Eastern European perspectives on the LA 
Olympic Games to the rest of the world. The Cuba news source quoted by Roh-Dong also 
accused the West of political misuse of the LA Olympic Games.     
……Recently, the Cuba National Olympic Committee published a statement which 
criticised the US for using the LA Olympics for impure political purposes…… 
(Roh-Dong 6, May, 1984) 
The USSR, one of the strongest of the socialist countries along with China, made a 
diplomatic gesture to the IOC as indicated in the following article. Nevertheless, the 
diplomatic power of the IOC was not strong enough to exert direct influence on the US which 
continued to promote an Anti-Communist Campaign to stop the Games.   
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……The USSR Olympic Committee made a statement indicating that they could not let 
their sports people participate in the 23
rd
 Olympics which will be held in LA, 
USA……Concerning the huge anti-communist campaign which is going on in the USA 
at this time, we have raised this as an issue with the IOC. Even the IOC pointed this 
out and delivered comments to the US Olympic Committee which seemed to be 
ignored by USA…In this circumstance we cannot send our players to the LA Olympic 
Games…… 
(Roh-Dong 10, May, 1984) 
The strong Anti-Communist mood in the USA explained by Roh-Dong was a reminder of the 
gap between the two ideological blocks which many had hoped would gather harmoniously 
in the Olympic arena. Consequently, Bulgaria and East Germany were also reported as 
blaming the USA using the term ‘craziness’ to describe its approach. Thus, the North Korean 
decision to boycott was justified under the argument of keeping ‘their sport people’s honour, 
dignity and life’.   
……In the meeting of the Bulgarian Olympic Committee, every member of the 
committee agreed not to send participants to the LA Olympics because of the 
craziness of anti-communist sentiments in the cities of the US……The East German 
National Olympic Committee has decided not to send sport players to the 23
rd
 
Olympics in order to save the honour, and dignity of their sport people…… 
(Roh-Dong 12, May, 1984)  
Countries like Mongolia and Vietnam voluntarily declared that they would not participate as a 
way of supporting their allies’ diplomatic decisions. Vietnam used the term ‘Conspiracy’ to 
express the distrust toward the US National Olympic Committee and described this as an 
attempt to demolish the Olympic Movement. There are two levels of questioning of this 
material that might be adopted. The first is whether or not the statements reported represent 
what was actually stated in the Mongolian and Vietnamese press, and secondly whether 
such statements make appropriate claims. 
……The Mongolian Olympic Committee has announced that it will not send its 
sportsmen and women to the LA Olympics as the result of their research into the 
circumstances…...The Vietnam Olympic Committee has requested the USA to respect 
the IOC’s principles and regulations…….The Vietnam Olympic Committee has been 
against the conspiracy of other nations’ Olympic Committee and International Sport 
Federations to demolish the Olympic Movement…… 
(Roh-Dong 13, May, 1984-3) 
Czechoslovakia and Laos also joined the boycott (Roh-Dong 14, May 1984). Other than 
these countries, the boycotters included the Afghan National Olympic Committee (Roh-Dong 
16, May 1984-2), the Hungarian National Olympic Committee (Roh-Dong 18, May 1984) and 
the Polish National Olympic Committee (Roh-Dong 19, May 1984) whose positions on the 
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boycott  was represented in Roh-Dong’s articles. Along with these countries, North Korea 
announced officially its boycott of the LA Olympic Games. Dong-A explained that ‘North 
Korea’s boycott was led by the USSR’, thus the “autonomy which North Korea emphasised 
and the theme of blaming South Korea-USA relations is a sham”. Dong-A also commented 
that North Korea suggested the ‘Unified Team’ just ‘to prevent South Korea from broadening 
its diplomatic influence to Communist Countries’ by blocking South Korea’s participation in 
the Olympic Games.    
……North Korea officially announced their absence from the LA Olympic 
Games……By joining the Olympic boycott which was led by the USSR, North Korea 
revealed how much of a sham their ‘principle of autonomy’ was……And the proposal 
for the Unified Team was just a means of preventing South Korea’s sport interaction 
with communist countries by blocking the South Korea’s participation of the Games…... 
(Dong-A 25, May, 1984) 
In addition to North Korea, other countries (Roh-Dong 30, May 1984-2), such as the 
Ethiopian National Olympic Committee (Roh-Dong 5, June 1984-2), Bolivia (Roh-Dong 27, 
June 1984-2), Bulgaria (Roh-Dong 18, July 1984-1) and Libya (Roh-Dong 29, July 1984-1) 
also expressed their objections to participating in the LA Olympic Games. North Korea 
forecast that the LA Olympics would become a ‘half Games’ since all of the World Lifting 
Championship winners would not participate.    
……Half of the world record holders and 100% of the World Lifting Champions will not 
be in the 23
rd
 LA Olympics. And other sports are also losing their light as an event in 
the Olympic Games…… 
(Roh-Dong 10, June 1984-2)  
 
4.6 The 1986 Seoul Asian Games 
 
4.6.1 The Conflicts and Challenges of the 1986 Asian Games  
Before the 1988 Seoul Olympics, the 1986 Asian Games was hosted in Seoul. North Korea 
also conducted a campaign against that event, while it argued for changing the host city of 
24th Olympic Games from Seoul, as we have seen its argument moved to promotion of the 
co-hosting of the Olympic Games. Dong-A wrote very little news about North Korea’s 
negative attitude, since Dong-A sought to construct the image of a smoothly prepared 
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Olympics which was the only view which the regime of the South Korea allowed it to present. 
The South Korean regime had to persuade the South Korean people to maintain domestic 
stability which was a key success factor for the Olympic Games. That was a strong motive 
for South Korea to persuade North Korea to be involved in the 1986 Asian Games and the 
1988 Olympics as the ‘Unified Team’.  
……South Korea truly wants to have a Unified Team with North Korea for the ‘86 Asian 
Games and ‘88 Olympics which will be held in our land, so we are expecting to have 
Talks to promote further discussions…… 
(Dong-A 21, August, 1984-3) 
President Chun even made a statement and broadcast that South Korea would ‘guarantee 
favourable conditions and all security issues’ for North Korea, if it would participate in both 
Games as a ‘Unified Team’ with South Korea (Dong-A 5, June, 1986). That statement was 
considered a major gesture taken very close to the Asian Games, and contrasted with Mr 
Chun’s usual policy towards North Korea. However, there was insufficient time to wait for a 
positive response from North Korea. North Korea maintained its negative attitude towards 
the Asian Games and this attitude was worsening.  
…… North Korea disturbed the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Olympics continually. 
And recently this opposition had become more intense. At this point, the domestic 
conflicts within South Korea could be used by North Korea…… 
(Dong-A 22, January, 1986)  
Actually, North Korea insulted South Korea by pointing out the criminal incidents that had 
happened in South Korea (dictator regime’s policy referred to above). The purpose of North 
Korea was probably to generate a lack of trust in the South Korean context by putting a 
spotlight on the nation’s political instability at a time when it prepared to host this 
International sport event. However, it was also regarded as helpful to South Korea, in the 
sense that South Korean administrative personnel noticed what might be its weak points 
from an international perspective, so it could pay more attention to reinforcing its areas of 
weakness. For example, in the following article, North Korea mentioned faulty food 
distribution in South Korea as an example of ‘social crimes’ detected in the South. There 
was some potential to undermine the international reputation of South Korea by making 
people doubt the fundamental trustworthiness of South Korea’s social system, but at the 
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same time it became an opportunity for the South Korea to show how it could handle 
problems like this.    
……South Korean society produced fake canned food which made by noxious material 
to circulate during Asian Games with labels as though it was imported from a foreign 
country……cheating on the quality of beef, fake foreign alcohol……   
(Roh-Dong 22, Mar. 1986-2) 
North Korea pointed to the fact that the South Korea regime had expelled small businesses 
from certain areas to impress foreign Olympic guests by building a clean image of the city. 
This strategy on the part of the South Korean regime was understandable given the priority 
of the South Korean military dictatorship to use the event in their regime’s propaganda. 
Concern about where the ‘poor people’ lived was thus low on the agenda. The fate of these 
people was not known but it is clear that they were badly affected.    
……The ‘stooge government’ of South Korea was criticised by small business people 
when South Korea ordered staff to use violence on these people to remove their 
business without notice…… 
(Roh-Dong 19, May, 1986)  
North Korea broadcast the fact that members of the South Korean population had staged 
demonstrations to express their opposition to hosting the Asian Games. Indeed, there were 
many demonstrations which were against hosting the Asian Games, and they were often 
also associated with many other issues, such as the promotion of domestic political 
democracy and the achievement of labour justice. Of course, the Asian Games could have 
acted as a fuse for this people’s movement, and it was the reason why it was spotlighted by 
the world. In other circumstances the foreign media did not receive much attention in South 
Korea. 
……South Korea people held a resistance demonstration on the matter of the hosting 
Asian Games…… 
(Roh-Dong 9, Aug. 1986-2) 
There were several foreign media sources, which criticised the South Korean regime for its 
‘fascistic’ approach to law and order, so the hosting of such significant events by the South 
Korean regime was portrayed as inappropriate since they should be associated with peace 
and harmony. Not only the citizens of Seoul, but also other nations expressed objections 
against the Seoul Asian Games; through their own newspaper such as: Japan (Roh-Dong 16, 
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Aug 1986-1), Malaysia and India (Roh-Dong 16, Aug 1986-3) a Czechoslovak, and Syrian 
newspaper (Roh-Dong 17, Aug 1986-1). The first reason that North Korea gave for its 
opposition to the Seoul Asian Games was the social instability of the nation due to the anti-
government movement which protested against the violation of human rights by the South 
Korean regime. North Korea criticised the military dictatorship of South Korea as the origin of 
these problems (Roh-Dong 20, Aug 1986-1). The second reason was that, just like the 
Olympic Games, the Asian Games could reinforce and further institutionalise the North and 
South Korean division, so that it would render the national unification of Korean more difficult 
(Roh-Dong 20, Aug 1986-3). Thirdly, North Korea cited the example of the ‘Scotland Games’, 
which had an impact on athletes’ health because of ‘serious air pollution’ and compared this 
case to South Korea’s situation. A Peruvian newspaper and American newspaper allegedly 
expressed objections to the hosting of the Asian Games in Seoul (Roh-Dong 28, Aug 1986-
1). In the following article, a demonstration by South Korean students was discussed and 
Roh-Dong proclaimed that the Asian Games would bring too much pain since it would 
manifest the separation of North and South Korea. It also implies that these students had the 
same view of national identity as the North Korean regime, since they are reported as using 
the term ‘Cho Sun’.    
……It is true that South Korea students are fighting against the staging of the Asian 
Games [in South Korea]. The students have said that Asian Games is not only giving 
pain to South Korea people but also using as a justification of Two Cho Sun Policy…… 
(Roh-Dong 29, Aug 1986-2) 
Since the opening event of the Asian Games was relatively imminent, North Korea 
accentuated the lack of popularity of the Asian Games for the domestic audience in Roh-
Dong’s article which comments that the South Korean regime was struggling with 
“……unsold tickets for Asian Games [which were] driving the South Korean regime 
crazy……” (Roh-Dong 29, Aug. 1986-4). For the reasons, North Korea finally expressed its 
official position concerning its intended absence from the Seoul Asian Games. The main 
concern was that this Asian Games would promote the conflicts between North and South 
Korea. Hence, North Korea considered the ‘conflict’ to have already been established by 
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South Korea’s hosting of the event on its own, which would of itself be more divisive in 
relations between North and South Korea. 
……We will not participate in flawed Games…these Games run counter to Olympism 
and sportsmanship with their impure political purposes, using the Games to promote 
conflict between North and South Korea……  
(Roh-Dong 1, Sept. 1986-1) 
Nevertheless, North Korea’s announcement of its boycott was made by foreign media such 
as the France AFP agency. Qatar, Pakistan and Thailand also declared that they would not 
participate in the Games (Roh-Dong 7, Sept. 1986-2). Roh-Dong started to announce the 
cases of boycotts as ‘the boycott’ to give an impression of ‘an international boycott 
movement’. This action had the potential to influence the international nature of the Games, 
giving them a negative image. Roh-Dong noted that the boycott by Syria and Brunei and the 
absence of matches involving the Philippines, Hong Kong, Japan, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and 
Pakistan.     
……The participant countries and organisation continue to decrease.…..  
(Roh-Dong 14, Sept. 1986-7) 
Those participants who might have been expected to boycott but who had decided not to 
tended to be given more attention by the South Korean media, and the participation of China, 
Iran and Iraq were highlighted by Dong-A. Since countries such as China, Iran, Syria and 
Bhutan which did not have diplomatic relations with the South Korea were coming to the 
Games, this international recognition of the Seoul Asian Games provided additional 
legitimacy for the South Korean regime’s decision to host the Games. Of course, the case of 
China was differ from the others, since China was a member of the Asian Games 
Federations (AGF) and its status in Olympic arena needed choose of participation without 
direct relations with South Korea.    
……The PRC is coming and ‘Iran and Iraq’ will come after their six year war. Pakistan 
which recently has established popular democracy will come. Not only Malaysia and 
Hong Kong, but also the PRC, Iran, Syria and Bhutan which are countries without 
diplomatic relations [with the South Korea] will also participate…… 
(Dong-A 1, September, 1986) 
North Korea highlighted the ‘strange’ situation of the South Korea in reporting the declaration 
of the temporary closure of the universities due to student demonstrations which had the 
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potential to ruin the Asian Games. By this time, North Korea had already declared its boycott 
of the Games, so the intention of the article was to ‘find fault’ with the Seoul Asian Games of 
South Korea as the host nation.   
……The South Korean stooge has declared the closure of many universities……  
(Roh-Dong 16, Sept. 1986-2) 
In contrast, instead of countering all the points raised by North Korea, Dong-A quoted an 
article from a UK newspaper, which raised suspicion that North Korea had been behind the 
Kimpo (name of the locale in South Korea, near the international airport) bomb explosion. It 
was also unusual for the South Korean media to cite an indirect source relating to news of a 
South Korean domestic incident. Furthermore, the results of the investigation had not been 
conclusive, thus it was inappropriate to broadcast the incident as having been caused by 
students of North Korean descent. But Dong-A cited a UK newspaper, allegedly having a 
South Korean officer as its source, such that it felt it was “quite clear” that the responsibility 
for the incident lay with individuals associated with North Korea.  
……The UK newspaper, The Times, has announced that the evidence of Kimpo bomb 
investigation has not yet been released, but it said that it seems quite clear that the 
North Korean agents or students might have done this…… 
(Dong-A 17, September, 1986) 
 
4.6.2 The 1986 Seoul Asian Games: a test for the 1988 Seoul Olympics 
The 1986 Asian Games which were held in Seoul from the 20th of September 1986 was the 
fruit of the efforts of both South Korea and the IOC. They ran relatively smoothly given all the 
negative comments beforehand, and Dong-A reported that the foreign media started to 
ignore North Korean arguments or treated North Korea as a politically peripheral entity on 
the Korean peninsula. In the same context, Dong-A delivered the news from the UK 
newspaper, as follows.  
…...The UK newspaper, the Times, stated that whatever offers are provided to North 
Korea, North Korea will refuse them anyway.…..it added that the attitude of North 
Korea is vague and that North Korea is just interested in making propaganda for its 
regime…… 
(Dong-A 20, September, 1986) 
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The UK media illustrates the image of North Korea as that of the ‘problematic relative’ which 
was against South Korea “anyway”, and thus seeking to cause any harm that it could to the 
Asian Games in order to serve its own propaganda. Dong-A explained this as motivated by 
‘jealousy’ on the part of North Korea. Through the successful running of the Asian Games, 
South Korea attained international recognition of its status in terms of sport realising North 
Korea’s fears, and consequently the gap between North and South Korea grew ever larger.        
……The Asian Games blow the coals of North Korea……With jealous eyes, North 
Korea is staring at South Korea as it opens the Asian Games…...Now South Korea will 
have developed its profile in international society……What makes North Korea anxious 
is the economic gap between North and South Korea…… 
(Dong-A 22, September, 1986) 
Roh-Dong consistently attempted to advocate the promotion of an anti-Seoul Asian Games 
movement whether North Korea was directly involved or not. The media of various countries’, 
such as Tanzanian and Bangladeshi newspapers were cited (Roh-Dong 22, Sept. 1986-10). 
Even during the Games, North Korea’s negative propaganda continued. It talked about the 
foreign players’ complaints to demonstrate the lack of preparation for the Asian Games. 
……The athletes from abroad have complained about the facilities and inconveniences 
of the Asian Games in South Korea…… 
(Roh-Dong 25, Sept. 1986-7) 
It was not only a matter of facilities but the operating system which was adopted to run the 
whole Games. Complaints about unfair horse inspections were raised (without giving details 
of how they were unfair). This criticism was raised by members of the Indian team but since 
South Korea was not a strong candidate for medals in equestrian races little credibility was 
likely to be given to claims that South Korea might be advantaging itself. However Roh-Dong 
used this issue as a means of damaging the reputation of the Asian Games’.    
……Reuters broadcast that a member of the Indian sport staff falsely complained 
about the South Korean organisers. South Korea tried to prevent good quality Indian 
horses’ participation of the Game by making an unfair inspection…… 
(Roh-Dong 29, Sept. 1986-2) 
However, the following story gives some insight into the impact of domestic security issues 
and the Asian Games itself. On one occasion during the Games, some Nepalese players 
were not allowed to take their lunch, because they had not followed the procedure, which 
was to submit an application form in order to be able to obtain lunch from the 
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accommodation for the day. Thus, they should have obtained lunch when they arrived at the 
stadium and they could not leave the stadium because of heavy security surrounding the 
facility, which (as explained by a South Korean security officer) was protecting players from 
attack by ‘angry’ Korean citizens. This incident was highlighted by Roh-Dong to emphasise 
the domestic instability of South Korea.  
……Nepalese players could not have their lunch, due to an army blockade all around 
the stadium and they had not submitted their application for lunch to the organising 
committee on the morning of that day…… 
(Roh-Dong 29, Sept. 1986-4) 
Dong-A was able to argue that if North Korea had participated they would not only have 
been able to win more medals for the Korean ethnic group but also would have provided a 
successful experience of peaceful atmosphere which North Korea claimed was something 
that they longed for.   
……However, International Sport Competitions are still affected by political issues and 
North Korea is a typical example of that……Had they participated as well, then the 
number of the North and South Korean medals would have been much greater…… 
(Dong-A 6, October, 1986) 
Dong-A displayed sufficient confidence in the matter of embracing North Korea, just after the 
successful hosting of the Asian Games, and it refers to hope for a positive future for the 
Korean Peninsula, in particular in relation to Unification. This was the most radical change in 
the Dong-A’s tone towards North Korea, since the Korean War. Dong-A even reported that 
South Korea needed to prepare its political foundation for the unification by reforming the 
domestic political systems of South Korea. 
……The fact that North Korea attempted to interrupt the Olympics,  and was not 
supported by any other countries, and it is therefore, caused self – isolation……For our 
part we just keep focusing on national unity and develop our politics in this way, and 
then unification will come about in the 90s…… 
(Dong-A 12, January, 1987) 
The Asian Games were deemed to be a success, so that South Korea felt that it had 
demonstrated its ability to act as a host country for the Seoul Olympics, and the prospect of 
the Seoul Olympic Games thus became ‘promising’. As a consequence, when North Korea 
called for a change of venues or to cancel the event, its requests carried very little weight in 
international circles.  
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4.7 The 1988 Seoul Olympic Games 
 
4.7.1 The North Korean Antagonism toward the 24th Seoul Olympics 
When Seoul became the host city for the 24th Olympic Games at the IOC session in Baden-
Baden, North Korea appealed against this decision. From the North Korean perspective, the 
hosting of the Olympic Games by Seoul alone was not an acceptable option and was at 
odds with the ‘one ethnicity, one nation’ rationale which it had adopted as the basis of its 
unification policy. As a result, North Korea asked the IOC to change its decision. In Roh-
Dong articles, the reasons for the North Korea’s objection were repeated regularly for a while. 
The first reason for objecting was the domestic political context of South Korea, which was 
described as featuring conflict between government, and the people who wanted political 
democracy, a claim which was associated with a nationalist approach to unification and with 
opposition to the Seoul Games if it was not to be a co-hosting event of North and South 
Korea. In the following article, North Korea criticised Chun Du Hwan’s regime which ruled 
South Korea after the military coup in 1981 and attempted to establish itself in power. Since 
North Korea thought that this regime wanted to achieve domestic political legitimacy and 
international recognition as a sovereign nation, by hosting the Olympic Games.  
……The conspiracy by Chun’s regime of establishing its period in power is the 
fundamental background to the hosting of the Olympic Games…… 
(Roh-Dong 15, Dec. 1981) 
Roh-Dong used the term ‘conspiracy’ concerning the attempt to extend Chun’s presidential 
term, and it was certainly true that Chun was actively seeking a way to change the law to 
make this possible, and it was not sure that Chun’s regime would respect the South Korean 
constitution as it stood. The general population seemed largely unaware of the threat to the 
constitution or else seemed apathetic. Moreover, Roh-Dong pointed to the fact that 
President Chun sought to become President of the OCOG after leaving political office.      
……President Chun Du Hwan has clearly shown his ambition at the recent Olympics. 
Chun has appointed himself as a president of the Organising Committee of the Seoul 
Olympics for a term which would last even longer than his presidential term…… 
  Roh-Dong 3, Dec. 1981-2  
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Would it be appropriate for the president to serve in a ‘diplomatic’ position after his 
honourable retirement, or would he wish to maintain the role of national president until the 
time of the Olympic Games in 1988? The South Korean regime did not explicitly respond to 
such questions but the general flow of South Korea’s domestic politics suggested that North 
Korean suggestions might be well founded. However, subsequently, Chun’s regime excused 
its plan to go beyond his term of office by explaining that the nation should not lose face by 
prejudicing the chance of a successful Seoul Olympic Games. The previous President, Park 
Jung Hee who had also been a military dictator was killed by his own body guard when he 
tried to gain a third term by changing the law which limited the term of the presidency. The 
leader of the coup which had followed, Chun Du Hwan, also ignored the people’s wish to 
develop national democracy, and this became one of the targets that North Korea attacked.   
……First of all, the South Korean regime wants to hide its fascistic brutality by 
arresting many democratic politicians and to hide the Kwangju Citizen Massacre from 
the eyes of the nation people…… 
(Roh-Dong 15, Dec. 1981) 
As Roh-Dong stated, the South Korean regime brutally oppressed democrat activists since 
the democrats were arguing for the development of North Korean friendly policy when anti-
communism was the dominant theme of South Korean politics. As a consequence, none of 
the media were permitted to broadcast the situation as it really was, since Chun’s regime 
inspected all media output applying its own regulations. While Chun’s regime ruled South 
Korea, it used the Cold War structure to protect its interests, becoming the best ally of the 
USA as a means by which to gain international recognition. As Roh-Dong declared:      
……The strategy of South Korea is to promote the international recognition of its 
regime by hosting the Olympics…… 
(Roh-Dong 15, Dec. 1981) 
The Olympic Games was the world’s biggest international sporting and cultural festival, and 
both participation in the Games and more importantly the hosting of the Games, provided a 
stage on which to boost recognition as an autonomous nation-state by demonstrating that 
the nation could manage this great event at an international level. Not only would that but the 
stage be ‘decorated’ by sport, making it an attractive means of ‘public diplomacy’. The 
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diplomatic fruits which South Korea might obtain after hosting the Games were what North 
Korea was most afraid of, not only due to the rivalry with South Korea, but also because of 
its own anti–Americanism and foreign policy of promoting independence from foreign 
intervention in the affairs of the Korean peninsula.  
……One thing which must be emphasised here is that this hosting was achieved 
through the power of its alliance with the USA…… 
(Roh-Dong 15, Dec. 1981) 
However, still, North Korea believed that the South Korean regime’s lack of legitimacy was 
an appropriate target to attack, and thus the fact that this was something the South Korean 
people’s movement alighted on was a good sign for North Korea in providing evidence of its 
superiority over the South Korean regime in terms of grassroots support of the people. North 
Korea sought to make the point in the following article that the hosting of the Olympic Games 
could be a vehicle by which to change the South Korean people’s mind.   
……The secret intention is to change the Korean people’s perception of its own regime 
so that it sees Chun’s regime as a military government…… 
(Roh-Dong 15, Dec. 1981) 
Public opinion would, it was anticipated, affect the South Korean stock market by 
encouraging foreign investors to have greater confidence in the South Korea market with its 
stable political circumstances and its embedded or entrenched regime. Investment in the 
South Korean economy was also receiving strong backing by the USA and Japan. The 
Olympics could become a great commercial media event itself, which would introduce the 
details of Korean Culture and images of a developed country in contrast to the scenes of the 
ruins from the Korean War. North Korea was afraid that the political stability and financial 
independence of South Korea would reinforce the division of the North and the South. 
Ultimately this might lead to separate membership of the UN as a nation-state by itself, 
which would mean that not only would North and South Korea remain a divided nation, but 
also would become internationally recognised as separate and independent nation-states.  
…… Chun’s fascist regime has camouflaged its subordination and the embers of war 
by hosting the Olympics. South Korea has tried to bring foreign investment to the 
country. The Japanese and USA government investors and business people will invest 
in South Korea to help maintain the stability of its regime……This will delay democracy 
and the unification of South Korea and it makes the decision to hold the Olympics in 
the Seoul Olympics a wrong one…… 
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……Chun’s regime will undertake diplomatic approaches to the nations who participate 
in the Seoul Olympics and will achieve the goal of ‘separate joining of the UN’…… 
(Roh-Dong 4, Jan. 1982-2) 
North Korea proclaimed that it identified South Korea’s goal of hosting the Seoul Games 
from a South Korean officer. In addition to South Korea’s political usage of the Olympic 
Games, North Korea also raised the issue of South Korea’s economic goals and the 
dependence of the South Korea economy on the former colonising powers in the Cold War 
era. Therefore, through the discourse, we can identify how North Korea assumed the 
political and economic usage of the Olympics along with the associated diplomatic benefits.  
……The despicable South Korean claims that it will host the Olympics so that it can 
also join the UN. This shows that South Korea is using the Olympics for political 
purposes…… 
 
……Actually, South Korea doesn’t have the economic foundations for hosting the 
International Olympics. As we all know the South Korea economy is a fully dependent 
economy……  
 
A Norwegian newspaper has written that Chun’s regime is attempting to be recognised 
as an ‘independent nation through the 1988 International Olympics. This has shown 
that South Korea will drive this Olympics to serve the purposes of its political 
conspiracy. Using the Olympics as a vehicle of the ‘Two Cho Sun (Korea)’ policy is an 
act of rebellion for all Koreans and for the people of the world who want the friendship 
and peace.….. 
(Roh-Dong 13, Jan. 1982) 
Roh-Dong claims that this Norwegian newspaper supported North Korea’s suspicions 
concerning South Korea’s reasons for hosting the Olympic Games, because the Norwegian 
newspaper also recognised that the Olympic Games would contribute to the ‘Two Cho Sun’ 
policy. This newspaper, it is claimed by Roh-Dong, used the term ‘Cho Sun’ which is a 
typical North Korean term in place of ‘Korea’ in English. Roh-Dong implied that it is a rational 
approach to maintaining a balance between North and South Korea which would make the 
achievement of national unification more feasible. However, the military competition between 
North and South Korea was becoming more serious. The diplomatic rivalry was even worse 
and the context of Cold War international relations further contributed to this confrontation. 
As the result of this unproductive rivalry, North Korea argued that the South Korea should 
renounce its approach to exploiting the Olympic Games.   
……The Fascist Regime plans to hide its brutal actions such as murder and burglary 
by ‘hosting the Games’ and using the Games as an excuse for suppressing democratic 
demonstrations and people’s resistance. At the same time, the regime has used 
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journalists and scholars to persuade people to endure their hardships such as poverty, 
unfairness and oppression until after the Olympic Games by promoting the fantasy of 
the Olympic Games.…..   
(Roh-Dong 27, Jan. 1982) 
South Korea did not answer this accusation directly but continued to stress that it would 
keep on trying to promote sporting relations with North Korea and to organise ‘unified team’ 
for future Games.  
……No matter what North Korea does, South Korean sportspeople will continue the 
policy of promoting sport relations between North and South Korea and organising a 
unified team for the International Sport Competition……The president of Korean Sport 
Association, Cho said that ‘Our fundamental principle is still the same as before……we 
are still waiting for a positive response on [these] proposals’..….  
(Dong-A 22, January, 1982-2) 
 
4.7.2 World voices on the 24th Seoul Olympics 
 
A. Voices from Abroad Against the Seoul Olympics  
The Seoul Olympic Games became not only a controversial domestic issue but also an 
international dispute. When the venue for the Games was decided at the IOC session in 
Baden-Baden, North Korea immediately raised an objection to the result. Roh-Dong outlines 
the response in an Austrian newspaper as follows:  
……An Austrian newspaper has written a column that is entitled ‘unbearable insult to 
the Olympic Movement’ suggesting that Seoul had been chosen as the International 
Olympics Venue … [even though] Seoul is ruled by a dictatorship regime. In addition it 
points out that a French newspaper has [also] written that it is problematic to vote for 
Seoul as the International Olympics Venue due to the dictatorship of this country…… 
(Roh-Dong 2, Jan. 1982-1) 
Roh-Dong further claims that the Norwegian and the Finnish newspapers expressed socialist 
sympathies. The Norwegian newspaper forecast that the Eastern European countries would 
not participate in the Games, and Roh-Dong alleges that the Finnish newspaper claimed that 
the president of the South Korea ordered a ‘massacre’ of the South Korean people, and that 
there was therefore, insufficient freedom of political expression. There were countries which 
understood that co-existence of various political ideologies was possible; and thus that the 
North and South Korean situation was a domestic political issue to be resolved locally.  
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……A Norwegian newspaper has written that it was a stupid and objectionable 
decision to decide that Seoul would be the International Olympics venue since many 
countries including those from Eastern Europe would not participate…… 
 
……A Finnish newspaper stated that Seoul was not a proper venue for the Olympics 
and that many sportspeople would not go there……and it said that selecting Seoul was 
really a serious problem…….it also said that South Korea was responsible for the 
massacre (Referring to the killing of students at a protest)……and that the Olympics 
must held in politically safe place……  
(Roh-Dong 2, Jan. 1982-1) 
The Council of a Swedish Province pointed out that the South Korean regime was fascist 
and that making Seoul the Olympic city was a problem.   
……The Gotland province even has adopted a statement that cites the decision of 
making fascist South Korea as the venue of the Olympics…… 
(Roh-Dong 2, Jan. 1982-1) 
Roh-Dong also cites a Czechoslovak newspaper which suggested that the regime had used 
money from its major business corporations to help to influence the hosting decision. 
…...A Czechoslovakian newspaper wrote in its columns that it was a debasement of 
the Olympic Spirit to allow the South Korean regime to host the Olympic Games 
……This regime had basically trampled over fundamental human rights and had killed, 
tortured and arrested many South Korean people. In these circumstances, allowing this 
dictatorial regime to host the Olympics was a disgrace to the Olympic Spirit……The 
newspaper went on to say that the real hosts of the Games would actually be a few 
western corporations and that South Korea had lobbied with money from these people 
because the regime wanted to be the Olympic host for political purposes……    
(Roh-Dong 18, Feb. 1982) 
Roh-Dong cites a Bulgarian newspaper as pointing to President Chun’s nomination as 
president of the Organising Committee of Olympics, and claiming that the Olympic 
movement had basically become a supporter of the dictatorship of South Korea. 
……A Bulgarian newspaper has written that it is a debasement of the Olympic Spirit to 
allow the South Korean regime to host 24
th
 Olympic Games ……The worst thing is the 
appointment of Chun, who is the head of the fascist military regime, as president of the 
Organising Committee of Olympic Games…… 
(Roh-Dong 26, Feb. 1982) 
The Japanese press commented on the economy of Seoul and the debts the nation would 
incur as a result of hosting the games. The news circulation suggested according to Roh-
Dong, that the Olympic Games could be a great festival internationally, but a disaster 
nationally. Since economic aspects of hosting the Games and its contribution to national 
development were one of the biggest propaganda elements that the South Korean regime 
had been promising to the South Korean people, Roh-Dong argued that the accusations of 
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this Japanese newspaper should be clearly answered by the South Korean government 
based on rational argument and objective data. However, it suggested that Chun’s 
dictatorship had no intention of proving or revealing this fact rationally.  
……One Japanese magazine exposed the delusion of Chun’s regime of using the 
Olympics to promote for itself a permanent place in government……It mentioned that 
many nations had been left with a huge debt though their hosting of the Olympics, and 
it wrote that ‘The Olympics will cost a great amount of money and will threaten Chun’s 
regime because of the collapse of the South Korean economy…… 
(Roh-Dong 14, Mar. 1982-1) 
Zimbabwe’s media was cited as saying that it could not agree to the use of the Olympic 
Games for ‘imperialist’ political propaganda, and that Seoul was viewed not only as the 
capital of South Korea, but also as a place that was under the US influence. This particularly 
showed the Olympics and its recognition in international politics which implied the hosting of 
the Games was the result of the power politics in the international relations framework.  
……At the end, he asked the president of the IOC to ensure that the Olympics should 
not be used for the imperialists’ political purposes and the Olympic Movement should 
follow its own principles in conducting the Olympics…… 
(Roh-Dong 21, Jan. 1985) 
The Korean Diaspora also raised its voice in support of the beloved homeland. Nevertheless, 
the Korean diaspora was divided between pro-North Korea and pro-South Korea, or rather 
conservatively ‘Nationalistic’ placing national unification as a top priority of all. In particular, 
the Min-Dan group, for example, who possessed North Korea passports in Japan, were 
excited about strongly expressing their position through Roh-Dong as follows.  
……Min-Dan [The North Korean nationality Japanese-Korean group] newspaper said 
that hosting the Seoul Olympics had become an opportunity to extend its regime and 
that the Seoul Olympics would help to maintain the oppression and plundering of this 
fascist regime, so we must stop this. It is an irony that hosting the Olympics had 
becomes a way of reinforcing the North and South Korean division making Korean 
people’s lives more painful by abandoning their commitment to Unification. 
Notwithstanding the delays to the process of unification, such a process has no 
meaning in North and South Korean national history…… 
(Roh-Dong 27, Jan. 1982) 
The Japanese-Korean press worried whether the Seoul Olympic Games would become an 
excuse for continuing the dictatorship. Moreover, they reinforced the view that the ‘national 
will’ was for Unification and they looked forward to see it realised as the appropriate 
teleological direction of national progress so that whatever delayed the unification was 
useless because it delayed progress. A Korean-American newspaper in the US was also 
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cited as saying that the issue was associated with the anti-Olympic Games, pro-Unification 
and anti-Chun regime movements.   
……A newspaper in the US published for a Korean audience a column by Professor 
Song who publicises the criminal actions of Chun’s regime as the Olympic host......If 
Chun’s regime is to be successful with simply hosting the Olympics, then we must be 
against the Seoul Olympics without equivocation…...We have endured a negative anti-
Unification, National Security and economic development approach for so long. Now 
we cannot be a victim again for the Olympics……We must be against hosting the 
Olympics, before it turns out to be a political curse…...The most shameful thing is if we 
have supported or maintained Chun’s regime just for the Olympics…… 
(Roh-Dong 14, Mar. 1982-2) 
Roh-Dong reported that in an effort to stop the Seoul Olympic Games, North Korea had sent 
an official letter to the IOC arguing that. 
……Seoul is not a suitable place to host Olympic Games……  
(Roh-Dong 17, Dec. 1984)   
By sending this letter to the IOC, North Korea hoped to persuade the IOC to reconsider its 
decision to award the 1988 Games to Seoul. It showed the North Korean sincerity in 
opposing the Seoul Olympics, since what North Korea wished to avoid was a ‘separation’ of 
itself from the ‘unified’ concept of Korea.   
……North Korea asked the IOC to reconsider its decision on the ‘88 Seoul Olympic 
Games…… 
(Roh-Dong 21, Dec. 1984-2) 
Roh-Dong cited comments and messages from many other countries, which were mainly 
their allies, but included a number which were not necessarily close to North Korea as well. 
After Seoul had been chosen as a host city in 1981, North Korea continued to object to the 
decision itself until July 1985. From that point in time, North Korea moved to an argument for 
co-hosting the Olympic Games with Seoul. They persisted with their resistance to the 
approval of the 24th Seoul Olympic Games and received support from around the world 
according to the nations in Appendix-1.  
 
A negative sentiment against the hosting Seoul Olympic Games was appeared to grow until 
1987, with the countries’ (in Appendix-2) media being cited in Roh-Dong as issuing serious 
warnings about the hosting of the Games in Seoul.  
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B. Changes of the Olympic Venue from Seoul 
The Finnish Student Association requested the IOC to change the venue from Seoul for the 
1988 Olympic Games. Roh-Dong cited the statement of the Finnish students who said that 
‘they cannot accept the decision’ of the IOC, because of the political circumstance of South 
Korea. For a Scandinavian country, with a political context which incorporated a socialist 
party and liberal entities in its democratic political system, both the regimes of North and 
South Korea might be similarly negatively regarded as dictatorships. Thus the Finnish 
students might have thought that it would not be fair to give the chance of hosting Games to 
South Korea only.  
……The ten Finnish student associations said that ‘when we consider the present 
situation of South Korea, we cannot accept the decision of the IOC to give the right to 
host 1988 Games to Seoul. The Olympics must be the stage for peace, friendship and 
a common sporting field for the world’s youth, so it must be held in a place where we 
can guarantee our participation. So our associations asked for a change of the venue 
for the 1988 Olympics from Seoul to another country.….. 
(Roh-Dong 27, Jan. 1982) 
In addition, another Finnish newspaper supported the above article by saying that the IOC 
started to look for another venue as an option, and that Finland had become one of the 
candidates. The Finnish newspaper mentions at the end of the article that the IOC had 
suggested a change of venue and the outcome was to be decided by the Finnish decision to 
answer positively or not. Therefore, behind the support for North Korea’s claims, there might 
have been the Finnish nationalistic purpose of considering the hosting of the Games.  
……The Finnish newspaper said that the unstable South Korean circumstances cast a 
shadow over the Olympic Games. The IOC has started to select another venue as an 
option and Finland has become a candidate. Seoul is a very dangerous place. The IOC 
has said that Finland will become the host nation if they accept to this decision…… 
(Roh-Dong 11, Dec. 1983) 
The news from Finland cited by Roh-Dong was made more plausible by citing of comments 
from a Vice President of the IOC about the Olympic venue changes. Moreover, the President 
of the IOC, Samaranch was quoted as saying that “it is not right to hold the Olympic Games 
in a venue where international tension exist” which could be a dangerous aspect of Seoul.  
……The Vice President of the IOC has mentioned that ‘it has a possibility that the IOC 
will change the host city of the 24
th
 Olympics from South Korea to a politically neutral 
venue……and President Samaranch also said that ‘it is not right to hold the Olympics 
in a venue where international tension exists…… 
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(Roh-Dong 24, May, 1984) 
If North Korea was able to harness this momentum, it was thought that it might be possible 
to change the venue of the Olympics. In the following article of Roh-Dong, its hope to 
change the venue was confirmed, and this was advocated as a “rational” decision in the light 
of all circumstances domestically and internationally.   
……Now sport people from around the world started to support North Korea about 
moving ‘88 Olympic venue from Seoul as an unstable site to somewhere else……And 
this opinion was the product of a rational decision made taking account of all the 
circumstances……  
(Roh-Dong 31, May 1984-1)  
Interestingly, The New York Times argued to change the venue, and forecast that the Seoul 
Olympics would suffer the same fate as the LA Olympics which had experienced a 
communist boycott. If the pressure from the world media became too huge to ignore, 
eventually the IOC would change its decision.   
……The New York Times argued for changing the venue of the 1988 Olympics from 
Seoul to other places. It mentioned that the LA Olympics had struggled due to the 
boycott from many countries, and Seoul will experience the same.…… 
(Roh-Dong 9, June 1984) 
There were many other media sources arguing for changing the Olympic venue including 
newspapers from Syria and Sweden. Another example was Nicaragua, which declared 
South Korea to be a colony of the USA, and therefore argued that the venue must be 
changed from Seoul to somewhere else. It has become clear, that what these writers 
disagreed with was that the dominant power in international politics, the USA, was achieving 
its ends through the backing of its ‘friend’ in the sport arena.   
……The director of the Nicaraguan Sport Association said that South Korea is 
absolutely a colony of the USA so the venue of 1988 Olympics must be changed…… 
(Roh-Dong 13, July 1984) 
Roh-Dong reported that the NOC of Yugoslavia had also expressed an interest in hosting 
the 1988 Olympic Games. Roh-Dong cited this with the expectation that such a change 
could be better for North Korea than hosting of the Games by South Korea alone.  
……The president of Yugoslavia Olympic Committee said that Yugoslavia has a mind 
to host 1988 Olympic Games and has enough facilities to operate this International 
Sport Event…… 
(Roh-Dong 22, Oct. 1984) 
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4.7.3 The Talks for the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games by the IOC arbitration 
 
A. The ‘Co-hosting’ issue for the 1988 Seoul Olympics  
The idea of the co-hosting of the 1988 Seoul Olympics began to appear in the international 
media while North Korea argued for changing the venue from the Seoul. North Korea 
changed its strategy from seeking to change the venue, to promoting the co-hosting of the 
Olympic Games. One of the reasons that North Korea had refused to accept Seoul was 
because it realised the potential of the Olympic Games themselves as a way to promote the 
North and the South division. Thus, the co-host issue was raised in the same context as the 
discussion of ‘organising a unified team’ to emphasise Korean national unity. The co-host 
proposal was presented in a Roh-Dong article as follows.  
……The great leader Kim taught us that once it had been decided to host the 24
th
 
Olympics in our great land then there should be a right for the Korean people to make 
a decision of co-hosting and this would be fair in terms of respecting national 
independence and all Koreans’ wish for National Unity. Even though we are divided we 
are still one nation and [share] one ethnicity. We therefore, have a huge interest in the 
Olympics being held in our land and we have a right to ask to be a co-host…… 
(Roh-Dong 26, June 1985) 
In the above article, ‘the right to co-host’ was declared by the North Korean great leader ‘Kim 
Il Sung’ and that meant it became the most important objective in North Korea since the 
order came from the Kim Il Sung directly and was thus to be given top priority in the practice 
of the national policy. The basis of this claim was that North and South Korea were a single 
Nation (in terms of a shared ethnicity). Moreover, North Korea expressed the concept of its 
‘territory’ including the Seoul. Thus, the view of Seoul which North Korea promoted changed 
from that of a dangerous city, ruled by a dictatorship; to that of being part of the Korean 
homeland through which North Korea could claim to a right to act as co-host. Thus if Seoul 
must hold the Olympic Games, then it should be organised by sharing responsibility 
including hosting authority between North and South Korea.   
……After we considered all of the circumstances, we concluded that the 24
th
 Olympics 
should be co-hosted by North and South Korea. The title of the Games needed to be 
changed to the ‘Cho Sun Olympics’ or ‘Cho Sun Pyongyang-Seoul’ Olympics and 
divides the matches to both sides. North and South Korea also can participate as ‘a 
unified team’ in this Olympics…… 
(Roh-Dong 31, July 1985-4) 
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After a month of promoting its official request to co-host the Games, North Korea brought up 
the issue of the title for the Olympic Games. They argued for using the ‘Cho Sun’ instead of 
the name ‘Korea’ with that of the city of Pyongyang also added to emphasise the North 
Korea’s role as the partner of the co-host. Moreover, in that case, it was argued that the 
participation of both North and South Korea as a unified team ought to be compulsory. North 
Korea recognised the charter of the IOC which declares that all the matches should be held 
in the stadium of the host city or in or around that area, and the venue must be formed as 
part of the territory under the governance of the host nations’ NOC (Charter 34/1). Thus, if 
North Korea wanted to co-host the Seoul Olympic Games, the Charter of the IOC would 
have to be changed. If the IOC fully accepted the co-hosting of the Games, it had made a 
mistake in awarding the Games to Seoul and thus it would need to open an emergency 
session for an election of a new host city. If this were the case, it would be hard to guarantee 
the participation of the IOC members and there would be additional costs as well. Under 
such circumstances, the chances of changing the arrangements were greatly reduced.     
……North Korea’s suggestion of dividing the Olympics between North and South 
Korea came about due to the rejection of the plan to change the Olympic venue which 
has been confirmed by the IOC and communist countries……The sport minister of 
South Korea Lee said that North Korea revealed its impure motives for using the 
Olympics for political purposes, and he asked North Korea to withdraw its appeal…… 
We want North Korea to withdraw the suggestion of co-hosting the Olympics and to 
focus on establishing a unified team for the North and South Korean sport…… 
(Dong-A 2, August, 1985)  
In the meantime, South Korea responded to North Korea’s suggestion. South Korea 
proclaimed that the request of co-hosting was merely rhetoric, as part of an attempt by North 
Korea to ruin the 24th Seoul Olympics. As South Korea pointed out, North Korea’s discourse 
regarding its involvement in the Olympic Games was transformed. Initially, North Korea 
refused to accept Seoul’s nomination as a host city for the 24th Olympics. Then, it argued for 
changes of venue, and subsequently it asked to co-host the Games and started preparations 
for the event. As North Korea announced its willingness to co-host the Games, Roh-Dong 
reported international allies expressing their support through the media. The 
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Czechoslovakian newspaper stated that its communist allies supported North Korea’s 
proposal.  
……The Czechoslovakian newspaper column announced details of the meeting of the 
Heads of Sport from communist countries in Hanoi. It said that North Korea’s 
suggestion was supported by (several) of the nations in the meeting…… 
(Roh-Dong 2, Dec.1985) 
However, the surprising news announced by Dong-A, was that ‘Cuba was the only nation, 
who agreed to the co-hosting of the Games among the 13 communist nations’. Roh-Dong 
and Dong-A both reported on the communist countries’ meeting in the Hanoi, but the 
accounts that they provided were completely at odds with one another. Roh-Dong cited the 
news from the Czechoslovakian newspaper, which had been their long term ally, and Dong-
A cited a Tokyo broadcast company which had provided its source. Roh-Dong had made the 
innuendo that North Korea’s idea had been accepted by most of the participants in the 
discussion.   
……The Tokyo News Company has broadcast that Cuba is the only nation which has 
agreed to the co-hosting of North and South Korea among the 13 communist nations 
meeting in Hanoi……  
(Dong-A 30, November, 1985)  
News from Dong-A were proved to be more trustworthy at this time due to the many 
communist participants in the Seoul Olympics. Thus, one might conjecture that many 
communist countries were reluctant to reveal that they would only participate in a co-hosted 
Game, but that they did not prevent the reporting of unofficial statements by private 
organisations to this effect. In this way, the communists could still accept their invitation to 
the Games while also retaining their diplomatic alliance with North Korea. However this 
strategy revealed the priority which these countries gave to not offending South Korea or the 
IOC. 
 
After the success of the 1986 Seoul Asian Games, North Korea focused more attention on 
the Olympic Games, which might have represented the last chance for them to be involved 
in the International sport arena.    
……The most important issue in the World sport field is co-host of the 24
th
 
Olympics…… 
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(Roh-Dong 3, Dec. 1986-1) 
Therefore, North Korea explored all avenues to becoming a co-host, and the exposure of its 
argument in the international media became one such strategy. Developing sport facilities 
was seen as beneficial for the nation. In the following article, a Yugoslavian newspaper 
reported the preparation of the North Korea’s (Cho Sun) Olympic stadium. North Korea 
started to publicise its preparation for the staging of the Olympic event. 
……Cho Sun established sports facilities quickly……North Korea answered the 
questions from Yugoslavian newspaper reports that ‘we will welcome foreign guests 
with all the great facilities in North Korea if we would co-host Olympics…… 
(Roh-Dong 7, Jan. 1987) 
While North Korea stated its plan to continue to request co-hosting, Dong-A presented the 
opinion of the South Korean NOC, suggesting that there was not enough time for organising 
a unified team, even though they would do their best to cooperate to achieve that goal.    
……We will keep asking to co-host the Olympics…... 
(Roh-Dong 26, Nov. 1987) 
……The president of the KOC said about the unified team of Seoul Olympics, ‘since 
there is only 300 days left before the Olympics, actually it will be hard to have a unified 
team, but we will do our best to provide every assist……   
(Dong-A 27, November, 1987) 
Ever since North Korea announced that it would request co-hosting of the Olympic Games, 
the support from its international allies had been publicised through Roh-Dong. Most sources 
were the voices belonging to various non-governmental organisations and thus it was not 
appropriate to consider these as their national positions. The following extracts illustrate the 
diversity and frequency of offered support.  
 
B. The ‘Co-hosting’ discussion at the Talks, by North, South Korea and the IOC 
Following comments by Samaranch cited below, South Korea became officially ‘the first 
developing country’ to host the Olympic Games. However, it did not seem right to accept this 
literally, since many other host cities before Seoul had been located in even less ‘developed’ 
countries. In that sense, it would be more accurate to say that there was no absolute 
conceptual standard dividing Global North and South, such as the division of developing and 
developed nations before the Seoul Olympics, when the dominant ideological division of the 
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world was in fact the East and West. Therefore, the usage of this term meant that 
Samaranch understood the context of the Cold War and the status of the IOC in the world 
order (Reuveny 2007). 
……Samaranch, the president of the IOC said that it is such a great turnover of the 
Olympic Movement since Seoul was selected as host city of the Olympics, because 
Korea is the first developing country to host the Olympics…….  
(Dong-A 2, October, 1981-2) 
Even though the president of the IOC mentioned the value of Seoul as a host city, this did 
not mean that there was no concern over the circumstances and the situation in Seoul. In a 
South Korean press conference of the IOC members, reported in the following article, the 
‘domestic politics of Seoul’ was a primary issue. Dong-A delivered the president of the South 
Korean Olympic Committee’s answer that South Korea would not expect any problems to 
occur during the Olympic Games.   
……Domestic political matters were the first question. And we answered that we do not 
expect any political and social confusion which will negatively influence Olympics. And 
if so there would be no political question at all. (From the president of the KOC, 
Cho)……  
(Dong-A 5, October, 1981) 
It was not certain that these were the ‘exact words’ of Samaranch’s speech or the North 
Korea’s interpretation, Roh-Dong mentioned Samaranch’s complements concerning North 
Korea’s sport facilities. As cited below, Roh-Dong claimed that North Korea prepared ‘great 
facilities for the Olympics’ but it did not mention the quality of infrastructure in Seoul.       
……I can confirm that North Korea has modern sport facilities, so it can be a great 
venue to host and organise the International Olympics…… 
(Roh-Dong 31, Mar. 1982-1) 
However, the consistent media interplay and North Korea’s announcement that it should co-
host the Olympics, finally lead the IOC to arbitrate between the two Koreas. On the 
suggestion of the IOC, North Korea responded that ‘basically, it is a matter to be discussed 
between North and South Korea without the IOC’; thus it clearly stated the North Korea’s 
fundamental diplomatic notion of independence.     
……In the 90
th
 IOC session, the president of the IOC, Samaranch, suggested that the 
IOC should arbitrate in relation to the ‘88 Seoul Olympics participation in the North and 
South Korean Sport Talks…….The ’North Korean Sport representative Chang said, the 
North and South Korean Sports Talks is something which the North and South Korea 
must discuss apart from the IOC’s intervention in this matter …… 
(Dong-A 3, June, 1985)  
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Later, it also was obvious that the decision about the host city could not be changed and the 
IOC wished all the other countries including North Korea to participate. Therefore, the 
request for co-hosting was officially denied by the IOC, but the IOC tried to play some role 
between North and South Korea through the Talks.   
 
The ‘noise’ made by North Korea in the international context could hardly be ignored by the 
IOC, since the Olympics and Olympism have carried out roles not only as protectors of fair 
play and sportspersonship and as advocates and messengers of peace. Therefore, from the 
IOC’s perspective, the claims of North Korea that it was acting against the fundamental 
ideology of the IOC would therefore need to be addressed. 
[Table 4.15] The 1
st
 - 4
th
 North Korea & South Korean Sports Talks with IOC arbitration for the 
1988 Seoul Olympic Games-1 
 Content 
Title The 1
st
 - 4
th
 North Korea & South Korean Sports Talks with IOC arbitration for 
the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games 
Date 1985.10.09-10/1986.01.08-09/06.10-11/1987.07.14-15 
Venue Panmunjom JAS (Joint Security Area) Northern and Southern areas in turns 
Summary When South Korea was selected as a venue for 24
th
 Olympic Games in the 
84
th
 Congress of the IOC session on September 1981, North Korea argued that 
it was inappropriate because 'the Korean peninsula is still in the midst of 
tension and the event being hosted by South Korea in Seoul means 
aggravating the division of the two Koreas, which is against the fundamental 
ideology of the Olympics’. Samaranch, IOC president, contacted both NOCs in 
Korea as the IOC executive decision wished to discuss this on the 1
st
 of 
February 1985 
 
The first of the IOC arbitration Talks in relation to the Seoul Olympic Games were held at 
Panmunjom, located in the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) of the Korean peninsula. However, the 
attitude of South Korea seemed to favour North Korea, as was demonstrated in the following 
Talks summary.  
 
[Table 4.16] The 1
st
 - 4
th
 North Korea & South Korean Sports Talks with IOC arbitration for the 
1988 Seoul Olympic Games-2  
 Content 
Title The 1
st
 - 4
th
 North Korea & South Korean Sports Talks with IOC arbitration for 
the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games 
Date 1985.10.09-10/1986.01.08-09/06.10-11/1987.07.14-15 
Venue Panmunjom JAS (Joint Security Area) Northern and Southern areas in turns 
Summary In Talks, KOC representative said through keynote speech that North Korean 
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players can join freely in the Seoul Games as expressed in the Olympic 
Charter…… 
 
South Korea summarised that it had suggested that North Korea should be free to join in the 
Seoul Games. This implied that there would not be any special treatment for the other state 
with the ‘same ethnic (national) groups’ vis-à-vis North Korea being the ‘co-host’. North 
Korea pressed strongly for the development of an ‘innovative alternative’ for the Games, and 
threatened that South Korea might experience an ‘extremely dangerous incident’ which 
might happen (at the Seoul Olympics).   
[Table 4.17] The 1
st
 - 4
th
 North Korea & South Korean Sports Talks with IOC arbitration for the 
1988 Seoul Olympic Games-3 
 Content 
Title The 1
st
 - 4
th
 North Korea & South Korean Sports Talks with IOC arbitration for 
the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games 
Date 1985.10.09-10/1986.01.08-09/06.10-11/1987.07.14-15 
Venue Panmunjom JAS (Joint Security Area) Northern and Southern areas in turns 
Summary North Korean representatives emphasised, if there was no major alternative 
plan for the venue of 24
th
 Olympic Games, that there would be an extremely 
harmful situation for the Cho Sun people unification and the healthy 
development of the Olympic Movement. Then he suggested the proposal for 
jointly holding the event jointly, in which North and South Korea could each 
host half of the Games 
 
North Korea viewed the process of co-hosting the Olympic Games in parallel with the 
process of the nation’s unification. Therefore, unification discourse was closely entangled 
with North Korea’s response to South Korea on the Olympics. Since the Olympic Movement 
was considered as a symbolic image of world peace, North Korea placed more value on the 
venue of the Games, which could become a strong allegorical symbol of the unification of 
the two Koreas.  
[Table 4.18] The 1
st
 - 4
th
 North Korea & South Korean Sports Talks with IOC arbitration for the 
1988 Seoul Olympic Games-4 
 Content 
Title The 1
st
 - 4
th
 North Korea & South Korean Sports Talks with IOC arbitration for 
the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games 
Date 1985.10.09-10/1986.01.08-09/06.10-11/1987.07.14-15 
Venue Panmunjom JAS (Joint Security Area) Northern and Southern areas in turns 
Summary North and South Korea co-host this event and participate as  'The Only Team’ 
 
Title of Game: The Cho Sun Olympic Games, or the Cho Sun Pyongyang-
 
 
136 
 
Seoul Olympic Games 
Free traffic through transport by land, sea and open airline 
 
Do not issue Visa to the media and visitors, just pass-certificate issue at the 
passing point' 
 
North Korea suggested several conditions and associated details for the co-hosting of the 
Games. It asked along with co-hosting for a changing of the title of the Games from the 
‘Seoul Olympic Games’ to the ‘Cho-Sun Olympic Games or Cho Sun Pyongyang – Seoul 
Olympic Games’ which underlined the homogeneous ethnic make-up of Korea. The familiar 
name for South Korea and North Korea is ‘Korea’ which had been developed from the name 
of ‘Koryo’; a dynasty that had existed in the Korean peninsula from AD 918 to 1392. The 
name was known to the world through its active trade, particularly via the Silk Road, and 
thus the name ‘Koryo’ came from the pronunciation ‘Core’ and becomes ‘Korea’(Cumings 
1997). This was related to the way in which the North Korean regime traced its legitimacy 
through the traditional legacy of the Cho Sun dynasty, which ruled the Korean peninsula 
after the Koryo dynasty. Thus, both names Koryo and Cho Sun were based on ethnic 
nationalism relating to present Korea. This was behind North Korea’s request to change the 
name of the Olympics if it were to become a co-host with South Korea. Even though North 
and South Korea had their own governments and political and economic systems, North 
Korea wanted to unify symbolically at least, by reinforcing the ideology of primordial 
nationalism. A fascinating element of the proposal related to the traffic of people during the 
Games. North Korea suggested free entry and exit by land, sea and air. At the time this 
proposal was made, North Korea had not engaged in any Talks to discuss such ideas, which 
as proposals did not take account of the political conflict and tension of the Korean War and 
the context of the cease-fire. None of the negotiations which had been conducted between 
North and South Korea had reached a conclusion this easily and this quickly. Moreover, 
issuing visas which each nation must issue to regulate human traffic solved the need for 
special permission to be given to enter North Korea. This reflected how North and South 
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Korean relations could be transformed through mutual flexibility, treating this issue as a 
special case.  
[Table 4.19] The 1
st
 - 4
th
 North Korea & South Korean Sports Talks with IOC arbitration for the 
1988 Seoul Olympic Games-5 
 Content 
Title The 1
st
 - 4
th
 North Korea & South Korean Sports Talks with IOC arbitration for 
the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games 
Date 1985.10.09-10/1986.01.08-09/06.10-11/1987.07.14-15 
Venue Panmunjom JAS (Joint Security Area) Northern and Southern areas in turns 
Summary Samaranch, the IOC president, shows the fundamental position of the IOC by 
the IOC’s separate contact with the KOC, respecting the decision to stage a 
Seoul Games at the Baden-Baden IOC session in 1981, in line with the IOC 
charter and with the contract between the IOC and the KOC. Also the IOC 
requests some programs which will make North Korea’s joining in Games more 
meaningful. 
 
As the president of the IOC, Samaranch had private contact with the South Korean officers, 
and indicated that the IOC would respect the decision made in the IOC session and thus that 
the IOC would keep its contract with the South Korean NOC. He asked the South Korean 
officers whether there was anything more attractive to North Korea which would make its 
meaningful participation in the Games more likely. It showed that, even though these 
Olympic Games were governed by the IOC, South Korea had a virtual veto on a decision on 
whether to accept North Korea’s proposals. Therefore, several issues such as changing the 
title of the Games, the portion of the matches to be located in the North Korean regions, the 
opening and the closing ceremony venue and TV license sharing were never acceptable, 
and so these became the reasons for blaming North Korea for the breakdown of the Talks. 
However, Dong-A commented on each request from South Korea and how much South 
Korea intended to accept them or not.  
……The North and South Korean Sports Talks in Lausanne have broken down without 
result due to North Korea’s determined work…… North Korea requested to change the 
title of the Games as ‘Cho Sun Pyongyang-Seoul Olympics’ and to share all the 
matches to 50:50. Moreover, North Korea asked to separate the opening and closing 
ceremonies allocating one each to North and South Korea, and proposed joint 
marketing of the TV licence.……Furthermore, the ‘88 Olympics will be held in the 
Seoul which is a City, not a South Korea which is a State…… 
(Dong-A 10, October, 1985-1)  
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The Talks bore little fruit because the requests from North Korea were regarded by the 
South as excessive. North Korea admitted that they asked for certain conditions, and they 
acknowledged what they could make for the Korean people in Korean peninsula.     
……We asked for the changing of the Olympics’ title to express unification rather than 
separation……What we asked for in sharing matches equally is also the result of the 
consideration of the circumstance of the nation and emotion of the people…... 
(Roh-Dong 11, Oct. 1985-2) 
Even though the First Talks for the Seoul Olympic Games ended without any conclusion, the 
IOC arranged another set of Talks for North and South Korea. It was held in early 1986, but 
the parties found it hard to reach the point of agreement. During the Second Talks, North 
Korea broadcast the news from an Austrian newspaper which was enough to ruin the 
reputation of South Korea and the IOC.  
……This rumour spread that South Korea brought around 140 staff including 
[presidential] bodyguards of the Blue House, and 20 prostitutes to help in the lobbying 
for the Seoul Olympics in the 84
th
 IOC sessions in Baden-Baden. One of the 
newspapers in Austria commented that ‘the Seoul is an Olympic Venue which was 
selected by a Women’s Body…... 
(Roh-Dong 8, Jan. 1986)  
Ostensibly, North Korea agreed on the Talks suggested by the IOC, but still had in mind that 
the decision by the IOC to award the games to Seoul was wrong, and wanted to find critical 
faults in the decision-making process for the hosting of the Olympics. Nevertheless, the IOC 
was under pressure since the Talks would provide the only means by which to persuade 
North Korea to join the Games.     
……When we proposed that we can consider three events which are men’s volleyball, 
handball and the football preliminaries, Samaranch asked whether any of final matches 
could be held in North Korea……The head of our representation Kim said in the 
keynote speech that our right of hosting Seoul Olympics is undeniable and we are 
nearly at the end of the preparations so we cannot accept the suggestion of co-hosting 
which goes against the IOC Charter……Samaranch said that it was a fundamental 
position of the IOC to try not to make North Korea withdraw from the Talks……  
(Dong-A 9, January, 1986)  
Five months after the second Talks in June 1986, the IOC suggested a better option for 
North Korea after discussion with South Korea which involved staging two finals matches in 
North Korea. In addition, the IOC asked for a few more events or matches to be staged in 
North Korea such as football and cycling along with other cultural events.      
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[Table 4.20] The 1
st
 - 4
th
 North Korea & South Korean Sports Talks with IOC arbitration for the 
1988 Seoul Olympic Games-6 
 Content 
Title The 1
st
 - 4
th
 North Korea & South Korean Sports Talks with IOC arbitration for 
the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games 
Date 1985.10.09-10/1986.01.08-09/06.10-11/1987.07.14-15 
Venue Panmunjom JAS (Joint Security Area) Northern and Southern areas in turns 
Summary 'The IOC suggested holding, in particular including final matches, for 2 sport 
events in North Korean region.' 
'IOC suggested to hold an additional, partial sport event in the North Korea 
region, and also proposed that North Korea participate in the Olympic related 
cultural events 
 
During the Third Talks which followed, South Korea made up its mind to accept the options 
given at the Talks. However, South Korea needed a public ‘excuse’ for the purposes of the 
domestic population who did not understand the circumstances under which South Korea felt 
that it had to share the Olympic Games with the North, especially given the strong anti-
communist mood of the local population. South Korea therefore suggested the term of the 
‘Sharing Games’ rather than referring to the ‘co-hosting’ of the Games. Dong-A mentioned 
that this was just a matter of “different words” in the same context, but that was for a 
comment aimed at persuading North Korea. 
……South Korea recognised the need to compromise on two items for the Olympics 
including the hosting of a final match, with North Korea for the Seoul Olympics…… 
Also, the South Korean head of representatives Kim used new terms, namely the 
‘Sharing Games between North and South Korea’ rather than using the term of ‘co-
host’ which meant the same outcome but different words……   
(Dong-A 20, June, 1986) 
North Korea did not share the same view of the Talks with South Korea and the IOC, since 
North Korea responded with sarcastic comments such as ‘South Korea announced we had 
made great progress and this was due to South Korea’s compromise made out of good will’. 
Once the Talks were in progress, South Korea and the IOC anticipated, given the South 
Korean gesture that that would have been enough to ensure that the North Koreans to 
participate, albeit reluctantly..  
……In the Talks in Lausanne, South Korea adopted a position in which they would give 
1-2 events to us and that this would be a hosting by Seoul rather than together with 
North Korea……Nevertheless, South Korea announced that we had made great 
progress due to their compromise made out of goodwill……  
(Roh-Dong 22, June 1986-1) 
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South Korea and the IOC attempted to negotiate with North Korea concerning the various 
sport events to transfer, even though the number of matches suggested did not meet North 
Korea’s expectations. However, those were what North Korea could be provided with by the 
time of these contacts and the Fourth Talks which were scheduled in the following year.    
[Table 4.21] The 1
st
 - 4
th
 North Korea & South Korean Sports Talks with IOC arbitration for the 
1988 Seoul Olympic Games-7 
 Content 
Title The 1
st
 - 4
th
 North Korea & South Korean Sports Talks with IOC arbitration for 
the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games 
Date 1985.10.09-10/1986.01.08-09/06.10-11/1987.07.14-15 
Venue Panmunjom JAS (Joint Security Area) Northern and Southern areas in turns 
Summary 'The IOC corrected and sent the previous proposal, and requested to know 
whether it would be accepted or not by the end of the August 1987 
 
By the time of the scheduled Fourth Talks, it was less than one year ahead of the Seoul 
Olympic Games. Thus, in the Fourth Talks the discussion had to reach certain conclusions. 
South Korea did not agree with the revised proposal of the IOC by the Third Talks, but 
changed its position in the Fourth Talks because of the limited time and to save the face of 
the IOC, rather than as a result of any willingness by to compromise.  
[Table 4.22] The 1
st
 - 4
th
 North Korea & South Korean Sports Talks with IOC arbitration for the 
1988 Seoul Olympic Games-8 
 Content 
Title The 1
st
 - 4
th
 North Korea & South Korean Sports Talks with IOC arbitration for 
the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games 
Date 1985.10.09-10/1986.01.08-09/06.10-11/1987.07.14-15 
Venue Panmunjom JAS (Joint Security Area) Northern and Southern areas in turns 
Summary 'If North Korea withdraws the co-host proposal, and guaranteed free traffic 
between North and South Korea and unconditional participation in the opening 
and closing ceremony, then South Korea will accept the proposal of the IOC 
 
Fundamentally, co-hosting was not appropriate given the IOC charter, particularly when just 
a couple of sport events could be held in North Korea. Thus, South Korea asked North 
Korea to step back from the position of insisting on the co-host label. North Korea could 
choose between the official title of co-host and the transfer of half of the matches, but the 
IOC could not guarantee either of these options. Samaranch described North Korea as a 
‘problem’ which ‘threatened’ the IOC with ‘boycotting’ the Games. It seemed that the IOC 
had done all that it was prepared to do for the time being.    
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……Samaranch pointed out that the only problem at this moment is North Korea. 
‘North Korea threatened that they would boycott the Olympics if there would be no 
more events from the Games held in North Korea for the ‘88 Seoul Games…… 
(Dong-A 26, Februrary, 1987) 
The IOC may have had the intention of gaining enhanced status in terms of its role in 
diplomacy by performing as an arbitrator for the Seoul Olympics. In the following article, a 
particular request from the IOC is identified when IOC representatives came to Seoul for 
discussions about the Games with North Korea in Pyongyang. The IOC wanted its 
representatives to be the first to travel to Seoul by land from Pyongyang as a way of 
symbolising the development of harmony between North and South.  
……On the 6
th
, the IOC staff said that ‘We expect that North Korea will allow us to 
cross the border on our way to Seoul. Then we can become the first International 
Organisational delegates permitted to do this…… 
(Dong-A 7, May, 1987) 
However, North Korea did not approve the request of the IOC. Moreover, the USSR, China 
and many other Eastern European countries so called allies of North Korea-decided to 
participate in the Seoul Games. The isolation of North Korea in diplomatic relations around 
the Seoul Olympics became increasingly apparent.   
…...It was a pity that North Korea refused the request of the IOC to travel by road on 
their way to Seoul from Pyongyang……The only obstacle affecting the hosting of the 
Seoul Games is the co-hosting claim of North Korea…...The USSR, China and Eastern 
Germany will participate, so North Korea is isolated even in the discussion of the 
boycott……  
(Dong-A 28, May, 1987) 
South Korea’s refusal to compromise over the term ‘co-hosting’ gained support as evidenced 
by the IOC’s confirmation of its members’ decision to award the Olympic Games to Seoul. 
The IOC emphasised that even though the Talks had produced no fruitful outcome, they 
were still valuable as an ‘attempt’ to achieve mutual cooperation between North and South 
Korea through the Olympics.   
……On the other hands, Samaranch confirmed that ‘what North Korea wants, ‘co-
hosting’, is impossible, and the 24
th
 Olympics will be hosted in Seoul as the IOC 
session has decided in 1981, Baden Baden. However, the Talks helped in mediating 
relations between the two. We, the IOC and South Korea, have based our approach on 
mutual cooperation rather than just negotiation…… 
(Dong-A 15, July, 1987) 
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Nevertheless, the impression recorded by South Korea in relation to these Talks with North 
Korea was not that positive. The South Korean government’s summary of the Talks referred 
to the stubborn attitude of North Korea in pursuing the co-hosting proposal for the Games.     
[Table 4.23] The 1
st
 - 4
th
 North Korea & South Korean Sports Talks with IOC arbitration for the 
1988 Seoul Olympic Games-9 
   Content 
Title The 1
st
 - 4
th
 North Korea & South Korean Sports Talks with IOC arbitration for 
the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games 
Date 1985.10.09-10/1986.01.08-09/06.10-11/1987.07.14-15 
Venue Panmunjom JAS (Joint Security Area) Northern and Southern areas in turns 
Summary North Korea said that the IOC's proposal is not that different from the previous 
one, and still does not match the co-hosting request 
 
North Korea was not satisfied with the IOC's mediation and continued to argue for its ‘One 
nation’ policy in the Olympic context. Dong-A blamed North Korea for the breakdown of the 
Fourth Talks, because of its unacceptable ‘greedy’ request which was not considered as 'fair' 
or 'generous' from the perspective of the IOC (Dong-A 20, July, 1987).  
 
4.7.4 The issues near the time of the 1988 Seoul Olympics 
The Talks for the co-hosting of the Olympic Games between North and South Korea with the 
IOC officially broke down after the series of four meetings. When Seoul was designated as 
the host city of 1988 Olympic Games, Dong-A mentioned two benefits which it expected to 
obtain by hosting the Games. The first was the establishing of better recognition of the 
importance of Sport in Korea with the influx of international spectators. The second was the 
development of sport facilities in general which would provide a better environment for 
people to get involved in the various sport activities.           
……What will be achieved by the Olympics in South Korea? First of all, the 
judgemental attitude about the sport will change……Many people will participate in 
sport activity and will enjoy it……One other factor is that of sport facilities. When the 
facilities are properly equipped, then 80% of the goal to develop sport participation will 
be achieved……And this will be good opportunity to attract people to participate in 
sport……  
(Dong-A 1, October, 1981-1) 
The article mentioned the domestic influence of hosting the Olympics while the article below 
refers to the diplomatic impact of the Games. In the article, Dong-A described South Korea’s 
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diplomatic goals which were ‘not yet accomplished’, and argued that the Olympics would be 
the best opportunity to establish diplomatic relations with new countries, such as the 
Communist bloc of nations.    
……Diplomats considered that the success of ‘Seoul Olympics’ will affect International 
Political relations. First of all, the 46 countries with which South Korea had no 
diplomatic relations including the Communist Bloc, Eastern European and anti-Korean 
African countries……This Olympics is definitely the chance to develop Korean 
diplomatic relations in a way which has not been accomplished since 
independence…… 
(Dong-A 1, October, 1981-2) 
On the other hand, North Korea was worried about South Korea’s enhancement of its 
diplomatic status, and warned about the problems of international recognition of the ‘Two 
Koreas’ by emphasising diplomatic relations with ‘One Korea’. This demonstrates that North 
Korea recognised the potential of the Olympic Games to enhance South Korea’s diplomatic 
status.  
……In relation to the fascistic South Korean regime of Chun Du Whan and its hosting 
of the Seoul Games, the way in which the Seoul Games are used for political 
propaganda is pretty suspicious……South Korea will attempt to achieve permanent 
separation of the countries by joining the UN separately through these Olympics 
……South Korea will improve its isolated IR position and will want to be recognised as 
a ‘Nation State’ following by its ‘Two Cho Sun’ policy…… 
(Roh-Dong 15, Dec. 1981) 
North Korea blamed South Korean ‘legalisation of the Two Cho Sun Policy’, and proclaimed 
that this was against the notion of the homogeneous nationalism of Korea.  
……The stooge South Korean prime minister has confessed the purposes of ‘86 Asian 
Games and ‘88 Olympics. What they want to achieve through the games was just 
legalisation of the ‘Two Cho Sun’ policy by being recognised as North and South Korea 
separately in an international context. South Korea has misused the Olympic for its 
own wrongful purposes…… 
(Roh-Dong 6, June 1986-2) 
When the staging of the Seoul Olympic Games was imminent, a popular movement asking 
the regime for democracy began to grow. The South Korean regime therefore needed to 
address the unstable framework of national security which had aimed to distract people’s 
attention away from domestic issues to focus on the external enemy, and in particular the 
military threat from North Korea.  
……The Olympics has been used as a tool in South Korea for suppressing democracy 
by concreting the North and South Korean War situation. South Korea mentioned the 
‘military invasion’ or ‘military provocation’ of North Korea continually……  
(Roh-Dong 21, Mar. 1986) 
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However, the president of the USA, as a strong ally of South Korea announced that he 
would support South Korea in its bid to make a success of the Games. The Prime Minster of 
the UK even underlined the need for caution in relation to North Korean activities which 
might be designed to undermine the Games. . 
……Reagan has mentioned that it is ‘good’ to host Asian Games and the Olympics in 
South Korea and the USA will do its best to support the successful Games…  
(Dong-A 12, April, 1986-2)  
……The Prime Minister Thatcher said that whatever North Korean motivation and 
actions, South Korea and the UN army must remain alert to danger……   
(Dong-A 1, May, 1986) 
South Korea named the North Korean diplomatic policy a ‘closed policy’ which would result 
in North Korea being isolated in international relations. Dong-A advised North Korea to 
become engaged in international relations by participating in the Seoul Olympics for its own 
sake, since the USSR and its entire group of allies would join the Games.    
……If South Korea’s Olympic Games are successful, then the isolation of North Korea 
will become obvious. Moreover, it will be hugely damaged if it continues with its ‘closed 
policy’ as South Korea progressively improves its democracy……The participation of 
China and the USSR means ‘more recognition’ for South Korea, so North Korea must 
be confused in terms of its political position and I had heard that North Korea is now in 
deep consideration on this matter…… 
(Dong-A 5, August, 1987) 
North Korea, aware of this circumstance, requested a further round of Talks with the IOC. 
However as Dong-A noted; 
……The IOC announced that they had refused the request of North Korea to have one 
more set of Talks for the Olympics….   
(Dong-A 25, August, 1987-2) 
Dong-A makes explicit its view as to why the IOC had refused in the following terms 
……It is because North Korea kept asking for co-hosting [of the Games] which was 
against the IOC Charter, thus any Talks could not progress ……   
(Dong-A 15, September, 1987-2) 
In the meantime, the opening of the 1988 Seoul Olympics was just one year away. The IOC 
started to send the invitations to participants (NOCs) for the Games. Chang, who represent 
the IOC in North Korea identified this as the ‘official break down of the Talks’ and requested 
that the IOC delay the dispatch of the letters of invitation. However, the IOC stated that it 
would not conduct any further action on behalf of North Korea which might cause any 
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inconvenience to the scheduling and preparation of the South Korean Organising Committee, 
thus it refused what North Korea had proposed.  
……The North Korean IOC member, Chang exclaimed that the preparations for 
sending invitations for the Olympics to all other countries meant a break down in the 
Talks which had lasted, until now……   
(Dong-A 15, September, 1987-1) 
…… The North Korean NOC asked the IOC for a delay in dispatching invitations to the 
Olympics, and Samaranch simply has answered that ‘there is nothing further we can 
expect from North Korea and the IOC must do what it has to do’…… 
(Dong-A 16, September, 1987-1) 
In relation to the Talks, the IOC acknowledged the hegemony of South Korea in relation to 
the agenda for the Talks, and the best the IOC could expect would be minimum disruption 
and the willing participation of North Korea in the Games. Despite the recognition of the role, 
or authority of, South Korea by the IOC, South Korea did not maximise the political capital 
from these Talks. The president of the South Korean NOC expressed a passive attitude in 
relation to participating in the Talks by saying that the decision would depend upon the 
decision of the IOC and until the IOC became involved, South Korea should wait for North 
Korea to make a further move. 
……The president of the KOC, Kim, said that there is no idea of having further Talks 
between North and South Korea, and since this is a matter relating to the Olympics, 
the IOC must be involved. However, we will wait until the last minute for North Korea’s 
participation……  
(Dong-A 18, September, 1987) 
South Korean university students who demonstrated for national democracy insisted on the 
co-hosting of the Olympic Games with slogans in favour of co-hosting. Student support for 
this type of slogan was based on the idea that co-hosting would help promote national unity 
on the Korean peninsula, and this became welcome news to Roh-Dong and implied 
evidence for the suppression of the South Korean people.     
……University students used the slogans as follows; ‘Let’s recover national identity 
independence by co-hosting the Olympics’, ‘let’s support the peoples’ movement’…… 
(Roh-Dong 22, Sept. 1987) 
Roh-Dong said that North Korea could not cooperate with this South Korean regime of 
President Chun. Roh-Dong had expected to engage with the new ‘Democratic’ regime, thus 
the ‘present’ regime was defined as ‘Non-Democratic’. This implied that North Korea 
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believed that the sport interaction between North and South Korea was not separable from a 
domestic political agenda, even though this sporting event is highly international.  
……As long as the present military dictatorship regime exists in South Korea, the co-
hosting of the Games cannot happen. Therefore, we think it is fair to delay all the Talks 
until there is a new democratic regime elected…… 
(Roh-Dong 27, Oct. 1987-3) 
Ironically, this ‘Non-Democratic’ South Korean regime was supported in hosting ‘its Olympics’ 
by expressions of participation from other socialistic countries. Samaranch had said that the 
official answer from these countries would be late due to the diplomatic relations with North 
Korea, but he found that they would definitely participate in the Games from various sources. 
Moreover, the foreign minister of Poland announced that he refused to boycott the Games 
when asked to do so by North Korea. ‘Nothing lasts forever.’ Would it be too much of an 
exaggeration to say that today’s friend becomes tomorrow’s enemy in this context?     
……Samaranch mentioned that socialist countries had just delayed announcement of 
their participation at the Seoul Olympic Games because of diplomatic relations with 
North Korea, but most of the socialist countries would participate in the Seoul 
Olympics……And the Undersecretary of State forecast that the USSR, China and 
other Eastern countries, and Cuba would participate in the Games so North Korea 
would not be able to use terror tactics…… 
(Dong-A 21, November, 1987) 
 
The Polish Foreign Minister said that he would refuse the request from North Korea to 
boycott the Seoul Olympics as long as the co-host issue is not solved properly……   
(Dong-A 23, November, 1987) 
 
4.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to sketch out the main characteristics of North-South Korean 
sport relations in the Cold War international context. Since China declared a policy of 
opening up its economy in 1979, this had a ‘knock-on’ effect on other Socialist countries 
such as North Korea, and the confrontational relationship between North and South Korea 
began to show potential to decrease when the 35th Table Tennis Championships were held 
in Pyongyang, North Korea provided a timely stimulus for Sports Talks between two Koreas. 
The discussion of the adoption of a ‘unified team’ was introduced at this time with a positive 
lead by North Korea, although ultimately agreement could not be reached.  
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In this period of Olympic history, there were Games which became the source and location 
of confrontation between the two political blocs, led by the USA and the USSR. The 1980 
Moscow Games and the 1984 LA Games were known as ‘half games’ and North and South 
Korea played complementary roles in this division by boycotting one Games each. Each of 
them tried to persuade the other to participate in the Games hosted by their own allies and in 
both cases the two Koreas attempted to organise unified team for the Games, even though 
North and South Korea withdrew in 1980 and 1984 respectively. The failure of these Talks 
reflected the limits of diplomatic action within this Cold War context.  
 
In 1981, South Korea was nominated as the host country for the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games 
by the IOC and this provoked strong resistance from North Korea. These circumstances 
reflected the paradoxical nature of the North and South Korean dialogues, which tried to 
achieve agreement on establishing a unified team while each was also trying to ensure that 
the ‘other party’ was given no advantage in the international sport context. This explains 
North Korea’s strong opposition toward the proposed South Korean hosting of the 1988 
Olympics. North Korea used diplomatic relations to place pressure on the IOC to change its 
decision, and when this proved unsuccessful it looked to promote the idea of North Korea 
being co-hosts, co-hosting, rather than a unified team became the primary focus of 
discussion. 
 
Sport interactions were live and relevant in this period but the sports discourse was always 
to be seen as part of the wider context of Cold War relations, and sporting discourses were 
inevitably entangled in wider and more generic discursive strands.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
148 
 
Chapter 5 North and South Korean sports relations from 1988 to 1997 
 
5.1 Introduction  
In this chapter, the discourses of the North and South Korean governmental and media 
sources with respect to sporting relations between the two states will be analysed. The time 
period of the analyses is from 1988 to 1997 and, particular emphasis will placed on studying 
‘international level’ matches which the South Korean government officially announced as an 
‘area for the support of sport interchange with North Korea’ (Korea 1990, 2005). From an 
international relations perspective, the mood of détente increased during this timeframe. 
Certainly, the Korean peninsula went from a state of conflict to détente, with North and South 
Korea representing the political super powers in their diplomatic dialogues. It is therefore not 
surprising therefore that the complex patterns of conflict and harmony prevalent in inter-
Korean relations were interwoven into their domestic and socio-economic situations. South 
Korean national politics began to move away from the military dictatorship regime, which 
was established by Chun Doo Hwan’s military coup in 1979, to the first democratic 
government elected by the people. The next President, Roh Tae Woo, had participated in 
Chun’s military coup (as his friend) and subsequently collaborated with the military 
government as a member of the cabinet. Therefore, Roh Tae Woo’s regime essentially 
pursued the same political direction as Chun had done, following a simple transfer of power 
between two close allies. On the other hand, in North Korea, the death of the ‘great leader’, 
Kim Il Sung in 1994 created the need for a sudden transition of political authority to his son, 
Kim Jong Il.  
 
From 1988 to 1997, South Korea rapidly enlarged its national infrastructures and enhanced 
the social welfare of its citizens, whereas North Korea focused on increasing its military 
capability. Developments in North and South Korea were closely followed by the 
international community as North Korea tried to gain legitimate its political authority. Thus, 
North and South Korea’s relationship might be described as ‘peace in progresses’ and a 
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decision to co-exist in relative harmony. After the right to host the 1988 Olympic Games was 
awarded to Seoul, various attempts were made to develop North and South Korean relations, 
and these interactions will be illustrated in this chapter. 
 
5.2 The 1988 Seoul Olympic Games and International Relations 
 
5.2.1 Samaranch and the IOC as a diplomat of the Games  
The particular circumstances of North and South Korean relations offered the IOC the 
opportunity to become involved as a sporting and diplomatic mediator. Dong-A highlighted 
that Samaranch performed a significant role in encouraging the member countries of the IOC 
to take part in the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games. In the end, the official number of NOCs who 
participated was 159; at the time the largest number for any Olympics. Building on the IOC’s 
governance of the Olympic Movement during the Cold War years, the President of the IOC, 
Samaranch, viewed the situation in Korea peninsula as the ‘perfect’ opportunity to act, as a 
mediator in the international sporting arena.  
 
Since North and South Korea had become members of the IOC, there was international 
recognition of their ‘separate’ political expression through spotlighted sports. Ironically, one 
of the reasons that Seoul was chosen as the host city for the 1988 Olympic Games was its 
symbolic value of ‘peace’, even though there was no formal ceasefire in place on the Korean 
Peninsula.   
Samaranch said that ‘The IOC had put most of its effort into making the Seoul Games 
a festival for the whole of humanity, and we also did our best to make a success of the 
North and South Korean Sports Talks. If North Korea had accepted our suggestion, 
then we would have supported their participation with the cooperation of all the IFs.     
(Dong-A 19, January, 1988) 
Samaranch, the former Spanish diplomat, did his best to encourage North Korea to 
participate in the Seoul Olympic Games, and tried to get them to become partial ‘co-hosts’ 
by asking South Korea to give up hosting some matches. However, after several meetings 
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with North Korea, Samaranch reached the conclusion that this co-hosting ‘dream’ could not 
be realised.  
In Calgary on the 6
th
, after 45min. of discussions with the president of the North Korean 
NOC on North Korea’s participation in the Seoul Olympic Games, he agrees to a 
further meeting with North Korea, if North Korea accepts some of the required 
conditions. However, he also mentions that North Korea’s attitude had not changed at 
all, and at this stage, more North and South Korean Sports Talks would be 
meaningless.     
(Dong-A 8, February, 1988) 
Despite Dong-A’s praise for the way Samaranch performed his role, Roh-Dong alleged that 
a member of the Cuban media denounced Samaranch’s statement at a press conference. 
Samaranch said that he did not expect North Korea to cooperate to any significant degree. 
The following article shows how North Korea felt during and just after the Talks had broken 
down. The article complained about the speech made by Samaranch, claiming that he acted 
‘as if he opened the door for North Korea’.    
……The newspaper made its point under the title of <what door did Samaranch open 
for North Korea?>. The president of the IOC, Samaranch, said at the press conference 
in Lausanne that the door for Pyongyang to participate in the 1988 Olympics had not 
yet closed. But realistically, what door is opening? ......What door has Samaranch 
opened? Will it be the door which disregards the Olympic idea which originated from 
Love and Unity through the Seoul Olympic Games? Is it the door that threatens to 
make North Korea accept the left overs of the dictatorship of South Korea? 
 (Roh-Dong 24, Jan. 1988) 
North Korea complained that Samaranch did nothing but force North Korea to accept the 
‘leftovers’ that the South Korean regime did not want. Certainly Roh-Dong’s claim illustrated 
North Korea’s disappointment with South Korea’s offer and the IOC’s efforts which were 
insufficient in the eyes of North Korea. Roh-Dong repeatedly reported that the North Korean 
regimes denigrated Samaranch’s work as a mediator between North and South in the Talks 
relating to co-hosting the Olympic Games. Nevertheless, Roh-Dong reported the positive 
comments of Fidel Castro on the work of Samaranch. Castro stated that he believed 
Samaranch’s desire for co-hosting to be sincere, and thus Castro’s evaluation of 
Samaranch’s diplomatic actions was certainly not negative.  
……Samaranch sent me (Castro) a letter saying that he would keep trying to find the 
solution. We were happy with this. If he could find a solution that satisfied the DPRK 
(North Korea) then we would support that and participate in the Games. Now although 
that would be a miracle, I think it is positive that Samaranch put in the effort here...... 
(Roh-Dong 2, Mar. 1988) 
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5.2.2 The Cold War VS Détente in North and South Korea 
The 1988 Seoul Olympic Games showed (with the symbolic meaning of the location of the 
games) that ‘World Peace’ in the ‘Cold War’ era could be achieved. There were official 
announcements to that effect by the participating countries including the USSR and other 
Eastern European Nations. Analysis of the media discourse reveals that the mood of détente 
at the end of the Cold War did indeed have an impact on the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games  
…… Staff from the USA gave indications on a number of occasions that the USSR 
would participate in the Games, since they had already been made aware of the 
intention of the USSR to do so from meetings with the Foreign Minister and other high-
level officials. Moreover, during the summit in December, last year, President Ronald 
Wilson Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev declared together that ‘We 
both wish for a successful hosting of the ‘88 Seoul Olympic Games’…… 
(Dong-A 12, January, 1988) 
This international context was also referred to in a press statement by Samaranch. 
Samaranch was clearly aware of the two international leaders’ intentions, the effect this 
would have on the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games, and on the negotiations between the two 
Koreas.  
Samaranch said that ‘…...the number of participants in the 88’ Seoul Olympic Games, 
will exceed that of previous Games, and the support of Reagan and Gorbachev has 
helped significantly…...’, In addition, Samaranch met  Gorbachev again to obtain 
‘positive support’ to persuade North Korea and Cuba to participate.  
(Dong-A 19, January, 1988) 
Dong-A admitted that South Korea had broken new diplomatic ground with the Socialist 
nations, and this was a significant milestone in communications between South Korea and 
the USSR. The North Korean alliance, (including Cuba), proclaimed that the Olympic Games 
was similar to a Cold War confrontation, with South Korea being perceived as a major ally of 
the USA. Roh-Dong referred to the South Korean regime as a “puppet government”, and the 
USA as the ‘boss’ of South Korea. This view explained how Roh-Dong defined the relations 
of South Korea and the USA, ‘which had a conspiracy to engage in military manoeuvres as a 
means of intimidation (Roh-Dong 21, Jan. 1988). Roh-Dong published an article about the 
“USA’s nuclear weapons” located in South Korea, and denigrated the efforts of the IOC for 
‘Peace’ by using the metaphor of ‘a dream of a dove, which had grown an Eagle’s claw”. It 
implied that the ‘real danger’ was “nuclear weapons” provided by the USA to South Korea. 
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Roh-Dong tried to show a clear contradiction between the issues of sports and military deals 
in North and South Korean relationships (Roh-Dong 24, Jan. 1988). North Korea objected to 
the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games because of South Korea’s military armament strategy, which 
the latter had developed in cooperation with the USA. The issue of security in the Korean 
Peninsula was further highlighted when Seoul was chosen as the host city of the Olympic 
Games. North Korea believed this to be an ironic choice, because it simultaneously involved 
both positive and negative relations, viz., a ‘Peaceful sport and cultural festival’ and a 
‘military confrontation’. In addition, Roh-Dong argued that South Korea was completely 
controlled by the USA. 
……On the grounds of <Olympic Security>, the USA has noticeably increased its 
military force based in South Korea and this is obviously a threat to North Korea. This 
is blasphemous for the Olympic Movement which is a search for Peace. At the same 
time, it is also a real challenge for North Korea which is seeking a peaceful solution 
and unification of the Korean peninsula. The actions of the USA cannot be understood 
in any way other than that the USA is controlling the 24
th
 Olympics behind the 
scenes…...  
(Roh-Dong 10, Feb. 1988) 
The existence of international support from the foreign media was alleged by Roh-Dong. The 
headline of a Finnish newspaper defined the USA’s military presence in South Korea as “the 
American threat”. And concerns about this practice seemed right, since the USA officially 
warned that the tension between North and South Korea might escalate during the Seoul 
Olympic Games. This encouraged South Korea to prepare for potential incidents that might 
occur during the Games.       
……A Finnish Newspaper <Kansan Uutiset> published an article under the title of 
<The Military Practice of the USA: A threat to the ideology of peace in the Olympics>, 
that criticised <Team Sprit 88>the  military manoeuvres which were planned for this 
autumn in South Korean home waters in cooperation with the US army. It pointed out 
that it this was a shocking announcement on the part of the USA, which sought to 
exercise its ‘War-games during the ‘Seoul Olympic Games’ and warned that the 
tension between North and South Korea could be severe…...  
(Roh-Dong 16, Feb. 1988) 
The Eastern European Socialist countries, which decided to participate in the Seoul Olympic 
Games, expected benefits from improved international cooperation. Nevertheless, they 
needed to maintain their rhetoric of joining the Seoul Olympic Games without detrimentally 
impacting their alliance with North Korea and their reputation for supporting a socialist 
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ideology by referring to ‘Seoul’ as a ‘city’, rather than ‘Seoul’ as a city of ‘South Korea’. A 
diplomatic relations dilemma existed between North Korea and the USSR. Samaranch 
revealed that Gorbachev’s leadership played an enormous role as the USSR’s primary 
decision maker. Moreover, the diplomatic actions of the USSR were not a single country’s 
actions; rather they were signals of collective diplomatic decisions taken by the socialist 
countries.   
When the USSR announced that they would support North Korea in the argument 
regarding the Co-hosting of the Games, this was interpreted as political rhetoric…... 
The participation of the USSR was not limited to the symbolic meaning of backing from 
a leader of socialist nations, but also a clear message to North Korea to not involve the 
international Olympic arena in this matter and to follow the principle of ‘separation 
between politics and sport’. 
                                                              (Dong-A 12, January, 1988) 
Dong-A clarified that the USSR shared the same perspective as the USA and China in 
matters pertaining to relations between the two Koreas. The USSR persuaded North Korea 
through diplomatic means to change its policy towards South Korea and to be more open in 
its diplomatic relations to the world by participating in the Seoul Olympic Games. The 
USSR’s decision to participate in the Seoul Games was thus no coincidence. The decision 
was made in the ‘mood of détente’ and the efforts of the IOC were considered as sincere 
attempts to foster peaceful relations. The decision on the part of the socialist countries to 
participate undoubtedly eased security concerns in relation to the Games.   
Now people say that world politics has arrived at a ‘new détente’. This is inferred from 
the fact that the USSR and the USA have changed their policy from one of pursuing 
increased military pressure to one of economic competition, thereby promoting world 
peace. Under these circumstances, the Seoul Olympics can be viewed as a stage for 
manifesting this ‘New Détente’ 
(Dong-A 17, September, 1988-2)                                                                                            
In early 1988, before the socialist countries’ decision to take part in the Games was 
confirmed, a security threat to the Games still existed. While North Korea criticised the 
military manoeuvres of South Korea and the USA, South Korea justified this activity as an 
essential procedure for the security of the Olympic Games, i.e., they were necessary in order 
to protect the venues and participants from terrorist threats. However, from North Korea’s 
perspective, the South’s military manoeuvres were seen as rehearsals for further conflict in 
Korean peninsula. In the following article Roh-Dong draws a parallel between the German 
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government’s activities prior to the Nazi Olympics of 1936 in Berlin (which immediately 
preceded World War II) and the pre-Games military activities of the USA and South Korea.  
......USA and its South Korean stooge increased the size of their military forces just 
before the Korean War, and enhanced their military presence along the cease fire 
line .What we have now is a similar situation. All circumstances point to the fact that 
the USA is misusing the Olympics to develop a new invasion strategy. This is not 
simply a guess; the USA clearly wants to use this Olympics in the same way as the 
Berlin Olympics were used prior to World War II.    
(Roh-Dong 17, Mar. 1988) 
The following article reflects Roh-Dong’s perception about the relationship between USA and 
the South Korean regime by linking the Olympics to the North and South Korean unification 
policy. The reason that North Korea could not agree to the ‘USA controlled’ Olympic Games 
was because the USA was regarded as an opponent of a Korean unification. 
Why is South Korea against the co-hosting of Olympics?......The USA doesn’t want 
Korean Unification. Korea is located near China and the USSR, and is thus 
strategically important. For this reason the USA, allotted 40,000 military personnel and 
stored nuclear weapons in South Korea permanently…...South Korea has not changed 
at all. Oppression and demonstrations have continued. The USA and the South Korean 
government officers don’t want national integration and unification. 
(Roh-Dong 28, Mar. 1988) 
Nevertheless, the military aspect was not the only issue of the Seoul Games. In terms of 
athletic performance at the Olympic Games, the prospect of North and South Korean 
confrontation in Olympic competitions generated huge pressures for both the North and 
South Korean Olympic teams. This was revealed in the following interview with the director 
of the South Korean national team.  
Lee Erisa, Director of the Team – I have anticipated North and South Korean match 
situations, and we have prepared for matches against North Korea and against China 
more intensively……  
(Dong-A 19, May, 1988) 
The tension between North and South Korea was captured in other cases, such as at an 
awards ceremony for table tennis in which the acting chair of Asian Table Tennis Association, 
a North Korean national, handed the medals to the winning South Korean players. When a 
North Korean man awarded the medals to the South Korean team, the South Korean and 
the Korean-Japanese cheering squad could not hide their views. North and South Koreans 
never dreamed that an encounter between two people from opposite sides could be possible, 
since private contact between the peoples of North and South Korea had been prohibited by 
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law in both North and South Korea. This significant event reflected how North and South 
Korean relations were perceived, and illustrated how sports events could produce the ideal 
context for promoting peace. Dong-A cited a South Korean politician’s statement that such 
situations would provide the opportunity to develop a process by which real interaction 
between North and South Korea, in terms of the interchange of people and materials, could 
be managed.        
One of the opposition party leaders Kim Dae Jung said ‘Olympic Security will becomes 
a greater concern if North Korea does not participate in the Game’ and ‘the 
establishing of friendship and peace is what the Olympics is  about, and if the tensions 
and conflicts are increased by this, then the value of the Olympics is decreased.’ 
(Dong-A 2, June, 1988) 
North and South Korea, since their separation, had a wish for unification. A number of North 
Korean allies boycotted the Seoul Olympics to express their support for North Korea’s wish 
for symbolic national unity in the Games. From a North Korean perspective, the co-hosting of 
the Games with South Korea would be a great achievement and would contribute to ‘real 
peace’ in the Korean peninsula. In that sense, North Korea understood that it had the right to 
secure a co-hosting position as the reward for ‘an official truce’. This was an idealistic 
approach, but many South Korean people supported the idea of having North Korea co-host 
the games for that same reason. For example, the Student Association for the Democracy 
and Unification in South Korea announced in an official statement that the Seoul Olympic 
Games must be organised by North and South Korea together for national unity, peace and 
democracy.  
  
5.2.3 North Korea, Cuba and other alliances  
With regards to the peoples’ protest over the issue of the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games, the 
support from diplomatic allies of North Korea was significant. The chief method of support 
was the media. For example, Roh-Dong reported that allies of North Korea advocated North 
Korea’s claim for co-hosting the Games and its position on other issues associated with the 
1988 Seoul Olympic Games. The following article shows that Roh-Dong’s claim was 
empowered through this international support.  
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The 24
th
 Olympics must be held by North and South Korea together…...and North 
Korea clearly publicised that they will not participate if the Games were not Co-
hosted…...The effort of Co-hosting of the Game was sponsored by various societies 
…...  
(Roh-Dong 16, Jan. 1988) 
One of most loyal allies of North Korea, Cuba, held marches demonstrating support for its 
official decision to boycott the 24th Olympic Game. These marches cited the ‘tainted (political) 
motives’ of South Korea in hosting the Games. North Korea and its ally considered South 
Korea’s refusal to co-host the games as unpatriotic (Roh-Dong 21, Jan. 1988). Cuba raised 
its voice to encourage North Korea highlighting the political and moral justifications for 
supporting North Korea’s co-hosting claim. Cuba stated that holding the Olympic Games in 
South Korea was akin to having the Games in Guantanamo, since it considered Seoul a 
closed city, much like the famous jail, Guantanamo of the USA. Cuba complained that the 
Olympic venue had become a stage for ideological conflict, and that the ‘security issue’ of 
the participants had become critical, when it decided to boycott the LA Olympic Games. 
Consequently, this ideological conflict constituted a threat to “Security”, and had affected the 
Cuban decision not to participate in the Olympic Games (Roh-Dong 2, Mar. 1988). The 
Cuban Minister of Education commented indirectly on Castro’s policy when addressing the 
importance of having North Korea co-host the Seoul Games. He stated that South Korea’s 
refusal to co-host made the “sweat (effort)” of the IOC to have both of the Koreas co-hosting 
the Games worthless. Thus, Cuba blamed South Korea for ruining the opportunity to have 
the Olympic Games hosted jointly (Roh-Dong 24, Jan. 1988). It can be interpreted that Cuba 
did not value the international status of the Olympic Games as much as other nations, since 
Cuba also viewed the Olympic Games and the two Koreas differently. Cuba believed that 
whatever the world said about North and South Korean co-hosting of the Olympics, its claim 
had a moral superiority above that of South Korea solely hosting the Games.      
……It cannot be a strange decision for the people who know Cuba and the people of 
Cuba that Cuba will not join the 24
th
 Olympics, unless an agreement had been reached 
with respect to the co-hosting of the games by Pyongyang and Seoul. These are 
examples of moral decisions, which imply that principles are more important than 
winning medals. Cuba supported co-hosting under the notion that co-hosting is the fair 
solution for the Korean people who were forced to divide by USA…...  
(Roh-Dong 2, Mar. 1988) 
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Concerning the military cooperation of South Korea and USA, a Cuban newspaper said that 
“South Korea would make an Olympic War”. The Olympic Security issue was critical, 
particularly at the Seoul Olympic Games, as even though a mood of détente existed; nothing 
could guarantee the security of international sporting events in South Korea.  
 
The statements which portrayed South Korea’s preparations for the Olympic Games as 
inappropriate were spread to the rest of the world. In particular, these politically charged 
statements were constantly being picked up by Roh-Dong. In the following article 
Madagascar’s decision to participate in the Games was conditional on the co-hosting of the 
games, which it viewed as an act in “support of peace and unification of the two Koreas”.         
Madagascar will join the Olympics only under the condition of the co-hosting of North 
and South Korea……and this decision was made independently…... Madagascar felt 
that it had to follow its own principles and the support peaceful unification of North and 
South Korea……  
(Roh-Dong 20, Jan. 1988) 
Roh-Dong alleged that Ethiopia believed that the Seoul Olympic Games would have a 
negative influence on North and South Korean relations unless it became a co-hosted event 
(Roh-Dong 22, Jan. 1988). Therefore, it decided not to participate in the Games as a way of 
indicating its political and diplomatic position. Syria, which supported the idea of North 
Korean co-hosting, criticised South Korea’s pursuance of a “two countries strategy”. It felt 
that South Korea’s preferred policy was that of a permanent separation between North and 
South Korea (Roh-Dong 5, Mar. 1988). China expressed hope that the Seoul Olympic 
Games and the World Youth Sport Games of North Korea would forge a ‘bond’ between the 
two Koreas. The media in China mentioned that the Olympic Games had certain “influences” 
in “Asia”, such as the changes of China and its position on the matter of North and South 
Korea (Dong-A 17, September, 1988-1). These announcements by North Korean allies 
highlight the relationship between the sports issue of whether the Games should be co-
hosted and the political issue of North and South Korean Unification. 
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5.3 The 1988 Seoul Olympic Games and Domestic Issues  
 
5.3.1 The meaning of hosting the Olympics to the South Korean regime  
As the opening ceremony of the Seoul Olympic Games drew closer, the co-hosting of the 
Games became increasingly impractical. The following article presents a narrative of how 
decisions about the hosting the Games were made and what it meant to the South Korean 
regime.      
Hosting and preparing for the Games is ‘a Glory and a Burden’ for the 5
th
 
Republic……The 5
th
 Republic won the bid for the Seoul Games just 1 year after the 
regime had begun, and it focused on the national goal of governing the ‘88 Olympics. 
Moreover, the successful opening of the Games was directly related to the internal and 
external ‘Pressure for constitutional improvement’.  
(Dong-A 19, February, 1988 ) 
Dong-A claimed that President Chun’s regime in South Korea had achieved a great 
diplomatic advance by hosting the Olympic Games, even though the regime’s capacity to 
manage the event was questionable. Thus, it could be perceived as both a “Glory and a 
Burden” to the South Korean regime in terms of the financial cost to the national 
infrastructure, and the political legitimacy of the non-democratically established regime. This 
latter issue became the greatest obstacle for Chun’s regime in terms of its original aim of 
gaining international recognition by hosting the Games. In the process of lobbying to host the 
Games, South Korea stressed its ‘role as a bridge between the East and the West’ by 
referring to the ‘special’ circumstances of the Korean Peninsula. After successfully bidding 
for the Games, the ‘role’ undertaken by South Korea had stretched far beyond its ‘capability’. 
Consequently, support from the USA and the IOC was essential, and eventually the 
responsibility for the success of the Olympic Movement overwhelmed South Korea.      
……‘Maximum participation’ became a mission of the Games, and this became a real 
problem for the 5
th
 Republic Regime……  
(Dong-A 19, February, 1988 ) 
After holding two ‘Half Olympic Games’ (the 1980 Moscow Games, and the 1984 LA Games), 
the IOC recognised the necessity of encouraging participation in the Games and South 
Korea accepted the authority of the IOC in its desire to “maximise participation in the 
Games”. Whether or not South Korea had any real intention of facilitating North Korea’s co-
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hosting of the Olympics was another matter. In an article by Dong-A, it was described as the 
application of extreme pressure, which  pushed South Korea to a significant compromise in 
order to achieve international status, while at the same time  facing the challenge of 
establishing a ‘democratic’ set up in national politics.        
……It is a huge pressure as a host country for the Seoul Games, since there is social 
instability and confusion concerning the legitimacy of the regime, and the constitutional 
revision, and this eventually gives impetus to the promotion of democratic decision-
making……     
(Dong-A 19, February, 1988 ) 
Nevertheless, South Korea had the option of not having open relations with North Korea 
about the Olympic Games. The following article explained the struggle South Korea faced in 
its decision-making on issues related to the Olympic Games and the results thereof.  
However it (the Olympic Games) has been planned and however it has been used in 
politics, we will host the Games 93 days from now……We will see whether the 
Olympics will increase North and South Korean distrust or hurt national pride, whilst 
deepening North and South Korean conflicts. We will evaluate this after the Olympics 
and take responsibility for whatever happens.   
(Dong-A 16, June, 1988) 
Domestically, the ‘responsibility’ of the South Korean regime was to accomplish political 
reforms for democracy. Other countries only focused on negotiations concerning the two 
Koreas co-hosting the Olympic Games. Intentionally or not, the IOC provided an impetus by 
pressing South Korea to establish a politically democratic process of surveying public 
opinion in the host city. It also expressed concern about the need for political innovation on 
the part of the South Korean regime.  
Samaranch said that “the political development of South Korean Democracy is one of 
the key elements for the guaranteed success of the Seoul Olympics”.     
(Dong-A 19, January, 1988) 
As Samaranch emphasised the condition of the domestic politics of South Korea, he 
arranged a meeting to share some ideas with South Korea’s major politicians concerning the 
issue of the Olympic Games. At the meeting, the leader of Pyung Min Dang, Kim Dae Jung 
met Samaranch. Kim enquired about the diplomatic position of China and the USSR 
regarding North Korea’s participation in the Olympic Games. Samaranch answered that the 
IOC wanted North Korea to participate in the Games (Dong-A 2, June, 1988).  On another 
occasion, Samaranch performed the role of international messenger by relying opinions from 
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one side to another and even visited North Korea twice as a mediator. While the IOC 
encouraged the South Korean regime to reform its politics to make Seoul a more suitable 
venue for the Olympic Games, Roh-Dong highlighted the shortcomings of Seoul as an 
Olympic venue to justify North Korea’s position as a co-host for the Games.        
The head of the ‘Korean ethnic democracy group’ Lee said that broad classes of South 
Korean people have a strong belief that we are one ethnic group and thus they support 
Olympic co-hosting. He reminds us that even though there is a violent dominant power 
in the South Korea, many students are asking for Olympic co-hosting and 
demonstrating on the street. 
(Roh-Dong 14, May, 1988) 
The Korean Ethnic Democracy Group’s promotion of the co-hosting was emphasised by 
Roh-Dong, since it was a good example of the existence of groups pressing for the co-
hosting of the Games in South Korea. Associated with domestic political issues, the Olympic 
Games co-hosting issue represented the nationalists’ argument and gained the support of 
student activists. The demands of student demonstrators centred on the “release of political 
prisoners”, “Olympic Games co-hosting” and the “withdrawal of the US military”. The 
argument for co-hosting the Olympic Games became a political and nationalist issue (Roh-
Dong 17 May. 1988).     
 
The slogans chanted by students, and by a student committing suicide convey how strongly 
the people of South Korea wanted to achieve a certain level of democracy. The supporters 
for co-hosting the games were not only reported in Roh-Dong, but also well presented in 
Dong-A as the voices of various actors in South Korean society. In particular, the 
organisations working for the unification of North and South Korea spoke out strongly for the 
co-hosting of the Olympic Games for “National Unity and Peace of the Ethnicity” (Dong-A 27, 
May, 1988). However, the South Korean regime’s stance on the death of the aforementioned 
student was harsh. President Roh stated that ‘the movement of the students and the 
Nationalistic organisations were the result of direct control by the North Korean regime’ and 
that any individual contact with North Korea, without permission from the South Korean 
government would be a direct violation of South Korean law. Thus, the South Korean 
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government was not willing to discuss the demands of the organisation or the students on 
issues such as national unification and the co-hosting of the Olympics.    
 
Hankyoreh wrote about regrets concerning the breakdown of the co-hosting discussions 
between North and South Korea. Hankyoreh perceived the opportunity to co-host the Seoul 
Olympic Games with North Korea as a potential pathway to national unity.       
......We must remember that we failed to co-host the ‘88 Olympics, due to a lack of 
preparation and misunderstanding on the part of both regimes. If that co-hosting had 
succeeded, the issue of the unification of North and South Korea wouldn’t be in this 
helpless situation……          
(Hankyoreh 21, January, 1996-2) 
 
5.3.2 The Co-hosting discussions of the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games 
When Seoul was selected to host the 1988 Olympic Games, North Korea reacted with 
extreme negativity. The changes in the North Korean discourses concerning the Olympic 
Games were addressed in the previous chapter, and the discourses of co-hosting that 
occurred when it was almost time to open the Games, were displayed in Dong-A. It 
represented the perspective of the South Korean regime and of people in prominent 
positions in society, including Dong-A itself. Dong-A stated that the request for co-hosting 
was “too much” and that it meant North Korea would “sink into a diplomatic quagmire” 
(Dong-A 12, January, 1988). The negative tone of Dong-A on the issue of co-hosting was 
revealed through different expressions including ‘co-hosting’ and the ‘distribution of some 
matches’. Since the Games were only four months away, the cooperative gesture could work 
and help achieve a ‘moral justification’ for building mutual trust. However, Dong-A had 
already set limits to what the Olympic Games could attain.   
Is it possible to implement the co-hosting of the ‘88 Seoul Games or to hold some 
matches in North Korea with only 4 months left? Can North and South Korea become a 
single team and participate in the Olympics together?...... However, the relevant 
organisations which have been preparing for the Seoul Games for the last 6 years, 
said that this claim can only become a moral justification for the foundation of 
reconciliation, by the annulment of distrust between North and South Korea......     
(Dong-A 17, September, 1988-1) 
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On the other hand, Hankyoreh reported the voices of the South Korean people and other 
organisations, which agreed with the idea of co-hosting the Games. The Democratic 
Unification Peoples’ Movement Association, along with the Association of Buddhism made 
statements which encouraged the South Korean regime to accept the co-hosting proposal 
(Hankyoreh 20, May, 1988). Influential people in politics gathered and conducted press 
conferences, making statements to support the proposal for co-hosting the Games to help 
achieve the goal of national unification (Hankyoreh 20, May, 1988). These movements and 
statements, reported on by Hankyoreh, implied that there were a significant number of 
people who were against the government and who could not be ignored (Hankyoreh 29, May, 
1988-1). It is particularly interesting to note that the majority of these articles were detailed in 
Hankyoreh, but were disregarded by Dong-A.       
 
In the following article, Dong-A interpreted the IOC’s approval of “allocating some matches” 
to North Korea as an important acknowledgement of the ‘two Koreas’ situation. This was 
with the emphasis that the Games did not belong to any domestic political group but were 
directly governed by the IOC and the IFs. Nevertheless, the policy of North Korea was 
described in Kim Il Sung’s speech as one where ‘the two Koreas can (thus, they must) 
decide major decisions, associated with the Olympic Games, independently by themselves 
since it was a ‘National matter’.  
……The IOC argues that the Olympics are basically an event of the IFs and IOC, 
therefore only the Organising committee can operate the Games. Therefore the 
request of North Korea to co-host is too much for the South Korean organising 
committee. 
(Dong-A 21, May, 1988) 
Roh-Dong consistently criticised the South Korean regime for its resistance to those South 
Korean voices which supported North Korea’s position on the issue of co-hosting the Games 
(Roh-Dong 10, June 1988). Roh-Dong defined the Seoul Olympic Games as a tool “to fix the 
North and South Korean division” and a way of “masking all the domestic political faults” of 
South Korea (Roh-Dong 12, July 1988). North Korea drew attention to the lobbying process 
for awarding Seoul the Olympic Games. Previously North Korea had announced that South 
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Korea had influenced the IOC members by providing ‘women’s bodies’’ (i.e., providing 
prostitutes). In the following article, one more issue was pointed out by Roh-Dong- South 
Korea’s lack of professional human resources for operating the Games. The efficient 
management of human resources for operating a huge event like the Olympic Games was 
an absolute necessity. Thus the South Korean regime urgently needed to train professional 
human resources in the field of sports to run the event properly.  
……The USA and president Roh’s regime prevented normal people’s participation in 
the Seoul Olympics illegally. All the processes for arranging the hosting of the event 
were made in secret, and only 13% of the 600 staff of the Olympic Organising 
Committee was professionals in the sports arena…… 
(Roh-Dong 5, Aug. 1988) 
Nearer the time of the Seoul Olympic Games, foreign journalists from the various countries 
participated in a press conference in Greece organised by South Korea and the IOC. The 
journalists were interested in the impact of the Olympic Games on North and South Korean 
relations and how they would organise ‘A Korean Team’. Particularly, the reporters asked 
questions about how ‘A Korean Team’ would operate. This is reflected in the following article. 
Through this, Hankyoreh tried to emphasise the idea  that organising ‘A Korean Team’ and 
‘co-hosting’ reflected not only the wishes of North Korea, but also the general wishes of the 
international media.   
A reporter said that for the harmony of North and South Korea, South Korea should try 
its best to encourage North Korea’s participation and that if there are some people who 
do not want North Korea’s participation, then they are wrong……another reporter said 
that if co-hosting is the only way to gaining North Korean participation then, the IOC 
must be more flexible towards the Korean Nations……      
(Hankyoreh 23, August, 1988-2) 
A South Korean officer, Kim, admitted that South Korea was in the unique position of hosting 
the Games while being subject to dual pressures - one from the IOC and the other from 
international rivalry groups. Therefore, South Korea needed to try every available option to 
make this event succeeded success. From the South Korean officer Kim’s perspective, it 
was clear that the South Korean regime blamed North Korea for its absence from the Seoul 
Olympic Games which occurred in spite of South Korea’s great compromise (such as 
marching at the last in the opening ceremony to show the ‘symbolic statuses’ of the co-
hosting country). This could be interpreted as not the invisible ‘real statuses of co-hosting 
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that North Korea really wanted to achieve, but as the ‘obvious statement’ without ‘real 
authority’ of co-hosting that was ‘hidden’ in the management of the Olympics.  
Under this particular context, we could be blamed more than we should, so we had to 
do our best……we provided all the reasons for the participation. Particularly as the 
hosting country, we suggested that marching in last in the opening ceremony……It 
was their mistake to decide not to participate……   
 (Hankyoreh 12, September, 1989-3) 
 
5.3.3 Issues of Nationalism in the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games 
Hankyoreh reported an analysis of the 7.7 declaration, which articulated the South Korean 
regime’s policy on unification. This followed the German approach to national unification 
based on the independence of the two nations in the Korean peninsula (Hankyoreh 8, July, 
1988-3). The contents of this statement would affect North and South Korean sports 
relations. Thus, the changes in ideas about nationalism can be seen in further discussions 
about nationalism and the two Koreas. In terms of the impact of the Seoul Olympic Games, 
Professor Cho mentioned the powerful international status of South Korea which had ‘forced’ 
the USSR and China to participate in the Games. And others forecasted that North and 
South Korea case would parallel the East and West German case, which was based on the 
‘absorption’ of one into another. Dong-A implied that the “superior” South Korea would 
absorb North Korea for the sake of “National Unity” and permanent peace in the Korean 
Peninsula. This article conveyed a different viewpoint from that of North Korea; since it 
insisted that the South Korean people should be liberated from the governance of the 
‘imperialist South Korea’, which was itself controlled by the USA (Dong-A 19, February, 
1988 ). 
 
The communication channels between North and South Korea were blocked following 
several incidents of conflict. Under these circumstances, the Olympic Games became the 
only premise for Talks between North and South Korea. In these Talks, the IOC became the 
mediator. The Roh’s South Korean regime produced the 7.7 statement, which included an 
innovative policy regarding North Korea. President Roh’s regime was established with the 
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promise of promoting national democratisation, and it was thus expected to display in that 
process, an achievement of peaceful relations between North and South Korea.             
…… Regarding the ‘7.7.Statement’, Foreign minister Choi has explained that the North 
and South Korean relationship is not that of ‘one ethnie and two nation-states’ but of 
‘one ethnie and two government system’. It is doubtful whether North Korea will accept 
and understand this. What we mostly want to mention as regards the unification is the 
German case and how they approved the ‘one ethnic group and two nation-states’ 
approach in the beginning……  
(Dong-A 9, July, 1988) 
Hankyoreh expressed clear sympathy for the failure of co-hosting the Games by using 
language such as the “absence of North Korea” as a “lost brother in the family festival”. 
Hankyoreh was relieved in some sense that the ‘Unification’ issue was raised in South 
Korean society through the debate about the Olympic Games. In other words, whether the 
purpose was achieved or not, the Olympic Games provided momentum for the unification of 
the two Koreas through an international sporting event (Hankyoreh 31, August, 1988-3). 
Hankyoreh pointed out the political dimension of the Olympic Games could be have been 
used as a propaganda tool for Korean nationalism by questioning the reason why South 
Korea emphasised ‘ethnic identity’ without any real emphasis on the “political unification” of 
this Korean ‘ethnic’ nation (Hankyoreh 7, September, 1988). This implied that Hankyoreh 
had same aspirations of realising a ‘unified team’ or ‘co-hosting’ of the Games to promote 
the political unification of two Koreas.  
The people who said the Olympics must be run with the spirit of sport instead of using 
politics have ended up using the Olympics for a political ceasefire which is ironic…… 
People use the term ‘ethnicity’ with ‘Festival of Ethnicity’ and ‘the foundation of the 
great achievement of ethnicity’. What does the South Korea mean by ‘ethnicity’?  
(Hankyoreh 7, September, 1988) 
The primordial nationalism of Korea was the dominant reason for justifying North Korea’s 
inclusion as a co-host of the Games. By contrast, South Korea did not use much of the 
rhetoric of ‘ethnic nationalism’ before the Olympic Games. The South Korean authorities 
might have been reluctant to concur with that type of primordial Korean nationalism, but 
were certainly more reluctant to co-host the Games. Dong-A and Hankyoreh naturally 
covered the issue of nationalism in Korea in a way which promoted the mood of a successful 
Olympic Games for the diaspora of Korean nationals who were due to visit Korea during the 
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Games as athletes and spectators. Consequently, Korean nationalism became a news topic 
as illustrated in the following article of Dong-A.  
The number of Korean-Chinese, who visited South Korea during the 24
th
 Seoul 
Olympics, the biggest event in South Korean history, has increased……These people 
knew that their home country had developed sufficiently to host the Olympics but could 
not come and meet their family who had been left in South Korea due to the ‘wall of 
ideology’.  
 (Dong-A 20, September, 1988) 
Based on the non-political clauses of the 7.7 statements, Dong-A expressed an expectation 
of an increase in the interactions between students from North and South Korea after the 
1988 Seoul Olympic Games. The areas of interaction announced by the Minister of Culture 
and Education of South Korea were rather vague as it indicated that the ‘non-political’ range 
of activities was broadened to incorporate ‘sport’ and ‘culture’. Therefore, the declaration 
itself along with the Olympics became the impetus for the development of North and South 
Korean non-political relations.       
After the ‘88 Games, interactions between students from North and South Korea will be 
promoted positively. Regarding this, a government officer said that an ‘Institute for 
Unification and Ministry of Culture and Education administrative officer has finished an 
investigation into the same after the ‘88 Games. This is also a part of the ‘7.7 
Statement’ which advocates the interaction in non-political activities by the people who 
are in cultural areas such as artists and athletes.           
 (Dong-A 29, September, 1988) 
Hankyoreh strongly expressed its sadness at the failure of the co-hosting proposal. 
Nevertheless, it admitted that the Olympic Games played a huge role in overcoming the 
ideological conflict among the people. This was achieved by highlighting the issues ‘of co-
hosting’ and organising ‘A Korean Team’, despite the previous animosity of North and South 
Korea toward each other (Hankyoreh 3, October, 1988-1). Hankyoreh emphasised the role 
of the Olympic Games in “reconciling the conflict and confirming a national identity for 
unification”. Thus, the fundamental belief was that the symbolic scene of national unity would 
affect people’s motivations towards unification in line with the lessons learnt from previous 
Olympic Games in which the East and West German teams had participated. This article 
clearly confirmed what Hankyoreh wanted to promote through the Games.    
North and South Korea had considered the Olympic Games an essential process to 
overcoming a divided ideology through reconciliation and a confirming of national 
identity that would encourage unification…...the East and West German case, in which 
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Germany had participated 3 times at the Olympics as a unified team, had hosted 200 
meetings and invested $5,000,000 on this,…...the North and South Korean case would 
also need patience and compromise…...           
 (Hankyoreh 22, December, 1988) 
Dong-A concluded that the Seoul Olympic Games was “an opportunity for maximising 
national pride”, observing that the Olympic Games had become a world celebration of 
‘Nationalisms,’ which was represented by, for example, ‘Koreanism’, ‘Americanism’ and 
‘Sovietism’. Dong-A commented that the Olympic Games were both an “opportunity and 
burden” for the South Korean regime. Thus political and economic development became an 
obligation for South Korea. The festival of ‘Nationalism’ could have been an ‘opportunity’, yet 
North Korea did not take advantage of this opportunity. However, though Dong-A 
acknowledged the role of the Olympic Games  in promoting peoples’ national pride, it 
focused more on the ‘competitive’ character of this festival of nationalism, rather than the 
harmonious mood of international relations at this time (Dong-A 3, October, 1988).          
 
During a meeting of North and South Korean representatives on 9th September, the North 
Korean representatives spoke proudly about the successful hosting of their own international 
festival (held at the same time as the Seoul Games), with more than a million foreign 
participants. His South Korean counterpart responded that the Seoul Olympic Games was 
also successful, but he expressed a wistful sense of loss at North Korea’s absence. The 
North Korean representatives replied that the Olympic Games might be recognised as an 
international success, but it couldn’t be described as ‘perfect’ since a ‘family’ member had 
been absent. Thus, North and South Korea still recognised each other as ‘family’ from a 
nationalistic perspective. It was however ironic to see both claim to be ‘family’ while still 
being unable to agree on the ‘family organising’ of this event. Even though North Korea did 
not participate in the Seoul Olympic Games, this became the first step in establishing a new 
North and South Korean sports relationship. Since then, several changes have taken place 
in the international sport arena through the gatherings of the people of North and South 
Korea. That was how the Olympic Games led to the transformation of society and to 
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changes in peoples’ perceptions. The following article highlights these changes in the 
interactions among sportsmen and women and shows that this was a unique outcome of the 
sport interactions. The article also provides an insight into the Unification policy-making 
process, in relation to what the two Koreas actually tried to achieve through the ‘Unification’. 
A friendly meeting of the North and South Korean sports people – ‘Even just a while 
ago, the North and South Korean sports people avoided each other when they met at 
international competitions or at coaching conferences. Recently, however, they stayed 
at the same hotel, and had meals at the same table. They also pointed out each 
other’s strong and weak points and cheered each other when they were competing 
against foreign players……The Director of Gymnastics Association Chung said ‘We 
naturally get along; for example, a North Korean referee smiled at us at the restaurant. 
I have known this North Korean referee since 1984, but we did not share greetings. But 
this time we shared our friendship, and even talked about how husbands are cheating 
[their wives]…… ‘                  
 (Dong-A 6, January, 1989) 
Even though the co-hosting of the Games had failed, North and South Korea expressed and 
confirmed their ethnic nationalism in discussions. This ‘clear’ shared notion of nationalism 
promoted a certain expectation of unity between North and South Korea. Other than that, the 
diplomatic relations of both blocks were enhanced through the Games. North and South 
Korea re-established diplomatic contact and made plans to cooperate. Obviously, this 
sudden openness towards each other brought about some confusion in South Korean 
society. Greater clarity was needed on issues relating to regulations and their interpretation, 
particularly those relating to contact with the North Korean people.    
Next follows a series of stories from North Korea. For example, even just a year ago it 
would have been impossible for such a variety of North Korean products to be sold in 
South Korean shops……While changes in relations within the Communist bloc were 
attributed to the Olympics, issues such as the potential for North Korea to co-host the 
Olympics, their participation in the Games and the ‘unification’ of both countries 
became public issues in North Korea and were topics of discussion in the Students’ 
movement…… In South Korea, this led to a questioning of ideology albeit with some 
degree of confusion and chaos……There was thus a political softening on the part of 
North Korea which, essentially, had a mixed reaction in South Korea…… 
 (Dong-A 12, January, 1989) 
Despite the agreement on ethnic nationalism, Dong-A claimed that North Korea had a 
hidden agenda in suggesting the formation of ‘A Korean Team’. Thus, Dong-A did not agree 
with the notion of ethnic nationalism, even though ‘A Korean Team’ could be a symbolic 
realisation of national unity.    
…...Despite the positive outcome forecast for the North and South Korean Sports Talks, 
there is also need for precaution. Ostensibly, the North Korean suggestion for a unified 
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team rooted in sport diplomacy and was intended as a peace-making gesture. 
However the aim was to achieve greater mileage for its political propaganda.  
(Dong-A 6, March, 1989) 
Using the notion of realising the ethnic nationalism of Korea, Hankyoreh expressed the idea 
that no matter how much the Seoul Olympic Games was valued; it was nevertheless, ‘half’ of 
the Olympic Games to Koreans (Hankyoreh 31, January,1990). This showed the specific 
priority of Hankyoreh with respect to sports relations between North and South Korea. It 
certainly reflected nationalistic positions of Hankyoreh. The paper supported the co-hosting 
of the Olympic Games, taking the view that this was promoting peace-making within the 
Korean Peninsula and it indicated that this was in line with the views of the Korean people. 
Hankyoreh was persistent in its support for ethnic nationalism between the two Koreas in 
sports.  The political usage of sports was, thus, strongly emphasised (Hankyoreh 3, 
February, 1990). Hankyoreh characterised the result of the Seoul Olympic Games as a 
failure, in terms of their effect on national unity - it was described as a ‘heart-breaking 
memory’ for the Korean people (Hankyoreh 19, September, 1990). Thus, Hankyoreh put the 
Korean people’s identity and the unity of the two Koreas as a top priority for the international 
sporting event to achieve. Hankyoreh explained that the long term “success in the hosting of 
the Games” would be a “transformation of North Korea”. Thus, one of the intended effects of 
sport interactions was to encourage an open North Korean regime. Hankyoreh admitted ‘soft 
power’ was the way to achieve public diplomacy.  
......After the successful hosting of the Seoul Olympic Games and the rapid changes to 
the political order, it (North Korea) showed the effort needed to transform the previous 
attitude and to become accustomed to changes in external circumstances.           
(Hankyoreh 9, July, 1994) 
 
5.4 The 1990 Beijing Asian Games  
 
5.4.1 The Issues for the Talks for Organising ‘A Korean Team’ for the Games 
Discussion about organising ‘A Korean Team’ became ‘routine’ in North and South Korean 
sports relations. Particularly so for major International sporting events, such as the Olympic 
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Games and the World Cup, which were held regularly under the governance of the IOC and 
FIFA. Therefore, these international sporting events provided the grounds for a discussion 
on establishing ‘a unified team’. North Korea could not easily ignore the opportunity of this 
sports-based platform, and thus proposed a unified North and South Korean team for the 
Asian Games, even though the North had previously refused to participate in the Seoul 
Olympic Games. Hankyoreh suggested that South Korea should accept North Korea’s 
proposal in order to have another chance to discuss the setting up of ‘a unified team’ during 
the Asian Games (Hankyoreh 23, December, 1988). The attitude of North Korea during 
these discussions was one that was closely related to maintaining the façade of real and 
substantial negotiations, i.e. ‘Playing the game of engaging in Talks so as not to lose face’ 
by keeping the ‘fundamental principle’ and ‘logic’ rather than actual progress through the 
Talks or negotiations. In the following article, however, Hankyoreh uses the failure to 
organise ‘a unified team’ to highlight the faults in North Korea’s elaboration of the ‘One Cho-
Sun’ Logic. Just like North Korea, Hankyoreh was concerned about the symbolic entity of 
Korea and its realisation in the sporting field. Hankyoreh defined ‘a unified team’ as 
potentially the ‘monument of unification’ and a symbolic realisation of the unification as a 
national hope.  
……Once a Unified Team is formed, North and South Korea will become one symbolic 
entity and both countries will be represented together for the first time since their 
division. And this will be a great monument for unification which is a national 
wish.…..This can be analysed as North Korea recognising that  the Unified Team is an 
important step to aid in recovering from the damage of the Seoul Olympic Games and 
an initiative of peace and diplomatic opening for the ‘One Cho Sun’ logic……         
(Hankyoreh 5, January, 1989-2) 
Hankyoreh talked about the expectation of organising ’a unified team’, since it believed that 
the prefatory procedures for this could become a great opportunity to help achieve a mutual 
understanding between the two Koreas and to rebuild the broken bridges between the two 
peoples. Hankyoreh emphasised that the construction of the ‘we’ identity is a key issue in 
the reconciliation of North and South Korea.  
…...There are many obstacles on the path to organising a Unified Team, indeed, as 
many as the expectations for the Unified Team……If both parties agree on the basic 
elements, then the North and South Korean sport interactions can be continued until 
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the Unified Team is established. Through this process, players will escape from the 
prior perceptions of conflict, and can construct the identity of ‘We’……           
(Hankyoreh 8, January, 1989-1) 
From the South Korean perspective, the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games was successful in 
terms of achieving a new level of international recognition. South Korea showed its 
enhanced diplomatic and economic relations with socialist countries at the ANOC 
(Association of National Olympic Committee) session in Vienna. This forced North Korea to 
seriously consider the potentially significant diplomatic impact of the ‘Sports Talks initiative’.  
Hence the North Korean proposal to organise ‘a unified team’ for the 1990 Beijing Asian 
Games, in which it had to participate since China was the host nation. In the international 
relations context, North Korea had struggled with the boycott of the Seoul Olympic Games 
and other controversial issues. Dong-A claimed that using sports as the basis for diplomatic 
exchanges between North and South Korea was the easiest method by which to re-establish 
relations from many perspectives.      
If we consider that there were appreciations and congratulations for the success of the 
Seoul Olympic Games in ANOC (Assembly of National Olympic Committee) in Vienna, 
North Korea could no longer deny that they were in a tight corner vis-a-vis their 
international status. This was due to the lack of moral justification for their decisions. 
One further significant point to note is that North Korea’s proposal of establishing a 
Unified Team for the Beijing Asian Games and the resulting sport interchange that it 
would entail is the simplest in procedural terms. Other Talks such as the Red Cross 
Talks took a long time to yield results. ‘But a sport interchange is always possible when 
both sides are in agreement.’          
(Dong-A 22, December, 1988-1) 
Nevertheless, Dong-A identified the negative aspects of organising a ‘Unified Team’ for the 
two Koreas for the 1990 Beijing Asian Games as a lack of time and a hidden agenda that 
underpinned North Korea’s suggestion (Dong-A 30, December, 1988). However, as stated in 
the aforementioned article, the cooperation between North and South Korea with regards to 
sports could be different. The South Korean regime’s lack of will with regards to the 
cooperation of North and South Korean sport is reflected in Dong-A’s article, which covers 
the case of the “Ministry of Sport” disapproving a research trip to investigate the East and 
West German cases. The reason given was an “issue about the validity of this project”. 
However this was an unusual decision since the South Korean Sport Association was a 
partner in the sport interactions between North and South Korea. They appealed on the 
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grounds that they wanted to investigate the details of the German case in order to see how it 
could be applied to North and South Korea.   
The Ministry of Sports had not approved the South Korean Sport Association’s plan 
which was to send three people to Germany to investigate the East and West German 
Talks in order to help them prepare for the North and South Korean Sports Talks. The 
Ministry of Sports took issue with the validity of this project, and refused to prepare a 
budget.  
(Dong-A 19, January, 1989) 
Dong-A admitted that the attitude of the South Korean regime was affected by the ‘rigid 
foreign policy of the USA towards North Korea. Even though Dong-A was not a supporter of 
North and South Korean cooperation, its stance shows the level of concern about “foreign 
intervention in national issues”. In issues relating to North and South Korean relations, the 
intervention of ‘a foreign actor’ became the one point where both parties reached agreement.      
On the other hand, there is a powerful opinion that the underlying reason for the 
hesitation of South Korea in progress its policy towards North Korea is the worries of 
the USA about expanding North Korean influence towards South Korea. . Indeed, 
President Bush of the USA, who will visit South Korea on 27
th,
 will deliver this opinion 
to President Roh concerning the direction and speed of the North’s policy……And this 
may become a dangerous situation involving a national issue being solved by a foreign 
power.           
(Dong-A 21, February,1989) 
While the fever of the Olympic Games was growing domestically, the international impact of 
the Olympic Games was also growing. It was at this moment that North Korea proposed its 
Talks for organising ‘a unified team’. The official Talks for organising ‘a unified team’ of both 
Koreas for the 1990 Beijing Asian Games were held a total of nine times on the Northern 
and Southern sides of Panmunjom. The first Talks were held on the 9th of March in 1989 and 
five more sets of Talks took place in the same year. There were two more Talks in the 
following January and the last one was held on 7th February 1990. The staging of these 
Talks was suggested by the president of the North Korean NOC, by sending a letter to the 
president of the South Korean NOC to have discussions about ‘a unified team’ for the 
Games. The summary of the Talks, which was written by the Ministry of Unification of the 
South Korean government, contained several allusions to North and South Korean sports 
issues, and were closely aligned to political issues as well (which also could be termed 
‘diplomatic’ matters).  
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[Table 5.1] The 1
st
 – 9
th
 North and South Korea Sports Talks, principle meeting for the ‘90 
Beijing Asian Games Unified Team organising and participation-1 
 Content 
Title The 1
st
 – 9
th
 North and South Korea Sports Talks, principle meeting for the ‘90 
Beijing Asian Games Unified Team organising and participation 
Date 1989.03.09/03.28/10.20/11.16/11.24/12.22/ 1990.01.18/01.29/02.07 
Venue Panmunjom JAS (Joint Security Area) Northern and Southern areas in turns 
Summary Although South Korea was suspicious of North Korea’s attitude, based on the 
history of North and South Korean Talks, the South Korean government 
decided to embrace these Talks with an open mind under the assumption that 
this unified team might ultimately help recover and develop national unity, as 
well as promote reconciliation and cooperation between the two countries. 
 
In the summary of the Talks, South Korea expressed strong doubts about North Korea’s 
motives. South Korea claimed that North Korea was responsible for the distrust between the 
two, as evidenced by its uncooperative attitude in prior Talks. From another point of view, as 
South Korea confessed from the beginning, the Talks started with very little confidence of 
achieving beneficial harmony with North Korea. This was clearly a self-contradicting logic for 
justifying the Talks by South Korea, when it had already accepted the proposal of these 
Talks. The distrust between North and South Korea originated from the tragic Korean War, 
which started on June 25th 1950. South Korea argued that this war began as a result of the 
invasion staged by the North Korean army to ‘liberate’ South Korea from suppression by the 
US imperialists’. If North and South Korea respected each other’s political ideology after 
Korea became independent from Japan on 15th August 1945 and parted peacefully or not 
parted, the hatred and scars of North and South Korea would not be that deep and 
complicated. Since the two Koreas had experienced combat between themselves historically, 
there was always a coexistence of love and hatred, which was associated with a strong 
ethnic sentiment. Consequently, the Korean peninsula became an icon for an ideological 
conflict of the Cold War. The atmosphere of détente could not be reached easily, since the 
cease-fire treaty between North Korea and the US was not permanent. Realistically, North 
and South Korea are still in the middle of a war, and their distrust of each other is natural, 
even in the sports arena. The ‘Unification’ issue is particularly significant in divided nations, 
and it became apparent in North and South Korean relations. This was because that the 
dominant notion of ethnic nationalism clearly defined political ‘Unification’ as the goal of the 
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nation. Although North and South Korea identified themselves as of one ethnicity and had a 
national desire for unification, the procedure of ‘Unification’ could not be agreed upon easily.     
 
According to the summary of the Talks, the statement made by South Korea was devoted 
mostly to what South Korea would do to reach a cooperative result from these Talks. With its 
passive attitude of hopelessness to the Talks, it absolved itself from blame. ‘A unified team’ 
discussion started with the decision of the team title, flag, anthem and selection of players. It 
presented, in highly figurative discourses, the breach between the two Koreas, in terms of 
different interpretations of the meaning of ‘a unified team’. As an anthem of the team, North 
and South Korea agreed on the 1920 version of ‘Arirang’, which was sung by Koreans 
before the country divided. Indeed, this was a relatively easy issue to be resolved since it 
was based on a shared history as one nation and was part of their common culture. ‘Arirang’ 
is one of the symbolic Korean folk songs, and contains unique emotions of Korean ethnicity. 
To understand the relationship between the two Koreas and Korean nationalism, it is 
necessary to broaden one’s focus on Korean history, which includes the period of Japanese 
colonialism. Koreans felt a strong attachment to this traditional song, since it described loss, 
travail, and self-affirmation even amidst Japanese brutality. Therefore, it was no wonder that 
the 1920 version of this song was chosen as the theme song of ‘a unified team’.  
‘Arirang, Arirang, A-ra-ri yo, (we are) Climbing up to the Arirang hill,  
My love that has left me  
His feet will be injured before he reaches to 4 km…    
 
In addition, both Koreas roughly agreed on the criteria for selecting the participants, namely 
choosing the best performing players for a unified team. However, they realised that there 
could be ‘different’ interpretations of this principle. Dong-A provides details of the selection 
process for players from each side. This had become a critical concern to the players in 
terms of their career; as they would be representing their nation. Both Koreas had their own 
competitive strengths in different sports, and the selection procedure varied with each sport. 
And they agreed on the anthem (the 1920s version of Arirang), which was suggested 
by North Korea…...Concerning the athletes’ selection procedure, players will 
participate in a joint training camp first. Each player’s record during practice will then 
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be used to gauge their competence. For games that use a scoring system, a public 
competition involving foreign teams will be held. For team sports and sports of a 
combative nature, the skills of the players will be observed during practice. This 
process thus guarantees a balanced approach to selecting players from both nations.  
(Dong-A 9, March, 1989-2) 
Hankyoreh represented North Korea’s views, which was consistent in its requests for  ‘a 
unified team’, thereby placing it in direct opposition with South Korea’s ‘two Koreas’ policy 
(Hankyoreh 10, March, 1989-3). The discussions surrounding this perception and the issue 
of unification will be detailed later, but certainly, Hankyoreh understood the intention of North 
Korea’s proposal.    
 
The following figure shows the initial suggestion from both sides during the first Talks. 
Although the themes and issues look similar, this can be attributed to their broad and 
general scope. The real problems of the Talks lay in the practical details if how to reach the 
goals. 
[Table 5.2] The Suggestion from Both Sides (The 1st Talks) 
 South Korea North Korea 
 
Theme 
The 11
th
 Beijing Asian Games 
North and South Korean Unified 
Team organising, participation  
The 11
th
 Beijing Asian Games 
Unified Team participation 
organising  
 
Title 
KOREA. The North and South 
Korean Unified Team (Nam Book 
Dan Il team, 남북 단일팀) 
KORYO. (Abb. KRY. Koryo 
Team, Ko Ryo Sun Su Dan, 고려 
선수단) 
 
Flag 
White background, Green 
Korean Peninsula, KOREA at the 
bottom 
White background, brown Korean 
peninsula, KORYO at the bottom 
in blue or red 
Anthem Arirang Arirang 1920 version 
 
 
 
Player selection 
 
1. Best from North and South 
Korea 
2. Exchange matches for the 
selection 
3. A selection competition from 
Each side more than 1 time 
1. Best from North and South 
Korea 
2. Discussion by the sport, 
depending on the entry of the 
Beijing Organising committee 
3. Considering all the records 
but keeping the balance 
between the North and South 
Korea 
Player selection 
and practice 
time 
As soon as possible through joint 
discussions 
Selection for Joint practice, 
deadline: August. Practice 
sessions from September, team 
sports till May 1990, individual 
sports till July 1990 
 
 
Director and 
staff 
1. Dependent  on player 
numbers, president 
2. Fewer number of players, 
vice president 
3. Greater number, director, 
less number, coach 
1. One person from each for all 
staff 
2. Following the OCA charter, 
but keep the balance of 
North and South Korea 
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During the second round of the Talks, both Koreas progressed to the issues of designing a 
team flag in the shape of the Korean peninsula, in a sky blue colour. These symbolic images 
represented a unified team and are closely linked to Korean ethnic nationalism. Ethnic 
nationalism clearly had a significant influence on the success of decisions at the Talks.  
[Table 5.3] The 1
st
 – 9
th
 North and South Korea Sports Talks, principle meeting for the ‘90 
Beijing Asian Games Unified Team organising and participation-2 
 Content 
Title The 1
st
 – 9
th
 North and South Korea Sports Talks, principle meeting for the 90’ 
Beijing Asian Games Unified Team organising and participation 
Date 1989.03.09/03.28/10.20/11.16/11.24/12.22/ 1990.01.18/01.29/02.07 
Venue Panmunjom JAS (Joint Security Area) Northern and Southern areas in turns 
Summary  
 In Korean In English 
North Korea NAM BOOK DAN IL TIM-Unified Team of North 
and South Korea 
KOREA 
South 
Korea 
KO RYO – originates from Korea, name of the 
dynasty 
KORYO 
 
 
North Korea prepared the 1920s version of the Arirang as an anthem of ‘a unified team’. 
There was no specific reason for South Korea to disagree with North Korea’s choice of this 
particular song. Hankyoreh commented that the song carried the typical emotions of the 
Korean people (Hankyoreh 29, March, 1989-4). In contrast to the decision of the anthem 
choice for a unified team, which was easily agreed to on the basis of ethnic nationalism, the 
decision of the title for the ‘unified team’ was more sensitive since it was interwoven with the 
political and diplomatic views of North and South Korea. South Korea wanted to use ‘Nam 
Book Dan IL Tim’ as the Korean name for the team. This was a direct translation of ‘Unified 
Team of South Korea and North Korea’. And for the English name for the team, South Korea 
expressed a preference for ‘KOREA’. North Korea proposed ‘KORYO’ as the team name in 
both Korean, and in English. Both Koreas had thus settled on a slightly different English 
name for the team. In doing so, they both borrowed from a name derived from the unified 
Korean ethnic dynasty, ‘KORYO’. The modern name ‘KOREA’ is derived from the name, 
‘KORYO’ as explained previously. What decisively differentiated North Korea from South 
Korea was the fundamental difference between ‘KORYO’ and ‘NAM BOOK DAN IL TIM’, the 
Korean titles proposed for the unified team. North Korea consistently identified with the 
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notion of ethnic nationalism; however, South Korea reflected separate entities within the title 
of the unified team. This variation reflected their differing views towards political unification 
as well. During the second round of the Talks, South Korea approved the Korean title as 
‘KORYO’, insisting, however, on the use of ‘KOREA’ as the English name for the team.  
 
As shown in the following articles, the tension between the two Koreas made it difficult to 
predict how ‘a unified team’ would be organised until it was actually confirmed. However, 
Dong-A believed in the potential and uniqueness of the impact of sport which was illustrated 
by the successful ‘Ping Pong diplomacy’ as it was in the relations between the ‘East and 
West German’. Dong-A was clear that one role of the Olympic Games was as a way to 
achieve ‘peace’ in international relations (Dong-A 20, March, 1989). The first barrier to 
organising a unified team of North and South Korea was the title of the team in English. At 
this point, it was not anticipated that South Korea’s proposal to use ‘Korea’ as the English 
name would be acceptable to North Korea. Nevertheless, ‘Korea’ was decided as the name 
of ‘a unified team’. North Korea’s approval of the name was a turning point in the Sports 
Talks (Dong-A 29, March, 1989). 
 
With these positive signs in sport interactions between the two Koreas, Dong-A predicted 
that Pastor Moon’s North Korean visit would not affect the second round of Sports Talks, 
which were scheduled for March 28th. However, since his visit was not legally approved, 
sanctions were predicted after his return to South Korea. The ‘Law of National Security’ in 
South Korea was controversial, particularly on the matter relating to North Korea. Thus, the 
decision to arrest Moon was fully dependent on the will of the South Korean regime. At the 
time, the dominant discourse of the South Korean regime on North Korean policy was one of 
anti-communism. Thus, the incident involving Moon became a ‘political sensation’ for the 
South Korean regime. Pastor Moon was a famous leader of the Korean national unification 
movement. He was previously an independence movement fighter against Japanese 
colonialism. The second round of Talks was held on March 28th as planned. However, North 
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Korea criticised pastor Moon’s arrest and postponed the third round of Talks by three 
months. This case was directly against the notion of ‘Sport and Politics being separate 
issues in North and South Korean relations’. It was revealed that sports lacked 
independence from political intervention, particularly in the areas of the Cold War conflict like 
that between North and South Korea, which symbolised a wider ideological conflict. Along 
with this, nationalism found its most powerful expression in sport, and political decisions 
could be presented at sporting venues as well. Pastor Moon gave an interview to Hankyoreh. 
He chose Hankyoreh to deliver his comments unbiased to both Korean audiences. 
Hankyoreh delivered the words from Kim Il Sung as narrated by Moon.     
……What does he (Kim Il Sung) think about ‘A Korean Team’?......He absolutely 
agreed with that……            
(Hankyoreh 7, April, 1989) 
In addition to delivering Kim Il Sung’s ideas to South Korea, North Korea complained about 
South Korea’s decision to arrest pastor Moon. In one sense it seemed right to question why 
visiting a ‘partner’ (who South Korea called ‘family’ because of the same ethnicity) became a 
crime that warranted arrest. This question became the justification for the redefining of North 
and South Korean relations.   
……North Korea blaming South Korea for its arrest of pastor Moon reflects the South 
Korean view of North Korea as an enemy rather than a partner. They thus postponed 
the Talks. South Korea responded by stating that North Korea was intervening in 
domestic issues and ‘Using Pastor Moon by hiring a jet and taking him to Pyongyang 
for political propaganda purposes’. Therefore, North Korea has to take responsibility for 
the relations deteriorating……           
(Hankyoreh 19, April, 1989-2)  
     
[Table 5.4]  The 1st – 9th North and South Korea Sports Talks, principle meeting for the ‘90 
Beijing Asian Games Unified Team organising and participation-3 
 Content 
Title The 1
st
 – 9
th
 North and South Korea Sports Talks, principle meeting for the ‘90 
Beijing Asian Games Unified Team organising and participation 
Date 1989.03.09/03.28/10.20/11.16/11.24/12.22/ 1990.01.18/01.29/02.07 
Venue Panmunjom JAS (Joint Security Area) Northern and Southern areas in turns 
Summary North Korea unilaterally postponed the third round of Talks which was planned 
to be held on the 18
th
 of April 1989 to the 18
th
 of July 1989, blaming South 
Korea of taking the legal action against Pastor Ik Whan Moon. 
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The third round of Talks, which was scheduled to be held on the 18th of April, 1989, was 
‘unilaterally’ cancelled by North Korea, because of the judicial treatment of pastor Moon Ik 
Hwan who had visited North Korea without the permission of the South Korean government. 
North Korea argued that this amounted to political suppression. This political incident directly 
affected the North-South Korean Sports Talks. Dong-A illustrated the different aspects of 
North Korea’s request to postpone the Talks. Dong-A inferred that the reason for requesting 
the delay was North Korea’s motivation to host the World Student Youth Festival 
successfully, since there would be many students from all over the world, including South 
Korea. Later, this became another reason for blaming South Korea because a female 
student, Yim, was arrested for participating in this festival without approval from the South 
Korean government. Nevertheless, the direct reason for postponing the Talks was Pastor 
Moon’s arrest. South Korea could handle this issue without postponing the Talks by treating 
it in a flexible manner. 
 
The South Korean regime did not intend to make the Talks more productive. Moreover, the 
postponement of the Talks was not accepted by South Korea. South Korea had prior 
negative experiences with North Korea wherein the latter failed to apologise for several 
political incidents on which South Korea had specifically asked for apologies with the excuse 
that the issues were not relevant to sport. The position this time was different and South 
Korea asked North Korea not to drag political issues into the sports Talks. Dong-A cited the 
comments of a South Korean government official as follows.    
Our head of representation Chang sent a telegram to North Korea on the morning of 
15
th
, that the 3
rd
 Talks were planned on 18
th
 which was suggested by North Korea as 
not proper since North Korea’s political conspiracy was not removed. And he added 
that ‘Now, North Korea regrets that they lead these Talks into a corner by making a 
connection between this and the other matter which is not relevant to these Talks. We 
sincerely hope to discuss the forming of Unified Team from North and South Korea 
soon.’          
 (Dong-A 15, July, 1989) 
Even Dong-A pointed out that it could not agree with the attitude of the South Korean regime 
towards the Sports Talks. Some reporters expressed the wish that South Korea should 
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reflect more unambiguously its support for the concept of ethnic nationalism in terms of 
applying the Koreas’ unity policy. The South Korean regime’s rationale for its reluctance to 
participate in the Talks with North Korea was revealed in the following article.  
Of course, North Korea cast a chill over the North and South Korean Sports Talk…...I 
do understand our point that ‘we cannot trust them’ since North Korea has broken the 
first promise - ‘let’s reach a good conclusion, just consider sports between sport people’ 
- and then they revealed their political motivation……  
 (Dong-A 10, August, 1989) 
Hankyoreh interpreted the absence of North Korea in the Seoul Olympic Games as an event 
that revealed the discord between the two Koreas and one that eventually affected the 
attitude of South Korea to further cooperation with North Korea. Hankyoreh drew two 
conclusions on why the South Korean people did not celebrate the anniversary of the Seoul 
Olympic Games. The first is that the Seoul Olympic Games was not hosted for populist 
motives. The other was that the cost for these Games became a great debt to the economy. 
Fundamentally, this could be understood as a criticism of the non-democratic decision 
making process in the bidding for, and hosting of, the Olympics.   
.…..After the Olympics, the voice of national unity was transformed into discord, thus 
the ‘positive’ expectation that Olympic fever would act as an impetus for national 
development has failed……   
 (Hankyoreh 12, September, 1989-2) 
Dong-A admitted that the matter of democracy is related to the active North and South 
Korean relations. If South Korea had strong appealed to a sense of nationalism as a way of 
supporting North and South Korea relations, it would be more easily that domestic 
democratisation accomplished based on this mutual understanding of different political 
ideologies. Thus, the democratisation of South Korea was closely related to a change in 
perspectives towards North Korea, with a transformational shift away from the view of North 
Korea as an enemy.    
 
In the following article, an officer of South Korea reveals that the South Korean 
administration was not committed to reopening the Talks for a ‘Unified Team’ since South 
Korea thought that it would not be fruitful. While South Korea foresaw that it would be difficult 
to draw any productive result from the ‘Unified Team’ discussions, the interactions among 
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the sports people in the international sport arena had a positive stance on the issue. This 
reflects the possibility that there might be a ‘valuable trial’ after several ‘failed’ Talks, since 
the Talks affected the North and South Korean people who competed with each other at 
sporting events. It made people start seeing each other not only as former ‘enemies’ but also 
as ‘partners’ in the near future. With the uncertainty surrounding the establishment of the 
‘Unified Team’, North and South Korea’s intentions of peaceful relations would have 
influenced the actual encounter between their respective sportsmen in the field. Dong-A 
described the scene at the North and South Korean players gathering in the 5th Asian 
Women’s Volleyball Championship where they had drinks together. This scene could be 
interpreted as reflecting the strengthening of the bond between the two Koreas. 
Nevertheless, the South Korean sport officer was still negative about the ‘Unified Team’ but 
excused his view by reference to sporting criteria, arguing that a unified team would not be 
that beneficial to the performance of the athletes in the long run (Dong-A 14, October, 1989). 
 
The North Korean Director of Sport suggested that a brighter future for the Korean people 
should be considered in the discussion of ‘a Unified Team’. He confidently stated that these 
Talks could have been concluded in two months if North and South Korea shared a 
fundamental ‘patriotism’ for Korea. In the following article of Dong-A, North Korea changed 
the title of ‘a unified team’ from ‘Unification Team’ (Tong Ii Team in Korean) to ‘the only team 
of North and South Korea’ (Nam Book Yu Il Team in Korean). Given this change, it appeared 
that North Korea sensed the reluctance of South Korea to use the term ‘Unification’ during 
the Talks to organise ‘a unified team’. Thus North Koreans changed the term to ‘the only 
team’, which incorporates the meaning that North Korea implied by using the term of 
‘Unification’. As the article stated ‘On the other hand’, the notion of ‘Unification’ could 
become the gap between North and South Korea, and against Dong-A’s position on the 
matter.       
On the other hand, the North Korean director Kim said that ‘let’s escape from the 
conflict situation of North and South Korea in the matter of making ‘the only team of 
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North and South Korea, and solve the problem by considering what the benefits are for 
our ethnic national group. And let’s try to conclude this matter in two months.’         
 (Dong-A 20, October, 1989-2) 
Hankyoreh argued that “sport was more persuasive than politics”. An identical view was 
promoted in North Korea in Roh-Dong, which emphasised the ‘symbolic meaning’ of a 
unified team as opposed to ‘Political Unification’ itself. Hankyoreh highlighted “actual 
sporting interactions” such as football matches as showing how actual contact between 
North and South Korean people is important (Hankyoreh 20, October, 1989-1). 
 
The South Korean people demanded more effort from the South Korean regime in the 
Sports Talks, specifically, by not bringing political issues, such as those of Pastor Moon and 
Ms Yim’s visit to North Korea without South Korea’s legal permission, to the table. The initial 
clue for interpreting the South Korean people’s wish of active cooperation with North Korea 
was provided by the peoples’ request to the South Korean regime to continue with the sports 
Talks despite these political issues. Thus, the tone of Dong-A had changed from previous 
occasions when its contents were inspected by the South Korean dictatorship regime which 
had an anti-North Korea stance.  
On the other hand, there were criticisms of our side for the lack of effort on the Talks in 
the matter of a ‘team name’ and ‘the speed of progress’, since North Korea has shown 
a relatively positive attitude to these 3
rd
 Talks without mentioning Pastor Moon or Ms 
Yim.         
 (Dong-A 21, October, 1989) 
The South Korean regime intended to sum up the discussions in as simple a manner as 
possible in order to avoid pressure from the people of the two Koreas. Hankyoreh criticised 
South Korea, which started the discussions by first setting a deadline. This could be 
considered a way of speeding up the Talks. North Korea, on the other hand, focused on the 
‘meaning’ of the Talks from which it wished to achieve ‘national benefits’ by overcoming the 
context of the conflict. Hankyoreh identified the more appropriate attitude to achieving ‘a 
unified team’. 
The South Korean representative Chang suggested, in a key note speech, that ‘There 
are only 8 months left till the Games, so let’s finish the organisation of the team by 20
th
 
June 1990 and let’s select the players in as balanced a manner as possible’……and 
the North Korean representative Kim said that ‘Let’s think of the organisation of the 
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Unified Team as a matter of national benefit rather than in the context of the North and 
South Korean conflict……   
 (Hankyoreh 21, October, 1989-1) 
South Korea wanted to start small interactions with North Korea, before it making any joint 
agreement on the fundamental principles for organising ‘a unified team’. It was understood 
that organising a team would be the result of various interactions based on frequent 
cooperation between the two Koreas. This indirectly indicated that the interactions between 
North and South Korea could be difficult to start. However, North Korea wanted to establish 
the team to overcome the image of ‘Two Cho Sun’. This was why North Korea was 
dedicated in realising the symbolic meaning as the North and South Korean joint 
representatives of the team. Hankyoreh identifies the fundamental differences of these two 
approaches in the following article. 
They both agreed that the ‘team’ is what we should concentrate on, but the 
fundamental difference is that South Korea has focused on the North and South 
Korean interactions and North Korea has focused on the symbolic meaning of 
organising the team……  
 (Hankyoreh 21, October, 1989-3) 
The date for the fourth round of Sports Talks was not settled easily due to the ‘absurd’ 
reason of the South Korean representative, who insisted that a private matter was more 
important than a national issue. It could be understood that the South Korea’s regime did not 
know how to approach North Korea in a manner that would produce a better result; rather 
South Korea simply identified matters that they could insist on. If this was not the case, it 
could be perceived that South Korea had a mind not to respond positively to progress in the 
Talks.  
When North Korea’s representative, Kim announced the date for Talks as 2
nd
, Nov.  
The representative Chang requested a change to 22
nd
, Nov. (since it was the 
anniversary of his university). North Korea’s Kim stated that ‘a national matter cannot 
be delayed due to a private issue’……therefore the date for the next Talks has been 
set as 16
th
 Nov…… 
 (Hankyoreh 21, October, 1989-5) 
Hankyoreh held the view of a ‘Nationalist’ and encouraged both North and South Korea to 
make compromises for a unified team for the Beijing Asian Games. Hankyoreh gave multiple 
interpretations of the meaning. It mentioned the people of ‘Korea’ who lived in China, and 
imagined the scene of singing ‘Arirang’ together with them, which highlighted the ethnic 
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nationalism of Korea (Hankyoreh 22, October, 1989-1). Thus, here, the organising of a team 
by Korean representatives was not only a matter for North and South Korea. Rather, it had a 
symbolic meaning of unity for Koreans around the world. 
 
The South Korean NOC forced the representatives for the Talks to obtain North Korea’s 
confirmation of a ‘separate participation’ at the Beijing Games, if the Talks did not go well. 
This request made apparent the view that South Korea was not committed enough to 
participating in the Games as ‘a unified team’ as it was seen to be preparing for the failure of 
the Talks. Moreover, South Korea did not try to hide its intentions. Hankyoreh told its readers 
that the “South Korean NOC’s suggestion could be a bomb which shook these Talks to their 
roots” and “implied a negative result of the Talks from the beginning”, It revealed that the 
South Korean regime “did not expect much progress in these Talks” (Hankyoreh 12, 
November, 1989). 
 
Hankyoreh evaluated the result of the Sports Talks as being simultaneously bright and dark. 
The agreements were a great achievement, but they were a product of nationalism. All these 
Talks and sporting interactions between North and South Korea were ultimately related to 
the discussion of unification. Thus, it was questionable whether the result of the Talks, such 
as the anthem, flag and title of the team, would relate to the long term discussions between 
North and South Korea. Nationalistic ‘pro-unification’ position of Hankyoreh was expressed 
clearly (Hankyoreh 17, November, 1989-3). Hankyoreh consistently approved the role and 
effectiveness of using sporting events for the North and South Korean relations. Based on 
this belief, the paper advised the South Korean representative to consider both North and 
South rather than focusing solely on ‘our side’ during the Sports Talks.  
Sport has a strong function to unite people, unlike politics and economics. We have 
already seen the emotional scenes in which the North and South Korean people 
become one on the sport field……The North and South Korean Sports Talks 
representatives must lead these Talks to success by considering their entire ethnicity 
rather than ‘our side’…… 
 (Hankyoreh 19, November, 1989) 
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The appointment of the director who represented ‘a unified team’ became an issue since the 
position itself had the symbolic meaning of representing a unified Korea (Hankyoreh 24, Nov. 
1989). Therefore, this would not be solved simply through a nationalistic approach. Whether 
two people represented ‘a team’ from each side in turns, or one person was selected based 
on agreements from the both sides was different. Moreover, this case could become an 
example for other forms of representation in cases, such as the UN, which would have to 
deal with membership issues relating to North and South Korea. 
 
North and South Korea discussed the date for the sixth round of the sports Talks, which 
came to a conclusion when North Korea compromised fully. It clearly showed that South 
Korea did not attempt to make any concessions for the progress of the Talks. The change in 
South Korea’s attitude since the Seoul Olympic Games was not that surprising, since South 
Korea did not need North Korea’s cooperation.     
……‘The North and South Korean representatives debated for one hour and a half for 
the date of the 6
th
 Talks and they reached an agreement when North Korea accepted 
South Korea’s argument.…..     
(Hankyoreh 25, November, 1989-1)  
Hankyoreh highlights the contrasting positions of North and South Korea concerning the 
attitude towards participation in the Talks. Even South Korea admitted that North Korea was 
relatively more sincere and positive in the Talks than South Korea. Hankyoreh pointed this 
out to encourage South Korean representatives to become more actively involved in the 
Talks and achieve a better result for the Korean nation (Hankyoreh 2, December, 1989-2). It 
looked like the South Korean official was performing his diplomatic duties with North Korea’s 
ally, the USSR. 
 
The South Korean regime’s consideration of the international context was revealed in the 
following article.     
……The problem is South Korea’s attitude on which they don’t wish to 
compromise…...The officer of the Ministry of Sport said that ‘We have delivered all the 
arguments to the officer of the USSR and they agreed with our opinions. And they said 
that they couldn’t understand North Korea’s arguments…….    
(Hankyoreh 16, December, 1989-2)  
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As the issues surrounding North and South Korea became more complicated, North Korea 
tried to implement ‘a unified team’ as evidence of the potential of sport to improve the 
relations with South Korean. That required compromises of North Korea even in political 
issues. Hankyoreh suggested that the compromises North Korea made in the Talks led to 
South Korea being ‘frustrated’ and it affected the ‘Northern Policy’ of the South Korean 
regime. Thus, the sport relationship between the North and South Korea was not only the 
product of the ‘Northern Policy’, but also the source of that policy (Hankyoreh 23, December, 
1989-2). Hankyoreh also reported on the ridiculous attitude of the South Korean 
representatives during the Talks. One of the South Korean representatives, Cho actually 
complained about North Korea compromising its position ‘too much’.  
……One of the representatives, Cho, said that ‘North Korea agreed on the proposal of 
South Korea without reading it’…...and also had said that ‘How can North Korea agree 
on that so easily as there are many issues which couldn’t be solved during one year of 
discussions…..’. South Korea, who used delaying tactics, was frustrated with the 
tactics of North Korea who gave the impression of rushing…… North Korea had 
accepted all the proposals of South Korea, but South Korea still didn’t agree that they 
had reached, an ‘agreement’ Instead, South Korea explained that this was just 
‘closeness of opinion’......North Korean reporters had expressed many opinions on 
Yim’s pictures and on the speech and South Korean reporters have taken pictures of 
them. Some of the lucky reporters who had received this calendar had to return this to 
the officers for the North and South Korean Talks…… 
(Hankyoreh 23, December, 1989-4) 
When Ms Yim came back to the South Korea after her visit to Pyongyang for the World 
University Student Festival, South Korean reporters were blocked from reporting on this. 
South Korea considered invoking a severe anti-communism law for journalists who sought to 
contact North Korea. Even some reporters, who had by ‘luck’ obtained the aforementioned 
calendar containing Yim’s pictures, had to return it to South Korean inspectors who worked 
for the South Korean side of the DMZ (Demilitarised Zone) Peace Office. The South Korean 
representatives’ reaction towards the compromises made by North Korea can be seen as 
evidence of the complicated decision-making process of South Korea, which needed to 
consider the wider, international context, domestic regime, sportspersons’ voices and the 
general views of the South Korean people. The real intention of the South Korean Sport 
Federation, which reflected sports people’s ideas, was one wherein they did not want any 
negative influence brought to bear upon organising the unified team or national unity 
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(Hankyoreh 29, December, 1989). Even Dong-A argued that the ‘Unified Team’ could bring a 
clear recognition of Korea as one ethnic entity, and that this was in the national interest 
(Dong-A 22, December, 1989-2).  
 
The ten fundamental principles were agreed in the discussions on organising ‘a unified team’ 
for the 1990 Beijing Asian Games. However, a South Korean representative requested North 
Korea to “guarantee to respect these principles” since South Korea distrusted North Korea 
and was concerned about North Korea disrupting the Talks (Dong-A 22, December, 1989-1). 
South Korea even asked for an additional regulation. North Korea responded that South 
Korea’s request was not justified. Nevertheless, Dong-A referred to South Korea as ‘our side’ 
and did not consider the “additional request” as being excessive. 
……Our side suggested a draft of the agreement and included ten principles and 
additional regulations. However, it didn’t proceed as North Korea had an issue with the 
additional regulations…...North Korea argued that the additional regulations were 
inadequate……      
 (Dong-A 10, January, 1990-1) 
Within contrast to Dong-A, Roh-Dong expressed many requests and additional statements 
for success of the Talks. North Korea mentioned that it even agreed to South Korea’s 
postponement of the next meeting. Thus, if the Talks had been terminated, then it would not 
have been the fault of North Korea.    
..…. We have repeatedly asked South Korea to confirm the 10 principles related to the 
Unified Team. But South Korea claimed that it is not relevant to the organisation of the 
Unified Team. We had tried to reach an agreement with South Korea on the matter of 
the introduction, the guarantee statement and the day of starting the agreement…..And 
we asked South Korea to have a sincere attitude for next time. We have suggested 
holding the next meeting on the 11
th
; however South Korea has insisted on the 15
th
, 
which we finally agreed on……    
(Roh-Dong 11, Jan. 1990) 
Roh-Dong blamed South Korea’s change of tone concerning the organising of ‘the only 
team’. North Korea believed that the South Korean regime did not have a strong motivation 
for organising ‘the only team’, but was just pretending that it did, with the intention of 
avoiding blame for the failure of the Talks. The evidence for this argument was revealed in 
contradicting of the interviews of the South Korean government officer and the President 
himself.  
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..….To interrupt organising the Unified Team for the Olympics is obviously because it is 
controlled by the Roh Tae Woo Regime. President Roh has advertised that they will 
solve the problem of organising the ‘Unified Team’, but on the same day of the 
administrative Talks, Roh’s staff showed a passive attitude to ruin the Talks. Roh’s 
regime looks positive on the issues, but they actually don’t want to have the ‘Unified 
Team’……    
(Roh-Dong 14, Jan. 1990) 
Another case in support of the argument that South Korea lacked any intention of 
establishing a unified team was the letter sent by South Korea to the IOC consulting on the 
matter of organising ‘the team’. North Korea argued that South Korea had abandoned the 
‘simple’ way to solve the problem by ‘ourselves’ and had intentionally chosen a complicated 
way of asking a ‘third party’ to intervene in their bilateral discussions (Roh-Dong 16, Jan. 
1990). The framework for viewing this Olympic issue was different between North and South 
Korea. North Korea’s view on this was that the matter should be decided between itself and 
South Korea, whereas South Korea considered this as an issue that needed permission or 
approval from the IOC.  
[Table 5.5]  The 1
st
 – 9
th
 North and South Korea Sports Talks, principle meeting for the ‘90 
Beijing Asian Games Unified Team organising and participation-4 
 Content 
Title The 1
st
 – 9
th
 North and South Korea Sports Talks, principle meeting for the ‘90 
Beijing Asian Games Unified Team organising and participation 
Date 1989.03.09/03.28/10.20/11.16/11.24/12.22/ 1990.01.18/01.29/02.07 
Venue Panmunjom JAS (Joint Security Area) Northern and Southern areas in turns 
Summary Particularly, North Korea argued that, concerning the sending of a letter to the 
organising committee of Beijing Asian Games and OCA (the resolution of 
guarantee for unified team, as South Korea wanted to), ‘what can be done to 
secure this agreement if either of us fail to fulfil this, not allow them to 
participate as a separate team at the Games’. But, this is the exposure of North 
Korea’s motivation to obstruct South Korea’s separate participation’ 
 
Eventually, the principle suggested by South Korea for organising ‘a unified team’ led to a 
deadlock. North Korea insisted that responsibility for this deadlock lay with South Korea, 
which was trying not to organise ‘a unified team’. North Korea claimed that a genuine 
resolution for ‘a unified team’ should be based on a confirmation of participation in the Asian 
Games. South Korea interpreted this as an obstacle to participating in the Games separately 
on any condition set by North Korea. Actually, North Korea stated that it would not attend the 
Asian Games without organising ‘a unified team’. This could be interpreted either as a 
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suicidal tactic on the part of North Korea or a lack of endeavour on the part of South Korea in 
organising ‘a unified team’.   
[Table 5.6] The 1
st
 – 9
th
 North and South Korea Sports Talks, principle meeting for the ‘90 
Beijing Asian Games Unified Team organising and participation-5 
 Content 
Title The 1
st
 – 9
th
 North and South Korea Sports Talks, principle meeting for the ‘90 
Beijing Asian Games Unified Team organising and participation 
Date 1989.03.09/03.28/10.20/11.16/11.24/12.22/ 1990.01.18/01.29/02.07 
Venue Panmunjom JAS (Joint Security Area) Northern and Southern areas in turns 
Summary  
 Claims 
North Korea 1) Make an announcement that South Korea and North 
Korea do not participate in the 11
th
 Beijing Games as a 
separate team 
 
2) South Korea approves that South Korea has the full 
responsibility for the delay of the Talks and entirely withdraw 
the resolution of the guarantee of ‘the team  
 
3) Cancel the speech by responsible South Korea sport 
society personage, concerning the separate participation in 
the Games 
South Korea If North Korea truly has a motivation for ‘the team’, then 
withdraw the three requests and show respect to the 
discussion for the resolution of the guarantee for ‘the team’ 
 
 
The ninth round of Talks centred on the quarrels and blames of each other by both parties 
for various disagreements. Even the summary of the Talks drawn up by the South Korea 
government evidenced this. As shown above, both sides wanted to organise ‘a unified team’, 
and asked the other side to be cooperative. There was however a mutual distrust of one 
another. It was not appropriate to judge who was right and wrong in this case. It was rather 
the matter of identifying the differences between them and how large these differences were. 
In that sense, ‘a unified team’ was not just a one-off event of making ‘a Team’. It would 
rather become a mirror of the symbolic expectation of Koreans in future sporting events. 
Roh-Dong described the South Korean representatives’ attitude during the Talks. The South 
Korean representatives could not justify their excuses, and North Korean representatives 
pressed them for logical explanations on issues concerning the principles of the Talks. Roh-
Dong argued that South Korea’s attitude to organising the ‘Unified Team’ was also a 
reflection of its attitude towards the political unification of the nation. This, therefore, became 
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the basis for North Korea blaming South Korea for the failure to establish ‘the team’. It 
further characterised this failure as a crime committed against the nation and Korean people 
(Roh-Dong 8, Feb. 1990).   
 
On February 8th, 1990, just after the ninth round of Talks failed, Dong-A and Hankyoreh 
claimed that the ‘distrust’ between South Korea and North Korea was the reason for the 
Talks’ failure. Even though Dong–A wrote considerably more about the negative aspects of 
the Talks than Hankyoreh, the same cause of the failure was identified, viz., the suspicion 
between the North and South Korea. Since Hankyoreh had consistently supported the Talks, 
it minimised any negativity in its report. Hankyoreh blamed South Korea for the breakdown 
by commenting that “the safety-net regulation became a trap” (Hankyoreh 8, February, 1990). 
The additional safety-net regulation, which South Korea had requested in order to guarantee 
North Korea’s sincere attitude, was rejected by North Korea. In fact, as long as both Koreas 
focused on the main purpose of the discussions, the additional regulations might not have 
been necessary. Roh-Dong added that the comments made by South Korea during the 
Talks were aimed at propagating it’s the success of the “Northern Policy”. 
……South Korean officers who pursue a permanent division of the Korean ethnie, from 
the beginning, were not interested in Unification or the One Team for Unification. They 
just tried to use the 11
th
 Asian Games as propaganda for the Northern Policy. Under 
this, the government officers were ordered to not agree on the issue of organising the 
One Team…… 
(Roh-Dong 22, Feb. 1990) 
Dong-A criticised  the conduct of the South Korean government on its negotiations with 
North Korea and recommended that the South Korean government should have a strict 
mind-set on the matters that South Korea was supposed not to compromise. It emphasised 
a more careful approach towards opening a conversation with North Korea since North 
Korea had not approved of the Red Cross Talks which, in South Korea’s view, was the top 
priority. By contrast, Hankyoreh covered the full version of the statement on ‘arms reduction’ 
in the Korean peninsula and the peaceful unification that was signed by 312 South Korean 
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persons. This was a symbolic gesture that Hankyoreh used to represent the people who 
wanted to achieve the unification of the two Koreas, no matter what it took. 
 
5.4.2 The Talks for Organising ‘A Korean Team’ for International Games 
Hankyoreh forecast that both Ministers could have a meeting for the Beijing Games as a 
continuation of the North and South Korean presidential summit. It might have been easier 
for both regimes to solve substantial issues under a cooperative framework.      
……The North and South Korean sports Talks will reopen at the Beijing Asian Games. 
The Minister of sport will start to talk again during the games and the mood will be 
quite good, since it follows the success of the presidential summit……     
(Hankyoreh 19, September, 1990) 
As the 1990 Beijing Asian Games approached, the hope of a symbolic unification through 
sports grew, and the people of both North and South Korea faced a situation where they 
would congregate as ‘Koreans’ in the sporting arena. A particular Korean, Cho Sun, who is 
from a minority community in China and who lived in the host city of the Games, Beijing, 
would play a part. Dong–A treated this issue as a symbol of ‘national unity’ rather than, 
political ‘unification’.  
……In this team, around 500 Korean diaspora were included……and 4,000 Korean-
Chinese would participate in the unified team……     
(Dong-A 18, September, 1990-1) 
International sporting events were well known for promoting nationalism, and nationalism 
was popular in the media, as it always gripped the public interest. Despite the different 
opinions of North and South Korea on unification, Dong-A produced a generous quantity of 
articles that encouraged Korean nationalism. These included topics associated with Japan, 
which showed that the Korean nationalism issue was not only related to North and South 
Korean unification, but was also a common feature of the Japanese colonial period. On 
September 18th, 1990, an article of Dong-A highlighted the attitude of a Japanese reporter, 
who wanted to know more about the relationship between North and South Korea. This 
reflected a change in positions compared to previous decades, when Japan reported 
relatively more on North Korean news than that of South Korea. The article called this the 
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“Japanese reporter’s privilege” (Dong-A 18, September, 1990-2). Consequently, this 
“Japanese reporter’s privilege” was considered to be potentially non-existent through the 
sharing of an ideal for the unification of North and South Korea. Korean nationalism could be 
the key to unification even though there were differences in the degree of responsiveness to 
the idea of unification. 
 
During the 1990 Beijing Asian Games, the team players of North and South Korea, 
participated in the Games separately, and the public who supported both teams created a 
very harmonious scene.  
..….In the meantime, North Korea forecasted that organising a unified team will 
happen for the Beijing Asian Games, thus, they brought ‘the team’ flag which the North 
and South Korea had agreed on, to the Sports Talks for Beijing……     
(Dong-A 19, September, 1990-3) 
That mood was delivered through the media to all Koreans abroad. This might have affected 
sport governance in both North and South Korea. At the very least they could not ignore the 
people’s feelings about using this sporting event for the purpose of national unification. 
Finally, they organised time to discuss the arrangements of future events. Before the 
meeting, a ‘North and South Unification Football Match’ was identified as a topic to be 
discussed during the meeting. This was actually an exchange of football matches, and the 
title of the matches was to be decided later.  
 
On September 20th, 1990, Dong-A simply considered this as a normal exchange event, and 
then published a column which expressed concern about North Korea’s motivation in 
agreeing to this event. Moreover, Dong-A was worried that this could be of benefit solely to 
North Korea. However, Hankyoreh provided a broader view of the symbolic unification of this 
experience. Therefore, it came to be expected that this would be a sign of advancement in 
the relations between the North and South Korea. On the following day, September 21st, 
1990, a Hankyoreh column titled ‘Football Match as a stepping stone for the achievement of 
unification’ demonstrated the attitude of Hankyoreh towards unification and the diplomatic 
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role of sports. However, Dong-A betrayed an unfortunate suspicion in its article on the 22nd 
of September, when it reported on the negativity of the North Korean sports people 
regarding the agreement.  
……However, Pyongyang’s [Unification event] was limited to the well fabricated 
playground and business on the Stage……the reason for the North Korea’s cold 
attitude to the Talks was that it was first frustrated by South Korea’s aggressive policy 
and the unilateral act of ‘football team’s Pyongyang visit’…… 
(Dong-A 22, September, 1990) 
On September 23rd 1990, during the Beijing Asian Games, the Ministries of Sport of North 
and South Korea made arrangements to hold a Talk. In fact, a North and South Korean 
football exchange was given the go-ahead before these Talks were actually held, and thus, 
the meeting was assumed to be a formulation of the football match interchange. After these 
Talks, both nations had a clearer idea on a joint squad. However, nothing was decided on 
the schedule of the football match. Participants in the meeting publicly announced that they 
did not reach an agreement. The disappointment of the people, contrasting as it did with the 
previous ‘positive’ news, was emphasised in both newspapers. Hankyoreh attributed the 
reason for this ‘nonsense’ to the limited ambition of the South Korean government. Dong-A 
had a slightly different view on this matter and focused on the individuals in the government 
rather than the government itself, i.e., it blamed the individuals who attended the Sports 
Talks. It also clarified that this problem evolved from the impatience of those individuals. In 
the meantime, however, Dong-A kept releasing articles, such as the scene of a ‘unified team’ 
that could boost Korean ethnic nationalism, since the Beijing Asian Games was proving to 
be of great public interest.  
……While the opening ceremony progressed the North and South Korea team 
encouraged each other and performed a joint cheer. The Chinese-Korean cheer team 
started to cry with pleasure…… 
(Dong-A 23, September, 1990-3) 
…….Until the Games were finished, the North and South Korean players and the team 
had confirmed they enjoyed it and that the ‘passionate heart’ was one, just as Korea 
was of one ethnicity. Since the 45 years of division, was there a time that the North and 
South Korea became ‘one heart, one will’?……The softball related person in China 
said that ‘the friendly scene of the North and South Korean teams was totally different 
to the North and South Korean relations’ and that ‘it was also the first occasion on 
which the scene of the North and South Korea’s flags flying together had been 
witnessed. Even foreign journalists said that ‘if we consider that the North Korea had 
boycotted the ‘86 Seoul Asian Games, this was extraordinary and it seemed that the 
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North and South Korean people are of one ethnicity beyond the political system and 
ideology’…… 
(Dong-A 24, September, 1990-4) 
Hankyoreh interpreted the result of the exchange football match between the North and 
South Korea, as a signal of ‘private’ relations (of the people rather than the government) 
between North and South Korea. Dong-A emphasised the determinations of ‘governments’. 
It was a coincidence that an opposite attitude to unification discussion was being displayed, 
whether it was a product of the willingness of the people or a ‘policy driven’ intention of the 
government. Dong-A insisted that unification needed to be discussed in an objective manner, 
and it strongly criticised the South Korean government that for having arranged this football 
exchange through a series of secret discussions with North Korea. The South Korean 
government searched for an effective method to achieve a resolution to the discussions with 
North Korea.  
[Table 5.7]  The 1
st
 – 4
h
 North and South Korea Sports Talks for further International Games 
unified team organising and participation-1 
 Content 
Title The 1
st
 – 4
h
 North and South Korea Sports Talks for further International 
Games unified team organising and participation 
Date 1990.11.29/1991.01.15/01.30 
Venue Panmunjom JAS (Joint Security Area) Northern and Southern areas in turns 
Summary 1) The 1
st
 South and North Sports Talks will be held at 10 a.m. 29
th
 of 
November 1990, in Northern area Pan Moon Jeom, Tong Il Gak 
2) The principle of the organising team represented at the Talks should 
be same as the 11
th
 Beijing Asian Games Unified Team, and will 
announce the list of the officials for the team later 
3) The agenda for Talks is Joint Team participation at the 41
st
 World 
Table Tennis Championship, the 25
th
 Barcelona Olympic Games and 
the 3
rd
 Sam Ji Yeon Winter Asian Games and other major international 
matches 
4) The issues of regularising the South and North Unification Football 
Match and other South and North Sports interchange will be discussed 
and decided at the South and North Sports Talks 
 
As shown above, this joint statement clearly promised that further sporting interchanges 
would be planned between North and South Korea. It was noticeable that there were a 
considerable number of world sports championships, which could provide opportunities for 
developing cooperation in peaceful harmony between two Koreas. Both were aware of this 
opportunity.   
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[Table 5.8] The 1
st
 – 4
h
 North and South Korea Sports Talks for further International Games 
unified team organising and participation-2 
 Content 
Title The 1
st
 – 4
h
 North and South Korea Sports Talks for further International 
Games unified team organising and participation 
Date 1990.11.29/1991.01.15/01.30 
Venue Panmunjom JAS (Joint Security Area) Northern and Southern areas in turns 
Summary In the middle of the growing mood of harmony and unity of the Korean people 
through the joint cheer team during the Beijing Asian Games…… 
 
In the summary of the Talks, it is mentioned that the mood became an impetus for the 
success of the Talks. It proved how powerful for expressing the wish for unification than 
sporting events, where the North and South Korea both could play and cheer each other. 
Hankyoreh kept reporting the progress of the Talks, but Dong-A did not pay that much 
attention to them, until they showed promising results.   
[Table 5.9] The 1
st
 – 4
h
 North and South Korean Sports Talks for further International Games 
unified team organising and participation-3 
 Content 
Title The 1
st
 – 4
h
 North and South Korean Sports Talks for further International 
Games unified team organising and participation 
Date 1990.11.29/1991.01.15/01.30 
Venue Panmunjom JAS (Joint Security Area) Northern and Southern areas in turns 
Summary North Korea argues for and brings out a draft letter to send to the IOC, FIFA, 
OFA, ITF on behalf of both countries. 
 
The summary above overlooks North Korea’s drive to organise ‘a unified team’. They led the 
procedures and prepared detailed documents. The fact that this summary was written by the 
South Korean government is further evidence of how hard North Korea was trying to reach a 
positive result. However, the second set of Talks ended on a negative note with South Korea 
blaming the attitude of North Korea for the eventual failure of the Talks.  
[Table 5.10] The 1
st
 – 4
h
 North and South Korean Sports Talks for further International Games 
unified team organising and participation-4 
 Content 
Title The 1
st
 – 4
h
 North and South Korean Sports Talks for further International 
Games unified team organising and participation 
Date 1990.11.29/1991.01.15/01.30 
Venue Panmunjom JAS (Joint Security Area) Northern and Southern areas in turns 
Summary North Korea remains consistently with the attitude of avoidance of South and 
North Sport interchange. The Talks concluded without any outcome due to 
North Koreas’ passive attitude. 
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[Table 5.11] The 1
st
 – 4
h
 North and South Korean Sports Talks for further International Games 
unified team organising and participation-5  
 Content 
Title The 1
st
 – 4
h
 North and South Korean Sports Talks for further International 
Games unified team organising and participation 
Date 1990.11.29/1991.01.15/01.30 
Venue Panmunjom JAS (Joint Security Area) Northern and Southern areas in turns 
Summary It is the first time for the South and North to participate as a unified team in the 
41
st
 World Table Tennis Championship and the 6
th
 FIFA U-20 World Cup, since 
they were divided 
 
This content was written as a summary after the Fourth Talks, and illustrates how 
momentum had been reinjured into cooperation in sport. It indicates that ‘a unified team’ 
would participate at the 41st World Table Tennis Championship and the 6th FIFA U-20 World 
Cup. The media covered all aspects of the same. The agreement of organising ‘a unified 
team’ was compared to the German case, since they had participated in the Olympic Games 
as Unified Team three times.  
 
5.4.3 The 41st World Table Tennis Championships in Chiba, Japan 
Four rounds of Talks were held relating to the issue of the 41st World Table Tennis 
Championship. North Korea suggested discussing the issue of organising ‘a unified team’ on 
the 11th of November 1990. Throughout the event, South Korea had its doubts about North 
Korea’s motivation in organising ‘a unified team’. Roh-Dong concluded that the South 
Korean officers were not interested in the unification since South Korea was not interested in 
the ‘symbolic unification’ as ‘a unified team’. Thus, South Korea would not support ‘the only 
team’ even though this would be helpful for the goal of unification.  
……No matter how beneficial the Unification would be, the South Korean officers won’t 
support the realisation of unification, and therefore, the Talks for organising the Only 
Team were not welcomed.……    
(Roh-Dong 16, Jan. 1991-8)  
Dong A stated that the Korea team would not be beneficial in terms of its unification policy 
and nationalism. However, a Hankyoreh article on the same issue argued for the opposite 
point of view. Hankyoreh showed real enthusiasm for ‘a unified team’ at the 41st World Table 
Tennis Championship and the 6th World Youth Football Championship. Hankyoreh 
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commented that this historical scene was exciting for Korea since it was an opportunity for 
“the people to become as one”. Hankyoreh expressed the special meaning of this project for 
national unification.    
..….The wish of organising a Unified Team for North and South Korea for the last 30 
years becomes a reality as the North and South Korean representatives signed the 
agreement in the last month (12
th
), at the North and South Korean Sports Talks, for the 
Unified Team of the 41
st
 World Table Tennis Championship and the 6
th
 World Youth 
Football Championship in April and June. 70 million of both the North and South Korea 
people must smile. People cannot hide their excitement when they imagine this 
historical scene as a divided people becomes one. The meaning of this agreement 
cannot be exaggerated when described as an ‘epochal event in the 46 years of division’ 
and an ‘historical event in ethnic history’. We have great expectations of this 
agreement since this will be the first step in the divided people’s reconciliation and the 
start of the North and South Korea unification project.      
(Hankyoreh 14, February, 1991-1) 
There must be a mutual understanding of ‘national identity’ between both North and South 
Korea, even though the nationalism that defines the modern nation state became the origin 
of the difference between the separate regimes and their ultimate goals.   
..….Here (on this agreement) lays the fundamental compromise and understanding of 
a strong ethnic identity and humanity from the North and South Korean sports 
people……      
(Dong-A 1, March, 1991) 
Dong-A emphasised the increased trade between the North and South Korea as one of the 
benefits achieved from the North and South Korean sport relations. The uniform for the 
players would be delivered through the DMZ, and it would be the first material dispatched 
through that avenue. It was further expected that there would be benefits through increased 
economic interchange between the North and South Korea. This would be a unique 
achievement and an example of what can be achieved through sporting interactions,  
..….The success of the Unified Team of North and South Korea at Table Tennis is 
making a breakthrough after 46 years of divided history. What we have agreed on in 
the Unified Team’s participation in international competition, is a first in history. 
Moreover, the exchange of uniform for the North and South Korean team members in 
the DMZ is the first material only exchange, and there has been no interchange of 
products only, even though there were the North and South Korean musicians and 
sports people who crossed the border for the unification music festival and football 
match.  
(Dong-A 21, March, 1991) 
Roh-Dong announced that the North Korean players would travel to South Korea by train, 
and this would become one of the events that would advance the cause of national 
unification. Thus, Roh-Dong had the perspective that these interactions, through sporting 
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events, could be helpful for achieving unification (Roh-Dong 21, Mar. 1991-1). Roh-Dong 
reported the joyful news of ‘the only team’ under the notion of ‘one ethnic people, one nation’. 
It showed a strong will for achieving unification and was fully supportive of the sports people.     
..….Korean table tennis was ‘the only team’ had won all its matches on that day. For 
the first time since the North and South Korea division, it displayed that our ethnic 
people is one and our nation is one, so we must achieve unification in the nineties with 
great support from the players and cheers from the Korean-Japanese……   
Roh-Dong 25, April 1991 
Roh-Dong described the moment of North and South Korea marching toward the stadium as 
‘imposing’ and that it reflected ‘the pride of the nation’. The team’s participation in the Games 
was officially announced by the organising committee during the opening ceremony and it 
was covered by Roh-Dong. Roh-Dong expressed the pressure on the team to display a 
stronger, ‘united’ Korea. Thus, the team had a symbolic meaning and represented the 
‘power’ of a unified Korea. The argument was that ‘the only team’ would encourage the 
unification for Korean ethnic people, which would be good for the supporters of Unification.     
..….The North and South Korean players (who were against each other) marched 
together with an imposing attitude……Especially noteworthy was that, the Director of 
the organising committee and Mayor of Chiba commented that the ‘significant feature 
of this event is the participation of a Korean Team’…… (Participant’s declare) ‘We 
must show the world how our great people have become one. Let’s all fight together by 
gathering all of our power.’…..the Director of the Korean team said that ‘there were 
huge worries after a Korean team was formed, about how the two different teams could 
harmonise, but that was not necessary……As soon as we met we became one. We 
can harmonise so fast since we are of one ethnicity’……The will of players and the 
Koreans’ unification wish, reminds us of the Korean people’s advance to Unification 
through ‘the only team’……We are proud to encourage the wish of unification for the 
Korean people.    
(Roh-Dong 26, April 1991-4) 
Roh-Dong connected this progress in sport relations to the ‘unification’ discussion through 
interpretations of ‘the only team’, ‘unification cheer team’ and ‘unification cheer flag’ as 
symbolic expressions in politics. By paralleling sport and politics, Roh-Dong might want to 
address the necessity of political advances on the ‘unification’ issue (Roh-Dong 27, April 
1991-2). Roh-Dong emphasised that the unity between North and South Korea players was 
extraordinary and the shared national identity played a great role in achieving this intimacy. 
The players carried the pressure that their results would reflect the justification for Korean 
unification. They, thus, wanted to have good results.  
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..….Then how did our players unite so easily? All the players said that it is because 
they are of one ethnic root. Our people lived as one people with one language near the 
Han River. The reason for our division did not come from us, but it was from a foreign 
power. The unity of the ‘Korean’ team proved that blood is thicker than water…But that 
is not all. What makes the ‘Korean’ team play as a strong team, which is bonding 
closely, is the strong passion for the unification in their mind……To the question from 
one reporter about the forecast of the match result, player Lee Moon Hee said that ‘I 
will do my best as if one single action of mine will advance the unification’ and another 
player Hong said that ‘we must succeed to win since we had made the first the only 
team. Then we can make the only team again and it will promote the Unification.    
(Roh-Dong 27, April 1991-3) 
Many Korean-Japanese who live in Japan came to cheer the team. The slogans chanted 
were such as “Korea won!”, “Our Player Won!” and “Our hope is Unification!” which might 
have seemed irrelevant to sport, but in this context appeared to be highly relevant. The 
students were so happy to chant that they even danced (Roh-Dong 29, April 1991-1). Dong-
A expected a better result in terms of the athletes’ performance. Interestingly, Dong-A was 
reluctant to use the word ‘unification’. However, the victory of ‘the team’ must have been 
more meaningful as the competition was held in Japan, which had once colonised the 
Korean peninsula.   
..….The victory of the Korean Women’s team in the 41
st
 World Table Tennis 
Championship was valued highly as it became an opening conquest of the last 46 
years of division to both the North and South Korea. A Korean team have made it 
possible to forecast that if North and South Korea cooperate and unite for a single 
purpose, then we can bring about a good result. North and South Korea have trained 
together just for one month in Japan and defeated the Chinese team who had been in 
the top position for 18 years and who were seeking their 9
th
 victory at a World 
Championships.  
(Dong-A 30, April, 1991-2) 
Hankyoreh stated that the stadium was full of the symbols of unification such as the flag and 
the song. The anthem was particularly significant since Arirang reminded the people of the 
former colonised homeland (Hankyoreh 30, April, 1991-1). Roh-Dong reflected upon the 
team’s play as the desire of the Korean people for unification. At the same time, North Korea 
showed the great pride in the national team, and described how, as the flag was ‘raised’, so 
too was its national pride.   
…..At that moment, all the Koreans stood up and shouted ‘Hooray Korea’, ‘National 
Unification’, ‘We, Korea Won’ and sang songs like ‘Arirang’ and ‘Our wish is 
Unification’……    
(Roh-Dong 30, April 1991-1) 
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Through Roh-Dong, it can be seen that the expectation of unification among the people was 
reflected through the ‘unified Korean team’ for the table tennis championship. This interview 
helped capture how ‘normal’ individual Koreans would think about North and South Korean 
relations.   
..….A woman said that ‘…..Now in the table tennis match we became ‘the team’, thus, 
we must go to the UN as ‘the team’ and all other areas must be unified’.….. 
(Roh-Dong 30, April 1991-2) 
 
5.5 The 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games 
Dong-A explained that the successful performance of the table tennis team pushed the North 
and South Korean regimes to plan the next step for Sports Talks for the coming Barcelona 
Summer and Albertville Winter Olympic Games (Dong-A 30, April, 1991-2). Despite the 
previous success in organising ‘a unified team’ for table tennis, Dong-A suggested that this 
would take considerable effort and it was reluctant to use the word ‘unification’ which was 
not the case for Hankyoreh and Roh-Dong.  
..….Both the North and South Korea must try to achieve a Unified Team to participate 
at the Barcelona Olympic Games. This sort of unity in Sport must also lead to the road 
for improvement of the North and South Korean interactions and harmony.    
(Dong-A 30, April, 1991-2) 
Roh-Dong warned that there was an anti-unification tendency in the South Korea regime, 
and requested that North and South Korea cooperate during their discussions  
..….However, recently the South Korean regime has suppressed participation and 
publicising of North Korea’s ‘91 National festival and Youth Unification festival. To 
contribute to National Unity and Unification through the Sports Talks, South Korea’s 
anti-unification activity must be stopped and the mood for the Talks needs to change. 
Thus, now we suggest having the North and South Korean Sports Talks on 17
th
 August 
in the Panmunjom on our side……    
(Roh-Dong 6, June 1991-1) 
 
5.5.1 North Korean Judo Player, Lee Chang Soo defection case 
[Table 5.12] The 1
st
 – 4
h
 North and South Korea Sports Talks for further International Games 
unified team organising and participation-6 
 Content 
Title The 1
st
 – 4
h
 North and South Korea Sports Talks for further International Games unified 
team organising and participation 
Date 1990.11.29/1991.01.15/01.30 
Venue Panmunjom JAS (Joint Security Area) Northern and Southern areas in turns 
Summary North Korea dispersed the 5
th
 Talks due to the defection of the North Korea Judo player 
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Chang Soo Lee which took place just 5 days before the scheduled Talks on 12
th
 of 
August 
 
The first obvious inference to be drawn from this text was the significance of the political 
issues which emerged from these sport relations. The defection of a well-known North 
Korean Judo player differed from previous cases, since the exile occurred during an 
international sporting competition. Consequently, this incident directly affected subsequent 
sport interactions between North and South Korea. Hankyoreh calls attention to the negative 
impact of this incident on North and South Korean sport relations.  
..….This defection will have a negative effect on the North and South Korean sport 
interchange, since it is now a critical moment of escalating expectations about the 
North and South Korean discussions about organising Unified Team for Barcelona 
Olympic Games.    
(Hankyoreh 6, August, 1991) 
Due to the defection of the North Korean Judo player Lee, Hankyoreh predicted that North 
Korea would postpone the Talks, which were planned for the 5th of the month. North Korea 
blamed South Korea as it believed that South Korea had helped Lee to seek asylum.  
..….The president of the North Korean NOC Kim sent a telegram to the president of 
the South Korean NOC Kim on the 12
th
. They announced that they would postpone the 
5
th
 Sports Talks which were planned for the 17
th
 due to the exile of North Korea Judo 
player Lee (24). They claimed that Lee had participated at the ‘91 World Judo 
Championships which were held in Spain, and South Korea had ‘seduced him.’    
(Hankyoreh 13, August, 1991) 
The interaction in sports between the North and South Korea was affected by the general 
diplomatic relations between the two Koreas. This was so because both regimes were 
governed by top-down dictatorship systems, with most of the decisions being made by a few 
cabinet members. The channels of communication could be mixed and often overlapped. 
The Minister of Sport and Youth, Park, announced the news of hosting the next Sports Talks 
as a result of other high level Talks that were held on the 13th.    
..….The Minister of Sport and Youth, Park broadcast that the North and South Korean 
Sports Talks will be held again around January of next year for the discussion for the 
organising of Unified Team since he received a positive answer from one of the officers 
of North Korea while they were in other high level Talks on 13
th
.    
(Hankyoreh 14, December, 1991-1) 
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5.5.2 Korea, as Divided Nations in the Olympics 
Hankyoreh pointed out that ‘the unified team’ issue was not a matter that was limited to 
North and South Korea. The IOC had already experienced organising ‘Unified Teams’ with 
countries of the former USSR, and they knew how to handle the matter. Hankyoreh 
expressed its sympathy on the failure to establish ‘a unified team’, as there had been a total 
of 29 sets of Talks since the two Koreas started planning for the 1964 Tokyo Olympic 
Games (Hankyoreh 3, April, 1992). Hankyoreh stated that the situation of North and South 
Korea is ‘the only case’ of a divided ethnic people, and that it had become a shameful 
‘Olympic Record’. It further stressed the point that ‘We’ have ‘never’ participated as a 
‘Unified Team’. Hankyoreh referred to North and South Korea as ‘we’, which belied its strong 
nationalistic sentiment. Its sympathy towards the situation was also reflected in the word 
‘never’.        
..….In this Olympics, the athletes from 171 countries will participate and we are the 
only case of an ethnic people who are separated and participate. This is our shameful 
‘Olympic Record’ in terms of the fact that we have never participated as a ‘Unified 
Team’ of our ethnic people since the modern Olympic Games began, which has lasted 
for 96 years and was the 25
th
 Olympic Games.    
(Hankyoreh 24, July, 1992) 
Kim Jong Il, the leader of North Korea, announced that they must host more international 
matches, and this would become the top priority of their policy. Once North Korea appealed 
to the international community to host international sport matches, it was considered a 
positive step towards improving North and South Korean relations in the international arena.   
..….Dear leader Kim Jong Il pointed as follows. <……We have to host international 
matches often.>……    
(Roh-Dong 2, Aug. 1992-1)  
Roh-Dong cited the letter from the president of the International Taekwondo Federation. It 
published the political opinion of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and North Korea’s 
withdrawal from the Treaty. In a personal voice, the paper warned that the diplomatic 
pressure on North Korea would lead to a physical conflict. Interestingly, the president of the 
ITF was used as a diplomatic medium for political issues.        
..….The President of the International Taekwondo Federation has sent a letter, which 
contained his support for the demand of the dear commander [not to pressure North 
Korea] and his statement of the (Cho-Sun) republic about the withdrawal from the NPT 
 
 
203 
 
(Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) to the General Secretary of the UN and the US 
House of Representatives……The letter said that it did not want another tragedy in 
Cho-Sun territory and the military threat to North Korea might evolve into physical 
conflict in the Cho-Sun peninsula, demolishing World Peace……    
(Roh-Dong 26, Mar. 1993-1) 
 
5.6 The 1994 Hiroshima Asian Games and the 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games 
North Korea did not participate in the 1994 Hiroshima Asian Games due to the death of Kim 
Il Sung. Hankyoreh expressed regret at North Korea’s absence from the Games.    
..…. First of all, the absence of North Korea is heart-breaking news for the North and 
South Korean people. It would be great to send a Unified Team or just to warmly cheer 
each other as separate teams.…...    
(Hankyoreh 4, October, 1994-2) 
Surprisingly North Korea registered to participate in the 1996 Atlanta Olympics, and it 
implied that the Olympic Games were relatively highly valued in North Korea’s foreign policy.  
..…. North Korea shows great changes recently. North Korea registered for the 
participation in the Atlanta Olympic Games …North Korea had disappeared from 
international sport arena since the 1st East Asian Games, on May 1993……  
(Hankyoreh 21, January, 1996-2) 
 
5.7 Conclusion  
This chapter reviews the various issues which emerged in the period at the end of Cold War, 
and the beginning of international detente. South Korean domestic politics was in a period of 
turbulence. In its broader pursuit of democratisation, the matter of relations with North Korea 
became a critical issue for South Korean society. At this time, with South Korea hosting the 
1988 Seoul Olympics and the two Koreas’ discussions about organising a unified team and 
co-hosting of the Games North and South Korea used the Sports Talks as a potentially 
important means of solving intra-Korean issues.  
 
Within the various Sports Talks between North and South Korea, a ‘Primordial’ Korean 
nationalism is revealed (Shin 2006). In the relatively frequent Sports Talks between the two 
Koreas at this time, subtle differences of meaning emerge in terms of what either side 
implied through the terms adopted to signify a ‘unified team’ or ‘unification’. At this time, the 
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first unified team was established for the 41st Table Tennis Championships in Japan, and 
this became a lesson or example to be emulated in further Sports Talks. It also represented 
the limits of what North and South Korea could achieve through sport interactions. Since 
there was no dominant diplomatic frame such as the Cold War international context which 
had influenced and constrained the Sports Talks in the previous decade, domestic politics 
and the attitudes of individuals became more prominent. Particularly, the issue of Pastor 
Moon’s visit to North Korea and the defection of a North Korean Judo players’ to South 
Korea impacted directly and negatively on the progress of the Sports Talks.  
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Chapter 6 North and South Korean Sports Relations from 1998 to 2007 
 
6.1 Introduction  
This chapter will cover the analysis of the discourse related to North and South Korean 
sporting relations from 1998 to 2007. This 10-year period can be generally described as a 
period of multi-polar international relations replacing the bi-polar relations of the Cold War 
period. It is a period in which several levels of actors on the global stage gave prominence to 
various aspects of culture such as sport. In consequence, the hosts of international sporting 
events found that these were increasingly recognised as being not only of cultural 
significance but also of economic and political importance. Previously, sport was considered 
rather as ‘soft power’ in North-South Korean relations that was only important on the cultural 
level, thus the role and meaning of sport in international relations in this period certainly 
needed to be re-interpreted.  
 
By analysing the summary of Talks between the two Koreas, and selected newspaper 
articles from both sides in this period, the interactions of political and cultural dimensions of 
North and South Korean sport relations are illustrated. The policy of South Korea towards 
the North during Kim Dae Jung’s presidency was termed ‘Sunshine policy’. The South 
Korean media did not always have a supportive view of this policy, but it seemed to work for 
better relations between the two Koreas, because eventually Summits were held in June, 
2000. Although the sport relations between the two Koreas were not consistently smooth 
due to the fluctuating international context over the two preceding decades, they at last 
agreed to organise ‘a unified team’ for the 2006 Doha Asian Games and the 2008 Beijing 
Olympic Games. This was considered both as a good sign for the two Koreas but also from 
an international relations perspective. During this period of time, depending on the nuclear 
and security issues in North Korea, South Korea sometimes faced situations in which 
expressing its diplomatic position on North Korea’s actions was necessary, and this 
significantly affected their general political relationship.  
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6.2 The Privately led Sporting Interactions 
The South Korean newspaper Dong-A stated that the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games was one 
of the impetuses for the economic development of South Korea, and provided a foundation 
to build competence in the domestic sport industry. The incidents related to South Korea’s 
use of the IMF (International Monetary Fund) SAP (Structural adjustment Program-to 
address the national financial crisis) in 1997 became a tragic occasion that led to North and 
South Korea being recognised as separate economic entities. Thus, it clearly brought ‘reality’ 
to the situation between the two Koreas. While South Korea went through the economic 
strictures advised by the IMF SAP, sport became one of the few sources for South Korea to 
maintain pride in its national identity at this difficult time of financial crisis. Nonetheless, there 
were not many articles in Dong-A about international sporting events, since the period was 
not one of festive mood, rather the whole nation was in suppressed mood because of the 
problems associated with the unstable economic situation which South Korean society faced, 
such as increased early retirement and high inflation. While South Korea was in debt to the 
IMF, the South Korean people criticised the government’s emphasis on economic 
cooperation with North Korea, which mainly consisted of unilateral aid from South to North. 
Thus, South Koreans worried about further damage to their national economy due to this 
‘additional cost’. 
 
Dong-A and Hankyoreh illustrated opposite views concerning the impact of sporting events 
in this period. Dong-A valued South Korea’s economic development most. In the meantime, 
Hankyoreh considered an ethnic-centered national unity as one of its top priorities. In the 
following article, Hankyoreh wrote about the expectations of the Seoul Olympic Games and 
the 2002 World Cup to contribute to establishing ‘national unity and a concrete Korean 
national identity’. 
..….We had to regret two things after hosting successful the Seoul Olympic Games in 
1988. One is the anger that sport and the Olympic spirit became degraded as the tools 
of preservation of a dictatorial regime. Another is a sense of shame that North Korea 
who shares our blood-line could not join in the party events which many other countries 
were invited to……One more thing to add is that we must be a ‘unified team’ in the 
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2002 World Cup. Even during this 50 year tragic period, sometimes sport has filled our 
hearts with pure love of the ethnic North and South Korean brotherhood……Like these, 
sport contributes enormously to national unity and making concrete identity, and that is 
much more than the meaning given in sport history.….. 
(Hankyoreh 9, May,1998) 
The 10th anniversary of the 24th Seoul Olympic Games was portrayed in Dong-A as a great 
success achieved by South Korea rather than a ‘legacy of Korean ethnicity’. It focused on 
the high standard of the Olympic Games was that was hosted in the “capital of South Korea, 
Seoul” (Dong-A 15, September, 1998). In this comment, it was emphasised that South Korea 
was a separate entity, which contrasted with Hankyoreh, which rather highlighted the unity of 
the two Koreas. Dong-A cited a speech made by the Mayor of Seoul, who was in office 
during the Seoul Olympic Games. In his speech, the Mayor proudly articulated that the Seoul 
Olympic Games was the bridge to restore the relations between the East and West from 
both an international and inter-Korean perspective. The Mayor was sure that this was only 
possible because the Games were held in Seoul, the capital of South Korea. He also added 
that from a diplomatic point of view the Games projected a bright future for North and South 
Korea’s membership of the UN. The domestic and international impact of the Seoul Olympic 
Games, which was evaluated by Dong-A, should be taken into consideration.  
…...The Seoul Olympic Games brought a great impact, internationally and intra-
nationally. Most of all, the ‘76 Montreal Olympic Games, ‘80 Moscow Olympic Games 
and ‘84 LA Olympic Games were held under failure to breakdown the wall of ideology 
and race, but the Seoul Olympic Games rewrote an Olympic history through 160 
nations’ athletes and coaches from the East and West of the world gathering in one 
place. It also affected South Korea immensely. It helped us open the door to Eastern 
European Socialist Countries and developed the relationship and established 
diplomatic relations. Moreover, it was realised that North and South Korea’s joining of 
the UN will come together…….<written by Mayor of Seoul in 1988> 
 
(Dong-A 15, September, 1998) 
By this time, North Korea and the IOC started to discuss mutually cooperating through the 
NOC, and this was considered a positive gesture for both. At least North Korea showed its 
presence in the international sport diplomacy arena, in contrast to the period of boycotting. 
The NOC of North Korea obtained more recognition from the IOC, and the IOC tried to 
demonstrate that it could put more effort into establishing a ‘constructive’ relationship by 
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donating a Benz bus to the North Korean NOC to symbolise its support. This was 
exceptional and quite a unique gesture from the international organisation.  
……The vice prime minster Kwak met the people from the IOC and German Corporate 
Daimler Benz presenters……the leader of this representatives, Thomas Bach, and the 
North Korean leader declared that they will provide energetic support for the 
development of the North Korean NOC and cooperation with the IOC …… 
 (Roh-Dong 20, Sept. 1998_1) 
Those ‘friendly’ gestures seemed to have given the IOC a positive impression that North and 
South Korean sport relations would bear fruit. Consequently, the IOC gained status as 
effectively a diplomatic organisation, which in the eyes of some would not be ‘proper’ for a 
‘non - political’ international sport organisation. 
..….The possibility is growing to restore the North and South Korean sport relationship. 
Thomas Bach, who is an IOC performance member visited North Korea and 
announced the possibility on the 21
st
. 
(Hankyoreh 23, September, 1998) 
 
6.2.1 Hyundai and the Private Sporting Interactions 
At this time, Hankyoreh focused on the private sport interactions between North and South 
Korea. Privately, Hyundai, as a company in South Korea, was well-known for its enthusiastic 
efforts in this particular contact with North Korea. The founder of Hyundai, Chung Ju Young, 
is a man who left his hometown in North Korea due to the Korean War, thus he was one of 
the ‘Sil Hyang Min’, who lost their home town. Therefore, Chairman Chung was determined 
and passionate about reviving relations between North and South Korea by whatever means. 
In the nick of time, he became president of the South Korean NOC and thus, he attempted to 
use this position to maximise North and South sporting interactions. This was made possible 
by the fund from Hyundai plus Chung’s determination, and had the approval of the North and 
South Korean governments. In the following article Hankyoreh explained this circumstance 
in a positive tone by commenting on the ‘expectation’ of South Korean government.  
.…..Concerning ‘the agreement of the construction of an Indoor stadium and private 
sport relations’, which was agreed by HYUNDAI and North Korea, it clearly declared 
‘Let’s make an environment within which we can participate in international 
competitions jointly by creating concrete trust in North and South Korean relations. 
One involved in this said ‘When HYUNDAI agreed on those issues they might have 
already shared them with the South Korean government, who want to open the door to 
North and South Korean relations. The South Korean government also presented its 
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expectation that ‘the natural dialogue will be possible if private sector North and South 
Korean relations on the matter of economy and other forms of cooperation become 
popular. Actually, sport talks are a non-political issue and already have had some 
fruitful results before. Thus, sport was viewed as the easiest channel.  
(Hankyoreh 5, November, 1998) 
Unlike the previous two decades, in this period North and South interaction tended to be 
driven by private sector entities and, thus, their interests were reflected in the actions taken. 
One of these interests was in Korean nationalism among the people of North and South 
Korea, because the half a century of division meant that the first generations that had been 
separated from their family were in a hurry to find a way to be reunited with their family 
members. At this time, Hyundai was in a good position to take the role of leading the two 
Koreas’ sporting interactions, since one of the sons of Chairman Chung was a vice president 
of FIFA, and South Korea won the bid for co-hosting the 2002 Korea-Japan World Cup. 
Therefore, another form of co-hosting’ became an issue between North and South Korea. 
However, even though Hankyoreh emphasised the “recognition of one ethnicity” for the sake 
of an ethnic dominant national unity, the dialogue between the two Koreas was not as 
effective as it wished for. An international sporting event, however, could be one of the 
arenas in which a strong recognition and sharing of a national identity can represent the 
‘symbolic unity’ of North and South Korea officially in public.  
..….Even though sporting interactions cannot make huge changes, it can be more 
frequent. And then it will be helpful to release the extreme tension of the cease fire line 
between North and South Korea. Whatever the price is, North and South Korea must 
meet more often. We need to consistently have dialogues to recognise ourselves as 
one ethnicity. There is nothing more effective than becoming one on the ground and 
sharing a fever together to be closer to each other. 
(Hankyoreh 6, November, 1998) 
Chairman Chung visited North Korea to discuss further interactions with Hyundai, and 
Hankyoreh spotlighted what Chung Ju Young’s visit implied for North and South relations by 
describing the gesture demonstrated by Kim Jong Il while Chairman Chung was in North 
Korea. As revealed in the article, North Korea showed a strong interest in interaction with 
South Korea and it displayed great potential for what ‘a motivated person outside the political 
arena’ could contribute to North and South Korean relations.  
..….Honourable Chairman Chung Ju Young said that Kim Jung Il visited his 
accommodation very politely and made him stand in the middle row for the photograph, 
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even though he refused to do so. And they represented a strong motivation towards 
North and South Korean economic cooperation and promised to operate all the 
agreements…… 
(Hankyoreh 7, November, 1998) 
At this time, Hyundai and the North Korean Asian Pacific committee agreed to set up a task 
office on each side to establish an indoor stadium in North Korea and to hold further sport 
interactions. The son of Chairman Chung, Chung Mong Jun was strongly recommended as 
a representative, which should be underlined as Chung Mong Jun was a vice president of 
FIFA and the president of the KFA (Korean Football Association), involved in the discussion 
of organising ‘a unified team’ of North and South Korea for the 2002 World Cup. Moreover, 
the issue of unification between North and South Korea was not only a national matter to 
Chairman Chung but was an element in his private wish for national unification.  
 
As the leader of a private company, Chairman Chung was motivated to utilise his corporate 
resources as a weapon to increase encounters with North Korea that would eventually 
contribute to the progress of North and South Korean relations. Chairman Chung met the 
great leader of North Korea, Kim Jong Il, and discussed several issues relating to what North 
Korea and Hyundai could do together. Chairman Chung and Hyundai were closely 
associated with South Korea’s policy toward North Korea, as strongly motivated actors in the 
matter. Particularly, the son of Chairman Chung was the vice president of FIFA and KFA at 
the same time, thus football matches were used as a platform for interactions.  
…...Chairman Chung and one of his sons, who is a chairman of HYUNDAI construction, 
said ‘we agreed to open a basketball match in Pyongyang around April, and the 
location for the indoor stadium construction is around Bo Tong River in Pyongyang…… 
(Dong-A 7, February, 1999) 
Roh-Dong did not ‘explain’ the usefulness of sport in terms of North and South relations but 
it rather focused on results from the ‘interactions’ such as ‘exchange football matches’. North 
and South Korean groups of workers agreed on hosting a football match. Above the 
symbolic meaning of the match, the match was titled ‘Unification Wish’, while a “drawing of 
the Korean peninsula” was on the ball. Thus, Korean ethnic nationalism was present in the 
private sporting interactions between North and South Korea (Dong-A 11, February, 1999). 
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As Dong-A did not release many articles regarding the ‘Unification Worker’s Football Match’, 
the game was not fully spotlighted compared to the events organised by the governments. 
But the unification wave that was based on Korean nationalism was becoming popular due 
to the moments created during the matches. 
..….As time went by, the football match encouraged unification fever in ‘one nation’ 
and ‘one ethnicity’ and great scenes were produced among players with their strong 
ethnic based family membership…… 
(Roh-Dong 14, Aug. 1999-1) 
The people, who actually participated in that event, naturally expressed a ‘special’ ethnic 
sense of identity based on national attachment to North and South Korea (Roh-Dong 15, 
Aug. 1999-7).  
 
A month after the ‘Unification Workers’ Football Match’, Hyundai achieved another 
opportunity, which was titled the ‘Unification Basketball Match’. This is meaningful since it 
became another ‘private’ encounter of sports between North and South Korea that was led 
by corporate Hyundai. With the chance of its broadcasting in South Korea, this became a 
doorway to North and South Korean sport relations reaching another level.  
..…. And also, this unification basketball match will be broadcast through the satellite 
since South Korean reporters and announcers were not permitted to broadcast 
anything in North Korea. 
(Hankyoreh 22, September, 1999) 
Chairman Chung Ju Young obtained another positive outcome after meeting with North 
Korean officers. Hyundai’s offer of building an indoor stadium in North Korea was accepted 
by North Korea, with the condition of naming the stadium after Chung Ju Young.  
The name of the stadium in Pyongyang would become ‘Pyongyang Ah-San Chung Ju 
Young Multi-Stadium…… 
(Hankyoreh 27, September, 1999-1) 
When the Hyundai basketball team arrived in Pyongyang, Dong-A referred to this as just a 
‘private initiative’ of less valued than ‘public interaction’ driven by both regimes. What made 
Dong-A’s devaluation of this private initiative between North and South Korea more plausible 
was the fact that Dong-A did not mention the more recent ‘Workers’ Unification Football 
Match’ as the latest North and South Korea friendly sporting event.   
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……It is the first time ever since North and South Korea were divided that there has 
been a North and South Korean friendly basketball match and is 9 years after the 
North and South Korean Unification Football Match in October 1990…… 
(Dong-A 28, September, 1999-1) 
Another exceptional case was made by the effort of Chairman Chung, when he visited 
Pyongyang for the opening ceremony of the Indoor Stadium constructed by Hyundai.  The 
group of people crossed the border between the two Koreas, through DMZ area to North 
Korea. Although this was just one of the private encounters with North Korea, the permission 
to cross the DMZ for this particular event seemed a special favour granted by the South 
Korean regime. Thus, this could be considered a ‘private event’ that was ‘unofficially 
authorised as a public’ initiative (Hankyoreh 29, September, 1999-2).  
 
Extraordinary expressions can be found in a Dong-A article about the scene and matches in 
which North and South Korea players played. Dong-A reported that the players shared a 
friendship and assumed that this originated from belonging to the same ethnicity. The article 
also alluded to the playing of these matches in a spirit of great harmony originating from the 
national identity of Korea (Dong-A 29, September, 1999). Interestingly, there were not as 
many articles in Roh-Dong about sporting interactions with Hyundai, since it was the case 
that North Korea was receiving aid from South Korea, particularly from a ‘bourgeois’ private 
company and this could damage the North Korean regime’s notion of Communism. 
Nevertheless, North Korea did express its great appreciation to Chairman Chung Ju Young 
from the perspective of shared ethnic nationalism. Hankyoreh argued that Hyundai and 
Chairman Chung had contributed greatly to North and South Korean relations.  
..….Hyundai and North Korea left a great impact on the North and South Korean sport 
relations, since they agreed on extending the number of sports in which matches could 
be exchanged…… 
(Hankyoreh 30, September, 1999-1) 
The North and South Korean Unification Basketball Match was planned to be held in Seoul 
as well. Kim Jong Il ordered the game to be held in December (Hankyoreh 4, October, 1999). 
Thus, it was expected that North Korean players would visit Seoul. A Hyundai family 
member, the son of the chairman, Chung, who was also the KFA chairman, announced that 
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he had received positive feedback from North Korea about organising ‘a unified team’ for the 
2002 World Cup (Hankyoreh 20, November, 1999). In Dong-A, it was identified that Hyundai 
would issue free tickets for the North and South Korea Friendly Match to the South Korean 
people (Dong-A 16, December, 1999). This was evidence for the assumption that the North 
and South Korean Unification Basketball Match was an ‘unofficially authorised public event’.  
 
The following article captures the changes in broadcasting procedures during the period, 
when North and South Korean relations were good. Previously, North Korea did not allow 
South Korean journalists’ to visit Pyung Yang in protest against South Korea’s military 
activities. However, North Korea allowed the broadcasting of the Unification Basketball 
Matches by the South Korean Broadcasting System (SBS, Seoul Broadcasting System) and 
sent its journalists to South Korea as well. Moreover, North Korea would directly receive the 
pictures and sound from SBS (Dong-A 22, December, 1999). Dong-A explained why the 
South Korean government could not support this event ‘officially’ and why the North Korean 
regime was reluctant to emphasise this event as an ‘official’ achievement of North and South 
Korean relations. Dong-A implied that the South Korean government could not officially 
contribute to this event as it intended to, because of the attitude of the North Korean regime, 
which wanted to treat this event as an entirely ‘private matter’. 
……However, it is not easy to see this event from the South Korean government’s 
perspective. North Korea minimised the meaning of this match by referring to it as just 
a ‘private sport event’, rather than developing the North and South Korean relationship. 
Thus, the South Korean government could not easily be seen to be involved in this 
match. 
(Dong-A 23, December, 1999-1) 
 
6.2.2 Other Issues in Private Sporting Interactions  
Another private sector organisation, Koryo University in South Korea, followed its 
nationalistic academic tradition and suggested a discussion about sport interactions in 
relation to the Bangkok Asian Games, for the sporting people of North Korean universities. 
Dong-A covered this proposal by Koryo University, since it was the first attempt made by a 
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private university, and the impact that the university itself had in terms of its academic 
reputation could not be ignored, especially in the area of North and South Korean relations. 
Contrary to Hankyoreh, Dong-A’s view was not presented in this article (Dong-A 4, 
December, 1998).   
 
The coverage of the matches between North and South Korea in Hankyoreh was focused on 
personal motivation, which was portrayed through personal interviews based on the 
recognition of the ethnic nationalism of the two Koreas. This international sporting event 
reaffirmed the shared relations based on the common ethnicity of the two Koreas, and 
justified the reason for their co-existence. One of the North Korean players demonstrated his 
feelings towards the cheering squad, spectators and those watching from home, by 
voluntarily bowing to people who cheered for him after playing against a South Korean 
player. At this moment, the separation between North and South among the players and 
spectators was not the issue at all.  
..….The match between Shim of South Korea and Kang of North Korea might be a 
litmus test of our nationalism… the North Korean Kang stepped down from the mat and 
bowed to South Korean coaches and cheer group.  
(Hankyoreh 14, December, 1998) 
One of the participants in the Worker’s football match escaped North Korea during the 
Games (Hankyoreh 3, June, 1999). This was the first known incident of defection associated 
with sporting activities between North and South Korea, since the North Korean Judo player 
Lee. However, this news did not have an influence on the match itself. This might be related 
to the fact that the Workers’ football match and the defection incident were three months 
apart. Thus, neither North nor South Korea could regard the staging of this football match as 
being solely responsible for his defection. In addition to this incident, increasing military 
tension between North and South Korea affected sporting relations. Traditionally, sporting 
relations were affected by military issues between North and South Korea, as illustrated by 
an article in Hankyoreh that reported the concerns made by people involved in sport. Thus, it 
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appeared that the various circumstances of North and South Korea were combined in 
constructing the reality of North and South sport relations.  
……People in sport worried about the negative influence on sport interactions of the 
military conflict between the North and South Korea navies on the 15
th
. In particular, 
the friendly match of the HYUNDAI basketball team will be directly affected, thus the 
result of negotiations gains more attention……And this will be an influence on the 2002 
World Cup and organising a ‘unified team’……. 
(Hankyoreh 16, June, 1999) 
The military conflict between North and South Korea affected the South Korean journalists’ 
visit to North Korea while the North and South played a basketball match which had been 
scheduled previously. This match was not cancelled because this was a friendly match 
between North Korea and the Hyundai team, but North Korea expressed its protest about 
South Korea’s military manoeuvres by restricting journalists’ entry into North Korea 
(Hankyoreh 22, June, 1999).  
 
There were cases of private interactions between North and South Korea which were 
mediated by a Japanese university. The Cho Sun University of North Korea, Tsukuba 
University, a university in Japan famous for its sport performance, and Seoul National 
University, gathered to play football together. In this case, the uniqueness of Tsukuba as a 
Japanese university worked effectively. Pro-North Korean residents in Tsukuba University 
contributed to weakening anti-Japanese sentiments in North Korea, whereas the Seoul 
National University agreed and participated in this interchange by emphasising the ‘private’ 
and ‘Japan-friendly’ aspect of the event. Thus, this case could explain the complexity of the 
involvement of Japanese organisations in North and South Korean relations and its 
usefulness in terms of promoting the interactions.  
..….Cho Sun University and Tsukuba University had played this match for 40 years. 
Seoul National University and University of Tsukuba have met for the last 18 years. 
About 3 years ago, the professors from three universities randomly mentioned this sort 
of gathering. This is the first match played under this arrangement……Sport doesn’t 
have a border. Study doesn’t have a border. They are not related to politics at all.  
(Hankyoreh 6, August, 1999) 
Contrary to the previous emphasis on Korean nationalism by North Korea, the attitude of 
North Korea when it broadcast its players’ winning against South Korea was different. The 
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emphasis on victory against South Korea implied that Roh-Dong treated the domestic 
regime’s propaganda as important. Therefore, the stability of domestic politics was also a 
priority for North Korea in terms of broadcasting the result of the sporting event (Roh-Dong 
26, Aug. 1999-1). Moreover, the good performance of the North Korean players provided a 
perfect opportunity to praise the leader of North Korea, Kim Jong Il, and Roh-Dong did not 
miss this chance (Roh-Dong 29, Aug. 1999-16).   
 
6.2.3 The Potential of Sporting Interactions  
The potential role of sport in the two Koreas’ relations was evident founded in the following 
article. Dong-A admitted that sport became “one of the easiest areas” to induce interactions 
between North and South Korea, and further, general interactions, mainly political, were 
affected by the result of “sporting interactions” (Dong-A 8, February, 1999). Dong-A started 
to recognise the multi–dimensional aspect of North and South Korean relations and 
moreover emphasised the accessibility and effects of sporting interactions. Nevertheless, 
Dong-A expressed some worries about sporting interactions, as sports could be the best 
method for the integration of the two Koreas, but at the same time it could be the root of 
‘emotional conflicts’ based on excessive competitiveness (Dong-A 11, February, 1999). 
Hankyoreh considered the visit of North Korean players to South Korea as an ‘historic event’ 
and made a comment that even though this visit did not yet signal ‘full spring’, the hope for a 
‘spring’ to bloom for North and South Korean relations remained alive. When the sporting 
interaction between North and South Korea was led by the private sector, then the politically 
symbolic value seemed weaker compared to that of a state-led approach.  
..….North Korea’s visit to Seoul will be enough to be recognised as another historical 
event……The North Korean team limits itself by calling this event a private affair, which 
excludes political meaning and makes contacts with the South Korean people seem 
reluctant. Nevertheless, this visit was interpreted as signalling that the ‘real spring’ 
won’t be far away. 
(Hankyoreh 23, December, 1999-1) 
Dong-A compared the North Korean Basketball players’ visit to Seoul and the Unification 
Football Exchanges in 1990. It is interesting to see that the mood of the people changed this 
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time since the visit was made for a ‘pure’ sporting purpose. Thus, Dong-A explained that 
sport interactions organised by the regime were certainly used to achieve a political purpose 
in 1990, and that gave a special meaning to the South Korean people. Dong-A considered 
this private sport interaction to be based on a ‘pure sport’ purpose, thus it created a different 
mood (Dong-A 24, December, 1999-2 ). Nevertheless, North and South Korean sport 
relations could not be a ‘pure’ sporting event. Hankyoreh commented that “to win or lose is 
not important” and implied that North and South Korean matches meant more than the 
results of the matches. The emotions people experience through sporting events such as 
this have more meaning than the match itself, and in this aspect this sporting event is closely 
related to the political relations between North and South Korea. Thus, sporting events are 
never considered as just about ‘pure’ sport (Hankyoreh 24, December, 1999). Dong-A 
quoted a visitor from North Korea, who embraced ethnic nationalism as a reason for 
organising a unified Korea (Dong-A 27, December, 1999). North Korean players visiting 
Seoul meant that North Korea was ready to ‘mutually’ interact with South Korea, at least in 
the sporting arena. Thus, Hankyoreh expressed its excitement and expectation at this new 
way of relating. North and South Korea spoke the same language, ‘Korean’, yet their 
communication seemed to be always interpreted by each in their own way. 
..….Therefore, the unification basketball match became an opportunity to change the 
one-way communication to bilateral communications.  
(Hankyoreh 27, December, 1999-2) 
 
6.3 Development of the Sport Relations of Two Koreas 
 
6.3.1 Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine Policy and Sporting Interactions 
In the following article, Hankyoreh appraised the previous year’s private interaction between 
South and North Korea as a success. Moreover, the South Korean government seemed to 
lean towards encouraging more ‘private’ led interactions with North Korea, which was part of 
the policy of Kim Dae Jung’s presidency, since he was a great supporter of broadening 
interactions with North Korea until the unification of the two Koreas could be accomplished. 
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President Kim wished for North and South Korean unification for a long time, and his effort to 
bring peace to the Korean peninsula through seeking national unification was appreciated 
internationally by his being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Thus, during Kim Dae Jung’s 
presidency, the South Korean regime supported the relations with North Korea even in the 
private sector including the field of sport.  
..….The Security Council announced that they will grow North and South Korean 
interactions in this year, in the private level in economy, culture, religion and sport, 
based on the results of last year’s effort at interaction ……President Kim said that if 
necessary, the government would give its best support. 
(Hankyoreh 6, January, 2000) 
President Kim mentioned that the South Korean regime intended to promote private 
leadership in its interactions with North Korea and promised the full support of the 
government.  
..…. “With the Presidential Summit on the 13
th
, the sport relations will develop like a 
storm. Kim Dae Jung’s government has been sticking to the ‘private leads principle’ in 
North and South Korean relations……However, the presidents of both will agree on 
sport interactions, then it means that the government will lead last of all.” 
(Dong-A 13, June, 2000) 
Under this supportive attitude of the South Korean government, Chairman Chung of Hyundai 
was admired for his contribution and investment in North and South Korean sporting 
interactions, and several universities including the Korean Sport University awarded him an 
honorary Doctorate (Dong-A 11, February, 2000). The peaceful relation between North and 
South Korea was supported by the South Korean administrative leadership which resulted in 
the historical Presidential Summit of North and South Korea. Thus, sporting interactions 
were also expected to be achieving active communication with North Korea. President of the 
KSA (Korean Sport Association) Kim Un Yong, who was also an IOC member for South 
Korea, expressed his ideas about the significance of sport in the interactions of the two 
Koreas.  At this time, North and South Korea sporting interaction involved joint training and 
friendly exchange matches in various sporting events.  
..….People in sport are expecting to have epochal progress towards organising one 
team and North Korea’s participation in Busan Asian Games after the historical 
Pyongyang Presidential Summit on the 12
th
 of June……the President of the Korean 
Sport Association Kim Un Yung has revealed that ‘We will do our best to improve 
reconciliation between North and South Korea through joint training of elite sport 
players and friendly matches…… 
 
 
219 
 
(Hankyoreh 11, April, 2000) 
How much the South Korean leadership valued sport interactions between North and South 
Korea is well presented in the following article of Dong-A. After the Presidential Summit, 
President Kim ordered a plan be drawn up to maximise the impact on North and South 
Korean relations. As one of the best supporters of the unification of North and South Korea, 
President Kim knew how important this sport interaction would be to North and South 
Korean relations.  
..….President Kim Dae Jung has ordered on the 1
st
 to ‘Prepare plans after the North 
and South Korean Presidents’ Summit for the growth of North and South Korean sport 
relations since sport is the easiest and the fastest way to make North and South 
Korean relations move towards reconciliation and mutual understanding. 
(Dong-A 2, May, 2000) 
The significance of this sporting event is explained in the following article of Hankyoreh. The 
character of sporting interactions, which includes ‘physical contact’, has a great potential to 
influence people’s emotion. Particularly, sporting events that promote unity on the basis of a 
shared nationalism are expected to demolish the ideological conflict, which was constructed 
by historical and social environments.  
..….Amongst all, sport relations are non-political in character and already we have a lot 
of experience, so that this has the potential to become the easiest area for recovery of 
good relations. Sport relations are not only for the display of sporting ability, but also 
promoting national unity and physical contact which cannot happen through other 
interactions.’…… 
(Hankyoreh 7, June, 2000) 
Hankyoreh emphasised the ‘experience’ of organising ‘a unified team’ of the two Koreas. 
That claim was plausible since it could be one of the social construction mechanisms by 
which unity was constructed. Hankyoreh predicted that the unity among the people through 
physical activities would contribute to the real unification of North and South Korea 
(Hankyoreh 8, June, 2000-1).  
 
Even in the Presidential Summit, several sport issues were discussed. This implied that the 
sport interaction between North and South Korea had become a significant part of the North 
and South Korean leaders’ interests. Specifically, the joint marching of the teams in the 
Sydney Olympic Games became the most positive interaction to be realised during that time. 
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The joint marching was regarded as a positive sign for the future, since East and West 
Germany had marched together before they organised a single team in the 1956 Melbourne 
Olympic Games (Hankyoreh 15, June, 2000). Therefore, it was a positive sign that Kim Un 
Yong explained the conditions for a joint marching in details such as the choice for an 
anthem and flag. The positive atmosphere in North and South Korean sport relations made 
specialists foresee future interactions among professional sport players (Dong-A 16, June, 
2000). This would represent great progress for North and South Korean relations, since the 
professional sport market was considered a major economic aspect of the interactions and 
could be highly effective in terms of impact due to its popularity. While the North Korean 
team arrived in South Korea, North Korean IOC member Chang Ung discussed the joint 
marching issue with South Korean representatives. Hankyoreh reported that the decision to 
organise a joint march was a ‘great achievement’ by the time it was finalized. Hankyoreh 
generally expressed the positive tone of North and South Korean relations, but in this case, it 
was important since it was fixed after a long time of positive expectation (Hankyoreh 16, 
June, 2000-4) 
 
Hankyoreh explained what Chairman, Chung’s achievement meant for North and South 
Korean relations. As an entrepreneur, who contributed to the development of South Korea, 
Chung utilised all his assets for South Korea to host the Olympic Games. Hankyoreh cited in 
his biography, that his effort to host the Olympic Games was purely patriotic.  
..….The honourable chairman of Hyundai, Chung, who passed away on the 21
st
 had 
left behind him great achievements in Korean Sport History……His biggest 
achievement was the hosting of the Seoul Olympics……He had written in his 
biography every detail from the day of winning the bid for the Seoul Olympics to the 
successful hosting and said proudly that ‘I did not earn any personal benefit from the 
Olympics.’…… 
(Hankyoreh 23, March, 2001) 
As a person who led private sport interactions between North and South Korea, Chairman 
Chung became a highly trusted figure in the North Korean regime. The following article 
presents how North Korea accepted Chairman Chung’s investment in developing the 
Keumgang Mountain Project. North Korea publicised that the investment was Chung’s wish 
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to contribute to his hometown economy even though it was located in North Korea. Thus, 
Dong-A argued in a Confucian tone that North Korea needed to send its people to South 
Korea to express their condolences upon the news of Chung’s death. But since North and 
South Korean relations were not on good terms at that time, Chung’s indoor stadium in North 
Korea would be utilised for the opening ceremony. In other words, Dong-A did not think that 
North Korea would send a representative to South Korea to deliver their condolences for 
Chairman Chung’s death.  
..….People from the Ministry of Unification said that ‘North Korea considered Keum 
Kang Mountain as the deceased Chairman Chung’s investment project in his 
hometown, so there is a possibility for revival. Therefore, Chung’s death has indirectly 
affected North and South Korean relations.’ Concerning the possibility of expressing 
sympathy on behalf of the North Korean people, the North Korean officer said ‘North 
Korea will express sympathy anyway, but now the timing of the North and South 
Korean Ministry Talks means that it will be difficult to have a direct visit to South Korea 
by a North Korean. And it might be possible to visit North Korea’s indoor stadium 
construction site.’ 
(Dong-A 23, March, 2001) 
Surprisingly, the prediction made by Dong-A was wrong. HYUNDAI AH SAN informed that 
there would be three representatives from North Korea to send their condolences. It was the 
first case of its kind, thus it showed how North Korea appreciated and respected Chairman 
Chung, as a partner who could discuss North and South Korean relations.  
..….HYUNDAI AH SAN announced that ‘The vice president of the Asia Pacific Peace 
Council, Mr Song, and another three people will come to Seoul to visit the mortuary 
where the honourable Chairman Chung of HYUNDAI lies. This is the first visit of North 
Korean high level officers to a South Korean mortuary.’…... 
(Dong-A 24, March, 2001) 
 
6.3.2 The 2000 Sydney Olympic Games and the Joint March of Two Koreas 
Despite the peaceful mood between North and South Korea, the prospects of organising ‘a 
unified team’ of North and South Korea for the Sydney Olympic Games was not bright. 
Therefore, South Korea put its last effort for symbolic realisation of national unity into the 
Games, by organising a joint march for North and South Korea at the opening ceremony. 
The ‘Sydney’ Games did not have strong meanings for North and South Korea unlike the 
earlier ‘LA’ and ‘Moscow’ Games, and thus it became one of the first events to represent the 
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unity of Korea through the Olympic Games as a non-political interaction between the two 
Koreas.  
..….Kim Un Yong, the president of Korean Sport Association, broadcast on the 29
th 
that 
‘there are many difficulties in organising a unified team for the Sydney Olympics so 
instead we promote the joint marching of North and South Korea in the opening 
ceremony at the Games.’  
(Hankyoreh 30, May, 2000) 
The decision made by the IOC to allow the two Koreas to use the Olympic flag instead of 
carrying two national flags during the joint marching at the opening ceremony reflected 
support from the international sport organisation. Moreover, the IOC added that the decision 
to use the Olympic flag symbolised how neutral the Olympic Games were on issues related 
to political conflict and how it could be supportive in the process of negotiating controversial 
issues (Hankyoreh 29, July, 2000-2). Contrary to Hankyoreh’s coverage on the confirmation 
of the joint march at the Sydney Olympic Games, Dong-A expressed its doubt about this 
decision. It rather implied that there was potential for a joint march by recalling the theme 
song of the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games, “Hand in Hand” (Dong-A 15, August, 2000). 
 
Dong-A confirmed that there would be no Presidential Summit in Sydney despite the great 
expectation in relation to sport.  Nevertheless, Dong-A argued that the South Korean regime 
would try its best to draw the best result from the discussions, and supported this idea by 
referring to the actors in this effort as ‘we’.  
..….We will do our best to reach an agreement on the North and South Korean joint 
marching, joint cheer team and using the flag of the Korean peninsula at the last 
minute. Furthermore, we also work towards the organising of one team for North and 
South Korea in each sport…… 
(Dong-A 7, September, 2000) 
While Hankyoreh and Dong-A predicted a bright future after a joint march in the Sydney 
Olympic Games, Hankyoreh quoted Samaranch as saying that the IOC still had not received 
confirmation from North Korea that it would participate in the joint march, but it would wait 
until the last minute. Hankyoreh also presented the strong will of the South Korean, Kim Un 
Young, who expected good news from North Korea. The wish of KSA (Korean Sport 
Association) president would be the same as that of Hankyoreh (Hankyoreh 7, September, 
 
 
223 
 
2000). The uncertainty of a joint march showed how unpredictable the result of the dialogue 
between North and South Korea would be, and the difficulty of achieving this ‘symbolic’ 
conclusion. Nevertheless, even Dong-A expressed its expectation of the joint march, since 
by that time Koreans accepted the situation as finalised. And Dong-A added that the joint 
march could be realised if the South Korean representative was more flexible. Surprisingly, 
Dong-A encouraged South Korea’s active attitude towards a compromise. This implied how 
important it was to South Korean society to make the joint march a reality. 
..….There is still a high possibility that the North and South Korean teams will march 
together in the Olympic opening ceremony. At this moment, the problems are the 
number of people who will be marching and which flag to use.  
(Dong-A 8, September, 2000-2) 
When the joint march was reconfirmed, Dong-A explained how the news came out at 
Hankyoreh and Dong-A. It was ‘agreed’ in the 111th IOC session, but North Korea changed 
its mind at the last minute by not sending any sign of its confirmation to the IOC. This was a 
very serious matter not only for the Presidents of North and South Korea, but also for the 
president of the IOC, as he became involved in the ‘pointless promise’ which made Koreans 
dream about a symbolic national reunification (Dong-A 14, September, 2000-1).  
 
The Sydney Morning Herald released an article with the title ‘North and South Korea would 
march together toward a national unification’. Korean people who lived in Australia arranged 
their schedule to cheer for the North and South Korean teams. Particularly, Dong-A reported 
the scene of a joint training session between North and South Korean players. It was shown 
that the announcement of the joint march became the North and South Korean players’ 
excuse to claim that they were part of this symbolic unification, thus allowing them to show a 
warmer attitude toward each other based on a shared national identity.   
..….North Korean player Choi has trained together with South Korean players from 
11
th
……Coach Kim has a good manner so he gets along well with coaches from South 
Korea. He said generously that ‘Why do we have to avoid each other? At the end of 
the day, far from the political conflicts, we are one ethnicity.’…… 
(Dong-A 14, Septemberl, 2000-2) 
North Korean IOC member Chang said that this joint march was not a result of the effort 
made by the IOC, but the fruit of the Presidential Summit between North and South Korea. 
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This reflected the independent character of North Korea, which consistently emphasised that 
there should be no foreign power allowed to intervene in a ‘national’ matter (Hankyoreh 14, 
September, 2000-1). Thus, based on the ethnic nationalism, North Korea saw North and 
South Korea together as a nation when they were against intervention by international 
powers. North and South Korea’s joint march was compared to the East and West German 
case even though they participated in the Olympic Games three times as one team. East 
and West Germany was one of the models which North and South Korea needed to consider 
as a model of unification. Thus, in a sport relations perspective, the East and West German 
case was mentioned and compared.  
..….North and South Korea decided to do the joint march in a symbolic place of peace, 
the Sydney Olympics.……This is the first time in Olympic history that the divided nation 
is represented by separate teams but is marching together.….. 
(Hankyoreh 14, September, 2000-2) 
Hankyoreh described the scene of North and South Korean people gathering in Sydney. 
This could be unique to the sporting event, which could have been easily compromised since 
it was not directly, but symbolically, significant for national unity. Additionally, people were 
directly included in the process, and people in sport were the main actors in this ‘symbolic 
scene’, thus they could amplify the impact of the interactions. North and South Korean 
people had not normally been allowed to have direct contact with each other; therefore they 
must have been excited to be in the middle of this ‘historical’ moment.    
……The head of North Korea, Yoon, carefully brought out Vodka and said ‘Let’s drink; 
we must celebrate this historical event.’ ……the head of South Korea, Lee, said ‘It is 
an unforgettable night, we could not imagine this even just a few days ago, and we 
hope to have similarly great memories from other area such as politics, society and 
culture,’…… 
(Hankyoreh 14, September, 2000-3) 
The encounter between the people of North and South Korea was shown in archery training 
as well. This demonstrated that sporting events have more of a chance to enable 
communication between North and South Korean people, since the sporting competition was 
an additional common issue they could share based on their shared national identity.  
..….Last 11
th
, North and South Korean archery players had a joint training session and 
helped each other. The South Korean team will give presents to the North Korean 
team of Korean bows since North Korea has used bows from the USA.’…… 
(Hankyoreh 15, September, 2000) 
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For the North and South Korean joint march in the Sydney Olympic Games, ‘Arirang’ was 
played as the theme song. This was the first time that this Korean folk song ‘Arirang’ was 
delivered from North Korea to South Korea as a sheet of music, although the recording was 
arranged by South Korea to be officially played at the Games.  
..….Our North and South Korean players marched together with the big Korean flag 
which has the Korean peninsula on it. And the Orchestra played the Korean folk song 
‘Arirang’. The AP broadcast that this was the first joint marching in the Olympics and 
this has a symbolic meaning for North and South Korean reconciliation…… 
(Roh-Dong 17, Sept.2000-1) 
 
6.3.3 The 2002 World Cup and Other Football Matches  
As for the football matches during 2002 World Cup, the president of KFA, Chung, requested 
that North Korea allow the use of Pyongyang Neunglado 5.1 Stadium for the event. Over 
concern for the scheduling of all the matches, South Korea suggested North Korea host two 
events from the total 32. He also suggested organising ‘a unified team’ for the Asian Cup in 
October and the 2001 Argentina World Youth Football Match. Hankyoreh projected that the 
realisation of organising a ‘unified team’ for the 2002 World Cup was not far away 
(Hankyoreh 16, June, 2000-2). Officially, North Korea failed to pass the preliminary rounds, 
but the AFC (Asian Football Confederation) gave permission to North Korean players to 
participate in the matches if it became part of a single team with South Korean players. This 
showed how flexible the governance of the international sport organisation had been in the 
matter of North and South Korean sport relations compared to the hard political aspect of 
international relations.  
 
Dong-A was relatively negative about the potential of sharing some of the matches of the 
2002 World Cup due to the time limitation. The article also added that North Korea wanted 
this very much. Dong-A perceived that there was a conflict of opinions within the leadership 
of FIFA. Thus, North Korea’s decision needed to be made quickly in order to have time to 
develop an international consensus.  
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..…. We cannot postpone making the decision on the matter of sharing the 2002 World 
Cup across both North and South Korea anymore. We will reach a conclusion soon. 
North Korea also knows well the importance of the World Cup and they are very much 
interested in the inside story from FIFA…… 
(Dong-A 17, June, 2000) 
North Korea proposed to host the discussion with South Korea and FIFA concerning the 
matter of the 2002 World Cup dispatch. Hankyoreh pointed out that South Korea’s attitude in 
this discussion was important, since this would affect other issues such as organising one 
team for the Sydney Olympic Games (Hankyoreh 13, July, 2000). This showed that the tone 
of Hankyoreh was hopeful unlike that of Dong-A. Dong-A argued that there was not enough 
time to discuss issues relating to the 2002 World Cup, but Hankyoreh claimed that the 
discussion would have a positive influence on the matter of the 2000 Sydney Olympic 
Games.  
 
The revival of the Seoul-Pyongyang Football exchange was one of the achievements made 
through the lively interactions between North and South Korea. The following article reveals 
that North and South Korean officers wanted to have more regular cultural interactions. It 
was time for the two Koreas to think seriously about how to manage real ‘peace’ between 
them.   
..….Minister Kim has met journalists and said that ‘the interactions of non-political 
areas such as culture and sport need to be continued under any political, military, and 
economic circumstances including situations of turbulence…… 
(Dong-A 28, December, 2000) 
In its article, Hankyoreh reflected the expectation of organising one team for the 46th World 
Table Tennis Championship. It would have been meaningful since North and South Korea 
had experienced the taste of victory through playing against China at the 1991 World Table 
Tennis Championship in Japan. At this time Hankyoreh even received information that North 
Korea was interested in that issue and that the South Korean minister would discuss this 
with the North Korean representative while he was in the meeting (Hankyoreh 8, March, 
2001-1). The tone of Hankyoreh became softer and its ‘expectation’ of having ‘one team’ 
was not written in a hurry to label it as a symbolic achievement, but rather in that the hope 
for ‘one team’ was a ‘fresh and light’ wish under a more relaxed and patient mood. 
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Nevertheless, Hankyoreh emphasised that if the ‘one team’ was successfully organised then 
this could be ‘real progresses in North and South Korean sport relations (Hankyoreh 15, 
March, 2001). 
 
Dong-A pointed out the impact of the US-North Korean relations, which influenced North 
Korea’s decision-making in relation to South Korean policy on certain issues. Dong-A 
explained that North Korea’s stance in its interaction with South Korea had changed 
according to its relations with the US and provided an analysis that North Korea was more 
influenced by its relations with the US than the progress made through its relations with 
South Korea (Dong-A 15, March, 2001-2).  
..….The Unification football match has started with the excitement of the participants, 
and both teams’ players have fought together well with the motive of contributing to our 
national pride and advancing unification…… 
(Roh-Dong 2, May, 2001-5) 
Unlike Roh-Dong’s interests in the ‘workers’ football matches’, Dong-A revealed that the 
South Korean president of KSA hoped for North Korea to participate in the Busan Asian 
Games. Since South Korea failed to invite North Korea to the 1986 Seoul Asian Games and 
the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games, this became the third opportunity to invite North Korea to 
participate in an international sporting event hosted by South Korea.   
..….The president of the Korean Sport Association Kim Un Young came back from 
Pyongyang after a 4 day visit to North Korea and said at a press conference on the 
night of the 22
nd
 that ‘It has been revealed that North Korea is considering its 
participation in the Busan Asian Games positively.’…... 
(Dong-A 23, June, 2001) 
 
6.3.4 The failure of establishing a unified team for the World Table Tennis 
Championships  
Particularly, the movements at this time of North and South Korea’s strong allies, such as 
Russia and the USA respectively, significantly influenced the decisions made by North and 
South Korea. The nationalistic voice revealed in this article by Dong-A implies that as one 
nation, North and South Korea needed to keep their sovereignty to themselves, against 
foreign intervention.   
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..….Putin, the president of Russia, stated on the 20
th
 that peace on the Korean 
peninsula must be dealt with by the Korean people themselves, and in that sense, the 
historical presidential summit of North and South Korea is very important…….Along 
with this, North and South Korea agreed that we should not allow foreign intervention 
and should solve the unification issues by ourselves under the guidelines of ‘6.15 
declaration. 
(Dong-A 21, July, 2000) 
The private-led sport interactions between North and South Korea were dominantly 
conducted through professional sports teams owned by a private corporation such as 
Hyundai’s basketball team and Samsung’s table tennis team. Hyundai offered to construct 
an indoor stadium and Samsung was known to have provided an electronic score board. 
With corporate entities, the scale of interactions were small, but were multifaceted. 
..….A North and South Korean Unification Table Tennis championship was held on the 
28
th
 in Pyongyang Indoor Stadium. This was held between the Samsung team from 
South Korea and the Moranbong team from North Korea with the donation of an 
electronic scoreboard by Samsung…… 
(Dong-A 29, July, 2000) 
Hankyoreh emphasised the significance of this table tennis interaction and recalled the 
experience of organising one team for the 1991 World Table Tennis Championship. 
Hankyoreh used the metaphor of ‘small unification’ for this interaction, and this is an 
indication of the discourse which reflected the connection between sporting relations and 
unification in North and South Korea (Hankyoreh 29, July, 2000-1). The 6.15 statement was 
about independent decision-making around North and South Korean relations. Nevertheless, 
the discussion between North and South Korea about organising a unified team for the 46th 
World Table Tennis Championship was cancelled. In consequence, this became a case in 
which sport relations could not overcome the political blockages between North and South 
Korea.  
…...It is sad that we should see the match between North and South Korea cancelled 
because of a political reason. 
(Hankyoreh 30, March, 2001) 
Even though organising a unified team for North and South Korea had failed, North and 
South Korean Sports officials and players in Osaka felt that they were one ethnic group and 
expressed a special attachment to one another (Dong-A 24, April, 2001). Since the North 
and South Korean people could communicate in the same Korean language, they could 
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interact and communicate when they were in the same location. Hankyoreh even referred to 
the North and South Korean Table Tennis players as ‘sisters’. This showed how strong an 
ethnic based nationalism was implied in Hankyoreh (Hankyoreh 27, April, 2001). There was 
an interview with the Korean international referee, Lee who also called North and South 
Korean players ‘daughters’ and expressed his sincere admiration for them. Despite the great 
performance by North and South Korean players in the finals, he admitted that this sporting 
confrontation itself was a ‘tragedy’ to all Koreans (Hankyoreh 28, April, 2001).  
 
6.4 The 2002 Busan Asian Games  
The second joint march of North and South Korean teams at the Salt Lake City Winter 
Olympic Games was agreed at the IOC session. The president of KSA and IOC member for 
South Korea, Kim, announced that he obtained a positive answer from the IOC member for 
North Korea, Mr Chang. It would be much easier for North and South Korea to agree on a 
second joint march as they had experienced a positive outcome in a joint march at the 
Sydney Olympic Games (Dong-A 14, December, 2001). Unfortunately, the planned joint 
march at the Salt Lake Winter Olympic Games was cancelled. Dong-A explained that this 
was due to the oppressive attitude of the President of the USA toward North Korea. In any 
case, North Korea was not so active in relation to the Winter Olympics (Dong-A 5, February, 
2002). Nevertheless, it was regrettable that North and South Korea’s agreement on the joint 
march at the event failed to bear fruit. 
 
North Korean newspapers in Japan expressed Korean nationalism by mentioning the victory 
of the South Korean football team against the USA. Even though North Korea could not co-
host this World Cup, North Korean newspapers mentioned “South Korea’s football 
performance” as a tool to spread ‘Korean national power’. Moreover, it added that this could 
bring national unification ‘closer’ (Hankyoreh 11, June, 2002).  
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6.4.1 North Korea’s participation in the Busan Asian Games 
Hankyoreh had a more positive opinion on the possible participation of North Korea in the 
Busan Asian Games. This reflects the strong confidence it had in its North Korean source 
(Hankyoreh 23, June, 2001). Dong-A argued that North Korea’s participation in the Busan 
Asian Games could become a historical moment. This seemed to not only reflect the wishes 
of Dong-A, since the organising committee for the Busan Asian Games planned the route of 
the torch relay to begin from the northernmost border of North Korean territory to the bottom 
tip of the southern peninsula. The torch from the North Korean region would be handed over 
to South Korea at the DMZ. This in itself conveyed that North and South Korea could hold 
this event with a shared supportive approach.  
……It is the first time that North Korea will participate in an international match which 
will be hosted in South Korea. In particular the organising committee have a plan to get 
the torch from Chongjin Baekdu Mountain on the North Korean side to Baekrokdam of 
Hanra Mountain on the South Korean side followed by a historical meeting in DMZ, 
JSA...… 
(Dong-A 5, August, 2002) 
The Busan Asian Games would become the first international sporting event to which North 
Korea would dispatch its players. Hankyoreh explained that the scene of gathering North 
and South Korean people together would portray the power of the Korean people. Despite 
the current conflict between North and South Korea, Hankyoreh strongly emphasised that 
this sporting event would become an opportunity for the reconciliation of the Korean ethnic 
group (Hankyoreh 5, August, 2002-2).  
 
The circumstances of the international relations surrounding North and South Korea are 
illustrated in the article of Hankyoreh. The USA restrained from commenting on the future of 
North and South Korean relations. The newspaper Yomiun in PRC projected a negative 
mood in North and South Korean relations, due to the military tension in the West Sea of 
South Korea. The Japanese newspaper, the Mainichi, by contrast had a relatively positive 
stance on the relation between North and South Korea, but was still cautious of the 
existence of oppositional voices in South Korea. These different perspectives on the North 
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and South Korean relations reflected the different positions of the nations which surrounded 
the Korean peninsula (Hankyoreh 6, August, 2002-1). Dong-A agreed on the significance of 
North Korea’s participation in the Busan Asian Games (Dong-A 10, August, 2002-1). This 
influenced the sponsorship of the Games since the exposure of North Korea to this event 
drew attention from the media internationally. Particularly, as an exception, North Korea 
announced that a ‘Cheer Team’ would be dispatched as well (Dong-A 10, August, 2002-2). 
This in its own right was interesting enough to attract attention from the world.  
 
The first visit to be made by North Korean people caused many concerns for the South 
Korean regime; particularly, the conservative group was worried that the visit would provide 
a socialist boost in South Korean society through exposing its flag. Hankyoreh cast aside 
these concerns, and quoted the opinion of an ordinary citizen about the visit. Showing North 
Korea’s flag while North Korean people cheer for their team would make South Korean 
people more familiar with North Koreans and their attitudes. Furthermore, considering that 
this sort of situation would occur during a sporting event, it would be unlikely that this would 
affect South Korean people’s preference of political ideology. Rather, Hankyoreh wanted to 
emphasise the meaning of the North Korean cheer team for particular reasons, such as 
stressing national identity (Hankyoreh 14, August, 2002).  
 
North and South Korea had official had Talks about North Korea’s participation at the Busan 
Asian Games. According to the summary made by South Korea, North Korea’s participation 
was considered to have great potential not only for the South Korean regime, but also for the 
AOC (Asian Olympic Committee). Domestically, North and South Korean unity at a peaceful 
sport event was a first, and internationally, breaking the record of the number of participants 
in the Asian Games would be an achievement attributable to the Olympics.  
     [Table 6.1] The 1
st
 – 2
nd
 Administrative work Contact for the Busan Asian Games-1  
 Content 
Title The 1
st
 – 2
nd
 Administrative work Contact for the Busan Sian Games 
Participation 
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Date 2002.08.17-19/08.26-28 
Venue The Geumgang Mountains 
Summary The South Korean government and Busan city council positively forecasted 
North Korea’s participation of the Games, under the estimate that if North 
Korea participates in the 14
th
 Asian Games, then it becomes the first Games in 
which all member states of the OCA will have participated and also provides a 
good chance to show our nation’s unity and harmony to the world. 
 
Nevertheless, South Korea’s enthusiasm for North Korea’s participation in the Games was 
limited. According to the summary of the Talks, South Korea insisted on having a separate 
entrance at the Game’s venue if North Korea decided to participate in the Games. South 
Korea commented that since this event would be held in the Korean peninsula, North and 
South Korea needed to enter separately. It can be assumed that South Korea considered 
that this sporting event could ‘symbolically’ represent North and South Korean unity, but not 
reflect the real intention behind political unification by showing the scene in the Korean 
peninsula.  
     [Table 6.2] The 1
st
 – 2
nd
 Administrative work Contact for the Busan Asian Games-2  
 Content 
Title The 1
st
 – 2
nd
 Administrative work Contact for the Busan Sian Games 
Participation 
Date 2002.08.17-19/08.26-28 
Venue The Geumgang Mountains 
Summary Our side said that it is proper to march separately in the opening ceremony 
since this game is held in the Korean Peninsula…… 
 
In the South Korean summary, North Korea seemed determined to insist on a joint march 
during the opening ceremony and on both using the same flag. North Korea’s voice was 
expressed particularly strongly, not with particularly forceful words, but with an unusually soft 
tone given North Korea’s normal way of speaking.   
[Table 6.3] The 1
st
 – 2
nd
 Administrative work Contact for the Busan Asian Games-3  
 Content 
Title The 1
st
 – 2
nd
 Administrative work Contact for the Busan Sian Games 
Participation 
Date 2002.08.17-19/08.26-28 
Venue The Geumgang Mountains 
Summary North Korea said that doing a joint march and using one flag are a 
‘fundamental issue’ and a ‘prior issue’ upon which there can be no 
compromise……. 
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The two Koreas could not reach an agreement about the joint march, it being opposed by 
South Korea. The decision was simply described in the summary of the Talks in a dry tone. It 
is explained in the summary that both teams would wear the uniform that was worn at the 
Sydney Olympics. 
[Table 6.4] The 1
st
 – 2
nd
 Administrative work Contact for the Busan Asian Games-4  
 Content 
Title The 1
st
 – 2
nd
 Administrative work Contact for the Busan Sian Games 
Participation 
Date 2002.08.17-19/08.26-28 
Venue The Geumgang Mountains 
Summary Joint marching at the opening and closing ceremony with Korean flag……and 
the uniform will follow the rule adopted for the Sydney Games 
 
Even though the joint march was realised as North Korea insisted, each athlete of the North 
and South Korean team represented their own nation, thus when they won a medal, each 
nation’s flag would be raised and anthem performed. This was a symbolic reference to the 
‘unseen’ national identity of Korea. 
     [Table 6.5]  The 1
st
 – 2
nd
 Administrative work Contact for the Busan Asian Games-5  
 Content 
Title The 1
st
 – 2
nd
 Administrative work Contact for the Busan Sian Games 
Participation 
Date 2002.08.17-19/08.26-28 
Venue The Geumgang Mountains 
Summary Both team’s player participated in the march separately, and used their own 
state flag and national song for award ceremonies. 
 
The following article from Dong-A reveals the discourse concerning the “Korean Peninsula 
flag”. In regards to North Korea’s participation in the Busan Asian Games and the joint 
march of North and South Korea, North Korea’s decision seemed significant. However, as a 
host nation, it was hard for South Korea to give up the chance of using its own national flag 
for national pride. Thus, it was implied that South Korea did want to present a scene of a 
harmonious Korean peninsula. This meant that there could be a potential conflict between 
North and South Korea about using the Korean peninsula flag for the Games.  
……However, North Korea must understand the ‘significant meaning’ of why South 
Korea accepted this ‘Korean Peninsular flag’ proposal even though there was domestic 
pressure. What South Korea ‘gave up’ in not using the South Korean flag solely as a 
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host country showed ‘a willingness to make this event a real grounds for reconciliation 
of North and South Korea…… 
(Dong-A 30, August, 2002-1) 
Dong-A made an observation that the military tension between North and South Korea 
seemed to decrease by the time the discussion of the Unification Football Match and Asian 
Games were held. By making a convincing argument based on the ethnic nationalism of 
Korea, Dong-A expressed its support for Korean Unification unusually. The belief in 
diplomatic sporting interactions between North and South Korea seemed to have grown 
since the last two decades during which the differences between North and South Korea 
were overcome through sporting interactions.  
…...The real significance of the North and South Korean sport event is that it 
overcomes North and South Korean differences and recovers National Identity……We 
are expecting to see a touching scene in which those people of Korean ethnicity shout 
for a ‘Unified Korea’ as one voice…… 
(Dong-A 5, September, 2002) 
By this time, North Korea also showed its excitement at visiting South Korea through Roh-
Dong. The director of the North Korean team, Lee, expressed that his belief in ethnic 
nationalism of Korea was tangible. Through the 2002 North and South Korean Football 
Matches, North and South Korean sport people were actually coming and going between the 
two countries under the theme of ‘unification’ (Roh-Dong 6, Sept. 2002-1).  
 
The 14th Busan Asian Games torch relay route implied how Korean ethnic identity is 
represented across the boundaries of the territory. It was from the top of the North, Baekdu 
and Keumgang Mountain, to the tip of the South, the host city, Busan. Roh-Dong 
emphasised that this torch relay route and the mountains had a nationally symbolic meaning 
for Korean ethnicity, with the mountains all being on the North Korean side (Roh-Dong 7, 
Sept. 2002). Thus, the territorial division of North and South Korea was symbolically 
connected through the torch relay for this sport event. That explains why Roh-Dong 
described the torch as ‘the patriotic fire of National Unity’. Roh-Dong explained that the 
sporting event between North and South Korea represented a ‘Will for Unification’. One of 
the characteristics of sports is the ability to establish national unity and people’s sense of 
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unity. Roh-Dong reported that the sporting event between the two Koreas could imply the 
wish for national unification. Moreover, Roh-Dong’s view on the political statement of 6.15 
can be found in this article. The 6.15 statement was recognised as a contributor to this sport 
interaction between North and South Korea.  
..….The 2002 North and South Korean Unification Football match became a great 
opportunity to represent a concrete will for unification of the strong nation and was 
followed by the 6.15 statements which encouraged trust between North and South 
Korean sport people…… 
(Roh-Dong 8, Sept. 2002) 
North Korean players recognised themselves to be on a ‘diplomatic’ mission for North Korea 
at the Asian Games. Although the division between North and South Korea was clearly 
apparent, a strong will for the reconciliation of national unity was present as well. As a way of 
expressing the intimacy of a shared national identity, North Korean players delivered good 
wishes from North Korea. The statement also showed a consistent political wish for ‘national 
unification’. Dong-A was reluctant to admit this as the newspaper’s perspective, and instead 
cited direct comments made by North Korean people.  
…...On their arrival statement, they said that “North Korean people have sent their best 
regards to all South Koreans and we will do our best to show our will for unification and 
national power’…… 
(Dong-A 24, September, 2002) 
The controversial dispute, concerning North Korea’s flag in South Korea is revealed in the 
following article. Under these circumstances, Hankyoreh reminded readers that this was a 
radical transformation of the relations between North and South Korea; from the tension of 
war to the joint march undertaken at the Games. Moreover, it is considered an ‘out-dated’ 
result of the Cold War if the situation of North and South Korea is portrayed as the two 
Koreas having antagonism toward each other. The side that fully welcomed this change in 
the relations between North and South Korea fundamentally accepted the ethnic national 
identity of Korea.  
..….We are warmly welcoming North Korean players under the name of Korean 
ethnicity……This is the first time that North Korea has sent a great number of players 
to South Korea for an international match……The North Korean flag will be displayed 
under the permission of South Korea and their cheer team can use the flag as 
well……There are some people who do not agree on a North and South Korean joint 
march under the Korean peninsula flag and the display of the North Korean flag under 
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the South Korean sky.…..These changes are surprising. It is out-dated to have a Cold 
War view on the matter of the North Korean flag and North Korean cheer team…... 
(Hankyoreh 24, September, 2002-1) 
Like Hankyoreh, Roh-Dong also emphasised the unity of North and South Korea that was 
realised through this sporting event. This could be one of the cases where Hankyoreh and 
Roh-Dong admitted to the same primordial nationalism as a reason for national unification 
(Roh-Dong 24, Sept. 2002). Dong-A tended not to express its own view of the North and 
South Korean sporting events; Instead, it rather described the scene of the people at the 
sporting venue. Through the sporting event, the scene of North and South Korean people 
communicating was portrayed in media such as Dong-A. It particularly used terms like 
‘warmly’ and ‘lively’, thus the North and South Korean sporting relation was looking positive.  
..….In many sports such as table tennis, gymnastics, shooting and rowing in which 
they trained today, North and South Korean players have met each other and shared 
conversation warmly. South Korea’s rowing team coach Son has shared greetings with 
North Korean coach Choi and they cheered each other just for a short time, but it was 
lively…… 
(Dong-A 25, September, 2002) 
The participation of North Korea in the Busan Asian Games encouraged North and South 
Korea to expect an image of unity between the two Koreas. Idealistically, Hankyoreh 
pictured the warm atmosphere at the sporting venue and the accommodation in which the 
athletes would stay together. However, the South Korean government viewed the 
circumstances of the North Korean players differently (Hankyoreh 26, September, 2002). 
They seemed to believe that North Korean players needed to be ‘protected’ such as the 
South Korean players would be if they were visiting North Korea. Hankyoreh criticised the 
South Korean regime’s policy and rigid attitude. 
 
The official name of the flag in Korean is the ‘Korean Peninsula Flag (Han Ban Do Gi)’. 
Hankyoreh emphasised the ethnic nationalism behind the flag, but Roh-Dong interpreted the 
meaning of the flag, which has one colour, as a political goal of Korean ethnic nationalism to 
be accomplished.  
..….When the North and South Korea jointly marched, the Busan Asian Games 
stadium seemed almost to explode. The Korean Peninsula flag, the North Korean flag 
and the South Korean flag were displayed all together among the spectators and it was 
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such a melting pot. There is no ideology and there are no nationalities only the same 
faces and same languages……there is only ‘one ethnicity’ (Hankyoreh in Korean)’. 
There is no border in the background music Arirang…… 
(Hankyoreh 30, September, 2002) 
 
6.4.2 North and South Korean Peoples’ Contact through the Games 
Other than appealing for a policy of appeasement toward North Korean players and dealing 
with big and small issues, Hankyoreh also tried to show the practical aspects of North and 
South Korean interactions during the Games in cases of cooperation during the sporting 
events. The Games were like two sides of the same coin: players were competing but also 
sharing tips on how to perform better during training sessions before matches, which implied 
more than a simple interaction between players from the two Koreas.     
..….North and South Korean gymnasts have trained together. They provided training 
materials such as ‘sugar water’ which is used for preventing slippery hands…… 
(Hankyoreh 27, September, 2002) 
Roh-Dong reported that North and South Korean sports players were under the ‘unification 
flag’. Moreover, the paper stated that the players were also welcomed by a cheering squad 
that waved the ‘unification flag’. The positive image of unification that was illustrated by Roh-
Dong also encouraged people to recognise their national identity as a unified Korea. Since 
the flag was used in 1991 in Chiba for the United Table Tennis Team, North and South 
Korea used this flag to jointly march at the opening ceremony of the 2000 Sydney Olympic 
Games (Roh-Dong 30, Sept.2002).  
 
North and South Korea marched together in the opening ceremony under the same flag and 
anthem. Nevertheless, this didn’t mean that North and South Korea became the ‘Korea 
team’. Thus, whenever North Korea or South Korea won a medal during the Games, 
competitors on both sides experienced the clear division between North and South Korea by 
seeing different national flags, and listening to different national anthems. At the same time, 
this self-recognition touched the people’s emotional attachment to the Korean ethnicity, and 
it made people express their wish of national unity with tears. A scene was described of 
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North Korean players and South Korean people being touched by the North Korean national 
anthem.  
..….The first Gold medallist for North Korea, Lee, has made a wish reminding us of the 
meaning of this event, which is ‘national unification’, by saying that ‘I hope this medal 
can contribute to unification.’ Lee started to cry when the first North Korean anthem 
first played in the stadium. Other North Korean supporters also cried. And South 
Korean people who cheered the North Korean Lee had tears in their eyes. They also 
made a big applause the first time the North Korean anthem was heard…… 
(Dong-A 2, October, 2002-1) 
Roh-Dong, instead of differentiating between people from North and South Korea, 
emphasised one Korean ethnicity as the ultimate goal of political unification, even though 
Roh-Dong called North Korean players ‘our players’. And it also called North and South 
Korean people ‘Korean’ and told us that the song titled ‘we are one’ was sung.  
……Our player Lee had won the women’s lifting Gold medal, breaking the World 
record, and the Korean people again waved the unification flag, and sang the song 
<we are the one> and congratulated her...… 
(Roh-Dong 2, Oct. 2002-1) 
The position of Hankyoreh seemed to be in the middle between Dong-A and Roh-Dong. The 
paper reported the victories of both North and South Korea when they won a medal in Judo, 
and also referred to them as ‘we’. This article reflects the national positioning of North and 
South Korea as separate entities.  
..….It was a day of North and South Korean Judo……We won all 4 medals…... 
(Hankyoreh 3, October, 2002-1) 
Hankyoreh reported that there was a small quarrel between the people from North and 
South Korea concerning the matter of how to refer to one another. A North Korean 
competitor raised this issue with a South Korean journalist and requested that they call them 
by their official national name. South Korea referred to the two sides as ‘North Korea and 
South Korea’, while North Korea called the two sides “North Cho Sun and South Cho Sun”. 
This is related to the self-legitimacy of nation building, as each were naming themselves 
after their inheritance from the dynasty of united Korea before becoming colonised. The 
official name of South Korea is Republic of Korea and North Korea is Democratic People’s 
Republic of Cho Sun. This could be one of the cases that represent Korean ethnic 
nationalism(Hankyoreh 3, October, 2002-2). Despite the many parts of North and South 
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Korea that represent their common national identity through ethnicity, culture and language, 
nationalism is apparent in each political entity through the selection of different names.  
 
North Korean Judo player Kye’s match reminded the North and South Korean people of a 
strong attachment as a single ethnic group. Even though there were several differences 
between North and South Korea, the matches against foreign players made people from 
both sides cheer together as if they were one nation (Hankyoreh 3, October, 2002-3). There 
were situations in which North and South Korea would confront each other, but whenever 
they faced a foreign power, the fundamental unity of North and South Korea was revealed. 
Hankyoreh particularly used the word ‘power’ which showed that it was convinced by the 
effect of the ‘situation’. 
 
At this time, Roh-Dong also focused on the results of North Korean athletes, and it became 
an issue that the good performances of North Korean players were broadcast on South 
Korean media. Since the Games were held in South Korea, it looked natural that the 
victories and excellent performances achieved by all participating nations would be 
broadcast. Particularly, as North Korea was a ‘special’ guest of the Games, the media of 
South Korea was interested in North Korea’s performance.   
..….Our player Ham has been prominent in the South Korean media since she won the 
Women’s marathon ……Ham said in the interview that <Kim Jong Il had waited for my 
winning news, so I was very touched> 
(Roh-Dong 16, Oct. 2002-2) 
Hankyoreh referred to it as playing a role in adding impetus to North and South Korean 
relations. This shows that the South Korean media was aware of its impact on political 
relations related to sport issues.   
..….The participation of North Korea is a great achievement of these Games…… 
Hankyoreh played a great role here. We have done our best to deliver North and South 
Korean reconciliation……. 
(Hankyoreh 17, October, 2002) 
Hankyoreh broadcast the positive views of South Korean people concerning North Koreans 
who visited South Korea to cheer for the North Korean team in the Busan Asian Games. 
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This became the official route for civilians of North and South Korea to contact one another, 
and therefore, another possibility that could happen through this sport event was captured. 
Hankyoreh seemed to be aware that there was not only positive opinion among the public in 
this private encounter between North and South Korea. Some of the South Korean media 
also pictured negative aspects of these visits. Some said that the members of the North 
Korean cheering squad were too pretty so it became a criticism of the anti-feminist social 
environment of North Korea.   
..….The North Korean cheer team was the star of the Busan Asian Games. Wherever 
they were, lots of people gathered and media even from abroad were busily filming 
them……The young people who are products of the Cold War conflicts that North 
Korea experienced had more ideas about unification…...But there were negative views 
as well……Nevertheless, they could not deny the impact of the Games on the spirit of 
peace and harmony which is needed for unification…… 
(Hankyoreh 25, December, 2002) 
 
6.4.3 The Impact of the Games 
The following script of an interviewee from South Korea clearly represents the view of 
Hankyoreh, in terms of the effect of the match, as a way of re-constructing the national 
identity of individual Koreans. The action of the sport was expressed discursively in terms 
used by Hankyoreh such as “reconciliation and harmony” to describe the match between 
North and South Korea.  
..….The North Korean Cheer Team bowed to the South Korean spectators before they 
started to cheer, and received great applause.…..Kim who brought his 6 year old 
daughter to the stadium said that ‘I came to show my child that North and South 
Korean matches are not about conflict but concern reconciliation and harmony and I 
certainly felt more than excitement for sport, which was rather touching.’…… 
(Hankyoreh 4, October, 2002) 
Dong-A reported that there was an irresistible urge to cheer for ‘both Koreas’ when they 
achieved the medals. Dong-A even expressed an expectation of reconciliation between 
North and South Korea, which could show the intention of Dong-A to support the present 
South Korean regime’s policy toward North Korea (Dong-A 5, October, 2002-2). Hankyoreh 
did not stop ‘cheering’ North and South Korea and named the day ‘Korean day’, a term 
which has potential to be used in other similar situations. 
..….This was a ‘Korean day’, the North and South Korean gymnasts flew high…... 
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(Hankyoreh 5, October, 2002) 
The new trend of discussions about North Korea and North Korean people emerged on the 
internet. It seems that there were enormous changes in the discursive environment in South 
Korea even though this occurred in internet-based communication. Moreover, Hankyoreh 
publicised the existence of this type of discussion, thus it became part of the revealed history 
of North and South Korea.  
..….The interests and popularity of North Korean players and the Cheer Team were 
consistent even in cyber space. Web sites for the North Korean players and the Cheer 
Team’s fan clubs and supporter’s web sites were set up…… 
(Hankyoreh 8, October, 2002) 
Atypically, Dong-A released the words spoken by the North Korean IOC member Chang 
when he congratulated the organisers of the Busan Asian Games. The reason that this 
article cited Chang was that he represented the views of North Korea commenting on the 
concept of national unity between North and South Korea.    
..….North Korean IOC member Mr Chang said that ‘Pyongyang [this could refer to it 
the people or Kim Jung Il) is very happy to hear that the Busan Asian Games went 
successfully. It is good to see that North and South Korea can become one in mind.’ 
Chang arrived in Busan on the 8th while the Games were going on…… 
(Dong-A 9, October, 2002) 
During the North and South Korean matches, the political slogan ‘National Unification’ was 
revealed as the real desire of North and South Korea. ‘National unification’ became the 
public aspiration as North and South Korea confronted each other on the football field (Roh-
Dong 10, Oct. 2002-1). Even though they were competing against each other on the football 
field, the competition made people yearn for the ‘political’ unification of the nation. People 
may have felt that the physical division between the teams did not accord with their Korean 
identity, which was spiritually united. One more condition of North and South Korean 
relations was revealed through a Dong-A article, which was about the financial cost of North 
Korea’s participation in the Games. This showed one special circumstance of the North and 
South Korean relations in which South Korea gave some sort of material reward for North 
Korea’s positive response to North -South Korean interactions. Nevertheless, in the case of 
sport relations,  
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..….The South Korean government has decided to pay the expenses, 2,120,000,000 
won [about 1,177,780 Pounds) of the North Korean players and Cheer Team in the 
name of North and South Korean cooperation…… 
(Dong-A 12, October, 2002) 
The Busan Asian Games became more significant since they made history through having 
all the member countries including North Korea participating in the Games. As the host city, 
Busan in South Korea put great efforts into achieving this level of participation and must 
have had full support from the national government. The conduct of sport relations between 
North and South Korea at this time was led by the NOC in South Korea rather than by the 
main government administration, and the NOC was less obliged to be concerned about the 
boundaries of political ideology or other differences.  The North’s wholehearted participation 
was taken as a major indicator of success, in particular because it was in an Asian Games in 
South Korea that 
..….It is the first time that North Korea has participated with such a great number of 
players.’…… 
(Dong-A 15, October, 2002-1) 
The flexibility of sport relations can be captured in the attitude of the North Korea IOC 
member Mr Chang, who, as an IOC member had the freedom to express his views 
concerning the Busan Asian Games. He was known as the key North Korean person in the 
area of sport and became the IOC member during the 1996 Atlanta Olympics together with 
Lee of South Korea. Mr Chang stated openly that the North Korea participation was not 
planned because it best suited North Korea’s (political) position, rather it was done to 
promote the realisation of positive relations between North and South Korea which as 
suggested in the 6.15 Statement1. He also mentioned the positive impression of Dong-A, 
since he knew that Dong-A had traditionally taken a nationalistic stance against Japan. This 
implied that Korean nationalism involved not simply cohesion of North and South but also an 
element of exclusion of other ethnicities, particularly the Japanese because of its colonial 
history, but also the US with its own more recent history of imperialism (Dong-A 15, October, 
2002-2).  
                                            
1
  This is the statement announce by the President Roh Tae Woo of South Korea in 1988 for initiative 
of North and South Korean dialogue for the new era and suggests six practical principles. 
 
 
243 
 
Even though Dong-A showed a change in its attitude to the South Korean government’s 
policy on relations with the North, moving from disapproval to support, Hankyoreh confirmed 
that enhancing sporting relations would promote the unity of ‘Korean National identity’ 
(Hankyoreh 15, October, 2002). Dong-A legitimated its shift to support for promoting sporting 
relations between North and South by appealing to ‘nationalism’.  
 
6.5 The 2003 Daegu Summer Universidad  
 
6.5.1 Chung Ju Young Stadiums in Pyongyang 
In the following article, Dong-A named the joint march of North and South Korea at the 
Aomori Winter Asian Games as a ‘small unification’ (Jak Eun Tong Il, ‘작은 통일’) rather than 
a ‘symbolic unification’ (Sang Jing Jeuk Tong Il, ‘상징적 통일’). This could be considered a 
significant development in the expressions used by Dong-A, since ‘small unification’ implied 
a ‘unification’ that included political and cultural aspects. It is also meaningful in that the 
status of the international sporting event and the performance of both North and South 
Korea was given great value by media such as Dong-A.  
..….North and South Korea have achieved a ‘small unification’ by jointly marching in 
the opening ceremony of the 5th Aomori Winter Asian Games…… 
(Dong-A 3, February, 2003) 
Several major issues in North and South Korean sporting relations had been resolved after a 
series of sporting events. North and South Korean athletes practiced for the games together, 
and the players drew closer to one another as time went by. The athletes felt that these 
interactions were beneficial, and they welcomed joint training sessions. Nevertheless, the 
athletes were restrained from developing relations beyond sport (Hankyoreh 8, February, 
2003).  
 
Another significant feature that is apparent within the North and South Korean sporting 
relations at this time was the positive mutual support for hosting an international sporting 
event. The following article reflects North Korean support for South Korea’s Pyongchang bid 
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for the Winter Olympics proposing the possibility of a unified team. This was shown to be an 
efficient way of cooperating since the president of the IOC recognised it as a ‘contribution of 
sport to Humanity’.   
..….North Korea announced that they supported the 2010 Pyongchang Winter 
Olympics, and the possibility of organising a unified team of North and South Korea for 
the Athens Games……The effort of working for North and South Korean reconciliation 
will be a great help……Jacque Rogge also said that ‘this is a great proof that sport can 
contribute to humanity’. 
(Hankyoreh 17, May, 2003) 
The peaceful mood between North and South Korea was supported by their private relations 
in sports. The legacy of the Hyundai Company Chairman, Chung, continued after his death. 
The newly built stadium that was named after him became the opportunity to hold a North 
and South Korean unification basketball match which had not been held for the last four 
years (Hankyoreh 3, July, 2003). Nevertheless, the response from abroad had a different 
tone. The emphasis on peace between North and South Korea in cooperating to host the 
Pyongchang Olympics became a ‘political gesture’, which reflected the changes in 
international circumstances of the time in contrast to the Cold War era. This claim  also 
implied that the Olympics valued ‘universalism’ (promoting shared interests and participation 
by all) over the narrow ‘political’ agendas of certain nations, though its reception by the IOC 
members was described as cool by Dong-A.       
..…. Pyongchang emphasised the slogan the ‘Peace Olympics’ which was seen by the 
IOC members as ‘too political’…… 
(Dong-A 4, July, 2003) 
However, these sporting matters brought to the fore once more political issues between the 
two Koreas, such as the flying of national flags during the matches. The Korean Peninsula 
flag had been used to represent ‘the two’ but this could only operate at the level of symbolic 
representation rather representation of the nation state. This harked back to the previous 
discussion in South Korea of the relatively recent past about whether or not it would allow 
the flying of the North Korean flag before a South Korean audience at the Busan Asian 
Games (Hankyoreh 7, July, 2003). South Korea decided to send young people to the 
opening ceremony of the Chung Ju Young Stadium, thus the legacy of sport interaction 
through the Universiad Games influenced the scheduling of further interactions between 
 
 
245 
 
North and South Korea (Hankyoreh 10, July, 2003). From a private perspective, Chung Ju 
Young left a great legacy on North and South Korean relations in terms of taking the lead in 
building on sporting relations between North and South Korea, through for example hosting 
a ‘unification basketball match’ for the opening ceremony of the Chung Ju Young stadium in 
Pyongyang (Hankyoreh 4, September, 2003). 
 
The occasion of the unification basketball match became an opportunity to create greater 
interaction through broadcasting on both North and South Korean networks. It was the first 
time that North Korea had accepted South Korean broadcast staff and facilities who had 
previously been refused entry to North Korea through the Demilitarised Zone. 
..….SBS (Seoul Broadcast System) will broadcast the Unification Basketball match at 
the Chung Ju Young Stadium opening ceremony on the 7
th
 from half past 2 to half past 
3……SBS said ‘this is the first time that we will bring two broadcast cars to North 
Korea through the DMZ. And this is different to previous broadcasting experience in 
North Korea when we used North Korea’s facilities. This time we will bring our set, 
costumes and light facilities.’…… 
(Hankyoreh 20, September, 2003) 
The ‘famous’ ‘Cows visit of North Korea’ was announced during this period, which was an 
event that became possible since it was organised on a private level with ‘pure’ private 
friendship based on the ethnic attachment.   
……1, 100 people from South Korea will visit North Korea by road on the 6
th
. These 
people will visit the opening ceremony of Chung Ju Young Stadium and will come back 
to South Korea on the 9
th
 by road. On this occasion one hundred cows will be donated 
[to the North] by Hyundai Constructions and Hyundai Motors…… 
(Hankyoreh 6, October, 2003) 
The staging of the unification basketball game and the opening ceremony for the Chung Ju 
Young stadium received a positive response from both Hankyoreh, and Dong-A. Hyundai 
gave added value to this occasion by acknowledging this initiative as providing new impetus 
for the development of closer North and South Korean relations. 
South Korean people have visited North Korea to participate in the opening ceremony 
of ‘Chung Ju Young stadium’ which was invested in by HYUNDAI AH-SAN with North 
Korea’s technical support. This will become an opportunity for the promotion of North 
and South Korean relations including sport……a representative from HYUNDAI AH-
SAN said that ‘This will become a new era for North and South Korean relations in 
culture and sport. And it is significant that the way has been opened for a road to North 
Korea from South Korea…… 
(Dong-A 7, October, 2003) 
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Roh-Dong agreed that the establishment of the Chung Ju Young stadium had a positive 
influence on North and South Korean unity in terms of national integration. It is also 
exceptional since this relationship was developed based on a private partner from South 
Korea even though the social status of the honourable Chairman Chung and HYUNDAI was 
in many aspects that of a major public figure.   
..….North and South Korean Unification Basketball Match will be held in the Ryu 
Kyung Jung Ju Young Stadium.…..Spectators had welcomed North and South Korean 
players, waving the Unification flag and chanting the slogan “We are one 
(unified)”……North and South Korean basketball players had strengthened the North 
and South Korean sports people and the proud features of our ethnicity which can 
create national unity and unification…… 
(Roh-Dong 8, Oct. 2003) 
 
6.5.2 Participation of North Korea in the Games 
Even though North Korea had suggested that it would potentially participate in the 
Universiad Games, securing its actual participation was not that easy. North Korea officially 
announced that they would not be participating in the games frustrating the wish of the South 
Korean people to welcome North Korea to the Games. Dong-A expressed the sadness and 
regret of the South Korean people at the decision.     
..….Although North Korea declared its absence from Daegu Olympiad, the organising 
committee and citizens of Daegu are still preparing to welcome guests from North 
Korea.……Park, who is the South Korean cheer leader for North Korean competitors, 
said that ‘We have lost our momentum since we prepared to welcome our 
relatives……We will wait until the last minute. We believe that they will come.’…… 
(Dong-A 19, August, 2003) 
Unlike Dong-A, Hankyoreh did not mention the gloomy future of the Universiad games, but 
focused on the possibility of North-South cooperation at the Athens Olympics. IOC members 
from both North and South Korea expressed their support for each other regarding particular 
sport issues, as well as practical matters that occurred during the establishing of the route 
for the cross border travel of people on the Korean peninsula.  
..….North and South Korea have agreed on a joint march and an organising a Unified 
Team for the Athens Olympics. Kim Un Young (South Korea) and Chang Ung (North 
Korea) participated in the press conference and proclaimed that ‘we will cooperate in 
the joint march and organising a Unified Team at the Athens Olympics for peace and 
stability in the Korean Peninsula’…… 
(Hankyoreh 21, August, 2003) 
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In the South Korean government summary of North-South Relations South Korea’s wish to 
have North Korea participate in the Daegu Universiad Games is well documented. The aim 
of the organising committee was not only to become a ‘successful host’ of the games, but 
also to maintain the ‘sustainability of North and South Korean cooperation’, and thus North 
Korea’s participation in the Games was important to enable the committee to accomplish this 
aim.  
 [Table 6.6] The Administrative work contract for the Daegu Summer Universiad-1 
 Content 
Title The Administrative work contract for the Daegu Summer Universiad 
Date 2003.07.04-06 
Venue The Geumgang Mountains 
Summary While preparing for a successful holding of the Daegu Universiad and 
sustainable cooperation and harmony for South and North, the South Korean 
government and organising committee constructively aim for North Korean 
players' participation 
 
What made the Daegu Universiad Organising Committee believe that North Korea’s 
participation would have a positive influence on the Games is provided in the following 
description. By having North Korean participation in the 14th Busan Asian Games, South 
Korea experienced great success not only in the public relations of the Games, but also in 
establishing a harmonious mood in North and South Korean cooperation. This showed the 
changes of the South Korean government’s attitude, becoming more flexible in terms of 
using sport events as a lubricant for the North and South Korean relations.   
[Table 6.7] The Administrative work contract for the Daegu Summer Universiad-2 
 Content 
Title The Administrative work Contact for the Daegu Summer Universiad 
Date 2003.07.04-06 
Venue The Geumgang Mountains 
Summary Moreover, the 14th Busan Asian Games attributed hugely not only to the 
popularity of Asian Games, but also to the cooperative mood of South and 
North through the participation of the North Korean players and cheer group, 
the necessity of North Korean players participation was strongly expressed  
 
In order to make North Korea’s participation in the Universiad a reality, the organising 
committee needed to first discuss the matter with FISU and obtain their commitment to 
support North Korea’s participation. This showed the international dimension of inter-Korean 
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relations, with each organisation having its own view on the diplomacy of North and South 
Korean relations.   
[Table 6.8] The Administrative work contract for the Daegu Summer Universiad-3 
 Content 
Title The Administrative work Contact for the Daegu Summer Universiad 
Date 2003.07.04-06 
Venue The Geumgang Mountains 
Summary First, the organising committee shared the response with FISU concerning 
North Korea's participation of the Games, and sent an official invitation to North 
Korea in August of 2002. 
 
Hankyoreh painted the scene in colours drawn from a palette of primordial nationalism. 
Hankyoreh tended employ emotive words or expressions when discussing issues of North 
and South Korean nationalism. People’s individual accounts of the shared national feeling 
were emphasised.   
..….Among the North and South Korean players, 322 people cannot be distinguished 
one from the other, with their common uniform of a bright dark blue upper garment and 
beige-coloured trousers. North and South Korean players marched together and 
shared jokes with each other and also ran and chased as if they were university 
students……The North Korean Cheer Team shouted ‘Unification of our homeland!’ and 
‘We are one’…..one of the North Korean supporters Kim said that ‘I can feel the warm 
friendship between Korean nationals.’…… 
(Hankyoreh 22, August, 2003-2) 
The North Korean newspaper, Roh-Dong, also mentioned the participation of North Korea in 
the Universiad games. The paper reported that the significance of North Korea’s 
participation in the games originated from a wish for unification rather than being a reflection 
of the fact that South Korea would be the host of the games. The North Korean newspaper 
focused on the ethnic nationalism of Korea by mentioning having the same language and 
culture that provides a rationale for the unification of Koreans.     
……North and South Korean players participated together in these Games after 
overcoming the challenge of anti-unification…… 
(Roh-Dong 22, Aug. 2003) 
The political statement of the North Korean representative also suggested that there was a 
group of people in South Korea who were against harmonious relations between North and 
South Korea due to their anti-North Korean political stance. Roh-Dong’s reference to this as 
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‘crazy’ clearly illustrates its leanings in terms of nationalism and its desire for national 
unification (Roh-Dong 25, Aug.2003-2).  
 
The matter of North Korea’s participation in the Daegu Universiad was settled at last after a 
considerable number of complications. However, following North Korea’s participation in the 
Games, there was an incident in which some South Koreans burnt North Korean flags, and 
North Korea sought an official apology from the South Korean government. Despite 
opposition from members of his cabinet, President Roh of South Korea apologised for the 
incident. This clearly illustrates the wish of the president and the South Korean regime to 
continue to have cooperative relations with North Korea. The criticism directed towards the 
South Korean president concerned that he had apologised after president of the organising 
committee had already done so. The South Korean government of explained that it wanted 
to confirm its position both within the Korean peninsula but also to the outside world, as well 
as to express that political messages should be controlled during sporting events.  
…… There was a criticism of president Roh’s expressions of ‘regret’ to North Korea on 
the matter of burning North Korean flags. We need to understand the differences 
between each other and extend our interaction so as not to repeat this conflict 
again…… 
(Hankyoreh 22, Aug. 2003-1) 
As shown above, papers like Hankyoreh judged his action in a very positive light but Dong-
A’s reaction was different. The view of Dong-A was that president Roh’s action was improper. 
Nevertheless, Dong-A also used the nationalistic terms, such as ‘brother and sister’ to refer 
to North and South Korea, when players from both sides won their Judo matches.  The tone 
of Dong-A towards North Korea became more nationalistic and positive towards the unified 
team when it achieved a better result than had been achieved when they were separated.  
..….North and South Korean Judo brothers and sisters have enjoyed their joint victory 
at the Daegu Universiad…… 
(Dong-A 28, August, 2003-1) 
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6.5.3 Aftermath of the Games 
A negative view of North Korean participants at the Universiad Games is however clearly 
shown in the following article. The article describes the attitude of North Korean participants 
as insincere and motivated by political factors. It does not provide any material evidence on 
that issue, but Dong-A expresses these ideas as personal opinions rather than as an official 
or formal observations. It is clear that international sporting events cannot be isolated from 
their political framework. The use of the team flag, which was the Korean peninsula flag in 
this case, was already a major political gesture. National anthems are not played at the 
Universiad, but the flag represents the nation instead. Thus, even though the Organising 
Committee would rather minimise the political nature of its Games, an individual still had the 
right to express her or his national / political identity during the games.  
..….One of the interesting points of this Daegu Universiad was that of the 302 North 
Korean women……they are very welcome but the uniform and political slogan created 
a negative image of them……The North Korean Cheer team doesn’t seem to have any 
freedom…...I took freedom for granted but I realise it is very important, since I saw 
them…… 
(Dong-A 28, August, 2003-3) 
The conservatives in South Korea were concerned with the side effects of an overly-friendly 
policy towards the North Korean regime that could make the difference between the two 
Koreas vague. Consequently, it encouraged the view that South Korean people who have a 
pro-unification position, similar to that held by the North Korean regime, should be 
considered to have loyalties to the North Korean regime and its political ideology.  
..….North and South Korea look like one but actually they are two, and this is the 
reality that we are faced with……In a situation in which North Korea’s motivation for 
participation in the games is not clear, the South Korean government better keep its 
position stably even though North Korean teams go back to North Korea.….. 
(Dong-A 29, August, 2003) 
The next day’s article in Dong-A seemed to be more critical about North Korea in a political 
sense. The article mentioned the reaction of the North Korean cheering squad beside the 
picture of its president, and expressed that this would not have been a normal attitude 
towards the North Korean president. It rather said that this action by the cheering squad may 
have had a political purpose to persuade South Korean people of their devotion to their 
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leader. Thus, what Dong-A criticised was not the “political meaning of unification”, but the 
“political propaganda of the North Korean regime”.  
..….The women cried, shouting ‘We cannot leave our president’s picture in the rain.’ 
This is far more than a simple gap between North and South Korea. It is hard to 
believe that they cried because of the president’s picture……There is a clear 
motivation behind North Korea sending a women’s cheer team to South Korea. They 
want a propaganda impact for their regime. The beautiful cheer team is not a group of 
volunteers. They are hand-picked from certain classes and trained…… 
(Dong-A 30, August, 2003) 
Roh-Dong tended to directly connect North and South Korean sport relations to a national 
‘unification’ issue as the following article illustrates. Thus, the issues of North and South 
Korea cooperating in the field of sports would have been resolved if they both had a real 
intention to promote national unification.    
..….Through these Games North and South Korean students had claimed that we are 
one ethnicity that cannot be separated and we must overcome the anti-unification 
movement to advance our national wish which is unification.….. 
(Roh-Dong 1, Sept. 2003) 
In the following article, the close interactions between North and South Korea in sports were 
directly related to the issue of national unification, just as the importance of a unified Korea 
was directly related to the shared ethnicity of the Korean people. The core ‘memory of the 
Games’ was thus their role in the ‘history of unification’. Moreover, since the notion came 
from the instruction of the ‘great leader’ Kim Jung Il, it was naturally treated seriously, and 
had priority over the national policy of North Korea (Roh-Dong 3, Sept. 2003-1). Roh-Dong 
showed its typical tendency towards an ‘emotional’ description of the situation concerning 
the public reaction towards the performance of the joint cheering team. It emphasised the 
claim that the sporting experience contributed to or reflected ‘national unity’ on a micro-level.   
……The .North and South Korean cheer team had one voice for unification, and it 
echoed……The North and South Korean cheer team had performed together and felt 
national unity in their hearts…… 
(Roh-Dong 3, Sept. 2003-3) 
Roh-Dong included another article that placed an emphasis on the regional festival of South 
Korea entitled ‘The National Unification and Peace, Sport and Cultural Festival’ for North and 
South Korean participants. This was a sport and cultural festival organised by the Je-Ju 
regional government rather than the national government (Roh-Dong 24, Oct. 2003-1). Thus 
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this might be the start of a private (non-governmental) initiative, even though both 
governments were supporting the initiative from behind the scenes. Roh-Dong highlighted 
the meaning and value of the National Unification and Peace, Sport and Cultural Festival by 
emphasising the impact of the Games on unity based on ethnic nationalism. Roh-Dong 
valued the cooperation between North and South Korea more than other South Korean 
newspapers, thus the development or improvement of the cooperation between North and 
South Korea would be regarded as more valuable than any other cooperation. Obviously, 
this may be taken as a positive aspect of national unification.   
……Let’s develop a national economy and sport by trusting our fellow ethnic group that 
has the same bloodline, instead of believing ‘the other’, so the fever of unification will 
be an impetus for national cooperation……he said that he felt the warm love of the 
nation so the chances must be growing for us to meet like this, for national unification, 
even though we are apart…… 
(Roh-Dong 27, Oct. 2003) 
Roh-Dong made it clear how it regarded this festival and how important the value of 
participation was to ‘national unity’ and ‘independence’ for the realisation of national unity. 
..….The statement declared that the fundamental spirit of these Games was preserving 
national unity and achieving unification…… 
(Roh-Dong 29 Oct. 2003) 
 
6.6 The 2004 Athens Olympic Games  
 
6.6.1 The Scandals surrounding the Sport Relations of Two Koreas 
Since there were many sporting interactions in relation to the Olympics and other 
international sporting events, the view of Dong-A on North and South Korean exchanges 
related to sports focused on hidden motivations in relation to these events rather than on the 
positive impact on the Korean peninsula. As the IOC member from South Korea, Kim Un 
Yong, confessed that he used some money for North Korea as a reward for their visit to 
South Korea and compensated them for expenses incurred by their participation at the 
sporting event.   
..….If Kim’s claim is right, the suspicion about the North and South Korean ‘bribe 
scandal’ for sport interaction in the 2002 Busan Asian Games and last year’s Daegu 
Universiad must be true. North Korea had sent players and North and South Korean 
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relations were lively but there were suspicious rumours about South Korea’s payment 
for the result…..The North and South Korean sport relations that are based on money 
must be stopped, and also must not to be advocated under the excuse of the necessity 
of North and South Korean reconciliation…… 
(Dong-A 7, January, 2004-1) 
This case showed the gap between the idealistic expectations of South Korean society 
toward North and South Korean relations and the ‘legal’ limitations placed on the promotion 
of North and South Korean relations. The relationship between the two Koreas though part 
of a consensus of ‘international relations’, was required to operate in terms of paying  
compensation within the limits of national legislation. This time, the money delivered from a 
South Korean IOC member to a North Korean IOC member seemed not to have been 
officially approved by the government, and was not considered an appropriate means by 
which to conduct North and South Korean sport relations.  
..….And he also added that here the money includes funds from the South Korean 
government and they had obtained government approval unofficially…… 
(Dong-A 7, January, 2004-2) 
Dong-A explained in the following article that the public could not accept this financial 
compensation to North Korea. The IOC member from South Korea, Kim, was already 
starting to be blamed for his diplomatic gesture, which was not welcomed by the South 
Korean public. Nevertheless, if one considers that an IOC member is not a representative of 
their country to the IOC, but a representative of the IOC in the nation, then his action of 
promoting and funding participation at the Winter Olympic Ceremony might be more 
understandable. However, he tried to play a role as a sport messenger between North and 
South Korea by using his international sporting status, and thus it would be difficult to excuse 
this as a private IOC matter. The IOC member in South Korea, Kim, was considered a 
legendary figure in sport diplomacy for Korea, since he had been at the centre of the sports 
domain since the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games. With the status of being an IOC member, he 
had various and regular opportunities to contact the IOC member of North Korea, therefore 
North and South Korean sport relations must have been discussed on several occasions. 
..…. Kim’s trouble started from the 2002 Salt Lake Winter Olympics. And now here 
once it is revealed that he paid for the joint march with North Korea in the Sydney 
Olympics, and collected money illegally for his election as president for the IOC, then 
he will be in big trouble...... 
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 (Dong-A 15, January, 2004) 
Despite the scandal of the South Korean IOC member Kim, North and South Korean sport 
relations proceeded following the Olympic schedule. Since North and South Korea had 
several chances to discuss similar issues, they arranged to meet to make a practical 
decision. As the two Koreas had already experienced a Joint March at the opening 
ceremony of the 2000 Sydney Olympics, it became a fundamental point that North and 
South Korea could easily reach an agreement. Dong-A simply asserted that, 
..….North and South Korea will do a Joint March in August at the 2004 Athens 
Olympics.….. 
(Dong-A 7, February, 2004) 
The IOC members of North and South Korea fully agreed with the plan for a joint march. 
Nevertheless, the IOC regarded this case as an exception Hankyoreh commented cautiously 
based on the wish of North and South Korea to make the best effort to achieve unity in the 
sporting arena (Hankyoreh 26, February, 2004). The sympathetic tone of Hankyoreh 
concerning the accusation against Kim Un Yong is revealed in the article cited below. 
Hankyoreh, unlike Dong-A, tended to explain the contextual circumstance behind the 
involvement of money and its ‘public purpose’ towards North Korea (Hankyoreh 17, March, 
2004). The article may be related to the intention of Hankyoreh, which was to not prejudice 
the South Korean government’s North Korean policy that aimed to establish peaceful 
relations with North Korea. The policy direction of the South Korean government in relation 
to North Korea was understood throughout South Korean society, which made Dong-A 
realise the importance of the interactions between North and South Korea. In the following 
article, Dong-A emphasised the importance of the role of the symbolic gesture of peace 
through sports in the ‘changing times’. Here the ‘times’ may imply both the domestic and 
international circumstances of North and South Korea , a context within which South Korea 
needed to consider its North Korean policy.   
..….Particularly, we need special wisdom to use the Athens Olympics as a chance to 
promote peace in the Korean peninsula and stimulate the North and South Korean 
national bonds…….the case of the joint march in Sydney shows the apparent power of 
sport in North and South Korean relations. Considering the cost of other areas of 
interaction, sport can have a huge role at a relatively small as cost……Now, the times 
have changed. The regime of South Korea is not weak as it was before when we used 
 
 
255 
 
sport as a tool of social integration. In the post-Cold War era, North and South Korea 
don’t need to compete in sport. Thus, the consequence is a focus on the agenda of a 
‘contribution to peace in the Korean peninsula through the Olympics.’…… 
(Dong-A 30, March, 2004) 
While the hopeful expectation for the joint march of North and South Korea in Athens was 
growing in the South Korean media, Hankyoreh reported that North Korea suggested holding 
talks on the issue. It also showed how North Korea was positive on the matter of this 
international sport event or at least wanted to express its willingness for a successful 
discussion (Hankyoreh 29, April, 2004).    
..….North Korea has suggested an administrative meeting for the joint march of the 
2004 Athens Olympics opening and closing ceremony…… 
(Hankyoreh 29, April, 2004) 
 
 
6.6.2 The Second Joint March at the opening ceremony of the Olympics  
Even though the mood of South Korea was supportive in realising the Joint March of North 
and South Korea in the opening ceremony of the Sydney Olympics, South Korea had a 
different attitude that was reflected in the summary made by South Korea. Previously, the 
major obstacles in the North-South Korean relationship were ‘political’ and ‘economic’. 
However, in the following summary, the detailed procedure for preparation became the issue.     
 
     [Table 6.9] The Administrative work Contact for the Athens Olympic Games Joint March-1 
 Content 
Title The Administrative work Contact for the Athens Olympic Games Joint March 
Date 2004.06.23-25 
Venue Beijing in China 
Summary It was an impossible situation to reverse, since the uniform was already chosen 
by our internal processes. 
 
However, South Korea’s minor obstruction was simply accepted by North Korean 
representatives. The following summary by South Korea shows how North Korea was 
positive in working to progress the talks for the realisation of the Joint March by accepting 
most of the suggestions made by the South Korean representatives.  
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     [Table 6.10] The Administrative work Contact for the Athens Olympic Games Joint March-2 
 Content 
Title The Administrative work contact for the Athens Olympic Games Joint March 
Date 2004.06.23-25 
Venue Beijing in China 
Summary North Korea understands our situation, and agreed with us at last……and also 
accepted our opinion concerning the matter of using a joint flag for the joint 
cheer. 
 
In the following article, the agreed items for the 2004 Athens Olympic Joint March were 
announced. North and South Korea both agreed that Arirang would be the official music and 
the Korean peninsula flag was chosen for the flag-bearer to carry.   
..….North and South Korea have agreed on a joint march at the 2004 Athens Olympic 
opening and closing ceremonies with the music Arirang and the Korean peninsula 
flag……North and South Korean players will have the sign ‘KOREA’ on their uniform 
with Arirang and the Korean Peninsula flag…… 
(Hankyoreh 25, June, 2004) 
Roh-Dong also reported that North and South Korea would have a meeting, but was not 
explicit about the expected result, in contrast to the article in Hankyoreh published the day 
before. This shows that even though North Korea was so positive about holding these talks, 
they were still very cautious about announcing any decisions. Thus, Roh-Dong just wrote 
about the issue in a bold tone.    
..….North and South Korean NOCs have held a practical meeting to discuss the North 
and South Korean joint march at the 28
th
 Olympics Opening and Closing 
ceremony…… 
(Roh-Dong 26, June 2004-1) 
Hankyoreh wanted to reveal more ways in which North and South Korea interacted in the 
sport arena. The following article introduced the case of the North and South Korean Table 
Tennis teams training together for the Athens Olympics. It seemed like this reflected great 
progress for the two Koreas, since it was the first official case of joint training and the leader 
of the North and South Korean teams expressed the wish that this would be extended to 
other sporting disciplines. The joint training of North and South Korea involved more 
practical interactions than the Joint March, since it produced direct contact between the 
sports people of North and South Korea, and this meant there was great hope for growing 
the potential of a cross-cultural understanding between North and South.   
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..….The Table Tennis team of North and South Korea have trained together for the first 
time for the Athens Olympics……A leader of the North and South Korean teams has 
said that they will enlarge the number of the sports in which they have joint training…… 
(Hankyoreh 13, August, 2004) 
North Korea showed a cautious attitude to reporting the result of the talks, but once it had 
actually happened in the Olympic arena, there was no hesitation about communicating this 
issue to the North Korean people. Instead of the ‘Korean peninsula flag’, Roh-Dong called 
the flag the ‘unification flag’ which made explicit the symbolic meaning of this Joint March, 
represented by two people from North and South Korea (Roh-Dong 15, Aug. 2004-1).    
 
Dong-A viewed the joint march in the opening ceremony of the Sydney Olympics as a 
celebration of South Korean culture. Despite the opportunity to show North and South Korea 
in harmony to the world, Dong-A rather focused on the South Korean cultural diplomatic 
impact through this march.         
..….The highlight of this opening ceremony was the joint march of North and South 
Korea with loud applause from the spectators. We are trying to create cultural 
diplomacy to present South Korea as not only a developed country of sport and 
peaceful but also a dynamic country with a sparkling cultural legacy…… 
(Dong-A 16, August, 2004) 
In the following article, Dong-A revealed the funding source for the uniforms to be worn in 
the joint march, and argued that the fund for North and South Korean relations had been 
used appropriately in this instance, unlike the case of the IOC member of South Korea, Kim 
(Dong-A 18, August, 2004). Hankyoreh was also aware of the criticism regarding the IOC 
member Kim, so the paper revealed an accurate figure for the amount of funding used for 
the Athens Joint March (Hankyoreh 18, August, 2004). Now the North and South Korean 
relations needed to be clearer in terms of the cost behind the procedure to reflect the ‘pure’ 
intention of both Koreas. However, there was no news that was reported in Roh-Dong 
regarding the sponsorship made by South Korea for the Joint March. There was only a bald 
statement concerning the closing of the Athens Games.  
..….The 28
th
 Olympic Games has been closed in Athens…… 
Roh-Dong 31, Aug. 2004-1 
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6.6.3 The 2005, 8.15 North and South Korean Unification Football Match 
With mutual agreement in the sport relationship between North and South Korea, the two 
Koreas started to discuss the Unification Football Match, which would commemorate 8.15, 
the Independence Day of Korea. In the following summary of talks, the official title for the 
North and South Korean players was discussed. The controversial issue was whether North 
and South Korea wanted to use ‘Cho Sun’ Korea, in its name, but it was finally decided that 
they would call each other ‘Northern and Southern’ which did not imply reference to the 
nation-state.  
 [Table 6.11] The 1
st
 – 2
nd
 Administrative work Contact for the 2005. 8.15 North and South 
Korean Unification Football Match-1 
 Content 
Title The 1
st
 – 2
nd
 Administrative work Contact for the 2005. 8.15 North and South 
Korean Unification Football Match 
Date 2005.07.26/28 
Venue Gaeseong in North Korea 
Summary The meaning of each team’s name: Northern players and Southern players, 
which does not suggest the state. 
 
Since this was a friendly match between North and South Korea, South Korea agreed to pay 
all the expenses, and the meaning of ‘Unification’ was to be particularly emphasised in all 
the details, such as the selection of organising team members for the Talks. These included 
the officer from the Ministry of Unification in South Korea as it was written in the following 
summary. 
[Table 6.12] The 1
st
 – 2
nd
 Administrative work Contact for the 2005. 8.15 North and South                     
Korean Unification Football Match-2 
 Content 
Title The 1
st
 – 2
nd
 Administrative work Contact for the 2005. 8.15 North and South 
Korean Unification Football Match 
Date 2005.07.26/28 
Venue Gaeseong in North Korea 
Summary All the expenses while Northern players stay in South Korea will be covered by 
the South Korean government. 
 
[Table 6.13] The 1
st
 – 2
nd
 Administrative work Contact for the 2005. 8.15 North and South                     
Korean Unification Football Match-3 
 Content 
Title The 1
st
 – 2
nd
 Administrative work Contact for the 2005. 8.15 North and South 
Korean Unification Football Match 
Date 2005.07.26/28 
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Venue Gaeseong in North Korea 
Summary The meaning of the representatives for Talks -: In these Sport Talks, the title 
includes the officer of the Ministry of the ‘Unification’ and in terms of organising 
representatives , the ministry of unification representatives are involved 
 
 
6.7 The 2006 Doha Asian Games and Unified Team of Two Koreas 
..….OCA (Olympic Council of Asia) has opened the administrative committee and all 
adopted the resolution ‘Recommendation of the Unified Team of the North and South 
Korea to their Olympic Committees.’…… 
(Hankyoreh 7, February, 2005) 
Since the OCA recommended a unified team of North and South Korea for the next sporting 
event, the Organising Committee of the Doha Asian Games publicly requested the 
participation of North and South Korea as a unified team (Dong-A 5, April, 2005). Discussion 
of a unified Korean team was becoming a routine procedure when organising an 
international sporting event. However it was pointed out that there was no unified team of 
North and South Korea. It had been discussed for more than a decade, but the Talks for a 
unified team continued to fail. Hankyoreh emphasised the fundamentally symbolic purpose 
of this unified team of North and South Korea. The biggest issue of organising a unified team 
was a matter of selecting athletes, whether, for example, it would be the same number from 
both North and South Korea or the best players from both sides. This is why Hankyoreh 
pointed that achieving the ‘best results’ was not the main goal of this unified team. In terms 
of Hankyoreh, organising the team in the way that can represent national unification was the 
principal criterion for this unified team.  
……A unified team is symbolically significant rather than aiming for a good result in the 
matches. This will be not only the foundation of national identity and reconciliation, but 
also an important opportunity to promote North and South Korean relations…… 
(Hankyoreh 10, September, 2005) 
Instead of focusing on how the unified team would be realised, Dong-A rather spotlighted the 
perspective of individual athletes in terms of their career and the chance of participating in 
an international sporting event. This implied that the South Korean athletes could not be 
forced to give up the chance to represent their nation in an international sporting event, since 
the event itself symbolised national unity.   
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..….The North and South Korean Unified Team is matter of ‘life or death’ to 
athletes…Sport relations seem relatively easy but they shouldn’t be arranged in a hurry, 
especially not North and South Korean relations. This sort of announcement for an 
‘event’ is not good psychologically for the players.….. 
(Dong-A 22, September, 2005) 
Interestingly enough, a similar perspective was taken by the South Korean government 
according to their summary of the Talks.  
[Table 6.14] The 1
st
 – 4
th
 North and South Korean Sport Talks for the Unified Team-1 
 Content 
Title The 1
st
 – 4
th
 North and South Korean Sport Talks for the Unified Team 
Date 2005.12.07/2006.06.29/2006.11.30-12.02/2007.02.13 
Venue Gaeseong in North Korea/Doha in Qatar 
Summary There may be no objection that the best players are supposed to be selected 
throughout South and North, and the most rational method of selecting players 
is open completion 
 
It also includes a contradicting comment in terms of the principle of organising a unified team.  
 
     [Table 6.15] The 1
st
 – 4
th
 North and South Korean Sport Talks for the Unified Team-2 
 Content 
Title The 1
st
 – 4
th
 North and South Korean Sport Talks for the Unified Team 
Date 2005.12.07/2006.06.29/2006.11.30-12.02/2007.02.13 
Venue Gaeseong in North Korea/Doha in Qatar 
Summary The unified team must be constituted based on the principle which is attributed 
to the unity of the nation’s people and unification of the nation 
 
As shown in the above articles and summary, the Talks ended without any agreement 
reached, just one month after Hankyoreh had released a positive article about the potential 
for a North and South agreement.   
..….North and South Korea have agreed on organising a unified team for 2006 Doha 
Asian Games and 2008 Beijing Olympics.….. 
(Hankyoreh 2, November, 2005) 
..….The North and South Korean Sport Talks for Unified Team in 2006 Doha Asian 
Games and 2008 Beijing Olympics have ended without any good news…...’ 
(Dong-A 8, December, 2005) 
In the meantime, Roh-Dong repeatedly mentioned how important the fundamental idea 
behind the unified team was, and the way to realise it should proceed independently. Roh-
Dong reflected the view that all the sporting interactions between the two Koreas were a way 
of achieving a national purpose mentioned in the joint statement of 6.15, which emphasised 
broad peace and unification for North and South Korea (Roh-Dong 8, Dec. 2005-1).  
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Concerning the Doha Asian Games and the Beijing Olympics, Hankyoreh expressed clear 
expectations for a positive outcome from the discussion about organising a unified team.      
..….There is high possibility of organising a North and South Korea unified team for the 
2006 Doha Qatar Asian Games and 2008 Beijing Asian Games. Therefore, we have to 
start the discussion on the Unification flag and Unification song to show the harmony of 
Korean national identity…… 
(Hankyoreh 7, March, 2006) 
About three months and a half later, Hankyoreh reported the special interests of the 
president of the IOC, who requested that the two Koreas participate as a unified team in the 
Beijing Olympics. By employing the support of the IOC president in organising a unified team 
for North and South Korea, Hankyoreh might have wanted to pressurise the South Korean 
government into making compromises with regard to agreeing details in the process of 
organising a unified team: 
..….It has been revealed that Jacques Rogge has sent a letter requesting a unified 
team to the presidents of North and South Korea for the 2008 Beijing Games……It is 
the first time that Jacques Rogge has sent a letter to North and South 
Korea……Rogge has been involved from the beginning in the discussion of organising 
a unified team for North and South Korea…...Several Times Jacques Rogge has 
expressed his opinion that ‘the IOC will positively support a North and South Korean 
agreement.’…… 
(Hankyoreh 24, June, 2006) 
However, Dong-A still had a negative perspective on the Talks, despite Roh-Dong having a 
adopted a softer tone in announcing the joint statement that resulted, which included a 
mutual agreement between the two Koreas to participate in the Beijing Games as a unified 
team (Dong-A 30, June, 2006). The significance of the announcement of this agreement is 
apparent, since it was the first time the idea of organising a unified team had been 
acknowledged in a written statement, even though there had seemed to be agreement on 
the idea on previous occasions.   
..….The North and South Korean sport Talks have proceeded to organise one team for 
the 29
th
 Beijing Olympic Games……In this Talks both had discussed the associated 
matters sincerely, and published a joint statement. The statement said that North and 
South Korea both agreed on the ‘Unified Team’ participants for the Beijing Olympic 
Games so they will do their best in compromising on practical matters…… 
(Roh-Dong 1, July 2006) 
Dong-A and Hankyoreh each had different standpoints on the intervention made by the IOC 
president. On the one hand, Dong-A first questioned whether the IOC should be involved or 
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not, then explained that North Korea did not have a positive attitude, and that there were 
limitations on the actions that South Korea could take (Dong-A 29, August, 2006). On the 
other hand, Hankyoreh cited a comment made by the president of the IOC, which implied his 
strong support for North Korea’s participation in the Olympics, in terms of maximising the 
number of participating countries.  
..….Jacques Rogge has promised that he will do his best to enlarge the entry of the 
organising team of North and South Korea……He said that ‘If North and South Korea 
request certain conditions, then we will discuss these with IFs positively.’…… 
(Hankyoreh 7, September, 2006) 
Although the Doha Asian Games were getting close, there was still no feedback from North 
Korea about participating in the Games as a unified team with South Korea. From an 
international relations perspective, North Korea’s nuclear weapon became an issue that was 
directly related to the national security of North Korea, and North Korea was thus distracted 
from any concern about sporting issues. However, the president of the IOC still wanted to 
believe that North Korea could participate in the Games, and so did Hankyoreh (Hankyoreh 
17, November, 2006). Even though a unified team was not realised for the Doha Asian 
Games, the joint march of North and South Korea in the Games did come about. Dong-A 
suggests that it was nearly cancelled due to international problems and other issues 
surrounding North and South Korea (Dong-A 23, November, 2006). Moreover, this joint 
march became a reality due to the positive effort made by the South Korean government, 
which placed emphasis on the maintaining of peace between North and South Korea.  
 
Nevertheless, the South Korean government and the sportspeople could not reach an 
agreement or find a compromise for the plan of a unified team. Unlike Dong-A, which 
reported the breakdown of the Talks in a bold tone (Dong-A 2, December, 2006), Hankyoreh 
showed a hopeful expectation of realising a unified Korean team for the Beijing Olympics.   
..….And the talks will be held again at the end of this year, so we are expecting great 
news of national reconciliation through sport…… 
(Hankyoreh 16, December, 2006) 
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6.8 Conclusion 
From the evidence at hand, one can identify two trends. The first is that privately-led North 
and South Korean sporting discussions and interactions began to characterise this period. 
The second is that domestic politics, rather than the international context became a 
determining feature of sport interactions. 
 
In terms of the nature of the sport issues under discussion, North and South Korea were 
focused on a joint march at the opening of the Olympic Games, implying a symbolic peace 
between the two Koreas (rather than the delicate issue of symbolising political unification of 
the Korean nation). Since North and South Korea started to seek the ‘practical’ and ‘realistic’ 
progress in terms of peace in the Korean peninsula rather than promoting the political unity 
of ‘the nation’, both North and South seemed to acknowledge that discussing political 
unification through the Sports Talks was simply too ambitious. Thus, instead of trying to 
establish a platform for unification talks sport came to be seen as a location for increasing 
interaction through private initiatives. 
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Chapter 7 Conclusion 
 
7.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapters this research sought to explore the ‘role’ of the Olympics and other 
major international sporting events in the development of North and South Korean relations 
by analysing the discourses of the North and South Korean governments’ documents and 
their newspaper media. The newspapers Roh-Dong, Dong-A and Hankyoreh represent their 
particular political and nationalism related perspectives on the relations between the North 
and the South entangled with various sporting interactions. Proceeding from an analysis of 
these perspectives represented in the discourse produced in these media, we have sought 
to evaluate the nature of the unique contexts of the two Koreas, and have attempted to 
sketch out what were the various circumstances which have affected North and South 
Korean sport relations (and been reflected in the discourse) but also how the inter-nation 
context has itself been constructed in part by the sporting interactions of the two Koreas (and 
thus been in part constructed by the discourse). In this chapter we will identify theoretical 
implications, seek to summarise our findings and clarify the ways in which the thesis is 
intended to make a contribution to knowledge.  
 
7.2 Contribution to Theory 
This thesis has adopted a critical realist ontological and epistemological position, which is 
based on a depth realist ontological belief (Bhaskar 1989) and a form of interpretivist 
epistemological position. However, that which is real may be socially constructed and part of 
the aim of the thesis is to analyse the process of construction of the positions adopted within 
and between North and South Korea in relation to sporting relations specifically and inter-
state relations more broadly. Such an analysis is undertaken through a deconstruction of the 
discourses reflected in the data employing a protocol adapted from Fairclough (2005) while 
also referencing ‘non-discursive practices and materialisations’ in North and South sport 
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relations, following Jäger and Meyer (2009). As a method, CDA (Critical Discourse Analysis) 
was adopted for reviewing the discursive construction of relations and to deconstruct the 
process of constructed relations between the two Koreas. The approach is ‘critical’ in the 
sense that it seeks to uncover the relative strength of interests and associated aspects of 
power represented in the discourse. 
 
[Table 7.1] Summarises the assumptions and strategy adopted for the research 
Category Content 
Meta-Theoretical Level Critical Realism  
Ontology Realist but socially/discursively constructed 
Epistemology Interpretivist approach to discourse construction together 
with analytic evaluation of underlying structure. 
Theory  Neo-constructivism – International relations are socially 
constructed based on real structures. Sporting relations 
have the potential to both reflect and reconstruct or at least 
to mediate the reality of such structures. 
Methods  Critical Discourse Analysis 
Research Strategy  Mixture of retroductive and abductive. 
 
For the purposes of the critical discourse analysis, the context of international relations and 
the perceptions of North and South of one another have been analysed through the official 
South Korean summary of the Sports Talks and through newspapers from the North and the 
South. Many of the articles in the three newspapers selected, Hankyoreh, Dong-A and Roh-
Dong address the reasoning behind the construction of North and South Korea sport 
relations in the domestic political context and highlight the intentions of the two regimes. A 
common thread however running through the accounts from both North and South is a 
commitment (sometimes weaker and sometimes stronger, but virtually always visible), of 
what Smith (2001) has termed primordial nationalism. In other words regardless of how 
difficult political relations have been between the two states there has been a commitment 
on both sides to the notion of a single ethnic entity which is the Korean people. 
The Figure 7.1 displays the sources of discourse and concisely summarises the outcomes 
contained in the analysis in Chapters 4, 5 and 6.  
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As it was noted in Chapter 3, although the approach adopted employs discourse analysis it 
follows Fairclough’s approach in adopting realist ontology. This implies a concern with ‘the 
depth of reality’ and what might be abductively/retroductively concluded about warrantable 
explanations of the findings from the analysis of the discursive outcomes. While reports of 
sporting events and other issues dealt with in the Sports Talks are directly observed in their 
written form, they represent ‘empirical reality’. However, this is only part of the picture. In 
terms of the ‘dispositive’ (Jäger and Meyer 2009:57) which incorporates discursive practices, 
non-discursive practices and materialisations, we recognise the significance of other forms 
of empirical observed reality beyond the discourse itself.  
 
In addition, there are aspects of reality which can in principle be observed, but in practice 
were not observed, the ‘actual’ in Bhaskar’s terms. We for example may not have had 
explanations of writers’ motivations for their actions, but we could in principle have had 
access to some information (were writers, for example, to be available for interview, and 
willing to be frank and open). The third level of reality, deep structures, which by definition 
are not observable directly, include the structure of international and domestic political 
relations, shared ideologies of nationalism and ethnic national identity and sporting relations. 
Our account throughout the thesis represents an attempt to use abductive and where 
possible retroductive analysis to identify the nature of these deep structures and their impact 
on, or implications for, the actions of agents and institutions. This has implications for our 
understanding of the nature of international relations at play. The constructivist tradition 
implies that the international context of North-South relations is socially / politically 
constructed in interaction between the two. However as our historical analysis of the North-
South context suggests, the realist tradition of international relations theory suggests the 
limits to the extent to which actors within the Korean domain can determine the context of 
their interaction. External factors such as the heightening and decline of Cold War relations 
and the  potential intervention of the super powers clearly limit the ability of the two Koreas 
to define their own ‘universe of possibilities’.  
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7.3 Research Findings 
The research which forms the core of this thesis has sought to ‘unpick’ the role of sport in 
competing discourses between North and South across more than three decades. Running 
through this discourse has been the ‘distinctive’ character of Korean nationalism and its 
‘small but clear’ transformations through the time. General trends of two Korea’s sport 
relations in the early part of the period (1978-1987) were inaugurated in the midst of the Cold 
War as it was identified in their Sport Talks. Although the battle between the two parties was 
on-going, after 1988 (the year of the Seoul Olympics) the South maintained a major 
economic advantage (until the on-set of the Asian economic crisis in 1997). During the 
middle period (1988-1997) diplomatic competition was replaced to some degree by sporting 
competition. Consequently, whether sport diplomacy can be an independent variable 
between two Korean relations was evidenced in some part in this period. In the last decade 
(1998-2007) the South Korean regime developed a relatively positive view on the ‘Two 
Koreas’ relations and North Korea showed signs of empowerment under a new leader. 
Nevertheless what each government sought to achieve was different and depended on their 
interpretation of the meaning of establishing a ‘Unified Team’, differentiating for example 
notions of cultural sporting unification and those of political unification. By using the 
discourses in newspaper media of both Koreas, the characters of the domestic regimes were 
expressed through their selection of topics, the perspective and tone of writing. This is 
reflects how the two Koreas, and the selected media sources represented different 
perceptions of ‘reality’ in terms of the North and the South sporting interactions and its 
potential.  
  
7.3.1 Assessment of sport diplomacy as an independent or dependent variable in 
North-South Korea relations  
Following the Korean War, the confrontation of North and South Korea became a fact of life, 
and the context of political conflict between the two Koreas was plainly evident, recognised 
as such by leading scholars. While North and South Korea saw themselves as legitimate 
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government in the Korean peninsula, the North saw the South as a ‘political colony’ of the 
West, while the South views the North as a totalitarian state. Neither saw the other as 
legitimate and the matter of unification is thus complicated by these negative projections of 
‘the other’.  
 
At the time of the Cold War, from 1978-1987 the ‘diplomatic competition’ between the North 
and South in the sporting arena was more than simply a matter of sporting events. The Cold 
War context placed the two Koreas in the roles of icons or symbols representing their allies, 
in particular the USSR and the US, as evidenced in the Moscow Olympics of 1980 and in the 
1984 Los Angeles Games. The Cold War implied ‘no interaction’ other than ‘War itself’ in the 
Korean peninsula. However in the lead up to the Moscow Games when ideological divides 
were very apparent in the Olympic world, North Korea suggested to South Korea that they 
should participate in 1980 in Moscow as a ‘single team’. Thus, it can be said that at this 
moment, North Korea considered sport diplomacy as a way of affecting inter-Korean 
relations. The regime of the South Korea seemed to interpret this as North Korean tactic of 
blocking independent participation by a South Korean team, but it is doubtful that the 
conditions provided by North Korea were the reason for South Korea joining the US-led 
boycott. Since the 1980 Olympics had become a ‘Soviet-led Olympics’ it was predictable that 
the next Olympics would become the ‘US-led Games’, and it was the turn of the South to 
promote to the North the idea of participation in a common team.  
 
One other reason that promotes sport diplomacy as potentially an independent variable in 
relations between the two Koreas is that the international sport governance system sought to 
intervene in North and South Korean international relations, if only to maintain the IOC’s 
claim to represent a global movement. When the North and South Korean Sports Talks 
started in relation to participation at the 1964 Tokyo Olympics and the IOC sought to 
arbitrate and set the boundaries of discussion between the two Koreas, the IOC asked them 
to organise a unified team for participation in the Games since North Korea did not have a 
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NOC and thus could not participate on its own. Thus, the approach adopted by the IOC, in 
relation to whether it would accept the North Korea as an independent nation or not, was a 
key factor at this, and at subsequent junctures for the two Koreas (providing some support 
for a liberal international relations perspective, one which . The outcome of this episode was 
that North Korea successfully sought recognition for its NOC and was thus able to participate 
in the Games in its own right instead of organising a unified team. The leadership of the IOC 
which had emphasised ‘World Peace’ was not able to be ‘practically’ effective in this Cold 
War confrontation, and therefore ceded to the North’s request for recognition.  
 
It should be remembered that the strength of the bi-polar international order was such that 
the countries of the ‘Third World’ were insufficiently strong to argue effectively for their 
interests, as the failure of the GANEFO Games movements illustrates (Connolly 2012:1311-
1324). North and South Korean relations were consequently tense at this time in the 
particular circumstances of the temporary truce after the Korean War. Fortunately, the 
Olympics was one place where North and South Korea were able to talk about mutual 
cooperation under the notion of ‘non-political, sport’, even though the intention of both 
regimes (below the surface) seems to have been to maximise their own diplomatic power, 
and to achieve recognition as the dominant independent state in the Korean peninsula.  
 
When it came to the issues of the 1988 Seoul Olympics, sport diplomacy was more evident 
than other forms of diplomatic interaction. The President of the IOC, Juan Antonio 
Samaranch, presented his own role and that of the IOC as one of strong leadership, and as 
a significant actor in the diplomatic field. The role sought for the IOC, even though it was not 
an international governmental organisation, was one of a central actor in international 
sporting relations. The sporting relations between North and South and the related sporting 
issues were discussed with the intensive involvement of the IOC. The IOC brokered talks 
between North and South and Samaranch engaged in a form of ‘shuttle diplomacy’ visiting 
the North and South Korea (see Table [3.1]).   
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Whether sport diplomacy is sustained as a significant if not entirely independent variable in 
North and South Korean relations seems clearer when we consider the direct contact and 
interactions of the North and South Korean people in sporting events. From 1998 to 2007 
sporting events became not only an opportunity for the North and South players and 
coaching staffs to exchange views with one other but for the spectators (at least those 
permitted to travel) in the venue, and for the people who were watching the scene at home, 
to experience a sense of attachment as a ‘member of a bigger family’. This represented a 
major improvement in relations at this level since there had been a time in which North and 
South Korean contacts were described as ‘tense’ moments for North and South Korean 
players and spectators. The provision of the indoor stadium in Pyongyang by Chairman 
Chung Ju Young of Hyundai showed how material exchanges between North and South 
Korea provided an impetus toward friendly relationships. Whether this was an independent 
variable bringing about better relations or a product of the better relations manifesting 
themselves in positive action is debatable. Nevertheless with the sporting related resources 
of Hyundai such as its professional basketball team participating in these ‘practical’ 
interactions between North and South, this provided a chance for the ordinary citizens of 
South Korea to engage with their counterparts, by being spectators at friendly matches. 
While North and South Korean interaction was developing in the sporting arena, this showed 
how private organisations with missionary and humanitarian goals could play a critical role in 
developing links between North and South.  
 
The implications of this line of argument are not to dismiss the role which social construction 
can play in the framing of international relations, but it is to say that the space for 
constructing that reality is mediated framed and to a certain extent structured by the reality of 
international relations, and the efforts of the wider sporting community. A realist perspective 
on international relations may be too constraining in the picture it paints of interaction 
between nations, particularly since it does not acknowledge the independent efforts of the 
IOC and other international sporting institutions which a liberal IR position wopuld advocate, 
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but the constructivist perspective is too agency-centred in the space it gives for social 
construction of the international relations environment. Thus sport and sport diplomacy, 
although not an independent variable nevertheless is a medium through which improving or 
deteriorating relations between nations are evidenced. 
   
7.3.2 The Primordial Nationalism of Korea and its challenges  
From 1978 to 1987 was a critical period in North and South Korean sport relations in terms 
of an emerging ‘new area of Talks’ which was being developed. Following the Korean War, 
the existence of a shared notion of nationalism  was almost the only theme which two 
Koreas could agree on, and their disputes were based on the different choices of ‘political 
and economic ideology’ for the ‘Korean Nations’’ development. Before they confronted each 
other, they were one nation, and fought against Japanese Imperialism for independence. No 
matter which side they were on both populations and governments dreamt about the future 
of the ‘Korean Nation’ as a political entity.     
 
In the dialogue between North and South Korea, the rhetoric of ‘nationalism’ had been a 
‘sensitive’ issue, since it was one of the controversial themes with which South Korean 
domestic politics had been struggling. This is evidenced in the various issues relating to the 
different ‘terminology’ used by the two sides. Both use the same language which called ‘Han 
Geul’ (which refers to the language of those of Han ethnic identity), and thus if the intention 
is to refer to the same phenomenon, one would anticipate use of shared terminology with 
only a difference of dialect. However, for example, when North and South were referring to 
each other South Korea used the terminology of ‘South Korea and North Korea’ (in Korean, 
Nam Han and Book Han), while the North used ‘South Cho Sun and North Cho Sun’ (Nam 
Cho Sun and Book Cho Sun). The use of ‘Cho Sun’ for Korea harks back to the Cho Sun 
dynasty which existed in the Korean peninsula until the Japanese invasion. What North 
Korea wanted to emphasise through its choice of terminology was that it was the inheritor of 
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the historical tradition of the independent Korean Nation. South Korea, however, used the 
terminology which had its origins in the expression of an independent nation emerging from 
the Japanese colonial period. 
 
Nevertheless, North and South Korean generally shared a ‘common’ perspective on 
nationalism and there were enough sources to express this unique identity in the 
international sporting events through the lens of Dong-A, Hankyoreh and Roh-Dong. For 
example, in the 1978 Bangkok Asian Games when North and South Korea were in 
opposition in a number of international sporting events and both were eager to win, the two 
Koreas faced each other on the field of sport and the media from each side expressed mixed 
emotions which reflected ‘attachment’ based on shared nationalism as well as ‘antagonism’ 
deriving from political confrontation. This ironic situation may explain how the North and 
South Korean ‘enemies’ continued to attempt to organise a single team from 1979, based on 
shared wish to realise the symbolic representation of a single Korean national identity in the 
sporting arena.  
 
With the 1988 Seoul Olympics Games, North and South Korea were known to the world as 
‘separate’ states, and the political and economic gaps between the two Koreas increased 
rapidly. Nevertheless, the symbolism produced in the international sporting arena, with for 
example the fielding of a ‘unified team’ of two Koreas and the ‘joint march’ in the Olympic 
opening ceremony in Sydney Olympics, effectively promoted the notion of a unity of interest, 
and a mood of ‘peace’ between the two Koreas. In addition it reproduced a powerful sense 
of common identity among the younger generation for whom primordial nationalism as an 
ideology was weaker. Moreover, the North and South Korean sport interactions were a 
vehicle for various political and socio-economic national interests of the two Koreas even 
though these ‘interests’ were subject to change over time by the political regimes in power. 
Also, the domain of sporting interaction was one which generally was relatively protected 
even at times of high tension. Therefore, the fact that sporting relations between North and 
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South did not simply parallel political relations can only be explained with reference to this 
shared sense of primordial nationalism.  
 
Through the three decades covered by this research, the political tension between the two 
Koreas has moved slightly from ‘extremely dangerous’ to ‘relatively less dangerous’. 
However, the progress achieved in the sport arena over this period was significant. North 
and South had organised a ‘unified team’ in certain sporting events, and North Korean 
athletes, coaching staff and cheer leader teams had visited South Korea, with South Korean 
basketball players and workers visiting North Korea for friendly matches. However, these 
expressions of shared nationalism are mediated through the discourses of the two Koreas’ 
media. Although media from both sides strongly supported the notion of ‘Korean ethnic 
nationalism’ this only applied when it did not cross the boundary of ‘state-oriented 
nationalism’. The North Korean media, through Roh-Dong considered the ‘Great Leader’s’ 
orders to be more important than maintaining North and South Korean interactions, while the 
South Korean newspaper Dong-A put South Korean national security before commitment to 
a unified team for the two Koreas. Thus, the central commitment to ‘primordial nationalism’ 
and its expression in sport policy needs to be identified within its proper context. 
 
7.3.3 Assessment of the significance of the newspaper discourse  
This research analysed discourses of printed media from both Koreas which represent 
certain views in terms of political perspectives on the question of Korean unification. The 
North Korean newspaper, Roh-Dong provided an insight into North Korean government 
thinking and the messages it wished to convey to its people and to the wider world.  
 
The newspaper discourses evaluated are significant since they represent a ‘reflection’ of 
reality while the discourses identified were also seeking to ‘construct’ that reality to a degree 
in line with the ideological leaning of the source. This ‘immanent’ approach (reflecting and 
constructing) was essential to understanding the competing realities of the two domains. The 
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North Korean newspaper Roh-Dong for example clearly represents what the North Korean 
government wanted to state rather than simply objectively conveying information and news, 
while the South Korean government’s account of the sports talks also reflects the 
‘government view’ of how these phenomena should be understood, with ideological 
variations on the South Korean press examples analysed. Nevertheless it is not simply a 
matter of any of these sources constructing a position regardless of external events. The 
message and its timing were clearly contingent on external events, lending support to a 
realist interpretation of international relations. The periodization of events provided below in 
Table 7.2 underlines this argument. The ‘realities’ of external political, economic, and 
sporting events frames the production of sporting discourse in North-South Korean relations 
rather than vice versa. However the importance of sport and the activities fo the Olympic 
movement also provides support for the significance of non-state actors in this domain. 
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Table. 7.2 Discourse Sources and Discursive Outcomes 
Period Sporting Event Issues and Talks 
Implications of Discourse Elements/ Outcomes and their 
dispositive construction 
1978-
1987 
The 1979 World Table Tennis 
Championships  
The 1
st 
– 4
th
 North and South Korean Table 
Tennis Association Discussion 
a. North Korean requesting for organising unified team as a unique 
way for the South Korean team to participate in the Championships 
in Pyongyang-> Nothing was agreed and South Korean Team did 
not participate in this Championships 
The 1980 Moscow Olympic Games 
North and South Korean Unified Team and its 
participation of the Games 
a. The meaning of South Korea's participation in Moscow Games in 
Cold War context of IR -> South Korean Team boycotted the 1980 
Moscow Games 
  
Seoul's nomination for the 1988 Olympics 
Games 
a. The objection of North Korea to South Korea's nomination to 
host the 1988 Olympics 
b. Critical change of North Korean position/strategy from 
demanding a changing of venue for the Games to asserting its 
'right' to 'co-host' the Games 
c. North Korea uses diplomatic responses from abroad to support 
these strategies 
d. The arbitration of the IOC relations to the North Korean co-
hosting of the Games    
e. As a result, North Korea did not participate in the Seoul Games 
even though most of all communist nations participated including 
the USSR 
f. The only major Olympic nation not to participate in the Games 
was Cuba 
The 1984 Los Angeles Olympic 
Games 
The 1
st
 – 3
rd
 North and South Korean Sports 
Talks for Unified Team for the LA Olympic 
Games 
a. South Korea requested North Korea to from a unified team 
b. North Korea refused and boycott the Games with most of the 
communist states 
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The 1986 Seoul Asian Games    
a. North Korea emphasized the social and economic difficulties 
South Korea is experiencing 
b. North Korea announced that the Games were not successful 
1988-
1997 
The 1988 Seoul Olympic Games 
The 1
st
 – 4
th
 North and South Korean Sports 
Talks with IOC Arbitration for the Seoul Olympic 
Games 
a. North Korea published in Roh-Dong negative views on the Seoul 
Olympics Games from about 60 nations and foreign organisations  
b. Also International Media from 14 countries warn of the potential 
failure of the Seoul Olympics and these warnings are re-published 
Roh-Dong  
c. North Korea claims that about 200 foreign media, organisations 
and national government expressed their support for the co-
hosting of the Games between North and South (through Roh-
Dong)  
d. North and South Korean could not reach on the agreement for 
co-hosting and for organising a unified team for the 1988 Seoul 
Games 
The 1990 Beijing Asian Games 
The 1
st
 – 9
th
 North and South Korean Sports 
Talks Principal Meeting for Unified Team for the 
‘90 Beijing Asian Games 
a. North and South Korea both had interests to organise a unified 
team for the Beijing Asian Games 
b. Two Koreas Sports Talks showed progression in terms of 
deepening the discussions of practical matters such as the title of 
the team 
c. Even though a unified team for the 1990 Beijing Games could 
not in the end be organised, potential for the further discussion  
The 1991 U-20 Football 
Championships The 1st – 4th North and South Korean Sports 
Talks for Unified Team for the International 
Games 
a. North and South Korea agreed on participation in these sporting 
events as a unified team 
b. This unified team achieved better results than they expected 
The 1991 41st World Table Tennis 
Championships 
The 1992 Barcelona Olympic 
Games 
  a. Pastor Moon's visit to North Korea without permission of South 
Korean government and a North Korean Judo players defection to 
South Korea affected the Sports Talks and no positive result 
The 1994 Hiroshima Asian Games    
The 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games   
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ensured  
1998-
2007 
  Hyundai and North and South sport relations 
a. The Chairman of Hyundai Jung Ju Young played a major role in 
hosting 1988 Seoul Games, and he started to lead the South 
Korean private sector initiatives for practical interaction with North 
Korea using sport as a tool  
b. Hyundai provided the indoor stadium in Pyung Yang and had a 
regular friendly basketball match between the professional players 
of Hyundai and the North Korean national team 
The 2000 Sydney Olympic Games   
a. The First Joint March of North and South Korea for the opening 
ceremony of the Games 
The 2002 Busan Asian Games 
The 1
st
 – 2
nd
 Administrative Discussion for North 
Korean Participation to the Busan Asian Games 
a. The first occasion on which a North Korean team participated in 
Games in South Korea  
b. North Korea dispatched the 'cheer team' consisting of 'young 
beautiful North Korean ladies' 
The 2003 Daegu Summer 
Universiad  
The Administrative Discussion for the Daegu 
Summer Universiad 
a. The second North Korean team participated in the Games in 
South Korea  
b. North Korea again dispatched a cheer team of 'young North 
Korean women' 
The 2004 Athens Olympic Games 
The Administrative Discussion for the Athens 
Olympic Games Joint March 
a. The Second Joint March of North and South Korea for the 
opening ceremony of the Games 
The 2005 8.15 North and South 
Korean Unification Football Match 
The 1
st
 – 2
nd
 Administrative Discussion for the 
2005 8.15 North and South Korean ‘Unification 
Football Match’ 
a. 8.15 is the Korean Independent Day  
b. The game is specifically given the titled of the 'unification' match 
The 2006 Doha Asian Games 
The 1
st
 – 4
th
 North and South Korean Sports 
Talks for Unified Team of Two Koreas 
a. The OCA(Olympic council of Asia) recommended a unified team 
of North and South Korea for the Games 
b. North Korea did not confirm the agreement of organising a 
unified team, thus two Koreas  participated in the Games separately 
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7.4 Research Limitations and Future Research 
One might argue that data selection on which this analysis of discourse is based may tend to 
be imbalanced since North Korean governmental documents and state media resources 
were not as available as those of their South Korean counterparts. However, while this may 
well be the case to some degree, I remain conscious and explicit about my position as a 
South Korean researcher seeking to understand the way in which both sets of parties put 
together their perspective in the media sources some of which might be regarded as directly 
state controlled (Roh-Dong and South Korean record of the Sports Talks) and some of which 
may be less directly influenced by the perspective the state wishes to present (Dong-A and 
Hankyoreh) but which nevertheless have their own ideological leaning.  
 
A further challenge is represented by the fact of my reading materials in Korean while 
presenting the results of my discourse analysis in English. Translation requires the 
communication of both the ‘denotational’ meaning of a word while conveying its 
‘connotational’ meaning also and my translations seek to respect this requirement. Mine is 
therefore a particularly reflexive analysis of discursive construction. My analysis does not 
however limit itself solely to the discourse about North-South Korean sports relations per se, 
but also focuses on the ‘materialisation’ of those relations in actions and events (Jäger and 
Meyer 2009:56-60). A further dimension of the analysis to emphasise is that identified by 
Hewitt (2009) concerning the relationship between narrative, positions and identity reflected 
in the discourses, since sport and sporting nationalisms both reflect and construct national 
identities, an aspect which is crucial to understanding the attitudes of the various parties to 
North-South relations (Hewitt 2009:1-16).   
 
This thesis has sought to illustrate the nature of ‘sport diplomacy’ between North and South 
Korea with various interactions in the arena of international sport, mainly in the case of the 
international sporting events. Also, the particular nature of nationalism of Koreas in sport 
was identified as an ideological factor which is central to understanding the evolving nature 
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of relations between the two Koreas. It illustrates both the process of construction and the 
limits to construction of the position of the two sides. 
 
At the same time, there are new research questions which emerge to be explained by further 
research. Since North Korea is still a relatively closed and little known nation, there are 
inevitable limitations to our interpretation of the view of North Korea. To address this it would 
be useful for North Korean international sporting relations to be analysed through various 
additional sources such as North Korean dialogue with nations other than the South Korea  
such as China, Cuba, or the USSR, and with international organisations such as the IOC, in 
particular through sources such as IOC correspondence with the North and South (when this 
becomes available post-embargo). These sources remain closed, however, and we have 
sought to provide the best available analysis through the sources which are available, while 
recognising the limitations of the sources employed as data. Several accounts of how North 
and South Korea constructed their sporting relations were identified both shaping and 
shaped by the structures of international relations, domestic economic-political contexts, and 
the ideology of primordial nationalism traditionally prevalent in Korea.  
 
7.5 Conclusion  
This research has focused on the process of the social construction of North and South 
Korean sports relations in the period from 1978 to 2007 within key sources. We have tried to 
capture in this thesis the ‘reality’ of the sports relations of the two Koreas in a qualitative 
manner, by analysing the dispositive of the North and South relations (that is through 
discourse, non-discursive elements, and materialisations relating to the development of such 
relations (Jäger and Meyer 2009).  
 
Overall, the period from 1978 to 1987 was one dominated by the Cold War and the 
confrontation of North and South. The two domestic political regimes both refused to 
recognise the ‘other’ as a legitimate entity and both were thus occupied in presenting 
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themselves as the legitimate voice in discussions concerning sports relations as with other 
aspects of the politics of nationhood. The notion of nationalism in sporting interactions 
represented very different forms of self-recognition as a ‘Korean nation’ and the North and 
South in this early period each presented their own picture of a ‘developed Korean nation’. 
However, from 1988, consistent attempts to host international sporting events and 
competitions in the international sporting arena represented recognition of the importance of 
these events and reflected changes of attitude between North and South Korea in their 
attempts to separate sport and politics. Even though their efforts were insufficient to allow 
organisation of a ‘unified team’ of the two Koreas for any Olympics up to the time of writing, 
there were partial successes in terms of organising a unified team for the 1991 World Table 
Tennis Championships and the FIFA Youth Football Championships. 
 
Since 1998, it seems that ‘the joint march’ of the North and South in the Opening Ceremony 
of the Sydney Olympics has represented the limit of what was able to be achieved between 
the two states. Subsequently, various private sector actors from South Korea initiated 
projects to develop another route by which to maintain the sometimes stuttering momentum 
in interaction between the two Koreas. In this manner, sport became more ‘popular’ as a tool 
of ‘soft politics’ providing a domain within which talk about North and South Korean relations 
could take place. Discussions about sport and actions to promote sport, led to exchanges of 
material and of people, and for example the development of debate about using a North-
South rail connection for travel from South Korea to the Beijing Games. ‘Sport diplomacy’ 
was thus literally opening up peaceful channels of communication between the two Koreas 
but under conditions established by political and economic contexts.  
 
A major element of the argument we have developed is that sport relations on the Korean 
peninsula both reflect but also reinforce and sometimes even challenge the structures 
underpinning North-South relations, for example in the international relations of the Cold War 
period. In this sense the thesis evaluates the discursive construction of relations but also 
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acknowledges the impact of wider sporting and non-sporting structures, factors and events. 
It thus explores the discursive construction of international relations while reaffirming the 
limits to such discursive construction in the face of ‘real’ external events.  
 
South Korea’s hosting of the 1988 Olympics reflected the growing strength of its economy 
while at the same time North Korea’s economy began to decline in absolute and 
comparative terms. Indeed the cooperation of the North and South in terms of joint 
participation in the Busan Asian Games and the Daegu Universiad was only made possible 
by the South meeting the North’s costs. However this fact was kept secret to try to ensure 
that the North did not lose face by being seen to have to rely on the South’s ‘charity’.  
 
The significance of the advent of aid provided by private individuals to the North was that this 
was not understood as receiving aid from an external source, since this was simply 
philanthropy from one Korean to another. Thus the emergence in the post-military 
dictatorship era of a vibrant and, in places, powerful private sector in South Korea meant that 
private sector actors (not simply affluent industrialists but workers’ organisations for example) 
were able to engage with the North in providing not only sport aid but also subsequently food 
aid. Thus sport kept alive (or was kept alive as) a conduit for discussions between North and 
South at times when other forms of interaction had been stifled, but has also reflected and 
contributed to the nature of North-South relations and in this sense sport diplomacy has 
taken on a special and perhaps unique form in the Korean peninsula. 
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Dong-A (11, February, 2000). [Lounge] Chung Ju Young will be awarded honourable 
Doctoral degree from the Korean National Sport University / [라운지] 정주영씨, 
한국체대 체육학 명예박사 받는다. Dong-A Il Bo, Dong-A Il Bo: 34. 
  
Dong-A (11, January, 1980). Refusal of North and South Korean unified team for 
Olympics Games / 올림픽 남북 단일팀 거부. Dong-A Il Bo, Dong-A Il Bo: 1. 
  
Dong-A (12, April, 1986-2). North and South Korean dialogue is the key of relaxation 
of tension 'North Korean must response quickly ' / 남북대화는 긴장완화 열쇠 '북한은 
대응 빨리해야'. Dong-A Il Bo, Dong-A Il Bo: 1. 
  
Dong-A (12, January, 1987). Welfare policy positively proceed, support for less 
previleged / 복지시책 적극추진 소외계층 지원. Dong-A Il Bo, Dong-A Il Bo: 3. 
  
Dong-A (12, January, 1988). Stepstone for the development of relations between 
South Korea and USSR, Eastern Europe / 한국-소 동구 관계개선에 디딤돌. Dong-A 
Il Bo, Dong-A Il Bo: 5. 
  
Dong-A (12, January, 1989). Various Society (2) Northern breeze, free from fetters / 
다양한 사회 (2) 금단족쇄 풀리는 북한바람. Dong-A Il Bo, Dong-A Il Bo: 5. 
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Dong-A (12, October, 2002). 21 billion won, North Korean expenses for participation 
in Asian Games will be supported by fund for the North and South cooperations / 북 
아시아 경기 참가비 21억 남북기금서 지원. Dong-A Il Bo, Dong-A Il Bo: 2. 
  
Dong-A (13, January, 1989). World-Asia level Sport, North and South interactions 
possible / 세계- 아시아 주관대회만 체육부, 남북 체육교류 허용. Dong-A Il Bo: 13. 
  
Dong-A (13, June, 2000). North and South Korean Sport interactions - Not much 
pressure will help ongoing progress / 남북체육교류-부담적어 합의땐 급물살 탈 듯. 
Dong-A Il Bo, Dong-A Il Bo: 49. 
  
Dong-A (14, December, 2001). "North and South Korean Joint March in Winter 
Olympics of next year" / "내년 동계올림픽 남북 동시입장". Dong-A Il Bo, Dong-A Il 
Bo: 42. 
  
Dong-A (14, October, 1989). Will the unified team of the North and South be 
organised for Beijing Asian Games? / 북경 아시안게임 남북한 단일팀 이뤄질까. 
Dong-A Il Bo, Dong-A Il Bo: 10. 
  
Dong-A (14, September, 2000-1). Olympics - two key persons of an agreement for 
the North and South Korean Joint march / 올림픽-남북동시입장 전격합의 두 주역. 
Dong-A Il Bo, Dong-A Il Bo: 34. 
  
Dong-A (14, Septemberl, 2000-2). Olympics - North and South Korean athletes get 
along well at the place of exercise / 올림픽-남북선수들 훈련장서 잘 어울려. Dong-A 
Il Bo, Dong-A Il Bo: 34. 
  
Dong-A (15, August, 2000). Olympics, more fun if you know more about it - 'nice to 
meet you', the song will be sung together / 올림픽 알고보면 재미두배-함께 부를 
'반갑습니다'. Dong-A Il Bo, Dong-A Il Bo: 16. 
  
Dong-A (15, January, 2004). Kim Un Yong received an arress warrant - endless 
suspicion of scandals...finally fall /김운용 의원 체포영장/ 끝없는 비리 의혹...결국 
몰락. Dong-A Il Bo, Dong-A Il Bo: 8. 
  
Dong-A (15, July, 1987). IOC suggested to allocate additional match of women's 
volleyball for North Korea / IOC, 88 여자배구 북한 추가배정 제의. Dong-A Il Bo, 
Dong-A Il Bo: 9. 
  
Dong-A (15, July, 1989). 18th, notice to North Korea of absense for the North and 
South Korean Sport Talks / 18일 남북체육회담 북한측에 불참통보. Dong-A Il Bo, 
Dong-A Il Bo: 2. 
  
Dong-A (15, March, 2001-2). Balancing account of Minister Kim Han Gil's visiting 
North Korea - agreement on the pricipals...fail to documentation / 김한길 장관 
방북결산/원칙만 합의...문서화엔 실패. Dong-A Il Bo, Dong-A Il Bo: 4. 
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Dong-A (15, October, 2002-1). Busan Asiad - "large number of North Korean 
participation will become a stepstone of sport interactions"...interview of president 
KSA Lee Yeon Taek / 부산아시아드-"북 대규모 참가 체육교류에 주춧돌"...이연택 
체육회장 인터뷰. Dong-A Il Bo, Dong-A Il Bo: 50. 
  
Dong-A (15, October, 2002-2). Closing ceremony of Busan Asian Games - Chang 
Ung North Korean IOC member interview "hand in hand of the North and the South, 
strong cheering, big plesure" / 부산아시아경기 폐박-장웅 북한 IOC 위원 인터뷰 
"손잡은 남북 뜨거운 응원 큰 기쁨". Dong-A Il Bo, Dong-A Il Bo: 17. 
  
Dong-A (15, September, 1987-1). North Korean resists on the dispatching invitations 
for '88 Games, claims 'a breakdown of the North and South Sports Talks' / 88 초청장 
발송에 북한 반발 '남북체육회담등 결렬' 주장. Dong-A Il Bo, Dong-A Il Bo: 9. 
  
Dong-A (15, September, 1987-2). For 2 years avoidance of North for the North and 
South Korean Sports Talks / 남북체육회담 북한딴전 2년. Dong-A Il Bo, Dong-A Il Bo: 
9. 
  
Dong-A (15, September, 1998). ' Assets of '88 Games', using for 2002 - Special 
feature of Kim Yong Rae / '88의 자산' 2002년 위해 활용을-김용래 특별기고. Dong-
A Il Bo, Dong-A Il Bo: 7. 
  
Dong-A (16, August, 2004). Athens Olympics - unified the North and the South, 
unified Olympics / 아테네올림픽/하나된 남북, 하나된 올림픽-정해문 그리스 대사 
올림픽에 부쳐. Dong-A Il Bo, Dong-A Il Bo: 52. 
  
Dong-A (16, December, 1999). [Basketball] free ticket for North and South Korean 
unification basketball / [농구] 남북통일농구 공짜로 보세요. Dong-A Il Bo, Dong-A Il 
Bo: 1. 
  
Dong-A (16, June, 1988). Olympics - It must be succeed / 올림픽-이젠 잘 치르는 길 
뿐이다 Dong-A Il Bo, Dong-A Il Bo: 5. 
  
Dong-A (16, June, 2000). North and South Korean sport interactions-Football and 
Table Tennis has huge possibility of organising an unified team / 남북체육교류-축구, 
탁구 단일팀 구성 유력. Dong-A Il Bo, Dong-A Il Bo: 51. 
  
Dong-A (16, September, 1987-1). 'we invites you in the '88 Seoul Olympic' the 
invitation will dispatch tomorrow in Losanne / '88 서울 하계 올림피아드에 귀국을 
초청합니다' 초청장 내일 로잔서 발송식. Dong-A Il Bo, Dong-A Il Bo: 8. 
  
Dong-A (17, June, 2000). Chung Mong Jun, president of Korean football association, 
"Sharing matches between North and South Korea will be discussed with the North" / 
정몽준 축구협회장, "남북 분산개최 이달중 북과 협상". Dong-A Il Bo, Dong-A Il Bo: 
18. 
  
Dong-A (17, September, 1986). Disperse of the hope for peaceful settlement in 
Korean peninsular / 한반도 화해희망 무산시켜. Dong-A Il Bo, Dong-A Il Bo: 4. 
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Dong-A (17, September, 1988-1). Seoul OIympics will become an impetus for next 
year Pyung Yang Games / 서울올림픽, 내년평양대회 남북추진역할 할것. Dong-A Il 
Bo, Dong-A Il Bo: 7. 
  
Dong-A (17, September, 1988-2). Olympic special reporting team discussion-Seoul 
Olympics, Springboard to World / 올림픽 취재 기획단 좌담-서울올림픽은 세계로 
뻗은 도약대. Dong-A Il Bo, Dong-A Il Bo: 24. 
  
Dong-A (18, August, 2004). North Korean uniform was given by the South..."from the 
fund for North and South Korean cooperations" / 북 올림픽선수단복도 지원...정부 
"남북협력기금서 정산". Dong-A Il Bo, Dong-A Il Bo: 8. 
  
Dong-A (18, September, 1987). No more Sports Talks without arbitration of the IOC / 
IOC 중재없는 남북체육회담 안해. Dong-A Il Bo, Dong-A Il Bo: 9. 
  
Dong-A (18, September, 1990-1). [North and South Korean Joint cheer] will be 
realised in Beijing / [남북한 공동응원] 이뤄진다 (여기는 북경). Dong-A Il Bo, Dong-A 
Il Bo: 5. 
  
Dong-A (18, September, 1990-2). The 'digging  in' nature of Japanese media / 일 
언론의 파헤치기 근성 (기자의 눈). Dong-A Il Bo, Dong-A Il Bo: 3. 
  
Dong-A (19, August, 2003). Dae Gu Universiad D-2 "North must come..." waiting for 
North / 대구 유니버시아드 D-2  "북 와야 할텐데..." 아쉬운 달구벌. Dong-A Il Bo, 
Dong-A Il Bo: 51. 
  
Dong-A (19, February, 1988 ). Settle account the 5th Republic (6) Glory and Burden 
of Seoul Olympics / 결산 제 5공화국 (6) 영광과 짐 함께 가져온 서울 올림픽. Dong-A 
Il Bo, Dong-A Il Bo: 5. 
  
Dong-A (19, January, 1988). '88 will bring the 'spring of humanity' / 88 은 '인류의 봄' 
열것. Dong-A Il Bo, Dong-A Il Bo: 1. 
  
Dong-A (19, January, 1989). The opportunity of experience the North...Students 
must remove people's worry / 북의 실상체험 기회로...학생도 국민우려 씻어줘야. 
Dong-A Il Bo, Dong-A Il Bo: 3. 
  
Dong-A (19, June, 1981-2). Let's make an unified team of North and South Korean 
for '84 Olympics / 84년 올림픽 남북단일팀 만들자. Dong-A Il Bo, Dong-A Il Bo: 1. 
  
Dong-A (19, June, 1981-4). The meaning of suggesting the North and South Korean 
unified team - the realistic approach of national peaceful settlement / 남북한 단일팀 
구성제의의 의의-민족화해의 현실적 접근. Dong-A Il Bo, Dong-A Il Bo: 2. 
  
Dong-A (19, May, 1988). South Korean Women's Table Tennis defeat the North and 
reach to the 'top of the world', first time that the South and North become the first 
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and second of the Games / 한국여자탁구 북한꺾고 '세계정상' 남북한 국제대회 첫 
1,2위 석권. Dong-A Il Bo, Dong-A Il Bo: 10. 
  
Dong-A (19, September, 1990-3). North Korea officially suggested joint cheer for 
Beijing Asian Games, we(South) will accept this / 북, 공동응원 공식 제의, 북경 
아시아경기-우리측 받아들일 방침. Dong-A Il Bo, Dong-A Il Bo: 1. 
  
Dong-A (20, July, 1987). No progress in the 4th North and South Sports Talks / 4 차 
남북체육회담 진전없었다. Dong-A Il Bo, Dong-A Il Bo: 8. 
  
Dong-A (20, June, 1981). Unified team of the North and the South for Olympics / 
남북 올림픽 단일팀. Dong-A Il Bo, Dong-A Il Bo: 2. 
  
Dong-A (20, June, 1986). Change the system of the Olympic Organising Committee 
as private leads / 올림픽 조직위 민간주도로 바꾸라. Dong-A Il Bo, Dong-A Il Bo: 5. 
  
Dong-A (20, March, 1989). "There is a possibility of [unified team of North and South 
Korea] / [남북한 단일팀] 가능성 보인다." 5. 
  
Dong-A (20, October, 1989-2). Out suggestion for "the team title [One nation/Han Na 
Ra]" / 우리측 제의 "선수단 호칭 [한나라]로". Dong-A Il Bo, Dong-A Il Bo. 
  
Dong-A (20, September, 1986). North Korea will find fault with some matches' 
dispatching for '88 Games - UK The Times / 88 일부경기 배정되도 북한측서 
트집잡을듯 (영) 더 타임즈지. Dong-A Il Bo, Dong-A Il Bo: 1. 
  
Dong-A (20, September, 1988). Olympics as a place for reunion, Korean-Chinese 
visit homeland in rows / 만남의 올림픽 중국교포 모국방문 줄이어. Dong-A Il Bo, 
Dong-A Il Bo: 14. 
  
Dong-A (21, August, 1984-3). Full statement for the proposal of North  and South 
Korean economy interaction / 남북한 교역, 경제협력 제의부분 전문. Dong-A Il Bo, 
Dong-A Il Bo: 1. 
  
Dong-A (21, February,1989). Northern fever was put on break / 제동걸린 북방열기. 
Dong-A Il Bo, Dong-A Il Bo: 3. 
  
Dong-A (21, February, 1979-2). Will it be possibile to organise a unified team of the 
North and the South if we see the history from 1964.../ 1963 년 이래의 전례를 보면 
남북한 단일팀 가능할까... Dong-A Il Bo: 8. 
  
Dong-A (21, Feburary, 1979-1). North Korea, suggested a unified team for the Pyung 
Yang Table Tennis Championship / 북한, 평양탁구 남북단일팀 제의. Dong-A Il Bo: 1. 
  
Dong-A (21, July, 2000). Putin visited North Korea, "the peace of Korean Peninsual 
must be kept by the Korean" / 방북 푸틴 "한반도 평화 한민족이 다뤄야". Dong-A Il 
Bo, Dong-A Il Bo: 1. 
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Dong-A (21, March, 1991). [Same pot] of the North and South Korean players / 남북 
탁구선수의 [한솥밥](기자의눈). Dong-A Il Bo, Dong-A Il Bo: 5. 
  
Dong-A (21, May, 1988). Will the co-host of the Olympics is possible? / 올림픽 남북 
공동개최 가능한가. Dong-A Il Bo, Dong-A Il Bo: 3. 
  
Dong-A (21, November, 1987). The Eastern Europes' participation  of Olympics / 
동구권의 올림픽 참가. Dong-A Il Bo, Dong-A Il Bo: 2. 
  
Dong-A (21, October, 1989). It is dfficult to say whether a unified team will be 
realised / 단일팀 성사여부 불투명. Dong-A Il Bo, Dong-A Il Bo: 3. 
  
Dong-A (22, December, 1988-1). Proposal for organising unified team - Changed 
attitude of North Korea / 단일팀 제의 - 달라진 북의 몸짓. Dong-A Il Bo, Dong-A Il Bo: 
5. 
  
Dong-A (22, December, 1989-1). An agreement for organising unified team for the 
North and the South / 남북한 단일팀 구성 타결. Dong-A Il Bo, Dong-A Il Bo: 2. 
  
Dong-A (22, December, 1989-2). '90 Big Match' ready to compete / '90 
빅게임"출전준비 OK". Dong-A Il Bo, Dong-A Il Bo: 19. 
  
Dong-A (22, December, 1999). [Basketball] North Korean team is superior in 
physical strength / [농구] 북한농구 체력에선 한수 앞선듯. Dong- A Il Bo, Dong-A Il 
Bo: 1. 
  
Dong-A (22, January, 1982-2). A diary for organising unifed team of the North and 
the South / 남북한 단일팀구성 회담일지. Dong-A Il Bo, Dong-A Il Bo: 9. 
  
Dong-A (22, January, 1986). The key contents of Roh Tae Yoo's press conference / 
노태우 민정대표 회견내용 요지. Dong-A Il Bo, Dong-A Il Bo: 2. 
  
Dong-A (22, May, 1978). Sport and Society both divided as the North and the South / 
스포츠도 사회도 남북분리. Dong-A Il Bo. South Korea, Dong-A Il Bo: 8. 
  
Dong-A (22, November, 1982). Rookies who represents 'young Korea' / '젊은한국' 
과시한 무서운 신예들. Dong-A Il Bo, Dong-A Il Bo: 8. 
  
Dong-A (22, September, 1986). Made North Korea angry / 북한엔 분노 안겼다. 
Dong-A Il Bo, Dong-A Il Bo: 5. 
  
Dong-A (22, September, 1990). Worried for a cold state between North and South 
Korean mood / 남북 화해분위기 냉각 우려(여기는 북경). Dong-A Il Bo, Dong-A Il Bo: 
5. 
  
Dong-A (22, September, 2005). [At the Gwang Hwa Moon] in and outsdied of 'unified 
team' of the North and the South / [광화문에서] '남북단일팀' 겉과 속. Dong-A Il Bo, 
Dong-A Il Bo: 30. 
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Dong-A (23, December,1978). Chariman Kim T.S. expressed his will of retirement / 
김택수 회장 물러날 뜻 밝혀. Dong-A Il Bo, Dong-A Il Bo: 8. 
  
Dong-A (23, December, 1999-1). [the meanig of North Korean Basketball team's 
arrival to Seoul] positive sign of reconstruct between North and South Korean 
relations / [북농구단 서울도착 의미] 남북관계 개선 청신호. Dong-A Il Bo, Dong-A Il 
Bo: 3. 
  
Dong-A (23, June, 2001). "North Korea, considering the participation of Busan Asian 
Games" / "북, 부산아시아경기 참가검토". Dong-A Il Bo, Dong-A Il Bo: 2. 
  
Dong-A (23, March, 2001). Chung Ju Young passes awar - His stocks will 'help' for 
'consturction' / 정주영 별세-남긴주식 건설자구에 '일조'. Dong-A Il Bo, Dong-A Il Bo: 
3. 
  
Dong-A (23, November, 1987). North Korean request of boycott the '88 Games to 
Poland was refused by the Polish minister of foreign affair / 북한의 88 보이콧 요청 
폴란드 외상 거부. Dong-A Il Bo, Dong-A Il Bo: 2. 
  
Dong-A (23, November, 2006). "Asian Games opening and closing ceremony, North 
and South Korean Joint March" South, will accept the proposal of the North / 
"아시아경기 개폐회식 남북 공동입장" 정부, 북측제안 수락하기로. Dong-A Il Bo, 
Dong-A Il Bo: 27. 
  
Dong-A (23, September, 1990-3). The first North and South joint cheer, spread the 
Korean spirit - Arirang sound in Beijing / 남북한 첫 공동응원 한민족 위용 떨치다-
북경에 울린 아리랑 합창. Dong-A Il Bo, Dong-A Il Bo: 1. 
  
Dong-A (24, April, 2001). Same will of the North and the South in the World Table 
Tennis Championship, "it is ok to compete as separate team" / 세계탁구선수권 남북 
한마음 "따로 뛰면 어때". Dong-A Il Bo, Dong-A Il Bo: 41. 
  
Dong-A (24, December, 1999-2 ). [North and South Korean unificaton football match] 
Citizens are welcoming North players in carm / [남북통일농구대회] 시민들 
북한선수단 맞이 차분. Dong-A Il Bo, Dong-A Il Bo: 3. 
  
Dong-A (24, March, 2001). North Korean sent messengers of condolence / 북한 
정주영씨 조문단 파견...송호경 등 4명 24일 도착. Dong-A Il Bo, Dong-A Il Bo: 1. 
  
Dong-A (24, September, 1990-4). Excitement of North and South Korean 'reunion' 
since 45 years / "하나"된 남북한 45년만의 감동(여기는 북경). Dong-A Il Bo, Dong-A 
Il Bo: 5. 
  
Dong-A (24, September, 2002). Busan Asian Games D-5 - North Korean Players 
enter the athletes' villiage / 부산 아시아경기 D-5/ 
"환영합니다""반갑스네다"...북선수단 1진 선수촌 입촌. Dong-A Il Bo, Dong-A Il Bo: 
59. 
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Dong-A (25, April, 1979). Fraud of North Korea and International Table Tennis 
Associaton / 북한의 사기극과 국제탁련. Dong-A Il Bo, Dong-A Il Bo: 4. 
  
Dong-A (25, August, 1987-2). North Korea proposed for a new North and South 
Korean Sports Talks, IOC 'No plan to suggest one' / 북한 새 남북체육회담 제의 IOC 
'주선의사없다' 거부. Dong-A Il Bo, Dong-A Il Bo: 5. 
  
Dong-A (25, May, 1984). Another stop of North and South Korean Sports Talks / 
남북체육회담 또 중단. Dong-A Il Bo, Dong-A Il Bo: 1. 
  
Dong-A (25, September, 2002). Busan Asian Games D-4, Shooting and Gymnastic 
players of the North and the South have 'the pleasure of reunion' / 부산아시아게임 
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APPENDIX 
 
[Appendix-1] The List of Nations announced statement of against Seoul Olympics 
No. Nation or Organization Newspaper and Date 
1 Afghanistan Roh-Dong 10, May 1985 
2 Angola 
Roh-Dong 24, Oct. 1984-2 
Roh-Dong 10, Dec. 1984-1 
3 Austria Roh-Dong 4, June 1984-1 
4 Bangladesh 
Roh-Dong 4, Jan. 1985 
Roh-Dong 5, Jan. 1985-2 
Roh-Dong 22, Jan. 1985 
Roh-Dong 19, Feb. 1985 
5 Barbados Roh-Dong 13, Feb. 1985 
6 Belgium 
Roh-Dong 10, Dec. 1984-1 
Roh-Dong 10 Jan. 1985 
7 Bulgaria 
Roh-Dong 6, Dec. 1984-1 
Roh-Dong 29, Dec. 1984-2 
Roh-Dong 5, Jan. 1985-2 
8 Burundi Roh-Dong 10, Dec. 1984-1 
9 Canada New Korea Times Roh-Dong 17, Apr. 1985 
10 Cuba 
Roh-Dong 4, Dec. 1984-1 
Roh-Dong 13, Dec. 1984-2 
Roh-Dong 18, Dec. 1984 
Roh-Dong 12, July 1985-1 
Roh-Dong 29, July 1985 
11 Czechoslovakia 
Roh-Dong 27, Nov. 1984 
Roh-Dong 2, Dec. 1984 
Roh-Dong 6, Dec. 1984-1 
Roh-Dong 15, Dec. 1984 
Roh-Dong 31, Dec. 1984 
12 Egypt 
Roh-Dong 13, Nov. 1984 
Roh-Dong 15, Dec. 1984 
Roh-Dong 19, Dec. 1984 
13 France Roh-Dong 13, Dec. 1984-2 
14 Finland 
Roh-Dong 2, Nov. 1984-2 
Roh-Dong 6, Dec. 1984-1 
Roh-Dong 10, Dec. 1984-1 
Roh-Dong 15, Dec. 1984 
15 Ghana 
Roh-Dong 9, Sept. 1984 
Roh-Dong 18, Dec. 1984 
Roh-Dong 19, Mar. 1985 
16 Ghana newspaper Roh-Dong 7, June 1986-1 
17 Guiana Roh-Dong 10, Dec. 1984-1 
18 Hungary 
Roh-Dong 10, Nov. 1984-2 
Roh-Dong 7, Dec. 1984-2 
Roh-Dong 29, Dec. 1984-1 
Roh-Dong 3, Jan. 1985-2 
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19 India 
Roh-Dong 2, Nov. 1984-1 
Roh-Dong 12, Dec. 1984 
Roh-Dong 6, Jan. 1985-1 
Roh-Dong 29, July 1985 
20 Indonesia Roh-Dong 3, Jan. 1985-2 
21 Iran 
Roh-Dong 10, Dec. 1984-1 
Roh-Dong 13, Dec. 1984-2 
22 Italy 
Roh-Dong 11, Oct. 1984 
Roh-Dong 15, Oct. 1984  
Roh-Dong 18, Oct. 1984 
Roh-Dong 24, Oct. 1984-2 
Roh-Dong 30, Oct. 1984-3 
Roh-Dong 10, Dec. 1984-1 
Roh-Dong 15, Dec. 1984 
Roh-Dong 31, Dec. 1984 
23 Jamaica Roh-Dong 4, Jan. 1985 
24 Japan Roh-Dong 14, Dec. 1984-2 
25 Lebanon 
Roh-Dong 10, Dec. 1984-1 
Roh-Dong 4, Jan. 1985 
26 Lesotho Roh-Dong 14, Sept. 1984-2 
27 Libya Roh-Dong 12, Nov. 1984 
28 Madagascar 
Roh-Dong 4, June 1984-2 
Roh-Dong 11, Nov. 1984-3 
Roh-Dong 4, Dec. 1984-2 
Roh-Dong 15, Dec. 1984 
Roh-Dong 3, Jan. 1985-2 
Roh-Dong 4, Mar. 1985 
29 Malaysia Roh-Dong 18, Oct. 1984 
30 Mali Roh-Dong 17, Jan. 1985 
31 Mali-Cho Sun Friendship Association Roh-Dong 7, June 1986-1 
32 Mauritania Roh-Dong 17, Nov. 1984-2 
33 Mongolia 
Roh-Dong 31, Dec. 1984 
Roh-Dong 8, Jan. 1985 
34 Mozambique Roh-Dong 29, July 1985 
35 Nepal 
Roh-Dong 4, Sept. 1984-3 
Roh-Dong 6, Dec. 1984-1 
Roh-Dong 15, Dec. 1984 
Roh-Dong 21, Dec. 1984-3 
Roh-Dong 5, Jan. 1985-2 
Roh-Dong 6, Jan. 1985-2 
Roh-Dong 5, Apr. 1985 
36 Norwegian newspaper Roh-Dong 6, May 1982 
37 Nicaragua 
Roh-Dong 6, Dec. 1984-1 
Roh-Dong 31, Dec. 1984 
Roh-Dong 4, Jan. 1985 
38 Niger 
Roh-Dong 18, Dec. 1984 
Roh-Dong 4, Jan. 1985 
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39 Nigeria 
Roh-Dong 24, Oct. 1984-2 
Roh-Dong 4, Dec. 1984-2 
Roh-Dong 10, Dec. 1984-1 
Roh-Dong 4, Jan. 1985 
Roh-Dong 5, Jan. 1985-2 
40 Norway 
Roh-Dong 1, Dec. 1984-2 
Roh-Dong 6, Dec. 1984-2 
Roh-Dong 15, Dec. 1984 
41 NY Times Roh-Dong 6, Dec. 1984-1 
42 Pakistan 
Roh-Dong 5, Jan. 1985-2 
Roh-Dong 8, Jan. 1985 
43 Peru Roh-Dong 10, Dec. 1984-1 
44 Poland 
Roh-Dong 24, Nov. 1984-4 
Roh-Dong 15, Dec. 1984 
Roh-Dong 29, Dec. 1984-1 
Roh-Dong 31, Dec. 1984 
45 South Korean People Roh-Dong 9, June 1986-2 
46 Sweden 
Roh-Dong 18, Oct. 1984 
Roh-Dong 4, Dec. 1984-2 
Roh-Dong 10, Dec. 1984-1 
Roh-Dong 9, Jan. 1985 
Roh-Dong 13, Feb. 1985 
Roh-Dong 21, Feb. 1985-1 
Roh-Dong 5, Apr. 1985 
47 Swiss 
Roh-Dong 10, Dec. 1984-1 
Roh-Dong 13, Dec. 1984-2 
48 Syria 
Roh-Dong 25, Nov. 1984-2 
Roh-Dong 4, Dec. 1984-2 
Roh-Dong 10, Dec. 1984-1 
Roh-Dong 15, Dec. 1984 
Roh-Dong 19, Mar. 1985 
49 Tanzania 
Roh-Dong 30, Oct. 1984-3 
Roh-Dong 12, Nov. 1984 
Roh-Dong 4, Dec. 1984-2 
Roh-Dong 10, Dec. 1984-1 
Roh-Dong 13, Dec. 1984-2 
Roh-Dong 14, Dec. 1984-2 
Roh-Dong 15, Dec. 1984 
Roh-Dong 3, Jan. 1985-2 
Roh-Dong 7, May 1985 
50 The president of Bulgaria Sport Alliance Council Roh-Dong 10, June 1984-1 
51 Uganda 
Roh-Dong 12, Nov. 1984 
Roh-Dong 6, Jan. 1985-1 
52 UK 
Roh-Dong 4, Sept. 1984-3 
Roh-Dong 4, Dec. 1984-2 
Roh-Dong 15, Dec. 1984 
Roh-Dong 29, Dec. 1984-2 
Roh-Dong 22, Feb. 1985-1 
Roh-Dong 29, July 1985 
53 UK newspaper Roh-Dong 7, June 1986-1 
54 USA AP Roh-Dong 14, Dec. 1984-2 
55 USA Christian Science Monitor Roh-Dong 19, Mar. 1985 
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56 USA Daily News Roh-Dong 6, June 1986-2 
57 USSR 
Roh-Dong 4, June 1984-1 
Roh-Dong 4, Dec. 1984-2 
Roh-Dong 21, Dec. 1984-1 
58 Vietnam Roh-Dong 29, Dec. 1984-1 
59 Yemen 
Roh-Dong 9, Dec. 1984-2 
Roh-Dong 10 Jan. 1985 
60 Yugoslavia 
Roh-Dong 15, Oct. 1984 
Roh-Dong 2, Nov. 1984-2 
Roh-Dong 17, Nov. 1984-2 
Roh-Dong 1, Dec. 1984-1 
Roh-Dong 15, Dec. 1984 
Roh-Dong 31, Dec. 1984 
 
 
[Appendix-2] The List of the Media which warn of Seoul Olympics 
No. Nation or Organisation Newspaper and Date 
1 Danish newspaper Roh-Dong 28, June 1987-2 
2 Finnish newspaper Roh-Dong 24, June 1987 
3 France newspaper Roh-Dong 28, June 1987-2 
4 Korean-Canadian Newspaper Roh-Dong 21, July 1987-2 
5 LA Times Roh-Dong 24, June 1987-3 
6 Norway Broadcast Roh-Dong 24, June 1987 
7 NY Times Roh-Dong 24, June 1987-3 
8 South Korean English newspaper-Korea Times Roh-Dong 25, June 1987-2 
9 Speak man of the USSR Foreign Ministry Roh-Dong 27, June 1987 
10 Swiss Newspaper Roh-Dong 28, June 1987 
Roh-Dong 28, June 1987-2 
11 The USA NOC special secretary Roh-Dong 21, June 1987-2 
12 UK Times Roh-Dong 24, June 1987-3 
Roh-Dong 25, June 1987-3 
13 USA Broadcast Roh-Dong 24, June 1987-3 
14 Wall Street Journal Roh-Dong 24, June 1987-3 
 
 
[Appendix-3] The List of Nations which support for the Co-hosting of the Seoul Games  
No. Nation or Organization Newspaper and Date 
1 A Statement from general secretary of Venezuela Roh-Dong 22, July 1986-1 
2 Afghanistan Roh-Dong 16, June 1987 
3 Afghanistan Newspaper Roh-Dong 11, Feb. 1987 
4 Angola Newspaper Roh-Dong 19, July 1986-4 
5 Association of Support of Cho-Sun Unification and pro-
Cho Sun 
Roh-Dong 19, Dec. 1985 
 
 
 315 
6 Bangladesh Roh-Dong 31, Dec. 1985 
7 Bulgaria Roh-Dong 2, Feb. 1987-1 
8 Bulgaria Newspaper Roh-Dong 11, Feb. 1987 
9 Canada Communist Party Roh-Dong 18, June 1986-1 
10 Central Africa cites Cuba Roh-Dong 19, Mar. 1986-7 
11 Central Committee of Norway Communist Party Roh-Dong 24, Sept. 1985-2 
12 Central Committee of Swedish Communist Youth 
Alliance 
Roh-Dong 3, Oct. 1985 
13 Chair of the Commission of India for supporting the 
Unification of Cho-Sun 
Roh-Dong 3, Dec. 1985 
14 Chair of the Tanzania Parliament  Roh-Dong 9, Mar. 1986-3 
15 Chairman of Nicaragua Committee Roh-Dong 9, Feb. 1987 
16 Chairman of the Ethiopia temporary military executive 
board 
Roh-Dong 12, April 1986-1 
17 Chairman of the USSR Sport Association Roh-Dong 19, Mar. 1986-6 
18 Chilean Ju-Che Ideology research Centre in Sweden Roh-Dong 14, Sept. 1985 
19 China Roh-Dong 3, Aug. 1985-4 
20 China Newspaper and China Sport Newspaper Roh-Dong 9, Mar. 1986-6 
21 China NOC Roh-Dong 7, Mar. 1986-3 
22 China Shin Hwa Broadcast Roh-Dong 19, Jan. 1987-1 
23 China Sport newspaper Roh-Dong 7, Mar. 1986-3 
24 Citizen of Seoul Roh-Dong 12, May 1986 
25 Column of Poland newspaper  Roh-Dong 24, April 1986 
26 Committee member of Yugoslavia Sport Alliance, 
Director of India New deli Ju-Che ideology Research 
Centre 
Roh-Dong 31, May. 1986 
27 Congo Roh-Dong 21, April 1986 
28 Congo Newspaper Roh-Dong 26, Sept. 1985 
29 Costarica Committee for the against to South Korea 
Seoul Olympic 
Roh-Dong 9, July 1986-14-4 
30 Cuba Roh-Dong 31, July 1985 
Roh-Dong 1, Aug. 1985-2 
Roh-Dong 3, Aug. 1985-1 
Roh-Dong 3, Aug. 1985-2 
Roh-Dong 5, Aug. 1985 
Roh-Dong 31, Aug. 1985-3 
31 Cuba Communist Centered Association Roh-Dong 11, Mar. 1986-1 
32 Cuba Communist Party Roh-Dong 21, April 1986 
33 Cuba in the Meeting for the Non-Block Associated 
Countries’ Foreign Minister 
Roh-Dong 7, Sept. 1985-2 
34 Cuba Labour Association Leader Roh-Dong 29 May 1987 
35 Cuba Leader Roh-Dong 24, Oct. 1985 
36 Cuba Minister Roh-Dong 3, May 1986 
37 Cuba newspaper cites Hungary Budapest New 
Company 
Roh-Dong 15, Sept. 1985 
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38 Cuba Newspaper Roh-Dong 5, Oct. 1985 
Roh-Dong 30, April 1986-2 
39 Cuba Newspaper and Broadcast Company Roh-Dong 17, Oct. 1985 
40 Czechoslovakia Roh-Dong 23, Aug. 1985 
Roh-Dong 2, Feb. 1987-1 
41 Czechoslovakia NOC Roh-Dong 1, July 1987 
42 Czechoslovakia news company Roh-Dong 30, Sept. 1985-2 
43 Czechoslovakia Newspaper Roh-Dong 13, June 1986-2 
Roh-Dong 9, July 1986-14-1 
44 Director of the Ethiopia National Olympic Committee Roh-Dong 26, April 1986-2 
45 Director of the International Boxing Association Roh-Dong 23, Mar. 1986 
46 Director of the North Europe Association for North Korea 
cooperation 
Roh-Dong 17, July 1987-2 
47 Dominica Newspaper Roh-Dong 19, Mar. 1986-7 
48 East Germany Roh-Dong 2, Feb. 1987-1 
49 Editor of the Egypt Newspaper Roh-Dong 21, May 1986 
50 Egypt Roh-Dong 27, Aug. 1985-1 
51 Egypt Newspaper Roh-Dong 31, Dec. 1985 
Roh-Dong 11, Mar. 1986-1 
52   
53 Ethiopia Minister Roh-Dong 3, May 1986 
54 Ethiopia Roh-Dong 10, May 1986 
55 Ethiopia Newspaper  Roh-Dong 7, Jan. 1986-1 
Roh-Dong 11, Aug 1986-2 
56 Execution Committee of Luxemburg Communist Party Roh-Dong 20, Sept. 1985 
57 Finnish Alliance Committee for Cho Sun Unification and 
Finnish Cho Sun Association send a letter to Finnish 
Olympic Committee 
Roh-Dong 31, Oct. 1985 
58 Finnish Newspaper Roh-Dong 24, Feb. 1987 
Roh-Dong 7, Oct. 1985-2 
Roh-Dong 11, Mar. 1986-1 
59 France Roh-Dong 1, Aug. 1985-2 
Roh-Dong 3, Sept. 1985-1 
60 French Council for supporting Koryo Democratic 
Federation Republic 
Roh-Dong 6, Sept. 1985-2 
61 General Secretary of Austria Congress Roh-Dong 31, Jan. 1987-1 
62 General Secretary of West Southern African People’s 
Organisation 
Roh-Dong 11, June 1987 
63 Ghana Roh-Dong 16, June 1987 
64 Ghana Acramin Democratic Youth Alliance Roh-Dong 10, May 1986 
65 Ghana Alliance Committee Roh-Dong 26, May 1986 
66 Ghana Africa Youth Leader group Roh-Dong 29, May 1986-2 
67 Ghana Friendly Association Roh-Dong 12, May 1986 
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68 Ghana Newspaper Roh-Dong 26, Sept. 1985 
Roh-Dong 24, Oct. 1985 
Roh-Dong 11, Mar. 1986-1 
Roh-Dong 10, May 1986 
Roh-Dong 21, May 1986 
Roh-Dong 19, July 1986-4 
Roh-Dong 4, Aug 1986-2 
69 Gienea Football Team boycott Roh-Dong 14, July 1987 
70 Ginne Newspaper Roh-Dong 15, Mar. 1986 
71 Greece Roh-Dong 3, Aug. 1985-3 
72 Guinea Roh-Dong 16, June 1987 
73 Hungary Roh-Dong 12, Aug. 1985-2 
Roh-Dong 2, Feb. 1987-1 
74 India Roh-Dong 28, Aug. 1985-2 
75 India Broadcast company Roh-Dong 19, Mar. 1986-7 
Roh-Dong 24, April 1986 
76 India Committee Roh-Dong 15, Mar. 1987 
Roh-Dong 24, Mar. 1987 
77 India Communist Party Roh-Dong 7, May 1986-2 
Roh-Dong 1, Mar. 1987 
78 India Congressman Roh-Dong 14, June 1986 
Roh-Dong 13, Jan. 1987 
Roh-Dong 31, Jan. 1987-2-3 
79 India Newspaper Roh-Dong 21, Sept. 1985 
Roh-Dong 28, Oct. 1985 
Roh-Dong 13, April 1986 
Roh-Dong 3, May 1986 
Roh-Dong 21, May 1986 
Roh-Dong 4, Aug 1986-2 
Roh-Dong 11, Feb. 1987 
Roh-Dong 24, Feb. 1987 
80 India Radio Broadcasting and Newspaper Roh-Dong 2, Aug. 1985-1 
81 India Study group Roh-Dong 16, May 1986 
82 IOC Media committee member Roh-Dong 6, Sept. 1985-2 
83 Iran newspaper Roh-Dong 24, Oct. 1985 
Roh-Dong 13, July 1986-1 
84 Ireland Roh-Dong 30, Aug. 1985-2 
85 Italy Roh-Dong 31, July 1985 
86 Italy Committee Roh-Dong 21, July 1987 
87 Jamaica Newspaper Roh-Dong 11, Mar. 1986-1 
88 Japan Roh-Dong 1, Aug. 1985-2 
Roh-Dong 7, Aug. 1985-2 
89 Japan Kodo Broadcasting Roh-Dong 2, Aug. 1985-1 
90 Jordan Roh-Dong 5, Aug. 1985 
Roh-Dong 19, Mar. 1986-7 
91 Ju-Che Ideology Research Centre of Finnish Committee Roh-Dong 16, Sept. 1985 
92 Korean Japanese in Japan Roh-Dong 17, Mar. 1986-2 
93 Kuwait Roh-Dong 23, Aug. 1985 
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94 Kuwait Newspaper Roh-Dong 11, Mar. 1986-1 
95 Laos NOC Committee Roh-Dong 31, Jan. 1987-2 
96 Latin America Caribbean Committee Roh-Dong 11, Aug 1986-2 
97 Leader of the Jordan Peace and Unity Committee Roh-Dong 19, May 1986-2 
98 Lebanon Newspaper Roh-Dong 13, July 1986-1 
Roh-Dong 4, Aug 1986-2 
99 Luxemburg Roh-Dong 25, Aug. 1985 
100 Madagascar Roh-Dong 20, Aug. 1985-1 
Roh-Dong 2, Sept. 1985-3 
Roh-Dong 8, Dec. 1985 
Roh-Dong 19, Mar. 1986-7 
101 Madagascar Antta Broadcast Roh-Dong 4, June 1986-4 
102 Madagascar Broadcast Roh-Dong 24, April 1986 
103 Madagascar Newspaper Roh-Dong 21, May 1986 
Roh-Dong 10, Mar. 1986-3 
Roh-Dong 10, May 1986 
104 Madagascar People and Youth Roh-Dong 30, April 1986-2 
105 Mali Committee of Cho-Sun Peaceful Unification 
Supporters 
Roh-Dong 26, May 1986 
106 Mauritius Labour Party Roh-Dong 11, Aug 1986-2 
107 Mayor of India New Deli Roh-Dong 3, Jan. 1987 
108 Minister of Culture in Lesotho Roh-Dong 14, Dec. 1985-1 
109 Minister of Cultural and Sport of Tanzania Roh-Dong 22, Feb. 1987 
110 Minister of Sport meeting-Cuba Roh-Dong 2, Feb. 1987-1 
111 Minister of Sport in Guinea Roh-Dong 2, Aug 1986-1 
112 Minister of Sport in Vietnam Roh-Dong 24, April 1986 
113 Modeling Division in the Association of for better 
relations of the Austria and Cho Sun Democratic 
People’s Republic 
Roh-Dong 12, Sept. 1985-5 
114 Mongolia Roh-Dong 7, Aug. 1985-1 
Roh-Dong 2, Feb. 1987-1 
115 Mongolia Newspaper Roh-Dong 26, Sept. 1985 
Roh-Dong 16, May 1986 
Roh-Dong 4, June 1986-4 
116 Mozambique Liberation Central Committee Roh-Dong 24, May 1986-1 
117 National Represented of South African in Algeria Roh-Dong 21, April 1986 
118 Nepal Newspaper Roh-Dong 31, Dec. 1985 
Roh-Dong 13, April 1986 
119 Nepal Peace Committee Roh-Dong 4, June 1987 
120 Nicaragua Roh-Dong 5, Aug. 1985 
121 Nicaragua Boycott Roh-Dong 23, May 1987 
122 Nicaragua Newspaper Roh-Dong 19, Mar. 1986-7 
Roh-Dong 21, May 1986 
123 North Europe-Cho Sun Friendly Association Roh-Dong 18, June 1986-3 
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124 Norway Newspaper Roh-Dong 9, Nov. 1985 
Roh-Dong 19, Mar. 1986-7 
Roh-Dong 3, May 1986 
Roh-Dong 13, July 1986-1 
Roh-Dong 4, Aug 1986-2 
Roh-Dong 9, Jan. 1987 
125 Pakistan Magazine Roh-Dong 11, Nov. 1985 
126 Pakistan Newspaper Roh-Dong 13, Sept. 1985-5 
Roh-Dong 13, Oct. 1985-4 
Roh-Dong 11, Mar. 1986-1 
Roh-Dong 9, Jan. 1987 
Roh-Dong 19, Jan. 1987-2 
127 Poland Roh-Dong 12, Aug. 1985-2 
Roh-Dong 23, Aug. 1985 
128 Polish Government Publication Spokesman Roh-Dong 21, May 1986 
129 Poland Newspaper Roh-Dong 7, Oct. 1985-1 
Roh-Dong 3, May 1986 
Roh-Dong 15, June 1986-1 
130 Poland Radio Broadcast Roh-Dong 2, Oct. 1985 
131 Poland TV program Roh-Dong 26, Sept. 1985 
132 Portugal newspaper Roh-Dong 9, Nov. 1985 
Roh-Dong 9, July 1986-14-2 
133 President of Ethiopia NOC Roh-Dong 21, Dec. 1985-1 
Roh-Dong 4, April 1987-4 
134 President of Japan NOC Roh-Dong 2, April 1986-2 
135 President of Madagascar Roh-Dong 30, April 1987 
136 President of Laos NOC Roh-Dong 15, June 1986-1 
137 President of Stockholm division in the Sweden-Cho Sun 
Friendly Association 
Roh-Dong 10, Sept. 1985 
138 President of the Benin Roh-Dong 27, April 1986 
139 President of the Mongolia NOC Roh-Dong 14, Feb. 1987 
140 President of the USSR NOC Roh-Dong 6, May 1986-2 
141 President of the West Germany NOC Roh-Dong 11, Mar. 1986-1 
142 Prime Minister of Malta Roh-Dong 30, April 1986-1 
143 Representative of Burkina Faso for congress in North 
Korea 
Roh-Dong 9, July 1986-9 
144 Representative of Ghana for congress in North Korea Roh-Dong 9, July 1986-8 
145 Representative of Malta for congress in North Korea Roh-Dong 9, July 1986-7 
146 Representative of South African National Council Roh-Dong 5, Sept. 1985-2 
147 Romania Roh-Dong 12, Aug. 1985-2 
148 Senegal Newspaper Roh-Dong 11, Mar. 1986-1 
149 Shin Hwa News Company Broadcasts the letter from the 
president China NOC to the IOC 
Roh-Dong 24, Sept. 1985-1 
150 Spanish Newspaper Roh-Dong 13, July 1986-1 
151 Students of Seoul National University Roh-Dong 9, Mar. 1986-2 
152 Sudan Roh-Dong 19, Mar. 1986-7 
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153 Sweden Roh-Dong 24, Aug. 1985 
Roh-Dong 28, Aug. 1985-2 
Roh-Dong 31, Aug. 1985-3 
154 Sweden Newspaper Roh-Dong 13, Oct. 1985-4 
Roh-Dong 11, Mar. 1986-1 
Roh-Dong 15, Mar. 1986 
Roh-Dong 10, May 1986 
155 Swiss Roh-Dong 23, Aug. 1985 
156 Swiss Newspaper Roh-Dong 7, Oct. 1985-2 
157 Swiss Peace Movement Roh-Dong 4, Sept. 1985-3 
158 Swiss Progressive Organisation Roh-Dong 18, June 1986-3 
159 Swiss Teset Committee Roh-Dong 4, June 1986-4 
160 Syria Newspaper Roh-Dong 31, Jan. 1987-2-4 
Roh-Dong 7, Feb. 1987 
Roh-Dong 18, July 1987 
Roh-Dong 1, Sept. 1987-2 
161 Syria NOC Roh-Dong 14, Oct. 1985-2 
Roh-Dong 15, Oct. 1985-2 
162 Tanzania Broadcast Roh-Dong 19, May 1986-2 
Roh-Dong 4, June 1986-4 
Roh-Dong 21, May 1987 
163 Tanzania Newspaper Roh-Dong 9, Nov. 1985 
Roh-Dong 31, Jan. 1987-2-4 
164 Thailand newspaper Roh-Dong 13, July 1986-1 
Roh-Dong 7, Feb. 1987 
Roh-Dong 15, May 1987 
Roh-Dong 21, May 1987 
165 The Director of the Kim Il Sung’s Ju Che Research 
Centre in Sweden 
Roh-Dong 15, Nov. 1985 
166 The Director of Tanzania South Africa National Group Roh-Dong 19, May 1986-2 
167 The Friendly Council of the People’s Republic of 
Bangladesh and Cho Sun 
Roh-Dong 11, Sept. 1985-2 
168 The Leader of the German Democratic People’s 
Republic NOC 
Roh-Dong 19, Mar. 1986-6 
169 The Letter from Austria International Progressive 
Organization to the IOC 
Roh-Dong 14, Dec. 1985-2 
170 The Letter from the chair of the Association of Norway-
Cho Sun friendship to the IOC 
Roh-Dong 9, Mar. 1986-5 
171 The Mali council of the support group for peaceful 
unification of Cho Sun 
Roh-Dong 11, Sept. 1985-1 
172 The President of Burkina Paso Roh-Dong 13, May 1986 
173 The President of Mongolia NOC Roh-Dong 7, Mar. 1986-4 
174 The President of the Czechoslovakia NOC Roh-Dong 16, Sept. 1986-4 
175 The President of USSR NOC Roh-Dong 2, Oct. 1986-1 
176 The Professor of Graz University in Austria Roh-Dong 10, Sept. 1985 
177 Tunisia Roh-Dong 23, Aug. 1985 
178 Tunisia Newspaper Roh-Dong 10, May 1986 
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179 Uganda Newspaper Roh-Dong 24, Oct. 1985 
Roh-Dong 7, Feb. 1987 
Roh-Dong 24, Feb. 1987 
180 UK Roh-Dong 28, Aug. 1985-2 
181 UK Newspaper Roh-Dong 11, Feb. 1987 
182 The USA AP Roh-Dong 1, Aug. 1985-2 
183 The USA NOC Roh-Dong 23, Mar. 1986 
184 The USA UPI Roh-Dong 2, Aug. 1985-1 
185 The USSR Roh-Dong 12, Aug. 1985-1 
Roh-Dong 2, Feb. 1987-1 
186 The USSR Broadcast Roh-Dong 22 July 1986-1 
187 The USSR Newspaper Roh-Dong 22, Mar. 1986-1 
188 The USSR NOC Roh-Dong 4, June 1986-2 
189 The USSR TAS Broadcast Roh-Dong 26, Oct. 1987 
190 Venezuela Roh-Dong 4, Aug. 1985-2 
191 Vice president of the sport federation of Yugoslavia Roh-Dong 9, Mar. 1986-4 
192 Vice chairman of the Youth Organisation in Jamaica 
People’s Nation Party 
Roh-Dong 10, Mar. 1986-2 
193 Vice President of the Bulgaria NOC Roh-Dong 31, Mar. 1986-1 
194 Vietnam Roh-Dong 2, Feb. 1987-1 
195 Yemen Roh-Dong 31, Dec. 1985 
Roh-Dong 10, May 1986 
196 Yemen Broadcast Roh-Dong 9, July 1986-14-3 
Roh-Dong 17, June 1987-2 
197 Yemen Cho-Sun Friendly Association Roh-Dong 29, May 1986-2 
198 Yugoslavia Roh-Dong 7, Aug. 1985-1 
Roh-Dong 12, Aug. 1985-2 
199 Yugoslavia Newspaper Roh-Dong 10, Mar. 1986-3 
Roh-Dong 20, June 1986 
Roh-Dong 18, July 1987 
200 Yugoslavia Foreign Affair Speak man Roh-Dong 24, May 1986-2 
201 Youth Federation for India Roh-Dong 17, Mar. 1986-2 
202 Youth in Madagascar Roh-Dong 15, Mar. 1986 
203 Zambia Boycott Roh-Dong 21, May 1987 
204 Zimbabwe Newspaper Roh-Dong 19, July 1986-4 
 
 
